feat(create_project): dispatch_allow also registers the repo into dispatch's allowlist (#54)

Extends the existing dispatch_allow flag (which already injects .dispatch-allow,
#43/#51/#53) to also append owner/name to mathias/dispatch's git-tracked
dispatch-repos.txt (dispatch#19) — the second of the two required dispatch
gates. Being listed there is necessary but not sufficient on its own (the repo
still needs its own .dispatch-allow marker) — both are applied independently,
neither implies the other, matching dispatch#3's structural trust-zone design
where both must say yes.

Idempotent: a repo already listed (e.g. dispatch_allow re-requested on resume)
is a no-op, not a duplicate line. Failure is reported in its own
dispatch_allowlist_failure field, distinct from partial_failure (substitution)
and dispatch_allow_failure (the marker file) — the three gates can each fail
independently, never conflated (same principle as #51).

The allowlist owner/repo/path/branch are hardcoded to match mathias/dispatch's
own DISPATCH_ALLOWLIST_* env defaults, confirmed unoverridden in the live
CronJob (2026-07-06) before implementing.

Tests: fresh registration (existing entries preserved, not clobbered),
already-listed no-op (zero writes), allowlist-write failure as a distinct
field, dispatch_allow=false never touches the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

HOW_GITEA_MCP_WORKS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+# How gitea-mcp works
+
+`gitea-mcp` is a custom **MCP (Model Context Protocol) front door for Gitea** — a
+small Go HTTP service that exposes ~60 Gitea operations as MCP tools over
+Streamable HTTP, so a claude.ai connector (or any MCP client) can drive the
+homelab's Gitea (`https://git.d-ma.be`) with proper auth, an owner allowlist,
+caller attribution, and defensive input handling.
+
+It is **not** a generic Gitea proxy. It is an opinionated, allowlisted, single-
+tenant front door built on the shared **`mcp-chassis`** auth library.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Request lifecycle
+
+Everything is wired in `cmd/gitea-mcp/main.go` on a plain `http.ServeMux`:
+
+```
+POST /mcp
+  → OriginAllowlist        (internal/mcp/origin.go)     browser Origin gate
+  → BearerMiddleware       (mcp-chassis auth)           authN: static token OR JWT
+  → CallerMiddleware       (internal/auth/caller.go)    extract caller identity
+  → MCP server             (internal/mcp/server.go)     JSON-RPC dispatch → tools
+
+GET  /healthz                                            unauthenticated health JSON
+GET  /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource               RFC 9728 metadata (when Dex set)
+```
+
+The middleware order is deliberate: Origin first (cheap reject), then authN,
+then identity extraction, then the MCP handler. A tool call is a JSON-RPC
+`tools/call` that the registry dispatches to a `Tool` handler.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Authentication (`mcp-chassis` `BearerMiddleware`)
+
+`Authorization: Bearer <token>` is checked with this precedence (`auth/bearer.go`
+in `mcp-chassis`):
+
+1. **Static bearer** — constant-time compare against `GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN`.
+   Wins immediately, never emits a `WWW-Authenticate` challenge. This is the
+   service-to-service path (repo `.mcp.json` files carrying `GITEA_MCP_TOKEN`).
+2. **JWT validation** — against a **list of trusted OIDC issuers**
+   (`NewMultiJWTValidator`, ADR-0011):
+   - **Authentik** (`DEX_ISSUER_URL` + `MCP_AUDIENCE=claude-ai`) — the claude.ai
+     web connector after its OAuth handshake.
+   - **k3s cluster OIDC** (`K8S_ISSUER_URL` + `K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE=gitea-mcp`) — lets
+     in-cluster pods authenticate with audience-bound projected **ServiceAccount
+     tokens** instead of a static bearer. The k8s issuer is additive and
+     best-effort: if the in-cluster OIDC can't be reached at startup it is
+     dropped so Authentik auth is never taken down (see `cmd/gitea-mcp/main.go`
+     and `cmd/gitea-mcp/k8soidc.go`).
+3. Otherwise **401**. If `MCP_RESOURCE_URL` + `DEX_ISSUER_URL` are set, the 401
+   carries a `WWW-Authenticate: … resource_metadata=…` header (RFC 9728) so
+   claude.ai's OAuth discovery can find `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`.
+
+A JWKS/issuer outage yields **503** (`ErrUnavailable`), distinct from a
+present-but-invalid token's **401**, so a transient IdP blip is retried rather
+than treated as a hard auth failure.
+
+### The k8s SA-token wrinkle (ADR-0011)
+
+k3s serves its OIDC discovery/JWKS over the **cluster CA** and requires an
+**authenticated** request (anonymous → 401). So `k8sOIDCClient()` builds an HTTP
+client that trusts `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt` and
+carries the pod's own SA bearer, passed to the chassis via
+`IssuerConfig.HTTPClient`. Proven live: a real `aud=gitea-mcp` SA token → the
+running server → HTTP 200.
+
+### Origin allowlist
+
+`OriginAllowlist` (`internal/mcp/origin.go`) rejects any request whose `Origin`
+header is not in `GITEA_MCP_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST` (`https://claude.ai`,
+`https://api.anthropic.com`). An **empty** Origin (server-side callers) is
+allowed — Origin is a browser-only header.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Authorization, identity & attribution
+
+- **Owner allowlist** (`internal/allowlist`) — tools only operate on owners in
+  `GITEA_MCP_ALLOWED_OWNERS` (default `mathias`). A call for any other owner is
+  rejected before it reaches Gitea.
+- **Caller identity** (`internal/auth/caller.go`) — the authenticated username is
+  read from reverse-proxy identity headers, `X-Auth-Request-User` (the verified
+  OIDC identity, authoritative) preferred over `X-Forwarded-User`. Conflicts are
+  logged, not silently resolved.
+- **Identity footer** (`internal/identity/footer.go`) — mutating tools that write
+  a body (issue/PR comments, creates) append
+  `_Created via git-mcp on behalf of @<caller>_`, so actions taken through the
+  front door are attributable even though all upstream calls use one service PAT.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Upstream Gitea access
+
+`internal/gitea/Client` is a thin REST client over `GITEA_BASE_URL`
+(`https://git.d-ma.be`). Every upstream call carries a **single service PAT** —
+`GITEA_MCP_DEFAULT_TOKEN` — as `Authorization: token <PAT>` (`client.go`). So
+gitea-mcp is a *front door*, not a credential pass-through: the caller's identity
+is captured for attribution, but Gitea sees one service account. A 60s branch
+cache and a 30s HTTP timeout round it out.
+
+Defensive guard: paths with an empty owner/repo segment (`//`) are rejected
+locally (`hasEmptySegment`) so callers get a typed validation error instead of
+Gitea's opaque `/api/swagger` 404.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Tools
+
+Tools are registered in `internal/tools/registry.go` into a `registry.Registry`;
+each implements the `Tool` interface (name, JSON schema, handler). ~60 tools,
+by area:
+
+| Area | Tools |
+|------|-------|
+| Repos | list, get, search, status, create, delete, update, tree, topics_update, mirror_push |
+| Files | file_read, file_write_branch, file_delete, dir_list |
+| Branches | branch_list, branch_delete, branch_protection_get |
+| Issues | list, get, create, edit, close, reopen, comment, label, list_comments |
+| PRs | list, get, create, comment, merge, files_diff |
+| Labels / Releases / Tags | label_list, release_create, tag_create |
+| Workflows (Actions) | run_list, run_status, run_trigger |
+| Search / Templates | code_search, create_project_from_template |
+| Composite | tbd_ship (trunk-based ship helper) |
+
+Shared tool-layer hygiene (`internal/tools/tool.go`):
+- **Alias normalization** — `repo`↔`name` and `number`↔`index` are reconciled so
+  a tool works whichever spelling a caller sends (an explicit canonical wins).
+- **Required-identifier validation** — an empty `repo`/`name` is rejected at the
+  tool layer (avoids the bare-404 leak); `owner` is covered by the allowlist.
+- **Page-size cap** — limits are clamped to 50.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Configuration (env)
+
+| Var | Purpose | Example |
+|-----|---------|---------|
+| `GITEA_MCP_PORT` | listen port | `8080` |
+| `GITEA_BASE_URL` | upstream Gitea | `https://git.d-ma.be` |
+| `GITEA_MCP_DEFAULT_TOKEN` | **upstream** service PAT (all Gitea calls) | *(secret)* |
+| `GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN` | static bearer for service-to-service auth | *(secret)* |
+| `GITEA_MCP_ALLOWED_OWNERS` | owner allowlist | `mathias` |
+| `GITEA_MCP_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST` | permitted browser Origins | `https://claude.ai,…` |
+| `DEX_ISSUER_URL` / `MCP_AUDIENCE` | Authentik issuer + audience | `…/o/claude-ai/`, `claude-ai` |
+| `K8S_ISSUER_URL` / `K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE` | k8s OIDC issuer + audience (SA tokens) | `https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local`, `gitea-mcp` |
+| `MCP_RESOURCE_URL` | this server's public URL for `.well-known` metadata | `https://git-mcp.d-ma.be` |
+
+Secrets come from k8s Secrets (`gitea-mcp-secrets`, `gitea-mcp-static-token`);
+non-secret values are inlined in the Deployment.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Health & observability
+
+- `GET /healthz` → `{"ok":true,"jwt":{"status":"disabled|enabled|degraded","last_error":"…"}}`.
+  `degraded` = a JWT issuer was configured but init failed (static-token auth
+  still works) — distinguishes "IdP unreachable" from "JWT not configured".
+- Every auth rejection is audit-logged (`mcp-chassis` `deny`) with the reason,
+  client IP, token *type*, and a truncated SHA-256 **fingerprint** — never the
+  raw token, so nothing secret lands in logs.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Deployment & CI/CD
+
+- **Runs in** the `gitea-mcp` k3s namespace (`git.d-ma.be/mathias/infra`
+  `k3s/apps/gitea-mcp/`): a Deployment on `localhost:5000/gitea-mcp:<sha>`, an
+  ExternalSecret for tokens, and a **default-deny NetworkPolicy** + an
+  `allow-ingress-nginx` rule (this namespace is the P6.1 netpol pilot — the only
+  ingress allowed is from `ingress-nginx`).
+- **Public endpoint** `https://git-mcp.d-ma.be` (NPM → ingress-nginx → svc:8080).
+- **Pipeline** (`.gitea/workflows/cd.yml`, self-hosted koala runner): quality gate
+  (test/vet) → `buildah` image → `localhost:5000` → smoke test → the deploy job
+  clones infra over SSH, `sed`s the image tag in `k3s/apps/gitea-mcp/deployment.yaml`,
+  commits, and triggers a **Flux** reconcile. Push to `main` ⇒ new image ⇒ rolled.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Operational notes
+
+- **Rollback** = revert the image tag (or the env change) in the infra Deployment;
+  Flux rolls back. Auth changes are additive, so enabling/disabling the k8s issuer
+  never affects the Authentik/static paths.
+- **NetworkPolicy kill switch** — delete the `gitea-mcp` NetworkPolicies to
+  restore open ingress if the pilot ever locks something out.
+- **claude.ai connector flakiness** — the claude.ai→gitea-mcp MCP path
+  intermittently hits a Cloudflare "you have been blocked" page (the error names
+  `anthropic.com`). On the Claude Code CLI, prefer the direct Gitea REST API for
+  reliability; the MCP connector remains the claude.ai-web path. (brain:
+  `prefer-rest-api-skills-over-mcp-on-cli-cloudflare-waf`.)
+
+## References
+- Auth library: `git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis` (`auth` package) — shared
+  `BearerMiddleware` + multi-issuer `JWTValidator` + RFC 9728 handler.
+- Multi-issuer / SA-token design: infra `docs/decisions/ADR-0011-service-to-service-auth.md`.
+- Source map: `cmd/gitea-mcp/{main,healthz,k8soidc}.go`,
+  `internal/{mcp,auth,gitea,tools,allowlist,identity,registry,config}`.

cmd/gitea-mcp/k8soidc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+const (
+	saCAFile    = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
+	saTokenFile = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" //nolint:gosec // path, not a secret
+)
+
+// k8sBearerRT adds this pod's ServiceAccount bearer to every request. k3s serves
+// its OIDC discovery/JWKS over the cluster CA and requires an AUTHENTICATED
+// request (anonymous is 401), so the JWKS fetch must carry a token — ADR-0011.
+type k8sBearerRT struct {
+	token string
+	base  http.RoundTripper
+}
+
+func (b k8sBearerRT) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+b.token)
+	return b.base.RoundTrip(r)
+}
+
+// k8sOIDCClient builds an HTTP client that can reach the in-cluster k8s OIDC
+// discovery + JWKS: it trusts the cluster CA and carries this pod's SA bearer.
+// Returns an error (not running in a pod, files unreadable) so the caller can
+// skip the k8s issuer without disabling other auth.
+func k8sOIDCClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	ca, err := os.ReadFile(saCAFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read cluster CA: %w", err)
+	}
+	pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(ca) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse cluster CA: no certs in %s", saCAFile)
+	}
+	tok, err := os.ReadFile(saTokenFile)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read SA token: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &http.Client{
+		Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
+		Transport: k8sBearerRT{
+			token: strings.TrimSpace(string(tok)),
+			base:  &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}},
+		},
+	}, nil
+}

cmd/gitea-mcp/main.go

@@ -37,7 +37,36 @@ func main() {
 
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	jwtValidator, jwtInitErr := chassisauth.NewJWTValidator(ctx, cfg.DexIssuerURL, cfg.MCPAudience)
+	// Build the trusted-issuer list. Authentik (DEX_ISSUER_URL) for interactive/
+	// web clients; the in-cluster k8s OIDC issuer for ServiceAccount tokens
+	// (ADR-0011 D1). The k8s issuer is ADDITIVE and best-effort: if its client
+	// can't be built (not in a pod) or its discovery is unreachable at startup,
+	// it is dropped so existing Authentik/static auth is never taken down.
+	var issuers []chassisauth.IssuerConfig
+	if cfg.DexIssuerURL != "" {
+		issuers = append(issuers, chassisauth.IssuerConfig{IssuerURL: cfg.DexIssuerURL, Audience: cfg.MCPAudience})
+	}
+	if cfg.K8sIssuerURL != "" {
+		if client, cerr := k8sOIDCClient(); cerr != nil {
+			logger.Warn("k8s OIDC client init failed; SA-token auth disabled (other auth unaffected)", "err", cerr)
+		} else {
+			issuers = append(issuers, chassisauth.IssuerConfig{IssuerURL: cfg.K8sIssuerURL, Audience: cfg.K8sAudience, HTTPClient: client})
+		}
+	}
+
+	jwtValidator, jwtInitErr := chassisauth.NewMultiJWTValidator(ctx, issuers)
+	if jwtInitErr != nil && cfg.K8sIssuerURL != "" && len(issuers) > 1 {
+		// A configured issuer (likely the in-cluster k8s OIDC) was unreachable at
+		// startup. Don't let it take down Authentik JWT auth — retry without it.
+		logger.Warn("multi-issuer init failed; retrying without the k8s issuer", "err", jwtInitErr)
+		pub := make([]chassisauth.IssuerConfig, 0, len(issuers))
+		for _, ic := range issuers {
+			if ic.IssuerURL != cfg.K8sIssuerURL {
+				pub = append(pub, ic)
+			}
+		}
+		jwtValidator, jwtInitErr = chassisauth.NewMultiJWTValidator(ctx, pub)
+	}
 	if jwtInitErr != nil {
 		logger.Warn("jwt validator init failed; JWT auth degraded", "err", jwtInitErr)
 	}

go.mod

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ module git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
 go 1.26.2
 
 require (
-	git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.3.0
+	git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.5.0
 	github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
 )

go.sum

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.3.0 h1:lV/vDsjrDeZojT7lhcwolM1lMZpsnEKEvf4kEHrxIa0=
-git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.3.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
+git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.5.0 h1:0w3dt4t4r8OtZBHIOoZkR6p6L3L6YDiqhMh9bTI/w/8=
+git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.5.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=

internal/config/config.go

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ type Config struct {
 	DexIssuerURL    string   // DEX_ISSUER_URL, e.g. https://auth.d-ma.be; empty disables JWT auth
 	MCPAudience     string   // MCP_AUDIENCE, JWT audience claim to validate, e.g. claude-ai
 	MCPResourceURL  string   // MCP_RESOURCE_URL, this server's public URL for /.well-known metadata
+	K8sIssuerURL    string   // K8S_ISSUER_URL, in-cluster OIDC issuer for ServiceAccount-token auth (ADR-0011 D1); empty disables
+	K8sAudience     string   // K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE, required audience claim for k8s SA tokens
 }
 
 func Load() (Config, error) {
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ func Load() (Config, error) {
 		DexIssuerURL:    os.Getenv("DEX_ISSUER_URL"),
 		MCPAudience:     os.Getenv("MCP_AUDIENCE"),
 		MCPResourceURL:  os.Getenv("MCP_RESOURCE_URL"),
+		K8sIssuerURL:    os.Getenv("K8S_ISSUER_URL"),
+		K8sAudience:     os.Getenv("K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE"),
 	}
 	return cfg, nil
 }

internal/tools/create_project_from_template.go

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
 				"description":{"type":"string"},
 				"private":{"type":"boolean"},
 				"template_name":{"type":"string","description":"Template repo name to generate from. Defaults to the server-configured template. Ignored when resume=true."},
-				"dispatch_allow":{"type":"boolean","description":"When true, inject a .dispatch-allow file so the project is opt-in for headless dispatch (dispatch#3). Default false. Safe to re-request on resume."},
+				"dispatch_allow":{"type":"boolean","description":"When true, inject a .dispatch-allow file (dispatch#3) AND register owner/name into mathias/dispatch's git-tracked allowlist (dispatch-repos.txt, dispatch#19) — both gates are required for the watcher to actually pick the repo up; each is applied independently and idempotently. Default false. Safe to re-request on resume."},
 				"resume":{"type":"boolean","description":"Resume substitution on an ALREADY-CREATED repo from a prior call that hit infra#179's branch-writability race (its partial_failure names this). Skips template lookup and repo generation entirely; the destination must already exist. Safe to call repeatedly — files/renames already correct are left untouched. Default false."}
 			},
 			"required":["owner","name"]
@@ -89,8 +89,21 @@ type createProjectResult struct {
 	FilesSubstituted         []string `json:"files_substituted"`
 	PartialFailure           string   `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
 	DispatchAllowFailure     string   `json:"dispatch_allow_failure,omitempty"`
+	DispatchAllowlisted      bool     `json:"dispatch_allowlisted,omitempty"`
+	DispatchAllowlistFailure string   `json:"dispatch_allowlist_failure,omitempty"`
 }
 
+// The dispatch allowlist (dispatch#19) is a fixed integration point — a
+// specific file in a specific repo the mathias/dispatch watcher reads at the
+// start of every cycle. Hardcoded to match its own DISPATCH_ALLOWLIST_OWNER/
+// _REPO/_PATH defaults (unconfigured in the live CronJob, confirmed 2026-07-06).
+const (
+	dispatchAllowlistOwner  = "mathias"
+	dispatchAllowlistRepo   = "dispatch"
+	dispatchAllowlistPath   = "dispatch-repos.txt"
+	dispatchAllowlistBranch = "main"
+)
+
 func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
 	var args createProjectArgs
 	if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
@@ -147,19 +160,26 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Opt the new project into headless dispatch if asked: presence of a
-	// .dispatch-allow file on the default branch marks it dispatch-eligible
-	// (dispatch#3). Skip if substitution itself already stalled — don't mark an
-	// incomplete repo dispatch-eligible. A failure here is reported in its OWN
-	// field (gitea-mcp#51) — it must never be indistinguishable from a
-	// substitution failure, since one can succeed while the other doesn't.
+	// Opt the new project into headless dispatch if asked. Two INDEPENDENT gates,
+	// both required (dispatch#3 + dispatch#19): the .dispatch-allow marker on this
+	// repo, and this repo's owner/name listed in mathias/dispatch's git-tracked
+	// allowlist. Skip both if substitution itself already stalled — don't mark an
+	// incomplete repo dispatch-eligible. Each failure is reported in its OWN field
+	// (gitea-mcp#51/#54) — never conflated with each other or with substitution,
+	// since any one of the three can fail independently of the other two.
 	if args.DispatchAllow && result.PartialFailure == "" {
-		didWrite, fail := t.injectDispatchAllow(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch)
-		if fail != "" {
+		if didWrite, fail := t.injectDispatchAllow(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch); fail != "" {
 			result.DispatchAllowFailure = fail
 		} else if didWrite {
 			result.FilesSubstituted = append(result.FilesSubstituted, ".dispatch-allow")
 		}
+
+		ownerName := args.Owner + "/" + args.Name
+		if didRegister, fail := t.registerDispatchAllowlist(ctx, ownerName); fail != "" {
+			result.DispatchAllowlistFailure = fail
+		} else if didRegister {
+			result.DispatchAllowlisted = true
+		}
 	}
 
 	// If substitution stalled because the generated branch wasn't writable in time,
@@ -302,6 +322,42 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) injectDispatchAllow(ctx context.Context, own
 	return true, ""
 }
 
+// registerDispatchAllowlist appends ownerName ("owner/name") to
+// mathias/dispatch's git-tracked dispatch-repos.txt if not already listed
+// (gitea-mcp#54) — idempotent, safe to call on every resume. This is the
+// SECOND of the two required dispatch gates: being listed here is necessary
+// but not sufficient on its own (the repo also needs its own .dispatch-allow
+// marker, injectDispatchAllow's job) — dispatch#3's structural trust-zone
+// design requires both independently. Returns whether a write actually
+// happened, so the caller only reports a fresh registration, not a no-op.
+func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) registerDispatchAllowlist(ctx context.Context, ownerName string) (didRegister bool, failure string) {
+	fc, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, dispatchAllowlistBranch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Sprintf("read %s/%s:%s: %v", dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
+	}
+	decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fc.Content)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Sprintf("decode %s: %v", dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
+	}
+	content := string(decoded)
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(content, "\n") {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(line) == ownerName {
+			return false, "" // already listed — idempotent no-op
+		}
+	}
+
+	newContent := strings.TrimRight(content, "\n") + "\n" + ownerName + "\n"
+	if _, err := t.c.UpsertFile(ctx, dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
+		Branch:  dispatchAllowlistBranch,
+		Content: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(newContent)),
+		Message: fmt.Sprintf("chore(allowlist): opt in %s for headless dispatch", ownerName),
+		Sha:     fc.Sha,
+	}); err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Sprintf("append to %s/%s:%s: %v", dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
 // infra179FinalizeMessage explains the best-effort outcome when gitea's slow
 // async template-generate (infra#179) leaves the branch unwritable within the
 // budget. It points at the concrete recovery step — re-invoking this same tool
@@ -374,21 +430,7 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) substituteEntry(ctx context.Context, owner,
 	enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(newContent))
 
 	if renamed {
-		if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
-			Branch:  branch,
-			Content: enc,
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", path, newPath),
-		}); err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, err)
-		}
-		if _, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, owner, name, path, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
-			Branch:  branch,
-			Sha:     fc.Sha,
-			Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: drop placeholder path %s", path),
-		}); err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Sprintf("delete %s: %v", path, err)
-		}
-		return path + " -> " + newPath, ""
+		return t.renameEntry(ctx, owner, name, branch, path, newPath, enc, newContent, fc.Sha)
 	}
 
 	if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, path, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
@@ -401,3 +443,45 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) substituteEntry(ctx context.Context, owner,
 	}
 	return path, ""
 }
+
+// renameEntry writes newPath then deletes oldPath. Both halves are idempotent
+// so a resume that hits a prior write-succeeded/delete-failed rename (the two
+// are separate, non-atomic API calls) completes cleanly instead of erroring on
+// a blind re-create at a path that already exists (gitea-mcp#53): if newPath
+// already holds the correct content, the write is skipped and only the
+// outstanding delete of oldPath runs; if oldPath is already gone, the delete
+// is a no-op too.
+func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) renameEntry(ctx context.Context, owner, name, branch, oldPath, newPath, enc, newContent, oldSha string) (substituted, failure string) {
+	existing, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, owner, name, newPath, branch)
+	switch {
+	case err == nil:
+		decoded, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(existing.Content)
+		if derr == nil && string(decoded) == newContent {
+			break // already correct from a prior partial run — skip the write
+		}
+		if writeErr := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
+			Branch: branch, Content: enc, Sha: existing.Sha,
+			Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", oldPath, newPath),
+		}); writeErr != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, writeErr)
+		}
+	case errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound):
+		if writeErr := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
+			Branch: branch, Content: enc,
+			Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", oldPath, newPath),
+		}); writeErr != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, writeErr)
+		}
+	default:
+		return "", fmt.Sprintf("read %s: %v", newPath, err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, owner, name, oldPath, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
+		Branch:  branch,
+		Sha:     oldSha,
+		Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: drop placeholder path %s", oldPath),
+	}); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound) {
+		return "", fmt.Sprintf("delete %s: %v", oldPath, err)
+	}
+	return oldPath + " -> " + newPath, ""
+}

internal/tools/create_project_from_template_test.go

@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ type fakeTemplateServer struct {
 	deletes       []string
 	putBodies     map[string]string // path -> decoded written content
 	repoGetsPost  int               // GET dest after generate (branch fallback)
+
+	// dispatchRepos simulates mathias/dispatch:dispatch-repos.txt (gitea-mcp#54).
+	// "" (default) 404s the read, matching a repo that hasn't seeded the file
+	// (a distinct error path); tests that care set it explicitly.
+	dispatchRepos     string
+	dispatchReposPuts int
 }
 
 func newFakeTemplateServer(files map[string]string, genBranch string) *fakeTemplateServer {
@@ -60,7 +66,28 @@ func (f *fakeTemplateServer) handler(t *testing.T, tmpl, dest string) http.Handl
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 		p := r.URL.Path
 
+		const dispatchReposPath = "/api/v1/repos/mathias/dispatch/contents/dispatch-repos.txt"
 		switch {
+		case r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == dispatchReposPath:
+			if f.dispatchRepos == "" {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
+				_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"not found"}`))
+				return
+			}
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"path":"dispatch-repos.txt","sha":"repos-sha","content":%q,"encoding":"base64"}`, encb64(f.dispatchRepos))
+
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPut && p == dispatchReposPath:
+			raw, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+			var args struct {
+				Content string `json:"content"`
+			}
+			_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &args)
+			dec, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(args.Content)
+			f.dispatchRepos = string(dec)
+			f.dispatchReposPuts++
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"content":{"path":"dispatch-repos.txt","sha":"repos-sha2"},"commit":{"sha":"c"}}`))
+
 		case r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == "/api/v1/repos/mathias/"+tmpl:
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(templateRepoJSON(tmpl, true)))
 
@@ -151,6 +178,8 @@ type createOut struct {
 	FilesSubstituted         []string `json:"files_substituted"`
 	PartialFailure           string   `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
 	DispatchAllowFailure     string   `json:"dispatch_allow_failure,omitempty"`
+	DispatchAllowlisted      bool     `json:"dispatch_allowlisted,omitempty"`
+	DispatchAllowlistFailure string   `json:"dispatch_allowlist_failure,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // Happy path: whole-tree substitution, content + path rename, correct module host.
@@ -329,6 +358,29 @@ func TestCreateProject_Resume_AlreadyFullyDone_IsSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure, "nothing left to do on resume must be success, not a loud failure")
 }
 
+// A resume where a prior partial run's rename write SUCCEEDED but its paired
+// delete FAILED (both are separate, non-atomic API calls) must complete
+// cleanly: recognize the new path is already correct, skip re-writing it, and
+// just finish the outstanding delete of the stray old path (gitea-mcp#53).
+func TestCreateProject_Resume_StrayRenamedOldPath_CompletesCleanly(t *testing.T) {
+	files := map[string]string{
+		// stray: delete never completed in the prior run
+		"cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go": "package main\nimport \"__MODULE_PATH__/pkg/litellm\"\nconst n = \"__PROJECT_NAME__\"\n",
+		// already correct: the write half of the same prior rename DID complete
+		"cmd/new-svc/main.go": "package main\nimport \"git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc/pkg/litellm\"\nconst n = \"new-svc\"\n",
+	}
+	f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true}`)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
+	assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go -> cmd/new-svc/main.go")
+	assert.NotContains(t, f.puts, "cmd/new-svc/main.go", "already-correct new path must not be rewritten")
+	assert.Contains(t, f.deletes, "cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go", "the outstanding delete must still happen")
+}
+
 // dispatch_allow injection is idempotent on resume: if .dispatch-allow already
 // has the correct content (from an earlier successful injection), re-invoking
 // must not attempt another write — and must not error the way a naive
@@ -390,6 +442,86 @@ func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowFailure_IsDistinctField(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "go.mod", "substitution must still be reported despite the separate dispatch failure")
 }
 
+// dispatch_allow now ALSO registers the new repo into mathias/dispatch's
+// git-tracked allowlist (dispatch-repos.txt) — the second of the two required
+// dispatch gates, independent of the .dispatch-allow marker (gitea-mcp#54).
+func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllow_RegistersAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
+	files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
+	f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
+	f.dispatchRepos = "# comment\nmathias/dispatch-sandbox\nmathias/cobalt-dingo\n"
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
+	assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
+	assert.True(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, f.dispatchReposPuts)
+	assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/new-svc")
+	// existing entries preserved, not clobbered
+	assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/dispatch-sandbox")
+	assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/cobalt-dingo")
+}
+
+// Registering is idempotent: a repo already listed (e.g. a resume re-running
+// with dispatch_allow:true) must not produce a duplicate line or a redundant write.
+func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllow_RegistersAllowlist_AlreadyListedIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc\n"} // already substituted
+	f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
+	f.dispatchRepos = "mathias/dispatch-sandbox\nmathias/new-svc\n"
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true,"dispatch_allow":true}`)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
+	assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
+	assert.False(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted, "already-listed must not be reported as a fresh registration")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, f.dispatchReposPuts, "already-listed repo must not trigger a write")
+}
+
+// A failure registering the allowlist is reported in its OWN field — distinct
+// from PartialFailure (substitution) AND DispatchAllowFailure (the marker
+// file) — since all three are independent gates that can fail independently.
+func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowlistFailure_IsDistinctField(t *testing.T) {
+	files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
+	f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
+	f.dispatchRepos = "mathias/dispatch-sandbox\n"
+	base := f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc")
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/mathias/dispatch/contents/dispatch-repos.txt" {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"boom"}`))
+			return
+		}
+		base(w, r)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure, "substitution succeeded — must not be conflated")
+	assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowFailure, ".dispatch-allow marker succeeded — must not be conflated")
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
+	assert.Contains(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure, "dispatch-repos.txt")
+	assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "go.mod", "substitution must still be reported despite the separate allowlist failure")
+}
+
+// dispatch_allow=false/omitted must never touch the allowlist file at all.
+func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowFalse_DoesNotTouchAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
+	files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
+	f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc"}`)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
+	assert.False(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, f.dispatchReposPuts)
+}
+
 // ── guardrails unchanged by the rewrite ──────────────────────────────────────
 
 func TestCreateProject_NameRegexFailure(t *testing.T) {