infra#344. gitleaks ORs the clauses of a GLOBAL `[[allowlists]]` block and does
not honour `condition = "AND"` there, so the `paths` entry suppressed EVERY
finding in the named file — not only the false positive the `regexes` line
describes. The regex alone is what was meant, and it works regardless of which
file the value turns up in (infra#256).
Verified rather than assumed, with a control for the probe itself: a live-shaped
credential planted in the formerly-exempt file scans clean before this change and
fires after it, and the same shape fires in a neutral path both ways (so "not
detected" cannot be mistaken for "immune"). The intended false positive is still
suppressed — the tree scans clean.
Refs: mathias/infra#344, mathias/infra#256, mathias/infra#317
The estate-wide secret scan (infra#316) flags a fixture value in this repo
as a credential. Verified by reading the surrounding code that it is not
one, then scoped an allowlist to it.
Scoped by BOTH path and pattern (condition = "AND"), never path alone: a
path-only allowlist would blind this file to a future REAL secret, which is
how a live token hid inside a file whose name read as safe (infra#256).
Allowlist by shape, not by filename.
Adds .gitleaks.toml where there was none, so this repo is no longer scanned
with bare defaults.