feat(hooks): mcp-destructive-guard asks before irreversible MCP verbs

gitea-mcp authenticates by PAT pass-through, so an agent holds the
caller's full PAT scope, and repo_delete's confirm field is filled in by
the model. The infra-mcp README said client-side deny lists covered
destructive verbs; on 2026-10-01 none existed in any settings file.

PreToolUse hook on mcp__.*: repo_delete, file_delete, branch_delete,
pr_merge, tbd_ship, repo_update and repo_mirror_push get "ask". Matched
on the verb, not the server name, so the connector namespace or a
renamed registration cannot bypass it. Never emits allow; malformed
input fails closed.

Scope limit: MCP calls only. The Gitea REST API via Bash with the PAT
in env is not covered (recorded in infra ADR-0027).

Refs mathias/infra#508

Bump-Type: minor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

hooks/hooks.json

@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@
             "timeout": 5
           }
         ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "mcp__.*",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh\"",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
       }
     ]
   }

hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# PreToolUse hook (mcp__.* matcher) — makes a human approve irreversible MCP
+# verbs instead of letting the model run them unattended.
+#
+# Why (infra#508, infra ADR-0027): gitea-mcp authenticates by PAT pass-through,
+# so an agent holds the full scope of the caller's PAT. repo_delete's own guard
+# (confirm == repo) is filled in by the model on both sides: it stops typos,
+# not an injected or mistaken agent. The infra-mcp README claimed client-side
+# deny lists covered this; on 2026-10-01 none existed on any settings file.
+#
+# Policy: match the VERB, not the server. The same tool is reachable as
+# mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__*, mcp__claude_ai_gitea__* (connector) or under
+# any name a host registers it with, so keying on the server name would let a
+# rename bypass the gate.
+#
+# Emits "ask" or nothing. Never "allow": a hook allow would override the
+# user's own deny/ask rules. Malformed input fails closed (ask).
+#
+# Scope limit, recorded in the ADR: this gates MCP calls only. A session with
+# the PAT in its environment can still reach the Gitea REST API via Bash.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+DESTRUCTIVE='repo_delete|file_delete|branch_delete|pr_merge|tbd_ship|repo_update|repo_mirror_push'
+
+ask() {
+  jq -n --arg reason "$1" \
+    '{hookSpecificOutput: {hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "ask", permissionDecisionReason: $reason}}'
+  exit 0
+}
+
+INPUT="$(cat)"
+if ! TOOL_NAME="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -er '.tool_name' 2>/dev/null)"; then
+  ask "mcp-destructive-guard: could not parse the tool call, so it cannot be shown safe. Approve only if you expected it."
+fi
+
+verb="${TOOL_NAME##*__}"
+case "$TOOL_NAME" in
+  mcp__*__*) ;;
+  *) exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+if printf '%s' "$verb" | grep -Eqix "($DESTRUCTIVE)"; then
+  ask "Irreversible MCP verb '$verb' (infra ADR-0027): needs your approval. The model filled in every argument, including any confirm field."
+fi
+exit 0