feat(capture): two-phase classification-aware AuditSink port (#54)

Splits the audit port into Reserve (before any write) + Record (after),
so "confidential + sink-down → refuse before any write" is literally true
even though the audit record — which lists what landed — can only be
written afterwards.

- AuditSink.Reserve(ctx, level) → AuditOutcome | error. The error path
  refuses the capture before writing: confidential + central sink down,
  or the all-tiers floor (nothing can record).
- AuditSink.Record(ctx, entry, outcome) persists per the reserved outcome.
- Service: I5 gate runs after the I1 gate and after the dry-run
  short-circuit (dry-run never probes the sink). AuditBuffered surfaces on
  the receipt. New ErrAuditUnavailable sentinel (→ HTTP 503).

The tier→behaviour decision lives in the sink impl (#54's DegradingSink),
not the service — the service just honours Reserve's verdict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-22 23:54:24 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent b7938d4636
commit 202212e8d5
4 changed files with 119 additions and 12 deletions
+24 -5
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ var validActions = map[string]bool{"create": true, "close": true, "comment": tru
// REST adapter maps it to HTTP 403. Callers test with errors.Is.
var ErrSovereigntyRefused = fmt.Errorf("capture refused by I1 sovereignty gate")
// ErrAuditUnavailable is returned when the I5 audit gate refuses a capture
// before any write: a confidential capture whose central audit sink is
// unreachable, or the all-tiers floor where nothing can record the audit.
// The REST adapter maps it to HTTP 503. Callers test with errors.Is.
var ErrAuditUnavailable = fmt.Errorf("capture refused: audit substrate unavailable")
// assertedZoneMismatch returns a security-event string when the caller's
// harness label asserts a trust zone that contradicts the server-derived
// origin. A harness label that names no zone (the normal case, e.g.
@@ -105,7 +111,7 @@ func (s *Service) Capture(ctx context.Context, in CaptureInput) (CaptureReceipt,
EffectiveClassification: effective.String(),
Items: nil, // refused before any write
SecurityEvents: append(securityEvents, "I1 refusal: confidential capture via us-nexus origin"),
})
}, AuditCentral)
return CaptureReceipt{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: effective classification confidential through %s origin",
ErrSovereigntyRefused, in.Context.Origin)
}
@@ -131,6 +137,16 @@ func (s *Service) Capture(ctx context.Context, in CaptureInput) (CaptureReceipt,
return receipt, nil
}
// I5 audit gate: decide BEFORE any write whether this capture can be
// audited at its effective classification. Confidential + central sink
// down → refuse here, before writing anything; the all-tiers floor
// (nothing can record) likewise refuses. Internal/public degrade to the
// durable local buffer (signalled by AuditBuffered).
outcome, err := s.audit.Reserve(ctx, effective)
if err != nil {
return CaptureReceipt{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrAuditUnavailable, err)
}
var landed []string
for i, ins := range in.Insights {
@@ -163,9 +179,9 @@ func (s *Service) Capture(ctx context.Context, in CaptureInput) (CaptureReceipt,
}
}
// I5: emit a request-level audit record of exactly what landed.
// Best-effort here; the classification-aware refusal/degradation
// policy is #54.
// I5: persist the request-level audit record of exactly what landed,
// using the outcome reserved before the writes. AuditBuffered surfaces
// the degraded (locally-buffered) state on the receipt.
if err := s.audit.Record(ctx, AuditEntry{
Timestamp: s.now().UTC(),
Principal: in.Context.Principal,
@@ -175,9 +191,12 @@ func (s *Service) Capture(ctx context.Context, in CaptureInput) (CaptureReceipt,
EffectiveClassification: effective.String(),
Items: landed,
SecurityEvents: securityEvents,
}); err != nil {
}, outcome); err != nil {
receipt.Errors = append(receipt.Errors, ItemError{Item: "audit", Error: err.Error()})
}
if outcome == AuditBuffered {
receipt.AuditBuffered = true
}
return receipt, nil
}