// Package localtools holds MCP tools that must never be reachable from the
// shared HTTP gitea-mcp server (RegisterAll, cmd/gitea-mcp). Each tool here
// carries a capability too dangerous to expose network-side, even behind
// OIDC — mint_service_account_token resets whatever password its target
// account has. Only cmd/gitea-admin-mcp, a separate local-only stdio binary,
// imports this package.
package localtools

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"strings"

	"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
	"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)

// bootstrapper is the one method this tool needs — narrow so tests inject a
// fake instead of a real adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper.
type bootstrapper interface {
	Run(ctx context.Context, req adminbootstrap.Request) (adminbootstrap.Result, error)
}

type MintServiceAccountToken struct {
	b bootstrapper
}

func NewMintServiceAccountToken(b bootstrapper) *MintServiceAccountToken {
	return &MintServiceAccountToken{b: b}
}

func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
	return registry.ToolDescriptor{
		Name: "mint_service_account_token",
		Description: "Create (or reset the password of) a dedicated Gitea " +
			"service/bot account, mint it a scoped access token, optionally " +
			"grant it read-only collaborator access on named repos, and store " +
			"the token via 1Password. Requires confirm_service_account=true: " +
			"this resets whatever password the target account currently has, " +
			"which is only safe for a dedicated bot account, never a real " +
			"person's login.",
		InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
			"type":"object",
			"properties":{
				"username":{"type":"string"},
				"email":{"type":"string"},
				"full_name":{"type":"string"},
				"scopes":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"}},
				"token_name":{"type":"string"},
				"secret_name":{"type":"string","description":"name to store the minted token under"},
				"grant_read_repos":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"},"description":"owner/repo strings"},
				"confirm_service_account":{"type":"boolean"}
			},
			"required":["username","email","scopes","token_name","secret_name","confirm_service_account"]
		}`),
	}
}

type mintArgs struct {
	Username              string   `json:"username"`
	Email                 string   `json:"email"`
	FullName              string   `json:"full_name"`
	Scopes                []string `json:"scopes"`
	TokenName             string   `json:"token_name"`
	SecretName            string   `json:"secret_name"`
	GrantReadRepos        []string `json:"grant_read_repos"`
	ConfirmServiceAccount bool     `json:"confirm_service_account"`
}

func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
	var args mintArgs
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &args); err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse arguments: %w", err)
	}

	repos := make([]adminbootstrap.RepoRef, 0, len(args.GrantReadRepos))
	for _, r := range args.GrantReadRepos {
		owner, name, ok := strings.Cut(r, "/")
		if !ok || owner == "" || name == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("grant_read_repos entry %q must be owner/repo", r)
		}
		repos = append(repos, adminbootstrap.RepoRef{Owner: owner, Name: name})
	}

	result, err := t.b.Run(ctx, adminbootstrap.Request{
		Username:              args.Username,
		Email:                 args.Email,
		FullName:              args.FullName,
		Scopes:                args.Scopes,
		TokenName:             args.TokenName,
		SecretName:            args.SecretName,
		GrantReadRepos:        repos,
		ConfirmServiceAccount: args.ConfirmServiceAccount,
	})
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return json.Marshal(result)
}