ai-sessions#13: capture's `summary` field wrote a frontmatter shape
(title/harness/fidelity/captured_at/repos_touched) that ai-sessions'
own extract/audit pipeline can't parse -- silently invisible to that
repo's own audit tooling, and bypassing its redaction + Stage2
completeness gates by construction. Only 5 files ever landed this way
over 3 weeks; the summary capability's whole value (speed) fights
ai-sessions' whole value (redacted, audited, complete), so kill it
rather than build a second parse branch.
capture now persists insights -> brain and action items -> Gitea
tickets only. Removes Summary/SummaryResult/SummaryWriter and all
wiring (service, REST body, MCP tool schema); close-session updated to
stop assembling a summary payload. specs/capture-*.md kept as historical
record with a superseded note -- the feature shipped and is documented,
just no longer current behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WPdSHbp9Utb2hPFm9wDG59
Splits the audit port into Reserve (before any write) + Record (after),
so "confidential + sink-down → refuse before any write" is literally true
even though the audit record — which lists what landed — can only be
written afterwards.
- AuditSink.Reserve(ctx, level) → AuditOutcome | error. The error path
refuses the capture before writing: confidential + central sink down,
or the all-tiers floor (nothing can record).
- AuditSink.Record(ctx, entry, outcome) persists per the reserved outcome.
- Service: I5 gate runs after the I1 gate and after the dry-run
short-circuit (dry-run never probes the sink). AuditBuffered surfaces on
the receipt. New ErrAuditUnavailable sentinel (→ HTTP 503).
The tier→behaviour decision lives in the sink impl (#54's DegradingSink),
not the service — the service just honours Reserve's verdict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the trust-zone Origin to CaptureContext and the I1 gate to the
use-case: a confidential effective classification through a us-nexus
origin is refused before ANY write (ErrSovereigntyRefused), and the
refusal is itself audited. A caller-asserted harness label that names a
different zone than the server-derived origin is logged as a security
event — context.Harness is descriptive-only, never a gate input.
The gate triggers only on an explicit ZoneUSNexus, so the unset default
(ZoneUnknown) can never make it fire on caller-controllable input; the
REST adapter always sets a concrete zone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Clean-Architecture core of the capture capability (#49b). Pure
orchestration over ports — no HTTP, no live Gitea, no audit I/O — fully
unit-tested against fakes before any adapter exists.
- Ports: BrainStore (#45 write/update/get), IssueTracker, SummaryWriter,
ClassificationPolicy (satisfied by #50's classification.Config),
AuditSink. Entities: Insight, Ticket, Summary, CaptureContext,
CaptureInput, CaptureReceipt.
- CaptureService.Capture: validate-before-write (fail-closed), resolve
effective classification (stricter of declared vs target-derived;
under-declaration logged as a security event), orchestrate insights
(write/supersede) → tickets → summary best-effort, emit a request-level
audit record of exactly what landed, return a partial-aware receipt.
- dry_run short-circuits after validation, writes nothing (not even audit).
Out of scope here, layered on later: the I1 origin sovereignty gate (#53,
needs the server-derived principal) and the classification-aware audit
degradation/refusal (#54). "Effective" is folded into the service as
classification.Stricter rather than a port method — the stricter-wins
rule is use-case policy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
mathiasandClaude Sonnet 5