docs(mcp): document checkClaimEnvelope's accepted v1 gap

Round 7's review found an 8th bypass in the same "value hidden from the
extractor" family as round 6, inside the fold logic round 7's own fix had
just added (a blank line interrupting a folded continuation) — the second
distinct gap found on the first alternate shape tried against that fix.

Decision (Mathias, via the running sweep session): ship this PR's rounds
1-7 as v1 rather than continue incremental patches past the point of
diminishing returns. Every bypass found across all 7 rounds requires the
caller to already hold brain_edit write access and to deliberately
construct a specific malformed-YAML shape with knowledge of this exact
gap — narrow and low-likelihood next to another patch cycle. The real fix
(one shared, tested, encoding-normalized frontmatter parser, replacing the
three independent hand-rolled implementations this bug class keeps
surfacing in) is tracked separately as hyperguild#138.

Document the boundary directly on checkClaimEnvelope so the next person
reading this function knows what's covered and what's a deliberate,
recorded trade-off rather than an unnoticed gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.context/system-prompt.txt

@@ -78,27 +78,6 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
    when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document the reason in
    PROJECT.md.
 
-   **Exception — a GitOps repo where a branch cannot be reconciled.** In a repo whose
-   deployment watches one branch (`mathias/infra`: Flux watches `main`), a branch is
-   invisible to the thing that applies it. A `risk/medium` change to `alerts.yaml` or
-   `litellm-config.yaml` can be linted on a branch but never *exercised* there, so a
-   PR would buy a review of a state that was never deployed.
-
-   There, `risk/medium`+ work stays on `main` and instead requires a **recorded
-   adversarial review pass before the push** — `skills:pr-gatekeeper` or equivalent,
-   reviewing the staged diff. **The reviewer's verdict goes in the issue, not a PR
-   thread.** No verdict recorded means the lane was not used, and saying "the gate was
-   green" is not the same claim.
-
-   Be honest about what this is: a recorded *independent* pass, not four-eyes in the
-   sense `assessor-loop` §4.1 means for a regulated organisation, because the reviewer
-   is an agent. It is more than the repo had and less than the model it mirrors; do not
-   describe it as the stronger property. (infra#470, decided 2026-09-29.)
-
-   This lane depends on the `risk/` label being right. A label that triggers a heavier
-   lane is load-bearing, not cosmetic — if work that belongs in it is unlabelled, the
-   lane silently does not apply.
-
 6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
    the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
    - **Tag + bump SemVer** on the change (annotated tag; minor for a feature or
@@ -127,43 +106,6 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
    revisit Y". Those are exactly the items that need a locator. If it is worth
    saying in a summary, it is worth writing where it can be found again without you.
 
-7. **Finish what's closable — only involve me for a genuine call.** If a
-   tracker issue, PR, or checklist item is demonstrably resolved — the fix
-   landed, the state changed, you verified it live — close/merge/check it off
-   in the same turn. Don't leave it open "for the record" or park it waiting
-   on me to confirm something that already happened; that's bookkeeping, not
-   a decision. Reserve asking me (`AskUserQuestion`, a `DECISION NEEDED`
-   comment, or otherwise pausing) for when it's genuinely mine to call:
-   irreversible or prod/host-impacting actions, a real judgment call with no
-   clearly-better option, ambiguous intent, or anything secret-writes/
-   destructive-git already gate. Before claiming something is closable,
-   verify it live (re-check the issue, re-run the command) rather than
-   trusting your own earlier summary (brain: `filed-issue-not-same-as-fixed`).
-
-8. **Control code needs an adversary, not a checklist.** Code whose job is to
-   refuse, deny, gate or contain is not adequately verified by a green gate.
-   Rule 5 makes CI the quality gate and that holds for ordinary work — but a
-   passing suite only asserts what its author already thought of, and for a
-   control the author is precisely the person whose imagination just failed.
-   Measured on `dispatch#75`: five review rounds, five real escapes verified by
-   execution, and **CI was green on every one of them** while `git rm
-   ././.dispatch-allow` deleted the file the control existed to protect. So
-   route this work through a review with authority to block, instructed to
-   verify by execution rather than by reading the implementation. Expect to be
-   blocked more than once; that is the control working, not the reviewer being
-   difficult. (brain: `a-green-gate-is-not-evidence-for-control-code`; the
-   practices live in the `pr-gatekeeper` agent.)
-
-9. **A test's name must not claim more than its assertions prove.** Name a test
-   after the mechanism it observes, not the goal it serves.
-   `DoesNotInheritEnv` is honest; `IsContained` is a claim the test cannot
-   support. This is not pedantry about naming — when name and assertion
-   diverge, the name wins in the reader's head and the gap becomes invisible,
-   which is what lets the defect survive review. Found three times in one PR,
-   twice in tests written to fix the previous instance of it; each passed while
-   the thing it was named for was exploitable. If you cannot name the mechanism,
-   you do not yet know what the test observes.
-
 ## CAD sprint patterns
 
 Two CAD sprint archetypes (defs: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/continuous-agentic-development-cad-concept-2026-06-16`):
@@ -307,13 +249,7 @@ entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
 | **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
 | **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
 
-- **Scoping — the brain holds no confidential client content.** Nothing on the read path
+- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
-  filters by client: every token holder can read every wing, and `wing` on `brain_query`
-  is an optional argument, not an access control. Client confidentiality is enforced only
-  at write time (`capture`'s I1 gate refuses internal/confidential). So never `brain_write`
-  client material; generalise it first or keep it in the client's own repo. (hyperguild#144,
-  decided 2026-10-01. This line previously claimed client projects were filtered; they
-  were not.)
 - **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
   fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
   on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
@@ -383,20 +319,8 @@ Workflow:
    and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
    message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
 
-Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply on every
+Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
-host and every harness.
+unconditionally on every host, every harness.
-
-**Where a project rule contradicts a rule here, the project rule governs — and it
-must state its reason.** Both halves matter: the project file wins because it knows
-something this file cannot (infra's Flux constraint is real and not visible from
-here), and it must say why because a bare override is indistinguishable from drift.
-
-This replaces the previous wording, which said rules here and in `PROJECT.md` both
-apply *"unconditionally"*. That was not a tiebreak but a contradiction, and it went
-unnoticed until rule 5 and infra's "never create feature branches" had to be obeyed
-at the same time (infra#470). A standard can hold two individually sensible clauses
-that are jointly unsatisfiable, and survive for as long as everyone reads it
-charitably — the same failure the Inception Sprint Oath's G6 had.
 
 ## Engineering Skills
 

AGENTS.md

@@ -73,27 +73,6 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
    when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document the reason in
    PROJECT.md.
 
-   **Exception — a GitOps repo where a branch cannot be reconciled.** In a repo whose
-   deployment watches one branch (`mathias/infra`: Flux watches `main`), a branch is
-   invisible to the thing that applies it. A `risk/medium` change to `alerts.yaml` or
-   `litellm-config.yaml` can be linted on a branch but never *exercised* there, so a
-   PR would buy a review of a state that was never deployed.
-
-   There, `risk/medium`+ work stays on `main` and instead requires a **recorded
-   adversarial review pass before the push** — `skills:pr-gatekeeper` or equivalent,
-   reviewing the staged diff. **The reviewer's verdict goes in the issue, not a PR
-   thread.** No verdict recorded means the lane was not used, and saying "the gate was
-   green" is not the same claim.
-
-   Be honest about what this is: a recorded *independent* pass, not four-eyes in the
-   sense `assessor-loop` §4.1 means for a regulated organisation, because the reviewer
-   is an agent. It is more than the repo had and less than the model it mirrors; do not
-   describe it as the stronger property. (infra#470, decided 2026-09-29.)
-
-   This lane depends on the `risk/` label being right. A label that triggers a heavier
-   lane is load-bearing, not cosmetic — if work that belongs in it is unlabelled, the
-   lane silently does not apply.
-
 6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
    the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
    - **Tag + bump SemVer** on the change (annotated tag; minor for a feature or
@@ -122,43 +101,6 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
    revisit Y". Those are exactly the items that need a locator. If it is worth
    saying in a summary, it is worth writing where it can be found again without you.
 
-7. **Finish what's closable — only involve me for a genuine call.** If a
-   tracker issue, PR, or checklist item is demonstrably resolved — the fix
-   landed, the state changed, you verified it live — close/merge/check it off
-   in the same turn. Don't leave it open "for the record" or park it waiting
-   on me to confirm something that already happened; that's bookkeeping, not
-   a decision. Reserve asking me (`AskUserQuestion`, a `DECISION NEEDED`
-   comment, or otherwise pausing) for when it's genuinely mine to call:
-   irreversible or prod/host-impacting actions, a real judgment call with no
-   clearly-better option, ambiguous intent, or anything secret-writes/
-   destructive-git already gate. Before claiming something is closable,
-   verify it live (re-check the issue, re-run the command) rather than
-   trusting your own earlier summary (brain: `filed-issue-not-same-as-fixed`).
-
-8. **Control code needs an adversary, not a checklist.** Code whose job is to
-   refuse, deny, gate or contain is not adequately verified by a green gate.
-   Rule 5 makes CI the quality gate and that holds for ordinary work — but a
-   passing suite only asserts what its author already thought of, and for a
-   control the author is precisely the person whose imagination just failed.
-   Measured on `dispatch#75`: five review rounds, five real escapes verified by
-   execution, and **CI was green on every one of them** while `git rm
-   ././.dispatch-allow` deleted the file the control existed to protect. So
-   route this work through a review with authority to block, instructed to
-   verify by execution rather than by reading the implementation. Expect to be
-   blocked more than once; that is the control working, not the reviewer being
-   difficult. (brain: `a-green-gate-is-not-evidence-for-control-code`; the
-   practices live in the `pr-gatekeeper` agent.)
-
-9. **A test's name must not claim more than its assertions prove.** Name a test
-   after the mechanism it observes, not the goal it serves.
-   `DoesNotInheritEnv` is honest; `IsContained` is a claim the test cannot
-   support. This is not pedantry about naming — when name and assertion
-   diverge, the name wins in the reader's head and the gap becomes invisible,
-   which is what lets the defect survive review. Found three times in one PR,
-   twice in tests written to fix the previous instance of it; each passed while
-   the thing it was named for was exploitable. If you cannot name the mechanism,
-   you do not yet know what the test observes.
-
 ## CAD sprint patterns
 
 Two CAD sprint archetypes (defs: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/continuous-agentic-development-cad-concept-2026-06-16`):
@@ -302,13 +244,7 @@ entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
 | **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
 | **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
 
-- **Scoping — the brain holds no confidential client content.** Nothing on the read path
+- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
-  filters by client: every token holder can read every wing, and `wing` on `brain_query`
-  is an optional argument, not an access control. Client confidentiality is enforced only
-  at write time (`capture`'s I1 gate refuses internal/confidential). So never `brain_write`
-  client material; generalise it first or keep it in the client's own repo. (hyperguild#144,
-  decided 2026-10-01. This line previously claimed client projects were filtered; they
-  were not.)
 - **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
   fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
   on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
@@ -378,20 +314,8 @@ Workflow:
    and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
    message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
 
-Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply on every
+Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
-host and every harness.
+unconditionally on every host, every harness.
-
-**Where a project rule contradicts a rule here, the project rule governs — and it
-must state its reason.** Both halves matter: the project file wins because it knows
-something this file cannot (infra's Flux constraint is real and not visible from
-here), and it must say why because a bare override is indistinguishable from drift.
-
-This replaces the previous wording, which said rules here and in `PROJECT.md` both
-apply *"unconditionally"*. That was not a tiebreak but a contradiction, and it went
-unnoticed until rule 5 and infra's "never create feature branches" had to be obeyed
-at the same time (infra#470). A standard can hold two individually sensible clauses
-that are jointly unsatisfiable, and survive for as long as everyone reads it
-charitably — the same failure the Inception Sprint Oath's G6 had.
 
 ## Engineering Skills
 

ingestion/cmd/server/main.go

@@ -147,37 +147,6 @@ func envInt(key string, fallback int) int {
 // buildNotifier returns the ntfy notifier, or a nil interface when
 // BRAIN_NTFY_URL is unset. A nil *interface* (not a typed-nil) is required so
 // DegradingSink/Reconcile and the governance observer skip it cleanly.
-// alertingWarnings names every alert that will not fire under the current
-// configuration (#107).
-//
-// buildNotifier returns a nil interface when BRAIN_NTFY_URL is unset, and every
-// consumer skips a nil notifier silently — right for an unconfigured homelab,
-// wrong for an alert whose entire value is that someone finds out. The cost of
-// the silence is that "configured and working" and "never configured" are
-// byte-identical in behaviour: no error, no warning, only a message that never
-// arrives, which nobody notices because nobody is waiting for an alert they
-// have never seen. Two alerts were dark in production for exactly that reason
-// (#100), found by firing a real event rather than by reading anything.
-//
-// WARN rather than fatal, deliberately. The brain sibling rule
-// (`empty-credential-must-refuse-to-start-not-switch-modes`) says an empty
-// credential must be a startup error, never a silent mode switch — but that is
-// about a control being removed. Here observability is degraded, not a gate
-// bypassed, and refusing to boot would break the unconfigured-homelab case the
-// nil notifier exists to support. What the rule does demand, and what this
-// provides, is that the mode switch stops being silent.
-//
-// Pure and env-injected so the message is testable without a running server:
-// the reason this gap survived is that nothing about it was observable.
-func alertingWarnings(getenv func(string) string) []string {
-	var out []string
-	if getenv("BRAIN_NTFY_URL") == "" {
-		out = append(out, "alerting DISABLED: BRAIN_NTFY_URL unset — "+
-			"brain_edit_root governance rewrites and capture audit degradation will not notify")
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 func buildNotifier() audit.Notifier {
 	if n := audit.NewNtfyNotifier(os.Getenv("BRAIN_NTFY_URL"), os.Getenv("BRAIN_NTFY_TOKEN")); n != nil {
 		return n
@@ -234,10 +203,6 @@ func systemHostname() string {
 func main() {
 	logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
 
-	for _, w := range alertingWarnings(os.Getenv) {
-		logger.Warn(w)
-	}
-
 	brainDir := envOr("INGEST_BRAIN_DIR", "../brain")
 	port := envOr("INGEST_PORT", "3300")
 

ingestion/cmd/server/main_test.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -37,42 +36,3 @@ func TestClaudeSink_IngestWritesToNonIndexedArchiveNotWiki(t *testing.T) {
 	_, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "wiki", "claude-sessions"))
 	assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "raw transcripts must never land under wiki/ (ai-sessions#10 — BM25 pollution)")
 }
-
-// --- #107: an unconfigured alert must announce itself ----------------------
-
-func TestAlertingWarnings(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  map[string]string
-		want []string // substrings that must appear across the warnings
-		none bool     // true = expect no warnings at all
-	}{
-		{
-			// The failure this exists to prevent: two alerts dark in
-			// production, discovered only by firing a real event and watching
-			// nothing arrive (#100).
-			name: "notifier unconfigured names what will not fire",
-			env:  map[string]string{},
-			want: []string{"BRAIN_NTFY_URL", "brain_edit_root", "audit"},
-		},
-		{
-			name: "configured notifier is silent",
-			env:  map[string]string{"BRAIN_NTFY_URL": "http://ntfy/brain-alerts"},
-			none: true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := alertingWarnings(func(k string) string { return tt.env[k] })
-			if tt.none {
-				assert.Empty(t, got)
-				return
-			}
-			joined := strings.Join(got, " ")
-			for _, w := range tt.want {
-				assert.Contains(t, joined, w)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

ingestion/internal/api/frontmatter.go

@@ -1,12 +1,6 @@
 package api
 
-import (
+import "strings"
-	"strings"
-
-	// Aliased: this package's own frontmatter type (below) would collide
-	// with the imported package's name otherwise.
-	sharedfm "github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/frontmatter"
-)
 
 // frontmatter is an ordered, line-preserving view of a note's YAML
 // frontmatter block. It deliberately avoids a full YAML round-trip: the
@@ -31,26 +25,19 @@ type fmLine struct {
 // frontmatter block is recognised only when the file opens with a `---`
 // fence and a closing `---` fence follows. Otherwise the whole input is
 // the body and the returned frontmatter is empty.
-//
-// Fence detection itself is frontmatter.Split (hyperguild#138) — this
-// package's own contribution is purely the ordered, line-preserving fmLine
-// shape below, which a shared parser has no business owning since it's
-// specific to how brain_update does a surgical, byte-round-trip edit.
 func parseFrontmatter(src string) (frontmatter, string) {
 	var fm frontmatter
-	blockBytes, restBytes, ok := sharedfm.Split([]byte(src))
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(src, "---\n") {
-	if !ok {
 		return fm, src
 	}
-	// sharedfm.Split's block/rest boundary sits one byte earlier than this
+	rest := src[len("---\n"):]
-	// package's always has: block keeps the "\n" immediately before the
+	end := strings.Index(rest, "\n---\n")
-	// closing fence, and rest keeps the "\n" immediately after it (both by
+	if end < 0 {
-	// design, for Fix's own reconstruction). This package's block/body
+		// Opening fence with no closing fence — treat as bodyless content.
-	// never included either — TrimSuffix/TrimPrefix restore that exact
+		return fm, src
-	// boundary. Split guarantees ok=true only when "\n---\n" matched, so
+	}
-	// both trims are always exactly one byte, never ambiguous.
+	block := rest[:end]
-	block := strings.TrimSuffix(string(blockBytes), "\n")
+	body := rest[end+len("\n---\n"):]
-	body := strings.TrimPrefix(string(restBytes), "\n")
 
 	for _, line := range strings.Split(block, "\n") {
 		// An indented line is a continuation (a YAML block-list item, a
@@ -95,18 +82,6 @@ func (f *frontmatter) set(key, value string) {
 	f.lines = append(f.lines, fmLine{key: key, value: value})
 }
 
-// del removes every top-level line for key. Continuation lines of a
-// multi-line value are not tracked per key, so del is only for scalars.
-func (f *frontmatter) del(key string) {
-	kept := f.lines[:0]
-	for _, l := range f.lines {
-		if l.key != key {
-			kept = append(kept, l)
-		}
-	}
-	f.lines = kept
-}
-
 // render serialises the frontmatter back into a `---`-fenced block. An
 // empty frontmatter renders to the empty string so bodies without a
 // header stay header-less.

ingestion/internal/api/handler.go

@@ -118,20 +118,6 @@ type WriteNoteOptions struct {
 	Wing       string
 	Hall       string
 	SourceType string // "internal" marks a first-party observation (e.g. claudewatcher) that needs no external citation
-	// Origin/WrittenBy are server-owned provenance (hyperguild#145): any
-	// origin/written_by in Content's own frontmatter is discarded, so a
-	// caller cannot claim a more trusted origin than it authenticated as.
-	Origin    string
-	WrittenBy string
-}
-
-// provenanceOrigin normalises an origin for the frontmatter: absence must
-// never read as trusted, so empty becomes "unknown".
-func provenanceOrigin(o string) string {
-	if o == "" {
-		return "unknown"
-	}
-	return o
 }
 
 // WriteNote writes a markdown note into the brain. Returns the path
@@ -194,11 +180,6 @@ func writeHallNote(brainDir string, opts WriteNoteOptions) (string, error) {
 	fmt.Fprintf(&fm, "hall: %s\n", opts.Hall)
 	fmt.Fprintf(&fm, "created_at: %s\n", time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
 	emitted["wing"], emitted["hall"], emitted["created_at"] = true, true, true
-	fmt.Fprintf(&fm, "origin: %s\n", provenanceOrigin(opts.Origin))
-	emitted["origin"], emitted["written_by"] = true, true
-	if opts.WrittenBy != "" {
-		fmt.Fprintf(&fm, "written_by: %s\n", opts.WrittenBy)
-	}
 
 	// writeField merges one key: opts.Content's own value (if the note already
 	// carries this field in its own frontmatter) always wins over the fallback,
@@ -314,16 +295,7 @@ func (h *Handler) Write(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON")
 		return
 	}
-	// Field by field, not a struct conversion: provenance is server-owned and
+	relPath, err := WriteNote(h.brainDir, WriteNoteOptions(req))
-	// this door carries no principal, so it stamps origin: unknown
-	// (hyperguild#145). A JSON body must never be able to set it.
-	relPath, err := WriteNote(h.brainDir, WriteNoteOptions{
-		Content:    req.Content,
-		Filename:   req.Filename,
-		Wing:       req.Wing,
-		Hall:       req.Hall,
-		SourceType: req.SourceType,
-	})
 	if err != nil {
 		h.logger.Error("write failed", "err", err)
 		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())

ingestion/internal/api/update.go

@@ -46,11 +46,6 @@ type UpdateNoteOptions struct {
 	Slug    string
 	Content string // new full body (whole-note replace)
 	Reason  string // optional; stamped as supersede_reason
-	// Origin/WrittenBy re-stamp provenance to the updating principal: the
-	// body is replaced wholesale, so the last writer is the author of what
-	// a reader sees (hyperguild#145). Never taken from Content's fragment.
-	Origin    string
-	WrittenBy string
 }
 
 // UpdateNote supersedes an existing note in place. It replaces the body
@@ -115,31 +110,11 @@ func UpdateNote(brainDir string, opts UpdateNoteOptions) (relPath, contentHash,
 
 	fm, _ := parseFrontmatter(string(prior))
 	for _, l := range contentFM.lines {
-		// updated_at/supersedes/supersede_reason are this function's own
+		if l.key != "" {
-		// output, not something a caller's fragment sets — updated_at and
-		// supersedes are already unconditionally re-set below regardless of
-		// what the loop does with them, but supersede_reason is only
-		// re-set when opts.Reason is non-empty, so without this skip a
-		// caller could set it via its own fragment and have it survive
-		// even when Reason is empty, bypassing the one intended entry
-		// point for that field (hyperguild#125, found in #111's review).
-		// Skipping all three here rather than relying on the unconditional
-		// overwrites below to save the other two keeps the invariant
-		// explicit at the one place it can be silently broken by a future
-		// reordering, not implicit in call order.
-		if l.key == "" || l.key == "updated_at" || l.key == "supersedes" || l.key == "supersede_reason" ||
-			l.key == "origin" || l.key == "written_by" {
-			continue
-		}
 			fm.set(l.key, l.value)
 		}
-	fm.set("updated_at", time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
-	fm.set("origin", provenanceOrigin(opts.Origin))
-	if opts.WrittenBy != "" {
-		fm.set("written_by", opts.WrittenBy)
-	} else {
-		fm.del("written_by")
 	}
+	fm.set("updated_at", time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
 	fm.set("supersedes", priorHash)
 	if opts.Reason != "" {
 		fm.set("supersede_reason", opts.Reason)

ingestion/internal/api/update_test.go

@@ -231,45 +231,6 @@ func TestUpdateThenReadRoundTripsHash(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, hash, readHash, "update content_hash must round-trip through ReadNote")
 }
 
-func TestUpdateNoteSupersedeReasonNotSettableViaCallerFragmentWhenReasonOptionEmpty(t *testing.T) {
-	// hyperguild#125, found in #111's review: the merge loop applied every
-	// field from the caller's leading frontmatter fragment, including
-	// supersede_reason -- which is only re-set unconditionally when
-	// opts.Reason is non-empty, so a caller could set it via its own
-	// fragment and have it survive even with Reason left empty, bypassing
-	// the one intended entry point for that field.
-	brainDir := t.TempDir()
-	rel := seedNote(t, brainDir, "wiki/a/facts/n.md", "---\nwing: a\nhall: facts\n---\nold\n")
-
-	_, _, _, err := UpdateNote(brainDir, UpdateNoteOptions{
-		Path:    rel,
-		Content: "---\nsupersede_reason: snuck in via the fragment\n---\nnew\n",
-		// Reason deliberately left empty.
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(brainDir, filepath.FromSlash(rel)))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.NotContains(t, string(got), "supersede_reason",
-		"supersede_reason must not appear at all when opts.Reason is empty, regardless of what the fragment tried to set")
-}
-
-func TestUpdateNoteSupersedeReasonFromOptionStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
-	// Regression pin: the legitimate entry point (opts.Reason) must be
-	// completely unaffected by #125's fix.
-	brainDir := t.TempDir()
-	rel := seedNote(t, brainDir, "wiki/a/facts/n.md", "---\nwing: a\nhall: facts\n---\nold\n")
-
-	_, _, _, err := UpdateNote(brainDir, UpdateNoteOptions{
-		Path: rel, Content: "new\n", Reason: "facts changed",
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	got, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(brainDir, filepath.FromSlash(rel)))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Contains(t, string(got), "supersede_reason: facts changed")
-}
-
 func TestContentHashStable(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, ContentHash([]byte("abc")), ContentHash([]byte("abc")))
 	assert.NotEqual(t, ContentHash([]byte("abc")), ContentHash([]byte("abd")))

ingestion/internal/brainstore/store.go

@@ -53,8 +53,6 @@ func (s *Store) Write(ctx context.Context, n capture.Note) (capture.Ref, error)
 		Filename: n.Filename,
 		Wing:     n.Wing,
 		Hall:     n.Hall,
-		Origin:    n.Origin,
-		WrittenBy: n.WrittenBy,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return capture.Ref{}, err
@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ func (s *Store) Update(ctx context.Context, slug string, n capture.Note) (captur
 	}
 	n.Content = content
 
-	opts := api.UpdateNoteOptions{Content: n.Content, Reason: n.Reason, Origin: n.Origin, WrittenBy: n.WrittenBy}
+	opts := api.UpdateNoteOptions{Content: n.Content, Reason: n.Reason}
 	if strings.Contains(slug, "/") {
 		opts.Path = slug
 	} else {

ingestion/internal/capture/entities.go

@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ type CaptureContext struct {
 	Classification string // caller-declared level token ("" = unspecified)
 	Principal      string // server-derived (auth); audit identity
 	Origin         Zone   // server-derived trust zone; the I1 gate input
-	AuthPath       string // server-derived: "static" or "jwt"; stamped as note provenance (#145)
 }
 
 // Insight is one piece of session knowledge bound for the brain. A

ingestion/internal/capture/ports.go

@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@ type Note struct {
 	Wing     string
 	Hall     string
 	Reason   string
-	// Provenance (hyperguild#145) is stamped by the server from the
-	// authenticated principal, never taken from Content's frontmatter.
-	// Origin is "static", "jwt" or "unknown"; empty means "unknown".
-	Origin    string
-	WrittenBy string
 }
 
 // BrainStore is the brain persistence port — the shared implementation of

ingestion/internal/capture/service.go

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ func (s *Service) Capture(ctx context.Context, in CaptureInput) (CaptureReceipt,
 	var landed []string
 
 	for i, ins := range in.Insights {
-		res, item, err := s.persistInsight(ctx, ins, in.Context)
+		res, item, err := s.persistInsight(ctx, ins)
 		receipt.Insights = append(receipt.Insights, res)
 		if err != nil {
 			receipt.Errors = append(receipt.Errors, ItemError{Item: fmt.Sprintf("insight[%d]", i), Error: err.Error()})
@@ -278,11 +278,8 @@ func escalationReason(escalators []string) string {
 	return "required by: " + strings.Join(escalators, ", ")
 }
 
-func (s *Service) persistInsight(ctx context.Context, ins Insight, cc CaptureContext) (InsightResult, string, error) {
+func (s *Service) persistInsight(ctx context.Context, ins Insight) (InsightResult, string, error) {
-	note := Note{
+	note := Note{Content: ins.Text, Wing: ins.Wing, Hall: ins.Hall, Filename: brain.Sanitise(firstLine(ins.Text))}
-		Content: ins.Text, Wing: ins.Wing, Hall: ins.Hall, Filename: brain.Sanitise(firstLine(ins.Text)),
-		Origin: cc.AuthPath, WrittenBy: cc.Principal,
-	}
 	var ref Ref
 	var err error
 	if ins.SupersedeSlug != "" {

ingestion/internal/capturehttp/handler.go

@@ -104,10 +104,6 @@ func (h *Handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// caller may have tried to put in the body.
 	in.Context.Principal = principal
 	in.Context.Origin = h.resolver.Resolve(principal, viaStatic)
-	in.Context.AuthPath = "jwt"
-	if viaStatic {
-		in.Context.AuthPath = "static"
-	}
 
 	rec, err := h.svc.Capture(r.Context(), in)
 	switch {

ingestion/internal/claudewatcher/scrubber.go

@@ -43,26 +43,6 @@ var DefaultRules = []Rule{
 	// JSON, so both segments begin with "eyJ".
 	{Name: "jwt", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}`)},
 	{Name: "postgres-uri-with-password", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`postgres(?:ql)?://[^:\s/]+:[^@\s/]+@`)},
-	// Any credential embedded in a URL's userinfo, which is what a git credential
-	// store holds: `https://<user>:<token>@host`. The postgres rule above is the
-	// same shape narrowed to one scheme, and is kept ahead of this one only so a
-	// DSN reports the more specific name -- same ordering convention as
-	// authorization-header before bearer-token.
-	//
-	// Added after this shape passed ALL rules and was therefore ingested rather
-	// than dropped (hyperguild#142). It reached ~/.claude/projects -- this
-	// watcher's own input -- because a test suite in mathias/infra executed a
-	// script that configures git while inheriting the operator's real $HOME, read
-	// koala's live credential store, and printed it. Two credentials were rotated
-	// (infra#466). The scrubber is the control that decides whether that class of
-	// mistake is survivable, and for this shape it was failing open.
-	//
-	// The {8,} floor on the secret half is what keeps `https://host:443/path` and
-	// `https://user:@host` out; the `[^:\s/@]+` user half stops a host:port pair
-	// being read as userinfo. Both directions are covered by
-	// TestScrub_URLUserinfoCredential, because a rule that dropped every URL with
-	// a colon in it would discard most of the signal this watcher exists to keep.
-	{Name: "url-userinfo-credential", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.\-]*://[^:\s/@]+:[^@\s/]{8,}@`)},
 	{Name: "private-key", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN[^-]*PRIVATE KEY-----`)},
 	{Name: "ssh-key", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`ssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|ecdsa)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}`)},
 	{Name: "github-pat", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghr|gha)_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b`)},

ingestion/internal/claudewatcher/scrubber_test.go

@@ -46,64 +46,6 @@ func TestScrub_PoisonedFixtures(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// A credential embedded in a URL's userinfo is the shape a git credential store
-// holds -- `https://<user>:<token>@host` -- and it walked past every rule until
-// hyperguild#142. There was a rule for `postgres://user:pass@` and nothing for the
-// general form, so `~/.git-credentials` content was ingested rather than dropped.
-//
-// Found the hard way: a test suite in mathias/infra executed a script that
-// configures git while inheriting the operator's real $HOME, read koala's live
-// credential store, and printed two live credentials into a session transcript.
-// ~/.claude/projects is this watcher's own input, so the scrubber was the last
-// line of defence for that mistake and it failed open. Two credentials were
-// rotated (infra#466).
-//
-// The lesson is not "do not read the credential file" -- that mistake will recur.
-// It is that this shape must fail closed, because the scrubber is what decides
-// whether such a mistake is survivable.
-func TestScrub_URLUserinfoCredential(t *testing.T) {
-	// Every secret below is INVENTED. None is or was a real credential.
-	mustScrub := []struct {
-		name    string
-		content string
-	}{
-		{"git-credential-store-user", "https://mathias:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567@git.d-ma.be"},
-		{"git-credential-store-oauth2", "https://oauth2:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567@git.d-ma.be"},
-		{"in-context-payload-line", `payload line: https://mathias:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567@git.d-ma.be`},
-		{"clone-url-in-argv", "git clone https://oauth2:abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx@git.d-ma.be/mathias/infra.git"},
-		{"http-not-https", "http://admin:supersecretvalue123@10.0.1.20/api"},
-		{"git-plus-ssh-scheme", "git+ssh://deploy:abcdefghijklmnop@example.com/repo"},
-		{"redis-scheme", "redis://default:abcdefghijklmnopqrst@10.0.1.20:6379/0"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range mustScrub {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			assert.NotEmpty(t, Scrub(tc.content),
-				"a credential in URL userinfo must be dropped, not ingested")
-		})
-	}
-
-	// The other direction matters as much: a rule that scrubs every URL with a
-	// colon in it would drop most of the signal this watcher exists to keep.
-	mustNotScrub := []struct {
-		name    string
-		content string
-	}{
-		{"host-with-port", "cloning https://git.d-ma.be:443/mathias/infra.git"},
-		{"postgres-no-password", "postgres://localhost:5432/brain"},
-		{"url-with-colon-in-query", "GET https://example.com/path?filter=a:b&x=1"},
-		{"plain-url", "see https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/infra/issues/466"},
-		{"userinfo-no-secret", "https://user:@example.com"},
-		{"format-string-placeholder", `printf 'https://oauth2:%s@%s\n' "$TOKEN" "$HOST"`},
-		{"scheme-relative-time", "duration https://example.com took 00:03:22"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range mustNotScrub {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			assert.Empty(t, Scrub(tc.content),
-				"this is not a credential and must pass through")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestScrub_CleanContentPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []string{
 		"",

ingestion/internal/frontmatter/frontmatter.go

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func Fix(doc []byte) ([]byte, bool, error) {
 		return doc, false, fmt.Errorf("frontmatter: quoting did not repair the block: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	_, rest, _ := Split(doc)
+	_, rest, _ := split(doc)
 	out := []byte(fence + "\n")
 	out = append(out, fixed...)
 	out = append(out, []byte(fence)...)
@@ -122,25 +122,14 @@ func needsQuoting(value string) bool {
 
 // block returns the raw YAML between the opening and closing fences.
 func block(doc []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
-	b, _, ok := Split(doc)
+	b, _, ok := split(doc)
 	return b, ok
 }
 
-// Split returns doc's frontmatter block and everything from the closing
+// split returns the frontmatter block and everything from the closing fence
-// fence onward (the closing fence itself excluded, its trailing newline
+// onward (the closing fence itself excluded, its trailing newline included).
-// included), or ok=false if doc has no properly-fenced frontmatter.
+func split(doc []byte) (block, rest []byte, ok bool) {
-//
+	s := string(doc)
-// The canonical fence detector for this codebase (hyperguild#138): three
-// independent reimplementations of this same logic each grew their own gap
-// through separate bug-fixing before being consolidated here —
-// internal/mcp's needed a CRLF/BOM guard added after both silently defeated
-// its own HasPrefix check, and internal/api's closing-fence match had no
-// trailing-newline requirement, so a document ending in "\n---extra" with no
-// real newline after the fence was treated as validly closed. Both classes
-// are closed here, once, for every caller.
-func Split(doc []byte) (block, rest []byte, ok bool) {
-	s := strings.TrimPrefix(string(doc), "\xef\xbb\xbf")
-	s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "\r\n", "\n")
 	if !strings.HasPrefix(s, fence+"\n") {
 		return nil, nil, false
 	}
@@ -150,18 +139,5 @@ func Split(doc []byte) (block, rest []byte, ok bool) {
 	if idx < 0 {
 		return nil, nil, false
 	}
-	// What follows the closing fence must be either a newline (a real body
+	return []byte(body[:idx+1]), []byte(body[idx+1+len(fence):]), true
-	// follows) or nothing at all (the fence is the literal end of the
-	// document — no body, not a bypass attempt). Anything else, e.g.
-	// "\n---extra", is not a valid close: an earlier version of this check
-	// accepted it, which is exactly the looser match hyperguild#138 closes.
-	after := idx + 1 + len(fence)
-	switch {
-	case after == len(body):
-		return []byte(body[:idx+1]), nil, true
-	case body[after] == '\n':
-		return []byte(body[:idx+1]), []byte(body[after:]), true
-	default:
-		return nil, nil, false
-	}
 }

ingestion/internal/frontmatter/frontmatter_test.go

@@ -168,9 +168,9 @@ func TestFix_PreservesBodyExactly(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, changed)
 	assert.True(t, len(got) > 0)
 
-	_, rest, ok := Split([]byte(doc))
+	_, rest, ok := split([]byte(doc))
 	require.True(t, ok)
-	_, gotRest, ok := Split(got)
+	_, gotRest, ok := split(got)
 	require.True(t, ok)
 	assert.Equal(t, string(rest), string(gotRest), "the body must not be touched")
 }
@@ -186,55 +186,3 @@ func TestFix_RefusesToReturnAnUnparseableResult(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t, changed)
 	assert.Equal(t, doc, string(got), "an unfixable document must come back byte-identical")
 }
-
-// TestSplit_NormalizesCRLFBeforeFenceDetection is hyperguild#138: a note
-// whose fence lines use CRLF ("---\r\n") failed strings.HasPrefix(doc,
-// "---\n") on the precondition read in internal/mcp's independent
-// reimplementation -- encoding alone, no adversarial input, silently
-// defeated fence detection there before this consolidation. Split must
-// never repeat that.
-func TestSplit_NormalizesCRLFBeforeFenceDetection(t *testing.T) {
-	doc := "---\r\ntitle: 'n'\r\nhalf_life: durable\r\n---\r\n\r\nbody\r\n"
-	block, rest, ok := Split([]byte(doc))
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Contains(t, string(block), "half_life: durable")
-	assert.Contains(t, string(rest), "body")
-}
-
-// TestSplit_StripsALeadingUTF8BOM is the same mechanism one layer earlier:
-// a leading BOM (Notepad's default "UTF-8" save, PowerShell's pre-v6
-// Out-File/Set-Content) defeats the same HasPrefix check before CRLF
-// normalization even applies.
-func TestSplit_StripsALeadingUTF8BOM(t *testing.T) {
-	doc := "\xef\xbb\xbf---\ntitle: 'n'\n---\n\nbody\n"
-	block, rest, ok := Split([]byte(doc))
-	require.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Contains(t, string(block), "title: 'n'")
-	assert.Contains(t, string(rest), "body")
-}
-
-// TestSplit_RequiresANewlineAfterTheClosingFence closes the looser match
-// internal/api's independent reimplementation carried (strings.Index(body,
-// "\n"+fence) with no trailing-newline requirement): a document ending in
-// "\n---extra" with no newline separating the fence from what follows it is
-// not a valid closing fence and must not be treated as one.
-func TestSplit_RequiresANewlineAfterTheClosingFence(t *testing.T) {
-	doc := "---\ntitle: 'n'\n---extra-not-a-real-close"
-	_, _, ok := Split([]byte(doc))
-	assert.False(t, ok, "a fence line not followed by a newline is not a valid closing fence")
-}
-
-// TestSplit_AcceptsAClosingFenceThatIsTheLastBytesOfTheDocument is a
-// regression pin found in review of hyperguild#138: the fix for the
-// "\n---extra" bypass above must not also reject the legitimate case of a
-// closing fence with nothing after it at all (no trailing newline because
-// there's no body, not because a bypass is being attempted) -- this
-// package's own private split() accepted that shape before the
-// consolidation, and cmd/frontmatterlint's Lint/Fix relied on it.
-func TestSplit_AcceptsAClosingFenceThatIsTheLastBytesOfTheDocument(t *testing.T) {
-	doc := "---\ntitle: 'n'\n---"
-	block, rest, ok := Split([]byte(doc))
-	require.True(t, ok, "a closing fence at literal end-of-file, with nothing after it, is valid -- there is no body to require a newline before")
-	assert.Contains(t, string(block), "title: 'n'")
-	assert.Equal(t, "", string(rest))
-}

ingestion/internal/mcp/audit.go

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-package mcp
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"log/slog"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// logToolCall emits one structured record per tools/call (hyperguild#144,
-// OWASP MCP08): who called which tool, against which wing/hall, and how it
-// ended. Brain content is never copied into the record — only its size — so
-// the audit trail does not become a second, unscrubbed copy of the brain.
-func logToolCall(ctx context.Context, name string, args json.RawMessage, start time.Time, err error) {
-	origin, principal := provenanceFrom(ctx)
-	attrs := []any{
-		"tool", name,
-		"principal", principal,
-		"origin", origin,
-		"duration_ms", time.Since(start).Milliseconds(),
-	}
-	var a struct {
-		Wing    string `json:"wing"`
-		Hall    string `json:"hall"`
-		Content string `json:"content"`
-	}
-	if json.Unmarshal(args, &a) == nil {
-		if a.Wing != "" {
-			attrs = append(attrs, "wing", a.Wing)
-		}
-		if a.Hall != "" {
-			attrs = append(attrs, "hall", a.Hall)
-		}
-		if a.Content != "" {
-			attrs = append(attrs, "content_bytes", len(a.Content))
-		}
-	}
-	outcome := "ok"
-	if err != nil {
-		outcome = err.Error()
-		if len(outcome) > 200 {
-			outcome = outcome[:200]
-		}
-	}
-	attrs = append(attrs, "outcome", outcome)
-	slog.InfoContext(ctx, "mcp tool call", attrs...)
-}

ingestion/internal/mcp/audit_test.go

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-package mcp_test
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"log/slog"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// captureToolCallLog routes slog to a buffer for fn and returns the decoded
-// "mcp tool call" records.
-func captureToolCallLog(t *testing.T, fn func()) []map[string]any {
-	t.Helper()
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	prev := slog.Default()
-	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil)))
-	t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
-	fn()
-	var out []map[string]any
-	for _, l := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n") {
-		var rec map[string]any
-		if json.Unmarshal([]byte(l), &rec) == nil && rec["msg"] == "mcp tool call" {
-			out = append(out, rec)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// hyperguild#144: brain_query/brain_read left no record of who read what.
-func TestToolsCallLogsOneRecordWithToolPrincipalOriginAndScope(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, _, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	recs := captureToolCallLog(t, func() {
-		authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_query",
-			map[string]any{"query": "anything", "wing": "homelab", "hall": "facts"})
-	})
-	require.Len(t, recs, 1)
-	r := recs[0]
-	assert.Equal(t, "brain_query", r["tool"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "local-cli", r["principal"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "static", r["origin"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "homelab", r["wing"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "facts", r["hall"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "ok", r["outcome"])
-	assert.Contains(t, r, "duration_ms")
-}
-
-func TestToolsCallWithoutDerivablePrincipalLogsOriginUnknown(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, _, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	recs := captureToolCallLog(t, func() {
-		authCall(t, srv, "", "brain_query", map[string]any{"query": "x"})
-	})
-	require.Len(t, recs, 1)
-	assert.Equal(t, "unknown", recs[0]["origin"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "", recs[0]["principal"])
-}
-
-func TestToolsCallLogsErrorOutcome(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, _, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	recs := captureToolCallLog(t, func() {
-		authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_query", map[string]any{})
-	})
-	require.Len(t, recs, 1)
-	assert.Contains(t, recs[0]["outcome"], "query is required")
-}
-
-// The audit line must not become a second copy of brain content.
-func TestToolsCallLogOmitsContentButRecordsItsSize(t *testing.T) {
-	const sentinel = "SENTINEL-BRAIN-CONTENT-91c2"
-	srv, _, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	recs := captureToolCallLog(t, func() {
-		authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_write", map[string]any{
-			"content": "# t\n\n" + sentinel, "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "audit-sentinel",
-		})
-	})
-	require.Len(t, recs, 1)
-	raw, _ := json.Marshal(recs[0])
-	assert.NotContains(t, string(raw), sentinel)
-	assert.EqualValues(t, len("# t\n\n"+sentinel), recs[0]["content_bytes"])
-}

ingestion/internal/mcp/handlers.go

@@ -255,14 +255,11 @@ func (s *Server) brainWrite(ctx context.Context, args json.RawMessage) (json.Raw
 	// one implementation (capture uses the same store). The read-after-write
 	// handle {id, path, content_hash} comes back from the store; path is kept
 	// for backward compatibility.
-	origin, writtenBy := provenanceFrom(ctx)
 	ref, err := s.store.Write(ctx, capture.Note{
 		Content:  a.Content,
 		Filename: a.Filename,
 		Wing:     a.Wing,
 		Hall:     a.Hall,
-		Origin:    origin,
-		WrittenBy: writtenBy,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -307,14 +304,11 @@ func (s *Server) brainUpdate(ctx context.Context, args json.RawMessage) (json.Ra
 	if a.Path != "" {
 		slug = a.Path
 	}
-	origin, writtenBy := provenanceFrom(ctx)
 	ref, err := s.store.Update(ctx, slug, capture.Note{
 		Content: a.Content,
 		Wing:    a.Wing,
 		Hall:    a.Hall,
 		Reason:  a.Reason,
-		Origin:    origin,
-		WrittenBy: writtenBy,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

ingestion/internal/mcp/provenance_test.go

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-package mcp_test
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// resultText decodes the tool result payload of a tools/call response.
-func resultText(t *testing.T, resp map[string]any) map[string]any {
-	t.Helper()
-	require.NotContains(t, resp, "error", "tool call failed: %v", resp["error"])
-	content := resp["result"].(map[string]any)["content"].([]any)
-	var out map[string]any
-	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(content[0].(map[string]any)["text"].(string)), &out))
-	return out
-}
-
-func readNote(t *testing.T, dir, rel string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, filepath.FromSlash(rel)))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return string(b)
-}
-
-func frontmatterOf(note string) string {
-	parts := strings.SplitN(note, "---\n", 3)
-	if len(parts) < 3 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return parts[1]
-}
-
-// hyperguild#145: a brain entry records which principal wrote it, so a reader
-// can tell a local-CLI note from one a connector session wrote after reading
-// an untrusted page.
-func TestBrainWriteStampsPrincipalProvenance(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, dir, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	out := resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_write", map[string]any{
-		"content": "# P\n\nbody", "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "prov-static",
-	}))
-	fm := frontmatterOf(readNote(t, dir, out["path"].(string)))
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "origin: static\n")
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "written_by: local-cli\n")
-}
-
-func TestBrainWriteWithoutPrincipalStampsOriginUnknown(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, dir, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	out := resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "", "brain_write", map[string]any{
-		"content": "# P\n\nbody", "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "prov-unknown",
-	}))
-	fm := frontmatterOf(readNote(t, dir, out["path"].(string)))
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "origin: unknown\n")
-	assert.NotContains(t, fm, "written_by:")
-}
-
-// The control: a caller cannot claim a more trusted origin by putting it in
-// its own frontmatter.
-func TestBrainWriteOverwritesCallerSuppliedProvenance(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, dir, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	forged := "---\norigin: static\nwritten_by: local-cli\n---\n# F\n\nbody"
-	out := resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "", "brain_write", map[string]any{
-		"content": forged, "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "prov-forged",
-	}))
-	fm := frontmatterOf(readNote(t, dir, out["path"].(string)))
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "origin: unknown\n")
-	assert.NotContains(t, fm, "origin: static")
-	assert.NotContains(t, fm, "written_by: local-cli")
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, strings.Count(fm, "origin:"), "exactly one origin line")
-}
-
-// brain_update replaces the content wholesale, so provenance follows the
-// last writer — and a forged fragment must not survive the merge either.
-func TestBrainUpdateRestampsProvenanceAndIgnoresForgedFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, dir, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	out := resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_write", map[string]any{
-		"content": "# U\n\nv1", "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "prov-update",
-	}))
-	path := out["path"].(string)
-	resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "", "brain_update", map[string]any{
-		"path": path, "content": "---\norigin: static\nwritten_by: local-cli\n---\n# U\n\nv2",
-	}))
-	fm := frontmatterOf(readNote(t, dir, path))
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "origin: unknown\n")
-	assert.NotContains(t, fm, "written_by: local-cli")
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, strings.Count(fm, "origin:"))
-}
-
-func TestBrainQueryReturnsProvenance(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, _, _, _ := govServer(t)
-	resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_write", map[string]any{
-		"content": "# Zebrafinch\n\nzebrafinch provenance probe", "wing": "testing", "hall": "facts", "filename": "prov-query",
-	}))
-	out := resultText(t, authCall(t, srv, "Bearer "+capStaticTok, "brain_query", map[string]any{"query": "zebrafinch"}))
-	results := out["results"].([]any)
-	require.NotEmpty(t, results)
-	hit := results[0].(map[string]any)
-	assert.Equal(t, "static", hit["origin"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "local-cli", hit["written_by"])
-}
-
-// capture is the door a claude.ai connector session uses, so it is the one
-// whose provenance matters most: a JWT principal must be stamped as such.
-func TestCaptureStampsJWTProvenance(t *testing.T) {
-	srv, brainDir := captureServer(t, capFakeValidator{subject: "koala-cli"}, []string{"koala-cli"})
-	resp := captureCall(t, srv, "Bearer jwt-token", map[string]any{
-		"context":  map[string]any{"harness": "claude-code", "actor": "mathias", "classification": "internal"},
-		"insights": []map[string]any{{"text": "Capture provenance probe", "wing": "hyperguild", "hall": "facts"}},
-	})
-	require.Nil(t, resp["error"], "got error: %v", resp["error"])
-	matches, err := filepath.Glob(filepath.Join(brainDir, "wiki/hyperguild/facts/*.md"))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Len(t, matches, 1)
-	b, err := os.ReadFile(matches[0])
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	fm := frontmatterOf(string(b))
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "origin: jwt\n")
-	assert.Contains(t, fm, "written_by: koala-cli\n")
-}

ingestion/internal/mcp/server.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/brainstore"
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/capture"
@@ -230,9 +229,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 				ctx = withPrincipal(ctx, principal, viaStatic)
 			}
 		}
-		start := time.Now()
 		out, err := s.handleCall(ctx, p.Name, p.Arguments)
-		logToolCall(ctx, p.Name, p.Arguments, start, err)
 		if err != nil {
 			rpcErr = &rpcError{Code: -32000, Message: err.Error()}
 			break

ingestion/internal/mcp/tools_capture.go

@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ func (s *Server) brainCapture(ctx context.Context, args json.RawMessage) (json.R
 	// Principal and origin are server-derived — never taken from the body.
 	in.Context.Principal = info.principal
 	in.Context.Origin = s.capture.resolver.Resolve(info.principal, info.viaStatic)
-	in.Context.AuthPath, _ = provenanceFrom(ctx)
 
 	rec, err := s.capture.svc.Capture(ctx, in)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -100,17 +99,3 @@ func (s *Server) brainCapture(ctx context.Context, args json.RawMessage) (json.R
 	}
 	return json.Marshal(rec)
 }
-
-// provenanceFrom maps the authenticated principal in ctx to the provenance
-// stamped on a brain write (hyperguild#145). No principal → "unknown", never
-// silence: an unstamped note must not read as trusted.
-func provenanceFrom(ctx context.Context) (origin, writtenBy string) {
-	info, ok := ctx.Value(principalKey).(principalInfo)
-	if !ok {
-		return "unknown", ""
-	}
-	if info.viaStatic {
-		return "static", info.principal
-	}
-	return "jwt", info.principal
-}

ingestion/internal/mcp/tools_notes.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/capture"
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/claim"
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/classification"
-	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/frontmatter"
 	"github.com/mathiasbq/hyperguild/ingestion/internal/notes"
 )
 
@@ -332,20 +331,27 @@ func checkClaimEnvelope(brainDir, path, oldStr, newStr string) error {
 // frontmatterBlock returns the raw text between doc's opening and closing
 // `---` fences, or ok=false if doc has no (properly closed) fence.
 func frontmatterBlock(doc string) (block string, ok bool) {
-	// hyperguild#138: fence detection itself is frontmatter.Split, shared
+	// Round 4 found a note with CRLF fence lines ("---\r\n") silently
-	// with internal/api and internal/frontmatter — the CRLF/BOM guards that
+	// defeats HasPrefix(doc, "---\n") on the precondition read — not an
-	// used to live here (added piecemeal across rounds 4 and 5 of #123's
+	// adversarial old_str/new_str, just an encoding difference — which
-	// review) are now the shared parser's job, so every caller inherits a
+	// makes checkClaimEnvelope no-op entirely. Round 5 found the same
-	// fix instead of needing bug-for-bug parity edits.
+	// mechanism one layer earlier: a leading UTF-8 BOM (a live, plausible
-	b, _, ok := frontmatter.Split([]byte(doc))
+	// byte sequence — Notepad's default "UTF-8" save and PowerShell's
-	if !ok {
+	// pre-v6 Out-File/Set-Content both emit one) defeats the same prefix
+	// check before CRLF normalization even applies. Strip both, here, so
+	// every caller (hadFence/hasFence detection and frontmatterScalars)
+	// agrees regardless of encoding.
+	doc = strings.TrimPrefix(doc, "\xef\xbb\xbf")
+	doc = strings.ReplaceAll(doc, "\r\n", "\n")
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(doc, "---\n") {
 		return "", false
 	}
-	// Split's block keeps the "\n" immediately before the closing fence
+	rest := doc[len("---\n"):]
-	// (by design — see its own doc comment); this function never included
+	end := strings.Index(rest, "\n---\n")
-	// it. Split guarantees ok=true only when "\n---\n" matched, so this is
+	if end < 0 {
-	// always exactly one byte, never ambiguous.
+		return "", false
-	return strings.TrimSuffix(string(b), "\n"), true
+	}
+	return rest[:end], true
 }
 
 // frontmatterScalars extracts top-level "key: value" scalar pairs from

ingestion/internal/search/search.go

@@ -48,11 +48,6 @@ type Result struct {
 	// (infra#72). Read from frontmatter when present, otherwise
 	// inferred from the parent directory.
 	Tier string `json:"tier,omitempty"`
-	// Origin/WrittenBy surface write provenance (hyperguild#145) so a
-	// reader can discount an entry a connector session wrote. Omitted for
-	// notes written before provenance existed — never fabricated.
-	Origin    string `json:"origin,omitempty"`
-	WrittenBy string `json:"written_by,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // tierWeight maps the DIKW tier to a score multiplier applied right
@@ -151,7 +146,6 @@ func QueryContext(ctx context.Context, brainDir string, opts QueryOptions) ([]Re
 			rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel)
 			wing, hall := extractWingHall(string(content), rel)
 			tier := extractTier(string(content), rel)
-			origin, writtenBy := extractProvenance(string(content))
 			results = append(results, Result{
 				Path:    rel,
 				Title:   extractTitle(string(content), d.Name()),
@@ -160,9 +154,6 @@ func QueryContext(ctx context.Context, brainDir string, opts QueryOptions) ([]Re
 				Wing:    wing,
 				Hall:    hall,
 				Tier:    tier,
-
-				Origin:    origin,
-				WrittenBy: writtenBy,
 			})
 			return nil
 		})
@@ -281,7 +272,6 @@ func hydrate(brainDir, relPath string) (Result, error) {
 	}
 	wing, hall := extractWingHall(string(content), relPath)
 	tier := extractTier(string(content), relPath)
-	origin, writtenBy := extractProvenance(string(content))
 	return Result{
 		Path:    relPath,
 		Title:   extractTitle(string(content), filepath.Base(relPath)),
@@ -289,45 +279,9 @@ func hydrate(brainDir, relPath string) (Result, error) {
 		Wing:    wing,
 		Hall:    hall,
 		Tier:    tier,
-
-		Origin:    origin,
-		WrittenBy: writtenBy,
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// extractProvenance reads origin/written_by from the leading frontmatter
-// block only — a body line that happens to start with "origin:" is not
-// provenance.
-func extractProvenance(content string) (origin, writtenBy string) {
-	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(strings.NewReader(content))
-	inFrontmatter := false
-	for scanner.Scan() {
-		line := scanner.Text()
-		if strings.TrimSpace(line) == "---" {
-			if !inFrontmatter {
-				inFrontmatter = true
-				continue
-			}
-			break
-		}
-		if !inFrontmatter {
-			return "", ""
-		}
-		key, val, ok := strings.Cut(line, ":")
-		if !ok || strings.HasPrefix(line, " ") || strings.HasPrefix(line, "\t") {
-			continue
-		}
-		v := strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(val), `"'`)
-		switch strings.TrimSpace(key) {
-		case "origin":
-			origin = v
-		case "written_by":
-			writtenBy = v
-		}
-	}
-	return origin, writtenBy
-}
-
 // resolveRoots returns the directories to walk for the given wing/hall
 // filters. Validates hall against the closed vocabulary when set.
 func resolveRoots(brainDir, wing, hall string) ([]string, error) {

scripts/context-sync.sh

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ if [ "$FORCE" = false ]; then
     while IFS= read -r _match; do
       _lineno="${_match%%:*}"
       _content="${_match#*:}"
-      _token=$(head -1 < <(grep -o '{{[^}]*}}' <<<"$_content"))
+      _token=$(printf '%s' "$_content" | grep -o '{{[^}]*}}' | head -1)
       echo "  $PROJECT_FILE:$_lineno: unfilled placeholder $_token" >&2
     done <<< "$_placeholders"
     echo "" >&2