feat(admin): local-only stdio MCP server to mint scoped service-account tokens (dispatch#67)
dispatch#67 fix #2 needed a read-only CI credential and hit a hard wall: Gitea's own token-creation and admin-user endpoints reject token auth outright -- POST /users/{u}/tokens returns 'auth required', POST /admin/users returns 'token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:admin]' -- for ANY existing token, by design. An existing token cannot mint another token or create an account; the only way through either endpoint is real basic auth as an actual site admin. That is exactly what a sandboxed agent session cannot safely hold. internal/adminbootstrap: the core bootstrap, HTTP-only, fully testable against a fake transport (5 tests, no network). Given real admin username/password, it creates the target account (or resets its password if it already exists -- deliberately unconditional, gated behind a required ConfirmServiceAccount flag since that reset is only safe for a dedicated bot account), mints it a scoped token by authenticating AS that account (Gitea requires this specifically -- an admin cannot mint on another account's behalf), grants it read-only collaborator access on named repos, and stores the result via a SecretStore -- never returning the token or either password to the caller. internal/localtools: the MCP tool wrapper (mint_service_account_token) and the real op-CLI-backed SecretStore (token passed via stdin, never argv, per the estate's own secret-handling rule). Deliberately its OWN package, not internal/tools -- this capability is far too dangerous to risk it ever being wired into RegisterAll and reachable from the shared HTTP gitea-mcp server, even behind OIDC. internal/mcp/stdio.go: a stdio JSON-RPC transport (one message per line, standard MCP stdio framing) for the existing registry.Tool interface -- the only transport gitea-mcp had before this was HTTP (server.go), which a sandboxed session can reach but a real admin password never should be piped through. cmd/gitea-admin-mcp: the binary. Meant to be spawned by a LOCAL Claude Code session (.mcp.json stdio server) or run by hand, via 'op run --env-file ~/.op-env' so admin credentials arrive just-in-time and never touch a sandboxed session. 11 new tests total, all passing under -race. Nothing in cmd/gitea-mcp (the shared HTTP server) changed.
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package localtools_test
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"testing"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/localtools"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// This tool lives in its own package, never internal/tools, on purpose: it
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// resets whatever password its target account has, which is far too
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// dangerous a capability to risk it ever being wired into RegisterAll and
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// exposed on the shared HTTP gitea-mcp server. Only cmd/gitea-admin-mcp (a
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// separate, local-only, stdio binary) imports this package.
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type fakeBootstrapper struct {
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gotReq adminbootstrap.Request
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result adminbootstrap.Result
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err error
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}
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func (f *fakeBootstrapper) Run(_ context.Context, req adminbootstrap.Request) (adminbootstrap.Result, error) {
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f.gotReq = req
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return f.result, f.err
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}
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func TestMintServiceAccountToken_ParsesArgsAndCallsBootstrapper(t *testing.T) {
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fb := &fakeBootstrapper{result: adminbootstrap.Result{
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Username: "dispatch-bot", Created: true,
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SecretRef: "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/token",
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}}
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tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
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args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
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"username": "dispatch-bot",
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"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
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"scopes": []string{"read:repository", "read:issue"},
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"token_name": "dispatch-ci-readonly",
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"secret_name": "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
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"grant_read_repos": []string{"mathias/cobalt-dingo"},
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"confirm_service_account": true,
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})
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out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Equal(t, "dispatch-bot", fb.gotReq.Username)
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assert.Equal(t, []string{"read:repository", "read:issue"}, fb.gotReq.Scopes)
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assert.Equal(t, true, fb.gotReq.ConfirmServiceAccount)
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require.Equal(t, []adminbootstrap.RepoRef{{Owner: "mathias", Name: "cobalt-dingo"}}, fb.gotReq.GrantReadRepos)
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var result map[string]any
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(out, &result))
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assert.Equal(t, "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/token", result["SecretRef"])
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// The tool's own output must never carry a raw token or password field --
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// adminbootstrap.Result structurally can't (it has none), which this pins.
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_, hasToken := result["Token"]
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_, hasPassword := result["Password"]
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assert.False(t, hasToken)
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assert.False(t, hasPassword)
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}
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func TestMintServiceAccountToken_RejectsMalformedRepoRef(t *testing.T) {
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fb := &fakeBootstrapper{}
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tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
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args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
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"username": "dispatch-bot",
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"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
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"scopes": []string{"read:repository"},
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"token_name": "x",
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"secret_name": "x",
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"grant_read_repos": []string{"not-owner-slash-repo"},
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"confirm_service_account": true,
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})
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_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "owner/repo")
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}
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func TestMintServiceAccountToken_PropagatesBootstrapperError(t *testing.T) {
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fb := &fakeBootstrapper{err: assert.AnError}
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tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
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args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
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"username": "dispatch-bot",
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"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
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"scopes": []string{"read:repository"},
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"token_name": "x",
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"secret_name": "x",
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"confirm_service_account": true,
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})
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_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
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require.Error(t, err)
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}
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func TestMintServiceAccountToken_Descriptor(t *testing.T) {
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tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(&fakeBootstrapper{})
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d := tool.Descriptor()
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assert.Equal(t, "mint_service_account_token", d.Name)
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assert.NotEmpty(t, d.Description)
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}
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