hooks/hooks.json

@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@
             "timeout": 5
           }
         ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "mcp__.*",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh\"",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
       }
     ]
   }

hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# PreToolUse hook (mcp__.* matcher) — makes a human approve irreversible MCP
+# verbs instead of letting the model run them unattended.
+#
+# Why (infra#508, infra ADR-0027): gitea-mcp authenticates by PAT pass-through,
+# so an agent holds the full scope of the caller's PAT. repo_delete's own guard
+# (confirm == repo) is filled in by the model on both sides: it stops typos,
+# not an injected or mistaken agent. The infra-mcp README claimed client-side
+# deny lists covered this; on 2026-10-01 none existed on any settings file.
+#
+# Policy: match the VERB, not the server. The same tool is reachable as
+# mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__*, mcp__claude_ai_gitea__* (connector) or under
+# any name a host registers it with, so keying on the server name would let a
+# rename bypass the gate.
+#
+# Emits "ask" or nothing. Never "allow": a hook allow would override the
+# user's own deny/ask rules. Malformed input fails closed (ask).
+#
+# Scope limit, recorded in the ADR: this gates MCP calls only. A session with
+# the PAT in its environment can still reach the Gitea REST API via Bash.
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+DESTRUCTIVE='repo_delete|file_delete|branch_delete|pr_merge|tbd_ship|repo_update|repo_mirror_push'
+
+ask() {
+  jq -n --arg reason "$1" \
+    '{hookSpecificOutput: {hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: "ask", permissionDecisionReason: $reason}}'
+  exit 0
+}
+
+INPUT="$(cat)"
+if ! TOOL_NAME="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -er '.tool_name' 2>/dev/null)"; then
+  ask "mcp-destructive-guard: could not parse the tool call, so it cannot be shown safe. Approve only if you expected it."
+fi
+
+verb="${TOOL_NAME##*__}"
+case "$TOOL_NAME" in
+  mcp__*__*) ;;
+  *) exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+if printf '%s' "$verb" | grep -Eqix "($DESTRUCTIVE)"; then
+  ask "Irreversible MCP verb '$verb' (infra ADR-0027): needs your approval. The model filled in every argument, including any confirm field."
+fi
+exit 0

tests/mcp_destructive_guard_test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Tests for hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh — the PreToolUse gate that makes a
+# human approve irreversible MCP verbs (infra#508, infra ADR-0027).
+#
+# Contract: reads PreToolUse hook JSON on stdin, ALWAYS exits 0, and answers
+# in hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision. "ask" = a human must approve;
+# no decision emitted ("NONE") = the guard stays out of the way and normal
+# permission rules apply. The guard never emits "allow": an allow from a hook
+# would bypass the user's own deny/ask rules.
+
+set -u
+
+ROOT=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)
+GUARD="$ROOT/hooks/mcp-destructive-guard.sh"
+
+pass=0
+fail=0
+
+# An empty stdout is a valid hook answer ("no opinion"), reported as NONE.
+decode() {
+  _out=$(cat)
+  [ -z "$_out" ] && { echo NONE; return; }
+  printf '%s' "$_out" | jq -r '.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision // "NONE"' 2>/dev/null || echo BROKEN
+}
+
+decision_for() {
+  jq -n --arg t "$1" '{tool_name: $t, tool_input: {owner: "mathias", repo: "x"}}' \
+    | "$GUARD" | decode
+}
+
+expect() {
+  _want=$1 _tool=$2 _label=$3
+  _got=$(decision_for "$_tool")
+  if [ "$_got" = "$_want" ]; then
+    pass=$((pass + 1)); printf '  ok   %s\n' "$_label"
+  else
+    fail=$((fail + 1)); printf '  FAIL %s\n       want=%s got=%s tool=%s\n' "$_label" "$_want" "$_got" "$_tool"
+  fi
+}
+
+echo "mcp-destructive-guard tests"
+
+# Irreversible verbs, on the plugin namespace.
+for v in repo_delete file_delete branch_delete pr_merge tbd_ship repo_update repo_mirror_push; do
+  expect ask "mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__$v" "plugin gitea $v asks"
+done
+
+# The same verb reached through a different server name must not slip past:
+# the claude.ai connector, a bare local registration, or any future rename.
+expect ask "mcp__claude_ai_gitea__repo_delete" "connector namespace asks"
+expect ask "mcp__gitea__repo_delete"           "bare server name asks"
+expect ask "mcp__git__repo_delete"             "renamed server still asks"
+
+# Case variants must not bypass (tool names are matched exactly by the host,
+# but a guard that lowercases nothing should not depend on that).
+expect ask "mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__REPO_DELETE" "uppercase verb asks"
+
+# Reversible / read verbs pass through untouched.
+for v in issue_close issue_create file_read repo_list pr_create file_write_branch; do
+  expect NONE "mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__$v" "$v passes through"
+done
+
+# Near-miss names are not the guarded verb.
+expect NONE "mcp__plugin_skills_gitea__repo_delete_dry_run_list" "suffix near-miss passes"
+expect NONE "Bash" "non-MCP tool passes"
+
+# Malformed input fails CLOSED (ask), never open.
+_got=$(printf 'not json' | "$GUARD" | decode)
+if [ "$_got" = "ask" ]; then pass=$((pass+1)); echo "  ok   malformed input asks"; else fail=$((fail+1)); echo "  FAIL malformed input: got=$_got"; fi
+
+# Executed as a program, like Claude Code does (shebang decides interpreter).
+[ -x "$GUARD" ] && { pass=$((pass+1)); echo "  ok   guard is executable"; } || { fail=$((fail+1)); echo "  FAIL guard not executable"; }
+
+printf '\n%d passed, %d failed\n' "$pass" "$fail"
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]