dispatch#67 fix #2 needed a read-only CI credential and hit a hard wall: Gitea's own token-creation and admin-user endpoints reject token auth outright -- POST /users/{u}/tokens returns 'auth required', POST /admin/users returns 'token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:admin]' -- for ANY existing token, by design. An existing token cannot mint another token or create an account; the only way through either endpoint is real basic auth as an actual site admin. That is exactly what a sandboxed agent session cannot safely hold. internal/adminbootstrap: the core bootstrap, HTTP-only, fully testable against a fake transport (5 tests, no network). Given real admin username/password, it creates the target account (or resets its password if it already exists -- deliberately unconditional, gated behind a required ConfirmServiceAccount flag since that reset is only safe for a dedicated bot account), mints it a scoped token by authenticating AS that account (Gitea requires this specifically -- an admin cannot mint on another account's behalf), grants it read-only collaborator access on named repos, and stores the result via a SecretStore -- never returning the token or either password to the caller. internal/localtools: the MCP tool wrapper (mint_service_account_token) and the real op-CLI-backed SecretStore (token passed via stdin, never argv, per the estate's own secret-handling rule). Deliberately its OWN package, not internal/tools -- this capability is far too dangerous to risk it ever being wired into RegisterAll and reachable from the shared HTTP gitea-mcp server, even behind OIDC. internal/mcp/stdio.go: a stdio JSON-RPC transport (one message per line, standard MCP stdio framing) for the existing registry.Tool interface -- the only transport gitea-mcp had before this was HTTP (server.go), which a sandboxed session can reach but a real admin password never should be piped through. cmd/gitea-admin-mcp: the binary. Meant to be spawned by a LOCAL Claude Code session (.mcp.json stdio server) or run by hand, via 'op run --env-file ~/.op-env' so admin credentials arrive just-in-time and never touch a sandboxed session. 11 new tests total, all passing under -race. Nothing in cmd/gitea-mcp (the shared HTTP server) changed.
101 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
101 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
// Package localtools holds MCP tools that must never be reachable from the
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// shared HTTP gitea-mcp server (RegisterAll, cmd/gitea-mcp). Each tool here
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// carries a capability too dangerous to expose network-side, even behind
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// OIDC — mint_service_account_token resets whatever password its target
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// account has. Only cmd/gitea-admin-mcp, a separate local-only stdio binary,
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// imports this package.
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package localtools
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
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)
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// bootstrapper is the one method this tool needs — narrow so tests inject a
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// fake instead of a real adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper.
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type bootstrapper interface {
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Run(ctx context.Context, req adminbootstrap.Request) (adminbootstrap.Result, error)
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}
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type MintServiceAccountToken struct {
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b bootstrapper
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}
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func NewMintServiceAccountToken(b bootstrapper) *MintServiceAccountToken {
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return &MintServiceAccountToken{b: b}
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}
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func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
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return registry.ToolDescriptor{
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Name: "mint_service_account_token",
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Description: "Create (or reset the password of) a dedicated Gitea " +
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"service/bot account, mint it a scoped access token, optionally " +
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"grant it read-only collaborator access on named repos, and store " +
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"the token via 1Password. Requires confirm_service_account=true: " +
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"this resets whatever password the target account currently has, " +
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"which is only safe for a dedicated bot account, never a real " +
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"person's login.",
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InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
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"type":"object",
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"properties":{
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"username":{"type":"string"},
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"email":{"type":"string"},
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"full_name":{"type":"string"},
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"scopes":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"}},
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"token_name":{"type":"string"},
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"secret_name":{"type":"string","description":"name to store the minted token under"},
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"grant_read_repos":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"},"description":"owner/repo strings"},
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"confirm_service_account":{"type":"boolean"}
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},
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"required":["username","email","scopes","token_name","secret_name","confirm_service_account"]
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}`),
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}
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}
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type mintArgs struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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FullName string `json:"full_name"`
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Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
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TokenName string `json:"token_name"`
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SecretName string `json:"secret_name"`
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GrantReadRepos []string `json:"grant_read_repos"`
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ConfirmServiceAccount bool `json:"confirm_service_account"`
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}
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func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
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var args mintArgs
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &args); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse arguments: %w", err)
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}
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repos := make([]adminbootstrap.RepoRef, 0, len(args.GrantReadRepos))
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for _, r := range args.GrantReadRepos {
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owner, name, ok := strings.Cut(r, "/")
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if !ok || owner == "" || name == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("grant_read_repos entry %q must be owner/repo", r)
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}
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repos = append(repos, adminbootstrap.RepoRef{Owner: owner, Name: name})
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}
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result, err := t.b.Run(ctx, adminbootstrap.Request{
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Username: args.Username,
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Email: args.Email,
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FullName: args.FullName,
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Scopes: args.Scopes,
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TokenName: args.TokenName,
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SecretName: args.SecretName,
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GrantReadRepos: repos,
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ConfirmServiceAccount: args.ConfirmServiceAccount,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return json.Marshal(result)
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}
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