feat(discovery): per-channel caption-availability memory (ADR-024)

After transcript caching (ADR-021) and the Shorts filter (ADR-023), the remaining
caption waste is the first fetch on every new video of a channel that never has
English captions — each costs one rate-limited fetch to resolve to "none", and on
a throttled IP churns the backoff machinery first.

Remember, per (user, channel), a streak of consecutive no-caption outcomes
(channel_caption_state, migration 016, RLS-scoped). Once it reaches
TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_THRESHOLD (default 5) the channel is suppressed — videos
discovered/listed but not caption-fetched — for TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_WINDOW
(default 14d), then one is re-probed (auto-recovery). A successful fetch resets
the streak; a 429 does not count; an explicit manual request bypasses suppression.
threshold=0 disables.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -46,3 +46,31 @@ TAPIR_SECRETS_FILE=
 # --- run loop -------------------------------------------------------------
 # Empty/0 = single pass. Set (e.g. 15m) to poll on that cadence.
 TAPIR_POLL_INTERVAL=
+# How long to wait before re-fetching a transcript that returned HTTP 429
+# (rate_limited). Inside the window the video is skipped without hitting the
+# caption endpoint; after it expires the video is retried. 0 = always retry.
+# Go duration; default 1h.
+TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF=
+# Recency bound for AUTO summarization: in automatic mode only videos published
+# within this window of now are summarized; older ones are discovered + listed
+# but wait for a manual "Summarize" (so a back-catalogue doesn't self-inflict
+# 429s). An explicit request bypasses it. Go duration; default 168h (~7d).
+# 0 = no bound (summarize every unseen video).
+TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW=
+# Minimum interval between outbound caption fetches across the WHOLE process —
+# the shared per-egress-IP rate gate (ADR-014). Scheduler runners and the web
+# "Summarize" click-path serialise through it so they cannot collectively trip
+# 429s. Go duration; default 2s. 0 = unlimited (dev/tests).
+TAPIR_FETCH_RATE=
+
+# --- scheduled discovery (tapir serve, ADR-018) ---------------------------
+# When > 0, `serve` runs in-process discovery for ALL users on this cadence
+# (e.g. 2h): one runner pass per user per tick, run-once-on-startup then ticked.
+# Empty/0 = disabled (dev/tests never auto-fetch). SINGLE-REPLICA assumption —
+# >1 replica double-runs discovery. Go duration.
+TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL=
+
+# --- invitations (tapir invite) -------------------------------------------
+# Public base URL used to build the invite link `tapir invite <email>` prints.
+# Default https://tapir.d-ma.be; no trailing slash needed.
+TAPIR_PUBLIC_URL=

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -90,24 +90,4 @@ jobs:
             && echo "Smoke test passed" \
             || echo "Smoke test inconclusive: $OUTPUT"
 
-  # ── 3. Mirror to GitHub (deploy intentionally omitted until manifests exist) ─
+  # ── 3. Mirror to GitHub — skipped for now (SSH key rotation pending) ─
-  mirror:
-    name: Mirror to GitHub
-    needs: build
-    runs-on: self-hosted
-    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name == 'push'
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-
-      - name: Push to GitHub
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p ~/.ssh
-          echo '${{ secrets.GH_DEPLOY_KEY }}' > ~/.ssh/id_rsa_gh_mirror
-          chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa_gh_mirror
-          ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts 2>/dev/null
-          GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa_gh_mirror -o IdentitiesOnly=yes" \
-            git push git@github.com:mathiasb/tapir.git HEAD:main
-          rm ~/.ssh/id_rsa_gh_mirror
-          echo "Mirrored to GitHub"

CLAUDE.md

@@ -46,8 +46,9 @@ These caused real mistakes that were caught and corrected; the corrections are l
 (See `DECISIONS.md` for full rationale. Listed here so you don't propose them.)
 
 - **No Supabase** — reuse Dex / ESO+1Password / Postgres (ADR-002).
-- **No global cross-tenant video/transcript table** — per-user isolation (data-model). Dedup
+- **No global cross-tenant *video* table** — videos stay per-user (data-model). Transcripts ARE
-  across users is a Future C concern, not a Stage 0/1 default.
+  shared since ADR-021 (public caption content, keyed by `(provider, provider_video_id)`, non-RLS)
+  so re-analysis never re-fetches; the *videos* half of cross-tenant dedup stays a Future C concern.
 - **No audio-download + speech-to-text in the core path** — captions-first (ADR-007). STT is a
   deferred, bounded optional component.
 - **No public SaaS / sign-up / billing / Google OAuth verification at scale** — Future C,
@@ -60,8 +61,14 @@ These caused real mistakes that were caught and corrected; the corrections are l
   stores, and sinks are adapters. Adding a video provider or a sink = a new adapter implementing
   the interface, nothing in the engine changes. This is what keeps "standalone vs homelab" a
   wiring choice (ADR-003).
-- **BDD.** The `docs/use-cases/*.feature` files are the behavior spec. New behavior gets a
+- **BDD.** The `docs/use-cases/*.feature` files are the behavior spec (design records — there is
-  scenario; the use-case core is tested through fake adapters, not live YouTube/brain.
+  no godog runner). New behavior gets a scenario; the use-case core is tested through fake
+  adapters, not live YouTube/brain. A name-coverage gate (`test/acceptance/scenario_coverage_test.go`,
+  `TestScenarioCoverage`) keeps the two from drifting: every non-`@pending` scenario must be
+  mapped to an existing Go test in `scenarioCoverage`. When you add a scenario, either map it to
+  its covering test or tag it `@pending` in the `.feature` with a one-line reason. It checks the
+  *link*, not that the test exercises the scenario — that's the deliberate trade for not running
+  godog (see issue #5 / the BDD-runner decision).
 
 ## Skills (engineering discipline)
 
@@ -79,23 +86,39 @@ Skills live in the canonical library `mathias/skills` and are wired into this re
 
 ## Current build state (start here for the first task)
 
-The repo is **scaffolded and intentionally RED**:
+The repo is **green and shipping** — last tag `v0.15.0`. `task check` passes (fmt, vet, lint,
+`go test -p 1 ./...`). Go is `1.26.1` (see `go.mod`).
 
-- Clean Architecture skeleton exists: `internal/domain` (entities), `internal/ports`
+- Clean Architecture core is implemented: `internal/domain` (entities), `internal/ports`
-  (interfaces), `internal/usecase` (engine), `cmd/tapir` (entrypoint stub),
+  (interfaces), `internal/usecase.Engine.ProcessNewVideo` (resolve transcript → summarize →
-  `internal/adapters` (empty — concrete adapters go here).
+  deliver to sinks | skip on no-transcript). The acceptance tests in `test/acceptance/` are
-- `usecase.Engine.ProcessNewVideo` returns `ErrNotImplemented`.
+  green against it.
-- `test/acceptance/summarize_new_video_test.go` translates the first two Gherkin scenarios and
+- Adapters present under `internal/adapters/`: `youtube` (captions-first `VideoSource`,
-  **fails** against the stub. `task check` is therefore red on `test`.
+  timedtext/InnerTube acquisition per ADR-010), `summarizer` + `llm` (the copied AI router,
-- **First build task:** implement `ProcessNewVideo` (resolve transcript -> summarize -> deliver to
+  now a resilient endpoint chain — local primary → local fallback → external worst-case,
-  sinks | skip on no-transcript) to make the acceptance tests green, following the `.feature`
+  parse-failure-aware, ADR-004 + ADR-022), `store` (Postgres, golang-migrate migrations 001–015),
-  files. Then add the AI-router `Summarizer` (copy `llm` per ADR-004), the YouTube `VideoSource`
+  `secrets` (file-backed `SecretStore`). The brain HTTP sink (ADR-005) is the remaining
-  adapter (captions-first), and the store + brain sinks.
+  optional sink.
+- Stage 1 is open (ADR-012): multi-user with **DB-enforced** isolation — Postgres RLS `FORCE`d
+  on all user-owned tables (migration 003), two-user isolation test in
+  `internal/adapters/store/rls_test.go`. Registration gate, per-user YouTube web connect, and
+  account management (disconnect / delete, ADR-013) all shipped.
+- Transcript persistence (ADR-021, migration 015): transcripts are a **shared, non-RLS** store
+  keyed by `(provider, provider_video_id)` — the single exception to the isolation boundary
+  (`TestTranscriptsTableIsSharedNotRLS`). The engine reads stored transcripts before any caption
+  fetch (`usecase.resolveTranscript`), so re-analysis — re-summarize, paste-a-URL, onboarding
+  burst — never re-touches YouTube. Per-user summaries/videos stay RLS-scoped.
+- `cmd/tapir` subcommands: `list`, `show`, `auth` (interactive host-side OAuth), `run` (batch
+  watch→summarize), `serve` (the HTMX+Templ web reader/writer under `internal/web`, a new
+  transport over the unchanged engine/ports — ADR-003). `tapir env` prints config.
+- **Build/run:** `task check` is the gate; `task build` produces the binary. Local dev uses
+  `StubAuth` (allow-all) and a `TAPIR_DB_DSN` Postgres; the deployed service uses Dex OIDC.
 
-**Unverified setup items** (see `docs/homelab-integration.md`, marked `confirm`): the Go version
+**Setup facts** (resolved — see `docs/homelab-integration.md` for the live values): LiteLLM is
-in `go.mod` (1.23 — match the koala runner; estate elsewhere uses 1.26.1), the brain-mcp URL, the
+off-cluster at `koala:30401/v1/` with `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` from 1Password; the summarization
-exact ESO secret-ref naming, and the summarization model alias. Resolve against the live cluster
+model is config (`TAPIR_SUMMARIZER_MODEL`, default `koala/phi4-mini`), never hardcoded. The
-before depending on them, and pin answers back into `docs/homelab-integration.md`.
+brain-mcp base URL and ESO ref scheme are pinned in that doc; check it before wiring rather than
+re-deriving.
 
 ## Provenance (where this design came from)
 

DECISIONS.md

@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ Go's concurrency model fits the watcher/worker shape).
 
 ## ADR-002 — No Supabase; reuse existing Dex / ESO / Postgres conventions
 
-**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02)
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02). The "Tapir does not write to the shared identity provider"
+implication is **partially superseded by ADR-017** (invite flow writes Dex Password CRs); the
+no-Supabase / reuse-existing-primitives decision stands.
 
 **Context.** The draft proposed self-hosted Supabase for auth + RLS + secrets (Vault). The
 homelab already runs **Dex** (OIDC), **ESO + 1Password** (secrets), and a **postgres18**
@@ -154,6 +156,22 @@ governs advancement. Reversible: if demand appears, a new ADR opens the Future C
 
 ---
 
+## ADR-009 — Trunk-Based Development
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02)
+
+**Context.** Platform-wide convention (homelab architecture review invariant; gitea-mcp #27):
+commit directly to `main`, one logical change per commit, every commit deployable.
+
+**Decision.** Tapir follows TBD. Commit directly to `main`. No feature branches or PRs for
+solo/agent work; short-lived `agent/<desc>` branches only when parallel agents are active on
+the repo simultaneously. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
+
+**Consequences.** Consistent with the rest of the estate. Depends on the direct-to-main write
+path tracked in gitea-mcp #35 (item #1).
+
+---
+
 ## ADR-010 — Third-party caption acquisition via the timedtext/player baseUrl
 
 **Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02)
@@ -203,22 +221,6 @@ player/timedtext baseUrl) only. ADR-007's captions-first stance and the STT defe
 
 ---
 
-## ADR-009 — Trunk-Based Development
-
-**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02)
-
-**Context.** Platform-wide convention (homelab architecture review invariant; gitea-mcp #27):
-commit directly to `main`, one logical change per commit, every commit deployable.
-
-**Decision.** Tapir follows TBD. Commit directly to `main`. No feature branches or PRs for
-solo/agent work; short-lived `agent/<desc>` branches only when parallel agents are active on
-the repo simultaneously. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
-
-**Consequences.** Consistent with the rest of the estate. Depends on the direct-to-main write
-path tracked in gitea-mcp #35 (item #1).
-
----
-
 ## ADR-011 — Web read-surface at Stage 0: Dex authn (single-user authz), action signal, public ingress + GitOps
 
 **Status:** Accepted (2026-06-02)
@@ -290,6 +292,637 @@ explicit call, with isolation as the guardrail that keeps it safe.
 
 ---
 
+## ADR-013 — Account deletion is Tapir-side only; the Dex identity is left intact
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-03). The "Tapir never holds write access to the shared identity
+provider" rationale is **partially superseded by ADR-017** (the invite flow now *creates* Dex
+Password CRs). The deletion-behaviour decision itself — delete Tapir-side state, leave the Dex
+identity intact — still stands; ADR-017 only changes the create side, not delete. See ADR-017
+for the now-asymmetric posture (Tapir can create Dex accounts but still does not delete them).
+
+**Context.** Stage 1 (ADR-012) added account deletion. A registered user is two things: a
+`users` row (plus all their data, cascade-linked) in Tapir's Postgres, and a subject identity
+in **Dex** (the homelab OIDC provider, shared across the estate — Tapir does not own it).
+"Delete my account" could mean (a) erase all Tapir-side data and secrets, or (b) that plus
+deprovision the Dex identity. The maintainer chose (a).
+
+**Decision.** Deleting a Tapir account removes **only Tapir-side state**:
+- The `users` row, cascading to all user-owned tables (`videos`, `transcripts`, `summaries`,
+  `sink_deliveries`, `video_connections`, and — via an **explicit delete**, because it has no
+  FK — `summary_actions`). The delete test asserts the cascade reaches every table and leaves
+  other users' rows untouched.
+- All of that user's secrets in the SecretStore (the per-user YouTube refresh-token refs).
+
+The **Dex identity is deliberately left intact.** Tapir does not deprovision, disable, or
+modify the shared Dex directory **on deletion**. (Note per ADR-017: Tapir *does* now create Dex
+Password CRs on invite — so the create and delete sides are deliberately asymmetric, and a
+deleted user's Dex Password CR persists. See ADR-017 consequences.)
+
+**Consequences.**
+- **Clean re-registration:** a deleted user who logs in again arrives as a Dex-authenticated
+  subject with no `users` row, so they hit the registration gate as a "new" user — no special
+  resurrection path needed. This is a feature of the choice, not an accident.
+- **Right-to-erasure is partial.** The user's *identity* still exists in Dex after deletion.
+  For Future B (trusted friends) this is acceptable: Dex is the maintainer's own directory and
+  the identity carries no Tapir content. **But if Tapir ever moves toward Future C (real
+  external/public users), this is a GDPR-shaped gap** — a true "delete my account" there must
+  also deprovision or anonymise the Dex identity, which is a new ADR and likely a Dex-admin
+  integration Tapir does not currently have. **ADR-017 widens this gap:** Tapir now *creates*
+  the Dex Password CR but does not delete it, so a deleted Tapir user leaves an orphaned Dex
+  local-password account. Tracked as a known gap in ADR-017.
+- **Blast radius:** ADR-013 originally claimed "Tapir never holds write access to the shared
+  identity provider." **ADR-017 changes this** — Tapir now holds scoped `create`+`get` on
+  `passwords.dex.coreos.com` in the `auth` namespace. The blast radius is no longer zero; it is
+  bounded by that RBAC. See ADR-017 for the security analysis.
+
+**Reversibility.** Adding Dex deprovisioning later is a superseding ADR; nothing about the
+current choice blocks it. Recorded now because "deletion is partial by design" is a deliberate
+semantic that future-Tapir (and any compliance review) must know was chosen, not overlooked.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-014 — Timedtext 429 handling: per-host backoff + honest in-flight UX, before any Whisper reconsideration
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-03). **Partially implemented as of v0.6.0** — see the
+implementation note at the end; the shared per-egress-IP rate gate (decision item 2) may not be
+fully realised. Verify against `internal/runner` + the youtube adapter before treating as done.
+**ADR-018 (in-process scheduled discovery + auto-summarize) makes decision item 2 load-bearing
+and folds its confirm/finish into that build.**
+
+**Context.** ADR-010 acquires captions from the unauthenticated `timedtext` baseUrl. Live runs
+show that endpoint **rate-limits per source IP (HTTP 429) under volume** — many videos fetched
+in one pass from one egress IP. Stage 1 (ADR-012) made this sharper in two ways: multiple users
+now drive fetches from the *same cluster egress IP*, and the v0.4.0 "Summarize" button fires an
+**immediate, synchronous-feeling** fetch on click (HTMX polls `/v/{videoId}/status`), so a 429
+now surfaces as a *user-facing stall* rather than a background batch hiccup. A throttle
+(`TAPIR_FETCH_DELAY`) exists but is a fixed inter-fetch delay, not 429-aware, and does not
+coordinate across the concurrent click-path and the `tapir run` batch path.
+
+This ADR is **not** a decision to build Whisper. ADR-007/010 keep STT deferred *pending
+measurement of the sustainable caption rate* — and that rate cannot be measured while the
+client reacts badly to the 429s it already provokes. Fix the backoff and the UX first; the
+clean data then tells you whether Whisper is warranted.
+
+**Decision.**
+
+1. **429-aware backoff at the fetch layer.** On a 429 from the timedtext/InnerTube fetch,
+   respect `Retry-After` when present; otherwise exponential backoff with jitter. This replaces
+   reliance on a fixed `TAPIR_FETCH_DELAY` alone (which stays as a floor/politeness delay).
+2. **A single per-egress-IP rate gate** shared by *both* the `tapir run` batch path and the
+   web click path, so they cannot collectively exceed the sustainable rate. Concurrency into
+   the timedtext endpoint is serialised/limited at this gate regardless of how many users or
+   goroutines are upstream. (The 429 is per *IP*, not per user — so the gate is process-/
+   cluster-egress-wide, not per-`withUser`.)
+3. **Honest in-flight UX (the product-shaping part).** The status poll distinguishes states
+   the user can understand instead of a spinner that silently stalls:
+   - *summarizing* — actively processing (the existing tapir spinner).
+   - *queued / waiting for rate limit* — fetch deferred behind the rate gate; show a calm
+     "queued, this can take a few minutes when busy" state, not a stuck spinner.
+   - *no transcript* — terminal, per ADR-010's degrade-never-error (a 429 that exhausts retries
+     resolves to `SourceNone`, same as any unavailable caption — it must not present as a hard
+     error to the user).
+   The spinner promising imminence is the wrong signal under rate-limiting; the UX must be able
+   to say "waiting" truthfully.
+4. **Measurement before Whisper.** Only once (1)-(3) are in and a real sustainable
+   per-IP rate is observed do we revisit whether caption coverage is good enough or whether the
+   deferred Whisper fallback (ADR-007) is finally warranted. That reconsideration is a future
+   ADR, gated on this data.
+
+**Consequences.**
+- Caption fetching becomes well-behaved under multi-user load instead of self-inflicting 429s;
+  the endpoint is treated as the shared, rate-limited resource it is.
+- The click-path UX stays honest: "waiting" reads as waiting, failure degrades to "no
+  transcript", never a stuck spinner or error spew.
+- A future per-IP cooldown / second egress IP / proxy becomes an option the rate gate can sit
+  in front of without UX changes.
+- **Still no Whisper** — and now there's a clean path to the *data* that decides whether it's
+  ever needed (`docs/homelab-integration.md` and a future ADR own that measurement).
+
+**Open (tracked, not in this ADR's scope):** the actual sustainable rate number; whether a
+dedicated egress IP / outbound proxy is worth it; CronJob-driven `tapir run` interaction with
+the rate gate (the batch path moves into k3s per the deferred CronJob item).
+
+**Implementation note (2026-06-03, v0.6.0 — added during reconciliation).** A v0.6.0 release
+shipped 429 handling: `domain.SourceRateLimited` (429 no longer collapsed to `SourceNone`),
+youtube adapter maps 429 → `SourceRateLimited`, **migration 007 added `videos.transcript_status`
++ `videos.rate_limited_at`** (durable per-video retry state), `TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF` config,
+runner records rate-limited + skips within the backoff window, and a "⏳ Retrying later" badge.
+This realises decision items 1, 3, and 4 well. **Item 2 (a single shared per-egress-IP rate
+gate) appears to be realised as per-*video* backoff state, NOT a process-wide IP gate** —
+multiple videos can still each hit the endpoint and collectively trip the per-IP 429. Treat item
+2 as **not yet confirmed done**; verify in `internal/runner`/youtube adapter and, if absent, it
+remains open. (Resolved during reconciliation: the v0.6.0 report's reference to "migration 008
+videos.rate_limited_at" was a **mislabel** — both columns shipped in migration **007**, not a
+missing 008. No migration was lost; the sequence legitimately skips 008. `rate_limited_at`
+exists and the runner's column reads are sound.) **ADR-018 makes item 2 a hard requirement:
+in-process scheduled discovery + auto-summarize drives all users' fetches through one pod egress,
+so the process-wide gate is confirmed/built as part of that slice.**
+
+---
+
+## ADR-015 — Per-user credentials: envelope-encrypted in PG18, not vault-stored
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-03)
+
+**Context.** The Stage-0/1 SecretStore (`internal/adapters/secrets/file.go`) holds per-user
+YouTube OAuth refresh tokens as a flat key-value JSON map on a PVC — explicitly a stand-in for
+"op/ESO later" (ADR-002, ADR-006). infra#86 proposed migrating it to an ESO-backed store. The
+decision spike (infra#88) found that framing subtly wrong: **ESO syncs vault→cluster at
+deploy/refresh time; it is not a runtime write API.** Per-user tokens are written *at runtime,
+per end-user* (every YouTube connect; on token rotation) — they are application state, not
+configuration. The homelab 1Password SA is also read-only, so a vault-write path would require
+a new write-capable SA, widening Tapir's blast radius to shared estate infra to store what is
+fundamentally Tapir's own row-data. Reading the actual SecretStore confirmed the shape: a
+3-method port (`Get`/`Put`/`Delete`) over opaque refs, written interactively per user.
+
+**Decision.** Per-user credentials are stored **envelope-encrypted in PG18**, not in the vault:
+
+1. Tokens are encrypted with a **single app-level envelope key** and stored as ciphertext in
+   PG18, under the Row-Level Security already enforced and tested (ADR-012). Reads/writes go
+   through the existing `withUser` RLS-scoped seam.
+2. The **envelope key** is the only secret in 1Password — fetched via the **existing read-only
+   SA** (confirmed working). No new write-capable SA; no per-user vault items.
+3. The `ports.SecretStore` port is unchanged (`Get`/`Put`/`Delete`). The implementation swaps
+   `FileStore` (PVC JSON) for a `PGStore` (encrypted rows). Every consumer — connect,
+   disconnect, delete-account — is untouched (the port abstraction holds, ADR-003 spirit).
+4. **Infra/operator credentials** (Dex client secret, MCP-auth tokens, service tokens) stay an
+   **ESO/1Password** concern. This ADR governs *per-user runtime* credentials only. The two
+   classes use two mechanisms deliberately — because they are two different things (runtime
+   app-state vs deploy-time config), not as a compromise. The "one mechanism" question
+   (maintainer's initial preference) was answered in #88 by correctly *classifying* the
+   secrets rather than unifying their storage.
+
+**Consequences.**
+- Runtime credential writes are normal RLS'd DB writes — no ESO sync latency, no indirection,
+  no write-SA blast radius. The interactive connect→store→use flow works without a vault
+  round-trip.
+- Keeps PG18 and keeps ADR-002 intact (Supabase was considered and rejected again in #88 —
+  adding a datastore to hold a few encrypted strings PG18 already holds).
+- Adds an encrypt/decrypt seam and an **envelope-key rotation** responsibility (re-encrypt the
+  per-user rows under a new key). infra#89 (build) must implement and test rotation, not assume
+  it — this is the real engineering cost of the choice.
+- The vault's involvement shrinks to one static key via the SA already trusted for reads.
+- **Supersedes** the "PVC stand-in for op/ESO" intent recorded in `secrets/file.go` and
+  `docs/homelab-integration.md` for the *per-user* secret path (the ESO/1Password reference in
+  ADR-006 stands for the *infra-cred* path).
+
+**Reversibility / falsification (from infra#88).** Revisit if: per-user tokens need
+high-frequency rotation writes (weak — PG18 handles it); an estate compliance policy requires
+all credentials in 1P for a single audit surface (maintainer-knowable, not currently believed
+to hold — would favour the vault-write path on policy grounds); or envelope-key rotation proves
+operationally worse than per-secret vault rotation (the real cost #89 must prove). If none hold,
+this stands. Full reasoning + rejected candidates (write-capable SA; Supabase): the infra#88
+decision doc (`infra/docs/superpowers/handoffs/`). Build + reboot-validation: infra#89.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-016 — Stage 0 gate revised: "useful to me OR a friend", behavioural not feedback
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-03). Revises the Stage 0 definition in VISION.md (supersedes the
+original "useful to me, specifically" gate and folds in the old Stage 1 "a trusted user returns"
+test). **The clock-start is further revised by ADR-018** (starts when scheduled discovery ships,
+since unprompted use was not possible before then).
+
+**Context.** The original Stage 0 gate was "the maintainer reads summaries weekly for four weeks
+and acts on one." The maintainer chose to change it to include friendly users, reasoning that
+early signal from friendly users is valuable. Two sub-decisions shaped the final form:
+- *Me OR a friend* (not AND): either the maintainer or an onboarded friend showing use clears it.
+- *Behavioural, not feedback*: the test is **return usage**, not stated approval.
+
+**Decision.** Stage 0 passes when, over a 3–4 week window, **either the maintainer or at least
+one onboarded friend returns to Tapir unprompted and reads/acts on summaries in ≥2 separate
+weeks.** Friend feedback is gathered and valued but is **not** the gate.
+
+**Why behavioural, not feedback (the load-bearing part).** Asked-for feedback from friendly
+users is the least reliable signal in product development — politeness bias means a friend you
+onboarded will tend to say encouraging things regardless of real value. The thing actually worth
+knowing is whether they *come back on their own*. So the gate measures returns, not nice words.
+This deliberately resists the most common way a principled gate dies: being declared "passed" on
+the strength of a polite reaction.
+
+**Honest note on what this change does.** This is a *guardrail edit made while the original gate
+was unmet* (Stage 0 had barely started; build had run well ahead of use-evidence). That is
+precisely the pattern that warrants scrutiny — redrawing a gate around work already done. It was
+examined on that basis and proceeds because: (a) the new gate is **not softer in kind** — it
+stays behavioural and sustained, merely broadening *who* can supply the signal; (b) friendly-user
+signal is genuinely valuable; (c) the politeness-bias guard keeps it from collapsing into
+"someone said it's nice." It is *not* a licence to treat the already-shipped Stage-1 machinery as
+evidence the gate passed — use-evidence remains open.
+
+**Consequences.**
+- VISION.md Stage 0 rewritten; old Stage 1 ("a trusted user returns") folded in (it was
+  near-identical to the new test); hardening renumbered to Stage 1.
+- New drift signal added: declaring the gate passed on polite feedback rather than return-usage.
+- The 2026-07-01 check-in now asks "is anyone (me or a friend) coming back unprompted?", not
+  "am I using it weekly?". (Check-in date itself revised by ADR-018.)
+
+**Reversibility.** A superseding ADR could tighten it back to maintainer-only or raise it to
+require multiple returning users. Recorded with the full rationale (including the self-scrutiny
+about editing a gate while it's unmet) so the reasoning survives, not just the new wording.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-017 — Invite flow: Tapir creates Dex local-password accounts (write access to the shared identity provider)
+
+**Status:** ~~Accepted~~ **SUPERSEDED by [ADR-019](#adr-019--authentik-owns-invites-tapir-stops-provisioning-accounts) (2026-06-07).** The Dex local-password
+invite provisioning was removed when the homelab IdP migrated Dex→Authentik
+(infra ADR-0001); Authentik now owns invites. Original record below.
+
+Accepted (2026-06-03), **recorded retroactively during reconciliation, then
+deliberately ratified KEEP (2026-06-03).** This capability **shipped in v0.7.0 without an ADR** —
+code, RBAC, and a deployed ServiceAccount landed before any decision record existed. This ADR
+documents what shipped and honestly records that the decision-before-code discipline was not
+followed here (see "Process note"). **Partially supersedes ADR-002 and ADR-013** (the "Tapir
+holds no write access to the shared identity provider" posture).
+
+**Keep-or-reverse, decided (2026-06-03).** After the retroactive recording, the maintainer
+weighed keep vs. reverse (drop the RBAC + invite flow, rely on Google OIDC only). **Decision:
+KEEP.** Deciding fact: not all intended Future-B users have / will use Google accounts, so Google
+OIDC alone *cannot* onboard them — the invite flow is therefore **load-bearing, not a redundant
+convenience**, and reversing it would leave some intended users with no onboarding path. The
+trust-surface cost (scoped `create` on `passwords` in `auth`) is accepted deliberately in
+exchange. The opposing argument (this contradicts ADR-015's "no write credential to shared infra"
+logic, applied there to secrets) was considered and outweighed *only* because the capability is
+genuinely necessary for real users here — it is **not** a precedent for widening the surface
+further. **Explicitly NOT chosen:** adding `delete` to the RBAC to close the orphan gap (that
+widens the surface in the wrong direction; accept the orphan at Future B instead — see open
+items).
+
+**Context.** Stage 1 onboarding needs a way for a friend to get a login. Two paths shipped:
+Google OIDC via Dex (no Tapir code — Dex handles it), and an **invite flow** where Tapir itself
+provisions a Dex **local-password** account. The invite flow is what this ADR is about.
+
+**What shipped (reconstructed from `internal/adapters/dex/dex.go`, `internal/web/invite.go`,
+migration `009_invitations`).**
+1. `tapir invite <email>` (host CLI) writes an `invitations` row: a 32-byte crypto-random,
+   single-use, 7-day-expiry `token` (the token is the capability), `email`, `used_at`.
+   The `invitations` table is deliberately **not** RLS/`user_id`-scoped — the invitee has no
+   user yet and the token itself is the secret. (Sound; documented in the migration.)
+2. Recipient visits `/invite/{token}` (public, no session), sets a password (validated *before*
+   the token is consumed, so a typo doesn't burn it), the token is claimed exactly once.
+3. Tapir bcrypt-hashes (cost 12) and **POSTs a `passwords.dex.coreos.com` Custom Resource into
+   the `auth` namespace** via the in-cluster Kubernetes API, authenticating as the `tapir`
+   ServiceAccount. TLS validated against the mounted cluster CA. Off-cluster (dev) it returns
+   `ErrNotInCluster` and degrades without consuming the invite.
+4. RBAC applied this deploy: the `tapir` ServiceAccount has **`create`+`get` on
+   `passwords.dex.coreos.com` in the `auth` namespace** (and only that).
+5. Dex (kubernetes storage) then serves local-password login for that email; Tapir's
+   registration gate creates the profile on first login.
+
+**Decision (as ratified now).** Accept the invite flow as built: Tapir *may* hold scoped write
+access to Dex's `passwords` resource in the `auth` namespace, for the purpose of invite-based
+local-account creation. This is a deliberate, bounded reversal of the prior "no write access to
+the shared identity provider" posture (ADR-002/013).
+
+**Why this is acceptable (the case for keeping it).**
+- The RBAC is **minimally scoped**: `create`+`get` on one resource type in one namespace, not
+  broad Dex/cluster write. Blast radius is bounded and inspectable.
+- It enables friend onboarding **without Google OAuth app verification** (ADR-008 deferred that),
+  which is genuinely useful for Future B — and necessary for users who won't use Google (the
+  deciding fact in the keep decision above).
+- The code is careful: validate-before-consume, single-use tokens, graceful off-cluster degrade,
+  sentinel errors mapped to clear messages, the base64-bcrypt storage gotcha handled.
+
+**Consequences / known gaps (the case to watch).**
+- **Reverses a load-bearing principle.** ADR-002 and ADR-013 leaned on "Tapir never writes to the
+  shared identity provider" for blast-radius minimisation. That is no longer true. Anyone reading
+  those ADRs without this one would be misled — hence the cross-references added to both.
+- **Create/delete asymmetry → orphaned Dex accounts.** Tapir now *creates* Dex Password CRs but
+  (per ADR-013) does not *delete* them on account deletion. A deleted Tapir user leaves an
+  orphaned Dex local-password account that can still authenticate (though it would hit the
+  registration gate with no profile). This widens the ADR-013 right-to-erasure gap. **Open —
+  accepted for Future B, revisit before Future C (do NOT add `delete` RBAC just to fix this).**
+- **`create` on a shared-namespace identity resource** is a meaningfully larger trust surface than
+  the rest of Tapir. If the `tapir` pod is compromised, the attacker can mint Dex local accounts.
+  Bounded by the namespace/resource scope, but real — worth a deliberate look before Future C.
+- Token custody for invites is in PG (`invitations.token`) in plaintext; single-use + 7-day TTL
+  bound the exposure, but a DB read yields live invite tokens until claimed/expired.
+
+**Process note (why this ADR is retroactive).** This capability was built and deployed by
+parallel agent sessions while the main planning thread was elsewhere, and shipped with no ADR —
+the first time in this project a guardrail-reversing change skipped the decision-before-code
+discipline. Recorded here not to rubber-stamp it but to restore the audit trail: the decision is
+now visible, its principle-reversal is named, and its open gaps (orphaned accounts, the larger
+trust surface) are tracked rather than buried in a release note. The maintainer ratified KEEP
+after the fact (see status block) on the deciding fact that some intended users cannot use Google
+OIDC.
+
+**Open items this ADR creates (tracked in infra):**
+- Confirm the RBAC really is `create`+`get` only (not broader) against the deployed manifest in
+  `infra` — a security claim currently resting on a sibling report, not a verified manifest read.
+- Accept the orphaned-Dex-account gap for Future B; revisit (orphan cleanup + the whole Dex-write
+  surface) before any Future C move. Do **not** add `delete` RBAC solely to fix the orphan.
+- Review the larger trust surface before any Future C move.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-018 — Make Tapir usable unprompted: in-process scheduled discovery, auto-summarize default, gate-clock reset
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-03)
+
+**Context.** The Stage-0 gate (ADR-016) measures whether the maintainer or a friend *returns and
+reads/acts* over weeks. But the system could not actually be used that way: discovery (`tapir
+run`) was **host-side manual**, so a newly onboarded user saw an empty list and had no reason to
+return. The gate was structurally unmeetable — not because the product failed, but because the
+*workflow* depended on the maintainer SSHing in to trigger each pass. The runner already has a
+`Loop(ctx, interval)` (run-on-start, then every tick) and per-user mode/dedup/backoff; what was
+missing was *invocation* — nothing called it for the deployed users on a schedule.
+
+**Decision.**
+1. **In-process scheduled discovery.** `tapir serve` launches a background goroutine that runs
+   discovery for **all users** on an interval (`TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL`; unset/0 = off). It
+   enumerates users (un-RLS'd `user_identities`) and runs each user's pass inside `withUser`,
+   reusing the existing `runner` — not a new scheduler. Stateless timing; ctx-cancellable;
+   per-user failures isolated.
+2. **Auto-summarize default ON** for Future-B users (new registrations default `true`; existing
+   rows updated), so discovery both populates *and* summarizes — the list fills itself. The
+   per-user manual toggle remains.
+3. **Gate-clock reset.** The Stage-0 3–4 week window (ADR-016) **starts when this ships**, because
+   unprompted use was impossible before it. This is starting the clock when the experiment can
+   actually run, **not** a reset to dodge a failing gate (the prior window measured nothing —
+   there was no way to use the system unprompted). The 2026-07-01 check-in moves accordingly to
+   ~3–4 weeks after this deploys.
+
+**Why in-process and not a k8s CronJob.** Maintainer's call: simpler deploy (no second deployable),
+acceptable at Future-B scale (1–3 users). The CronJob's advantage — failure isolation between
+discovery and the web/read path — was weighed and traded away knowingly.
+
+**Consequences / constraints.**
+- **Discovery shares the web process's lifetime and egress.** A wedged discovery pass can degrade
+  the reading UI (the coupling a CronJob would have avoided). Accepted at this scale.
+- **SINGLE-REPLICA ASSUMPTION (load-bearing).** If `tapir serve` ever runs >1 replica, *every*
+  replica runs the discovery loop → every user fetched in parallel (429s + duplicate work). Tapir
+  must stay single-replica while in-process scheduling is enabled, or this is revisited (move to
+  CronJob, or add leader-election). Recorded so a future scale-up doesn't silently double-run.
+- **Makes ADR-014 item 2 (shared per-egress-IP rate gate) load-bearing.** In-process + auto +
+  multi-user drives all caption fetches through one pod egress, concurrent with click-path
+  Summarize. The build confirms/finishes the process-wide rate gate in the same slice; without it
+  the system self-inflicts 429s every cycle. **Auto-summarize ON is gated on the rate gate
+  existing** (fallback: ship discovery with auto OFF until it does).
+
+**Reversibility.** Disable via `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL=0` (reverts to manual `tapir run`).
+Moving to a CronJob later is a superseding ADR; the per-user `runner` is unchanged either way.
+Spec: `docs/specs/scheduled-discovery.md`.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-019 — Authentik owns invites; Tapir stops provisioning accounts
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-07). **Supersedes ADR-017** (Dex local-password invite
+provisioning).
+
+**Context:** infra ADR-0001 migrated the homelab IdP Dex→Authentik. Authentik provides
+first-class invite flows; the Dex local-password connector never consulted the Password
+CRs Tapir wrote (the defect that triggered the migration). Tapir-web's OIDC issuer now
+points at Authentik (infra ADR-0001 step 3).
+
+**Decision:** Tapir no longer provisions accounts. The Dex-password invite path is removed:
+`internal/adapters/dex`, the public `/invite/{token}` set-password UI (`internal/web/invite.go`),
+the `tapir invite` CLI (`cmd/tapir/invite.go`), the `InvitationStore`/`DexPasswordCreator`
+ports + `App.Invitations`/`App.Dex` wiring, the invite Templ pages, and the
+`tapir invite` Taskfile target. New users are invited via Authentik's flow, log into Tapir
+via OIDC, and are captured by Tapir's existing provider-agnostic `/register` (display name).
+Login + Google moved by config only (Authentik per-app issuer); the OIDC adapter is unchanged.
+
+**Consequences:** smaller Tapir blast surface — no writes to the shared identity provider, no
+configmap/CR access, the dedicated `passwords.dex.coreos.com` RBAC + ServiceAccount are
+removed (infra side, coupled change). The `invitations` table (migration 009) is left in
+place — migrations are append-only and the unused table is harmless; a future migration may
+drop it. The `*_DEX_*` config/identity names (`TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_*`, `dex_subject`, the
+`DexAuth`/`oidc` package) are now misnomers; renaming is deferred (cosmetic, not behavioural).
+
+**Rejected:** keeping Tapir's `/invite` UI but calling Authentik's API on claim — couples
+Tapir to Authentik's admin API + a token for no real gain; Authentik's own invite flow is
+the supported path.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-020 — Recency-bounded auto-summarize + honest sparse-state surface
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-08). **Refines ADR-018** (auto-summarize) and **ADR-014**
+(per-IP caption rate gate).
+
+**Context.** Tapir is operational but sparse: at real subscription volume the maintainer's
+account holds ~283 discovered videos, ~15 summarized, ~256 behind the respected per-IP caption
+rate gate, ~12 no-captions. Two problems follow. (1) **Load:** ADR-018 auto-summarizes *every*
+unseen video, so a large back-catalogue re-drives the whole queue through the gate every cycle —
+self-inflicted 429s with no user value (nobody is waiting on a 6-month-old video). (2) **First
+contact:** a new user sees a mostly-empty feed with no moving parts and a UI that implied
+abundance/imminence ("fetching soon" ×256, "Run `tapir run`", "Summarize now"); the Stage-0 gate
+is *return usage*, and the experience died at the first visit. Source: a UX heuristic review
+(`docs/ux-review/UX-REVIEW-stage0-recency.md`).
+
+**Decision.**
+1. **Recency bound on auto-summarize.** In automatic mode the scheduler only summarizes videos
+   published within `TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW` (default ~7d). Older videos are still discovered
+   and listed but not auto-processed — they keep the manual "Summarize" affordance. An explicit
+   manual request bypasses the bound. `0` disables it (pre-recency behaviour). This bounds auto
+   *load*; it does not fetch harder — the gate (ADR-014) is untouched and the manual path still
+   serialises through it.
+2. **Honest sparse-state surface.** Copy is reframed to surface scarcity truthfully, never to
+   look fuller: "N ready · M in queue · K no captions" (not "fetching soon"); a one-line "captions
+   are fetched slowly on purpose" note; "Summarize" (not "Summarize now"); the empty-connected
+   state stops printing an impossible CLI command.
+3. **Feed IA = one list, noise-collapsed.** Summarized + recent un-summarized cards lead inline;
+   the older un-summarized back-catalogue collapses behind a single "Show N older videos"
+   disclosure; caption-less videos collapse to a one-line count instead of N dead cards. List is
+   ordered summarized-first, then `published_at DESC NULLS LAST`.
+
+**Consequences.** The auto path's per-cycle fetch volume is bounded by recent uploads, not the
+whole back-catalogue, so steady-state 429 pressure drops sharply. Older videos become explicitly
+on-demand — a deliberate honesty trade (the user chooses to spend a scarce fetch on old content).
+The single-replica assumption (ADR-018) is unchanged.
+
+**Deliberately NOT done (premature until the Stage-0 loop is validated).** Return-nudges
+(digest email / push) — a nudge contaminates the *unprompted*-return signal the gate measures
+(ADR-016); building it now poisons the experiment. Also deferred: full-text search, channel
+facets, read/unread, saved views — all need summary abundance to matter.
+
+**Reversibility.** `TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW=0` restores summarize-every-unseen; the feed
+collapse keys off the same window (`App.RecencyWindow=0` → everything inline).
+
+---
+
+## ADR-021 — Persist transcripts as shared, video-keyed public content (re-analysis never re-fetches)
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-09). **Reopens the transcripts half of** the "Global cross-tenant
+`videos`/`transcripts` table" rejection (data-model.md). **Builds on ADR-007** (captions-first),
+**ADR-010/ADR-014** (the per-IP caption rate gate), and **ADR-012** (per-user RLS isolation).
+
+**Context.** Every summarization fetches the transcript fresh through the caption path, even when
+the exact same transcript was fetched moments ago — for the same user re-summarizing, or for a
+second user who happens to watch the same video. The caption fetch is the one genuinely scarce,
+genuinely risky operation in the system: YouTube's timedtext endpoint is unofficial and per-IP
+rate-limited (ADR-010), and tripping it risks the maintainer's Google standing (ADR-014). So the
+operation we most want to *avoid repeating* is the one we currently repeat unconditionally. A
+transcript is **public content** — the same words YouTube serves to anyone — and carries nothing
+user-identifying. The per-user isolation that protects summaries, feeds, and tokens (ADR-012) is
+the wrong shape for it: it forces a re-fetch per user for data that is identical across users.
+
+The original rejection ("Global cross-tenant `videos`/`transcripts` table") bundled videos and
+transcripts together and rejected both on the grounds that "at 1–5 users, re-summarizing is
+cheaper than the coupling." That reasoning holds for **videos** (per-user feed rows, genuinely
+user-scoped) but not for **transcripts**: the cost being avoided is not LLM re-summarization, it
+is a *rate-gated, reputation-risky network fetch*, and that cost is paid per re-fetch regardless
+of user count. One re-fetch avoided is strictly worth more than the coupling it removes.
+
+**Decision.**
+1. **A single shared `transcripts` table, keyed by the cross-user dedup key
+   `(provider, provider_video_id)`** — the stable public identity of the video, not Tapir's
+   internal per-user `videos.id`. Columns: the key, `source` (`captions`/`none`), `language`,
+   `content`, `fetched_at`. It holds **only public caption content + the video's public id** —
+   nothing user-identifying — and is therefore **NOT RLS-scoped**: no `user_id`, no policy, no
+   `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`. This is the deliberate, single exception to the ADR-012 isolation
+   boundary, and the only one.
+2. **Summarize path becomes read-stored-first.** Have a stored transcript for this video? →
+   summarize from the stored text, **no caption fetch**. No stored transcript? → fetch *through
+   the unchanged gate* (ADR-014) → store it → summarize. The gate is neither bypassed nor
+   weakened; persistence reduces how *often* we reach it, never how *fast*.
+3. **De-facto cross-user dedup is the intended behaviour, not a feature with a switch.** Two
+   users who share a video share the one transcript row. A permanent `source = 'none'` (no
+   captions) is stored too, so a known-caption-less video is not re-fetched by anyone. A
+   transient 429 (`SourceRateLimited`) is **never** stored as terminal — it stays a per-user
+   retry via the existing `transcript_status` backoff (ADR-014), so persistence cannot mask a
+   rate-limit into a false "no transcript."
+4. **Per-user `summaries` stay RLS-scoped (ADR-012 unchanged)** and reference the transcript by
+   video id. Videos stay per-user. Only transcripts go shared.
+
+**Consequences.** Re-analysis (re-summarize, different model, paste of an already-seen video,
+onboarding of a second user with overlapping subscriptions) never re-touches YouTube — the
+primary win, and it *reduces* aggregate caption-gate pressure, reinforcing ADR-010/ADR-014 rather
+than straining them. The isolation surface gains exactly one non-RLS table; an isolation test
+asserts the boundary is *exactly* there and has not leaked to any user-owned table (this is the
+proof the public-content classification was implemented as designed). It also unblocks
+multi-model / customizable analysis (re-run analysis on stored text for free) — enabling that is
+this ADR's point; building it is separate.
+
+**Reversibility.** The read-stored-first check is the only behavioural coupling; removing it
+restores fetch-every-time. The down-migration recreates the per-user RLS-scoped transcripts shape
+(001/003). No user-facing surface depends on cross-user sharing — sharing is the *storage shape*,
+never exposed in the UI.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-022 — Summarizer is a resilient endpoint chain, not a single model
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-10). **Extends ADR-004** (the copied `llm` Primary→Fallback
+routing). Triggered by the first friendly-pilot live run, where a connected user got **zero**
+summaries after 12h.
+
+**Context.** Stage-0 ran a single summarizer model (`koala/phi4-mini`) with no fallback wired
+(`summarizer.New(primary, nil)`). The live run exposed three independent failure modes, each of
+which silently produced no summary:
+
+1. **Context overflow.** `phi4-mini` has an 8k context. Real transcripts (one was 11,602 tokens)
+   exceed it and the gateway returns HTTP 400 — and the request also sent `max_tokens=8192`, so
+   even a short transcript plus the completion budget could overflow the window.
+2. **Malformed model output.** `phi4-mini` intermittently emits `highlights` as a bare string
+   instead of an array, producing `cannot unmarshal string into []string`. The old code returned
+   the parse error **without** trying any other model — a 200-with-bad-JSON short-circuited.
+3. **No fallback existed at all** — any primary failure was terminal for that video.
+
+`phi4-mini` is kept as primary deliberately: it is fast and, on transcripts that fit, correct.
+The fix is resilience around it, not replacing it.
+
+**Decision.**
+1. **Ordered endpoint chain (`summarizer.NewChain`).** Endpoints are tried in order; the first to
+   return a *parseable* summary wins. Default chain:
+   `koala/phi4-mini` (primary, local) → `koala/phi4-14b` (fallback, local) →
+   `berget/mistral-small` (worst-case, external). All three are reached through the **one** LiteLLM
+   gateway by alias — the gateway already fronts both llama-swap and berget — so a fallback is a
+   different alias, not a second client config.
+2. **A parse failure advances the chain, same as a transport error.** "Reliably summarized" means
+   *parseable summary returned*, not *HTTP 200*. This is the behaviour the old Primary→Fallback
+   shape missed.
+3. **Tolerant parse.** `highlights`/`takeaways` coerce from a bare string (or a mixed scalar
+   array) to `[]string`, so the most common small-model quirk is absorbed **without** spending a
+   fallback round-trip — keeping the fast path fast.
+4. **Transcript truncation (`TAPIR_MAX_TRANSCRIPT_CHARS`, default 18000).** Input is bounded
+   up-front to fit a small-context primary, so overflow is prevented rather than recovered-from.
+5. **Bounded completion budget (`TAPIR_SUMMARY_MAX_TOKENS`, default 1500).** A summary needs few
+   hundred tokens; the old 8192 budget itself contributed to 8k-window overflow.
+
+**Local-first guarantee preserved.** The chain ordering *is* the guarantee: locals are tried
+first, so content reaches the external endpoint only after every local endpoint has failed.
+`TAPIR_CLOUD_FALLBACK_MODEL=""` removes the external endpoint entirely — the lever a
+**client/NDA deployment** pulls so content never leaves the local stack. With no external endpoint
+configured the `ai_routing.feature` "content only local" scenarios hold unchanged.
+
+**Reversibility.** Pure wiring + config. Setting `TAPIR_FALLBACK_MODEL` and
+`TAPIR_CLOUD_FALLBACK_MODEL` empty collapses the chain back to single-primary behaviour; the
+tolerant parse and truncation are strict supersets of the old behaviour (a previously-parseable
+reply still parses; a transcript within budget is unchanged).
+
+---
+
+## ADR-023 — Drop Shorts/livestreams at discovery to protect the caption budget
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-10). **Builds on ADR-014** (per-IP caption rate limit is the
+binding constraint) and the ADR-022 live-run findings.
+
+**Context.** The scarce resource is the unofficial timedtext caption fetch (per-egress-IP
+429, ~3 successful/pass). The first multi-user run showed the candidate set was mostly noise —
+Shorts, sub-minute clips, and live broadcasts — each of which still consumes a caption-fetch
+attempt (and a "none" result is a *completed* fetch, so it costs budget even when it yields
+nothing). Spending the rate-limited budget on content the user will not read is the waste to
+cut first; it is cheaper and lower-risk than raising the ceiling (multi-IP, Whisper).
+
+Duration and live status are NOT in the playlistItems discovery response, but they ARE in the
+Data API `videos.list` (contentDetails.duration + snippet.liveBroadcastContent) — the official
+**quota-based** API (1 unit/call, 50 ids/call), which is a *different* limit from the timedtext
+429. So one cheap quota call buys a filter that saves many expensive throttled fetches.
+
+**Decision.**
+1. `NewVideos` enriches its candidates with a single `videos.list` call and drops, before
+   returning: videos shorter than `TAPIR_MIN_VIDEO_SECONDS` (default 60) and any `live`/
+   `upcoming` broadcast. Dropped videos are never persisted, so they also declutter the list.
+2. The filter is **degrade-open**: `MinVideoSeconds=0` disables it (no quota call), and a
+   `videos.list` error returns the candidates unfiltered — discovery must never break because a
+   metadata call hiccuped (worst case = pre-ADR-023 behaviour).
+3. The paste-a-URL path (`VideoByID`) is **not** filtered — an explicit user request for a
+   specific video (even a Short) is honoured.
+
+**Reversibility.** Pure discovery-time filter + config. `TAPIR_MIN_VIDEO_SECONDS=0` restores
+the old behaviour. No schema change, no effect on already-stored videos.
+
+**Quota note.** Per-channel enrichment adds ~1 unit/channel/pass. At pilot scale (≤3 users)
+this is well under the 10k/day cap; at larger scale, batch `videos.list` across channels
+(50 ids/call) by collecting all discovered ids per pass before enriching.
+
+---
+
+## ADR-024 — Per-channel caption-availability memory
+
+**Status:** Accepted (2026-06-10). **Builds on ADR-014** (per-IP caption budget), **ADR-021**
+(shared transcript cache), **ADR-023** (Shorts filter).
+
+**Context.** After ADR-021 caches transcripts and ADR-023 drops Shorts, the remaining caption
+waste is the *first* fetch on every new video of a channel that never publishes English captions
+(foreign-language news, music, etc.). Each costs one rate-limited fetch to resolve to "none" —
+and on a throttled IP that fetch may 429 and churn the backoff machinery before it ever gets a
+verdict. A pilot user's feed had several such channels.
+
+**Decision.** Remember, per `(user, channel)`, a streak of consecutive no-caption outcomes
+(`channel_caption_state`, migration 016, RLS-scoped like the rest of the user-owned schema).
+Once the streak reaches `TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_THRESHOLD` (default 5) the channel is
+suppressed — its videos are discovered/listed but not caption-fetched — for
+`TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_WINDOW` (default 14d), after which one video is re-probed
+(auto-recovery for a channel that starts adding captions). A successful fetch resets the streak;
+a fresh 429 does NOT count (transient, not a caption verdict). An explicit manual request
+bypasses suppression. `threshold = 0` disables the feature.
+
+**Why per-user, not global.** Caption availability is really a channel property (public), so a
+global table would let users share the learning. But subscriptions are per-user (ADR-012) and at
+pilot scale users' channel sets barely overlap, so per-user + RLS keeps it consistent with the
+existing isolation model with no new non-RLS exception to justify. Promoting to a shared table
+(like transcripts, ADR-021) is a future optimisation if channel overlap grows.
+
+**Reversibility.** Migration 016 is a clean drop; `threshold = 0` disables at runtime. The
+memory only ever *suppresses fetches* — it never deletes content or affects already-stored
+summaries.
+
+---
+
 ## Rejected alternatives
 
 Approaches considered during the 2026-06-02 planning + grill session and **deliberately not
@@ -304,10 +937,15 @@ maps to the ADR that settles it.
 | Lifting shared packages into a `brain-common` module | Couples Tapir's release cycle to the monolith for negligible code savings | ADR-004 |
 | Importing/replicating the filesystem `brain` package | Assumes co-location with the brain git checkout; wrong for a standalone networked service | ADR-005 |
 | Reusing `ingestion`'s `oauth` package for YouTube/Vimeo | Same name, opposite direction — it's inbound MCP-server auth, not outbound provider OAuth | ADR-006 |
-| Global cross-tenant `videos`/`transcripts` table (dedup) | Reintroduces the cross-domain DB coupling the homelab review is removing; at 1–5 users, re-summarizing is cheaper than the coupling | data-model.md |
+| Global cross-tenant `videos`/`transcripts` table (dedup) | Reintroduces the cross-domain DB coupling the homelab review is removing; at 1–5 users, re-summarizing is cheaper than the coupling. **Transcripts half reopened by ADR-021** — the avoided cost there is a rate-gated, reputation-risky *caption fetch*, not LLM re-summarization, so it outweighs the coupling; **videos stay per-user.** | data-model.md, **ADR-021** (transcripts only) |
 | Audio-download + Whisper STT in the core path | ToS-grey, breakage-prone (yt-dlp), contends for koala GPU with the JEPA PoC; captions alone test the core hypothesis | ADR-007 |
 | Building multi-tenant SaaS / Google OAuth verification now | "Real users soon" was lowered to Future B; SaaS machinery before the Stage 0 self-use gate is the primary documented anti-goal | ADR-008, VISION |
 | Delegating the S5 reuse spike to an agent swarm | A 1-hour sequential read-and-judge with a single coupled conclusion; orchestration overhead exceeds the work, and it's Diamond-1 judgment the maintainer wanted to own | (process note) |
+| Vault-write SA for per-user OAuth tokens (ESO as runtime write path) | ESO syncs vault→cluster at deploy time, not a runtime write API; a write-SA widens blast radius to shared infra to store app row-data | ADR-015, infra#88 |
+| Supabase for per-user credential storage | Adds a second datastore for a few encrypted strings PG18 already holds; reopens ADR-002 | ADR-015, infra#88 |
+| Feedback-based Stage 0 gate (friends saying it's useful) | Politeness bias makes asked-for feedback the least reliable signal; return-usage is the real test | ADR-016 |
+| Reverse the Dex-write invite flow (Google OIDC only) | Some intended Future-B users won't use Google; OIDC-only leaves them with no onboarding path — invite flow is load-bearing | ADR-017 |
+| k8s CronJob for scheduled discovery (vs in-process) | At Future-B scale the in-process scheduler is simpler to deploy; CronJob's failure-isolation benefit was weighed and traded away knowingly (revisit if >1 replica or load grows) | ADR-018 |
 
 If a future case genuinely reopens one of these, that's a new ADR superseding the relevant one —
 not a silent reversal.

README.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ model, behavior specs) remain the source of intent.
 
 ## Running the Stage-0 demo
 
-Tapir runs on **your own** YouTube account: authorize once, then run the
+Tapir runs on your YouTube account(s): authorize once, then run the
 watch→summarize→deliver loop. All configuration is via `TAPIR_*` environment
 variables — copy [`.env.example`](.env.example) to `.env` and fill it in (no
 secrets are committed; at demo time source them from op, e.g. `op run -- ...`).
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ go build -o bin/tapir ./cmd/tapir
 ./bin/tapir auth
 
 # 3. run: detect new videos across your subscriptions, summarize, deliver to the
-#    store. Unset TAPIR_POLL_INTERVAL = single pass; set it (e.g. 15m) to loop.
+#    store. Single pass; set TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL (e.g. 2h) for the serve loop.
 ./bin/tapir run
 ```
 
@@ -68,6 +68,18 @@ URI matches `TAPIR_OAUTH_REDIRECT_ADDR`. The summarizer model
 (`TAPIR_SUMMARIZER_MODEL`, default `koala/phi4-mini`) is overridable; pick the
 final alias when the gateway is reachable (see `docs/homelab-integration.md`).
 
+### Web surface (`tapir serve`)
+
+`tapir serve` starts the HTMX+Templ web UI on `:8080`. Users log in via Dex OIDC (local
+password or Google); a new Dex subject is routed to `/register` to create a Tapir account.
+Stage 1 is multi-user: each user connects their own YouTube account from the browser and
+manages their own summaries under DB-enforced RLS isolation. When `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL`
+is set (e.g. `2h`), the serve process runs a scheduled discovery pass for every registered
+user automatically — no CronJob required. In auto mode only videos published within
+`TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW` (default ~7d, ADR-020) are summarised automatically; older videos
+are listed and summarised on demand, so a large back-catalogue doesn't keep re-driving the
+caption rate gate. See `docs/homelab-integration.md` for the full config reference.
+
 ### Headless on koala
 
 koala has no browser and no interactive `op` session, so the two interactive

VISION.md

@@ -44,50 +44,74 @@ fallback — their key, their choice.
 
 ## Who it is for
 
-- **Now (the first customer):** the maintainer — one person, their own subscriptions,
+- **Now (the first customers):** the maintainer and a small number of known, trusted
-  summaries delivered to their own store and brain.
+  friends — each with their own account, isolated data, optional BYO-AI. The maintainer is
-- **Soon (Future B):** a small number of known, trusted users (friends / beta) — each with
+  the first customer; friendly users provide the earliest real-world signal.
-  their own account, isolated data, optional BYO-AI.
 - **Maybe (Future C, explicitly not built yet):** a public multi-tenant service. Deferred
-  until there is evidence of sustained personal use **and** real demand. Building for C
+  until there is evidence of sustained use **and** real demand. Building for C before that
-  before that evidence is a known anti-goal.
+  evidence is a known anti-goal.
 
 ## Definition of Success
 
 Success is staged. Each stage has a single, falsifiable headline test. We do not advance
 to the next stage's ambition until the current stage's test passes.
 
-### Stage 0 — Useful to me (the gate)
+### Stage 0 — Useful to me or a friend (the gate)
 
-> **Headline test:** For four consecutive weeks, the maintainer reads Tapir-produced
+> **Headline test:** Over a 3–4 week window, *either* the maintainer *or* at least one
-> summaries for their own subscriptions at least weekly, and at least once acts on a
+> onboarded friend returns to Tapir and reads/acts on summaries in **≥2 separate weeks**.
-> summary (watches / skips / saves a video *because of* the summary).
+> The test is *return usage* (behavioural), not stated approval. The ideal signal is an
+> **unprompted** return (organic, not because the maintainer nudged them) — but see the
+> measurement note below: we currently cannot distinguish prompted from organic returns, so
+> in practice we count all returns and read the result with that caveat.
 
-- Captions-first summarization works end-to-end for the maintainer's real subscriptions.
+- Captions-first summarization works end-to-end for real subscriptions (the maintainer's
-- Summaries land in the maintainer's store and (optionally) brain.
+  and onboarded friends').
+- Summaries land in each user's own store and (optionally) brain.
 - Local-first AI produces summaries of acceptable quality without manual intervention
   most of the time.
-- **This is the gate.** Multi-user, BYO-AI-for-others, and any SaaS ambition stay deferred
+- **Why behavioural, not feedback.** Friend *feedback* is gathered and genuinely valuable —
-  until Stage 0 holds. (Ties to the 2026-07-01 self-use check-in.)
+  but it is **not** the gate. Asked-for feedback from friendly users is the least reliable
+  signal in product development (politeness bias); whether they *come back* is the thing we
+  actually care about. So the gate measures returns, not nice words.
+- **Measurement note — "unprompted" is an ideal we can't yet measure.** Whether a return was
+  organic or prompted by a nudge is not captured by any data Tapir holds (it's context only
+  the maintainer has). Rather than waive the standard, we name the gap: *unprompted* return
+  is the signal we genuinely want; *returns* (prompted or not) is what the data can show. A
+  return that needed a nudge is a weaker signal than one that didn't, and the result is read
+  with that in mind. If distinguishing them ever matters enough, the maintainer tracks nudges
+  manually or a future build records prompt events — neither is in scope now.
+- **Why "me OR a friend".** This replaces the original "useful to *me*, specifically" gate
+  (2026-06-03 decision, recorded in DECISIONS.md ADR-016). Getting signal from friendly
+  users is valuable enough to count — but the bar stays behavioural so it can't be cleared
+  by a polite reaction. (Ties to the 2026-07-01 check-in.)
+- **How it's measured.** Return usage is read from two sources: `summary_actions` (timestamped
+  watch/skip/save per user) answers "acted in ≥2 distinct weeks"; an append-only login-events
+  table (see infra/Tapir build) answers "returned/read in ≥2 distinct weeks" even without an
+  action click — the honest signal for a *reading* product. Login events accrue only from their
+  deploy date onward, so the gate window's data begins then.
+- **Gate-clock reset (ADR-018).** The 3–4 week window starts when in-process scheduled discovery
+  + auto-summarize ship — before that, unprompted use was impossible, so the prior window
+  measured nothing (this is starting the clock when the experiment can actually run, not a reset
+  to dodge a failing gate). The 2026-07-01 check-in referenced above moves accordingly to ~3–4
+  weeks after this deploys. See DECISIONS.md ADR-018.
+- **This is the gate.** Hardening (Stage 1) and any SaaS ambition stay deferred until this
+  behavioural signal exists. Note: multi-user machinery was deliberately built *ahead* of
+  this gate (ADR-012) with isolation enforced — that was an explicit, recorded call, not a
+  sign the gate had passed. The gate is about *evidence of use*, which is still open.
 
-### Stage 1 — Useful to a few (Future B)
+### Stage 1 — Trustworthy at rest (hardening, Future B)
-
-> **Headline test:** At least one trusted user other than the maintainer connects their
-> own account and, within their first month, keeps using it (returns to read summaries in
-> ≥2 separate weeks) without the maintainer hand-holding each summary.
-
-- Multiple users, each with isolated accounts, credentials, and summaries.
-- A new user can self-connect a YouTube/Vimeo account and get summaries with no code change.
-- Optional BYO-AI works per-user.
-- No cross-user data leakage — demonstrable, not assumed.
-
-### Stage 2 — Trustworthy at rest (hardening, still Future B)
 
 > **Headline test:** Credentials (OAuth tokens, BYO-AI keys) are encrypted at rest via the
 > homelab's existing secrets convention; a documented, rehearsed recovery path exists; and
 > a deliberate isolation test (user A cannot read user B's data) passes in CI or a
 > documented manual drill.
 
+- Per-user data isolation is enforced and tested (delivered early via ADR-012 RLS).
+- Per-user credentials are encrypted at rest (ADR-015 envelope encryption; build in infra#89).
+- A new user can self-connect a YouTube/Vimeo account and get summaries with no code change.
+- Optional BYO-AI works per-user.
+
 ### Non-goals (current)
 
 - Public sign-up / billing / a marketing surface.
@@ -98,7 +122,11 @@ to the next stage's ambition until the current stage's test passes.
 
 ## How we will know we are drifting
 
-- We are building Stage 1+ machinery before the Stage 0 gate has passed.
+- We declare the Stage 0 gate "passed" on the strength of polite feedback rather than
+  behavioural return-usage (the politeness-bias trap the gate is designed to resist).
+- We build Stage 1 hardening or Future C machinery while the Stage 0 use-evidence is still
+  absent. (Multi-user machinery already shipped ahead of the gate via ADR-012 — a recorded,
+  deliberate exception, not a precedent for more.)
 - A user's content reaches a third-party model without that user's explicit, per-user opt-in.
 - "Brain ingestion" starts dictating the architecture instead of being one sink behind an
   interface.

cmd/tapir/discovery.go

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/runner"
+)
+
+// discoveryRunner runs one user's discovery pass.
+type discoveryRunner func(ctx context.Context, userID string) (runner.Stats, error)
+
+// serialize wraps run so calls never overlap: every discovery pass — scheduled
+// or connect-triggered (#6) — acquires the same lock, preserving the
+// one-fetcher-at-a-time invariant the scheduler relies on (ADR-018, the
+// single-replica assumption). Locking is per-user, so a connect-triggered pass
+// interleaves between the scheduler's users instead of waiting for a whole pass.
+func serialize(mu *sync.Mutex, run discoveryRunner) discoveryRunner {
+	return func(ctx context.Context, userID string) (runner.Stats, error) {
+		mu.Lock()
+		defer mu.Unlock()
+		return run(ctx, userID)
+	}
+}
+
+// discoveryTrigger fires an out-of-band discovery pass for one user without
+// blocking the caller (the connect HTTP handler). The pass runs on the server's
+// long-lived ctx — not the request ctx — so it survives the post-connect
+// redirect. run is the serialized runner, so a trigger never overlaps the
+// scheduler. Satisfies web.DiscoveryTrigger.
+type discoveryTrigger struct {
+	ctx context.Context
+	run discoveryRunner
+	// onboard, when set, runs after the discovery pass to summarize a capped number
+	// of the user's newest videos (Feature 1). Optional.
+	onboard func(ctx context.Context, userID string)
+	log     *slog.Logger
+}
+
+func (t *discoveryTrigger) Enqueue(userID string) {
+	go func() {
+		if _, err := t.run(t.ctx, userID); err != nil {
+			t.log.Warn("discovery: connect-triggered pass had errors", "user", userID, "err", err)
+		}
+		if t.onboard != nil {
+			t.onboard(t.ctx, userID)
+		}
+	}()
+}

cmd/tapir/discovery_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/runner"
+)
+
+// serialize must guarantee at most one discovery pass runs at a time, so a
+// connect-triggered pass never fetches concurrently with the scheduler.
+func TestSerializeRunsOneAtATime(t *testing.T) {
+	var active, maxActive int32
+	run := func(_ context.Context, _ string) (runner.Stats, error) {
+		n := atomic.AddInt32(&active, 1)
+		for { // record the high-water mark of concurrent runs
+			m := atomic.LoadInt32(&maxActive)
+			if n <= m || atomic.CompareAndSwapInt32(&maxActive, m, n) {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
+		atomic.AddInt32(&active, -1)
+		return runner.Stats{}, nil
+	}
+
+	s := serialize(&sync.Mutex{}, run)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) { defer wg.Done(); _, _ = s(context.Background(), fmt.Sprintf("u%d", i)) }(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	require.Equal(t, int32(1), atomic.LoadInt32(&maxActive),
+		"serialize must run at most one pass at a time")
+}
+
+// Enqueue runs the user's pass out-of-band (non-blocking) on the trigger's ctx.
+func TestDiscoveryTriggerEnqueueRunsUser(t *testing.T) {
+	done := make(chan string, 1)
+	run := func(_ context.Context, userID string) (runner.Stats, error) {
+		done <- userID
+		return runner.Stats{}, nil
+	}
+	tr := &discoveryTrigger{ctx: context.Background(), run: run, log: quietLog()}
+
+	tr.Enqueue("u1")
+
+	select {
+	case got := <-done:
+		require.Equal(t, "u1", got)
+	case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Enqueue did not run the user's pass")
+	}
+}

cmd/tapir/main.go

@@ -20,17 +20,15 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
-	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/llm"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/secrets"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
-	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/summarizer"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/youtube"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/auth"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/config"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/runner"
-	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/usecase"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/web"
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/web/oidc"
 )
@@ -57,6 +55,8 @@ func main() {
 		err = cmdRun(ctx, log)
 	case "serve":
 		err = cmdServe(ctx, log)
+	case "report":
+		err = runReport(ctx, os.Args[2:])
 	default:
 		usage()
 		os.Exit(2)
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ usage:
   tapir serve             run the web UI (read summaries, record watch/skip/save)
   tapir list [-limit N]   list stored summaries, recent first
   tapir show <video-id>   show one summary in full
+  tapir report            Stage-0 usage gate: per-user distinct active weeks
 
 configuration is via TAPIR_* environment variables (see .env.example).
 `)
@@ -120,34 +121,35 @@ func cmdRun(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger) error {
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
 
-	secretStore := secrets.NewFileStore(cfg.SecretsFile)
+	// Same wiring the web serve path uses (buildProcessor). ValidateForRun above
-	src := youtube.New(youtube.Config{
+	// already required the engine's inputs, so a nil here is a genuine config gap.
-		ClientID:           cfg.YTClientID,
+	engine, err := buildProcessor(cfg, st)
-		ClientSecret:       cfg.YTClientSecret,
+	if err != nil {
-		TokenSecretRef:     cfg.YTTokenRef,
+		return err
-		PreferredLanguages: []string{"en"},
-	}, secretStore)
-
-	// Local Primary only; no BYO fallback for the demo (fallback nil).
-	primary := summarizer.Endpoint{
-		Client:   llm.New(cfg.GatewayURL, cfg.GatewayKey, cfg.SummarizerModel, cfg.SummarizerTimeout),
-		Provider: "local",
-		Model:    cfg.SummarizerModel,
 	}
-	sum := summarizer.New(primary, nil)
+	if engine == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("run: incomplete summarization config (gateway, youtube credentials, secrets file)")
+	}
+	// Process-wide caption-fetch rate gate (ADR-014 item 2): the batch path shares
+	// the same per-egress-IP limiter as the web click-path.
+	youtube.SetFetchRate(cfg.FetchRate)
 
-	engine := usecase.NewEngine(src, sum, st)
+	r := runner.New(engine.Source, st, engine, cfg.UserID, log,
-	r := runner.New(src, st, engine, cfg.UserID, log)
+		runner.WithBackoff(cfg.FetchBackoff),
+		runner.WithAutoWindow(cfg.AutoSummarizeWindow),
+		runner.WithCaptionMemory(cfg.ChannelCaptionlessThreshold, cfg.ChannelCaptionlessWindow))
 
 	log.Info("starting run", "user", cfg.UserID, "model", cfg.SummarizerModel,
-		"gateway", cfg.GatewayURL, "poll_interval", cfg.PollInterval)
+		"gateway", cfg.GatewayURL, "poll_interval", cfg.PollInterval, "fetch_backoff", cfg.FetchBackoff,
+		"fetch_rate", cfg.FetchRate, "auto_window", cfg.AutoSummarizeWindow)
 	return r.Loop(ctx, cfg.PollInterval)
 }
 
-// cmdServe runs the Stage-0 web UI: the summary reader over the existing store
+// cmdServe runs the Stage-1 web UI: the summary reader over the existing store
-// (ADR-003 — a new transport, not new core). Auth is the StubAuth allow-all seam
+// (ADR-003 — a new transport, not new core). Auth (web.Auth) gates access; the
-// keyed to the configured user; the Conductor swaps in oidc.DexAuth at merge —
+// registration gate resolves the authenticated subject to a tapir user_id and
-// the only line that changes is the `authn` assignment below.
+// scopes every store access by it (ADR-012). With Dex configured, real OIDC login
+// is used; otherwise StubAuth (dev only). The store doubles as the Identity port.
 func cmdServe(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger) error {
 	cfg, err := config.Load()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -163,10 +165,15 @@ func cmdServe(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger) error {
 	}
 	defer st.Close()
 
+	// Process-wide caption-fetch rate gate (ADR-014 item 2): the web click-path
+	// and the scheduled-discovery runners share one per-egress-IP limiter so they
+	// cannot collectively trip 429s. Must be set before either path fetches.
+	youtube.SetFetchRate(cfg.FetchRate)
+
 	// Auth seam (handlers depend on web.Auth only). With Dex configured
-	// (TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER set) serve uses real OIDC login with single-user
+	// (TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER set) serve uses real OIDC login — any Dex subject may
-	// allowlist authz (ADR-011); otherwise it falls back to the allow-all
+	// authenticate, then registers a tapir user (ADR-012); otherwise it falls
-	// StubAuth for local dev — never expose StubAuth publicly.
+	// back to the allow-all StubAuth for local dev — never expose StubAuth publicly.
 	var authn web.Auth
 	if cfg.DexConfigured() {
 		authn, err = oidc.New(ctx, oidc.Config{
@@ -175,7 +182,6 @@ func cmdServe(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger) error {
 			ClientSecret:  cfg.DexClientSecret,
 			RedirectURL:   cfg.OIDCRedirectURL,
 			SessionSecret: cfg.SessionSecret,
-			AllowedSubject: cfg.AllowedSubject,
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("dex oidc: %w", err)
@@ -186,7 +192,100 @@ func cmdServe(ctx context.Context, log *slog.Logger) error {
 		log.Warn("web auth: STUB allow-all (no TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER) — local dev only, do not expose")
 	}
 
-	app := &web.App{Store: st, Auth: authn, UserID: cfg.UserID, Log: log}
+	// The file-backed SecretStore is shared by the connect flow (writes tokens)
+	// and account management (deletes them on disconnect / delete-account).
+	secretStore := secrets.NewFileStore(cfg.SecretsFile)
+	app := &web.App{Store: st, Identity: st, Auth: authn, Secrets: secretStore, Log: log, RecencyWindow: cfg.AutoSummarizeWindow}
+
+	// User onboarding is handled by the IdP (Authentik invite flow), not Tapir —
+	// the Dex local-password provisioning path was removed (ADR-019). An
+	// authenticated subject with no Tapir user is routed to /register.
+
+	// Web-initiated YouTube connect (ADR-006). Mounted only when the OAuth client
+	// credentials are present; the refresh token persists through the SecretStore
+	// under a per-user ref (web.YouTubeTokenRef). Live connect also needs the
+	// callback URL registered in the Google OAuth client's authorized redirects.
+	if cfg.YTClientID != "" && cfg.YTClientSecret != "" {
+		app.Connect = web.NewConnectHandler(auth.Config{
+			ClientID:     cfg.YTClientID,
+			ClientSecret: cfg.YTClientSecret,
+			RedirectURL:  cfg.YTConnectRedirectURL,
+		}, secretStore, st, log)
+		// Paste-a-URL (Feature 2): same YouTube credentials, per-user adapter built
+		// per request. Mounting the /paste route keys off app.Fetcher being set.
+		app.Fetcher = videoFetcher{cfg: cfg, secrets: secretStore}
+		log.Info("web youtube connect + paste enabled", "redirect", cfg.YTConnectRedirectURL)
+	}
+
+	// Immediate summarization for the web "Summarize" button. When the engine can
+	// be built (gateway + YouTube credentials + secrets present), a click runs the
+	// summary now in the background; otherwise the button stays queue-only and the
+	// next `tapir run` does the work (buildProcessor returns nil — never an error).
+	engine, err := buildProcessor(cfg, st)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if engine != nil {
+		app.Processor = &engineProcessor{engine: engine, store: st}
+		log.Info("web immediate summarization enabled", "model", cfg.SummarizerModel)
+	} else {
+		log.Info("web summarization is queue-only (incomplete engine config)")
+	}
+
+	// In-process scheduled discovery (ADR-018): when enabled, a background
+	// goroutine runs a discovery pass for ALL users on TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL,
+	// reusing the per-user runner.Runner. Cancelled by the same ctx as the server.
+	//
+	// SINGLE-REPLICA ASSUMPTION (load-bearing): this loop lives in the web process.
+	// Running serve at >1 replica would make every replica fetch every user in
+	// parallel — duplicate work and self-inflicted 429s. replicas: 1 is required in
+	// the deployment manifest; scaling up needs a CronJob or leader election first.
+	if cfg.DiscoveryInterval > 0 {
+		log.Info("scheduled discovery enabled", "interval", cfg.DiscoveryInterval, "fetch_rate", cfg.FetchRate)
+		log.Warn("scheduled discovery assumes a SINGLE replica — running serve at >1 replica double-runs discovery (ADR-018)")
+		rawRunUser := func(ctx context.Context, userID string) (runner.Stats, error) {
+			r, err := buildUserRunner(cfg, st, secretStore, userID, log)
+			if err != nil {
+				return runner.Stats{}, err
+			}
+			return r.RunOnce(ctx)
+		}
+		// One lock shared by the scheduler and connect-triggered passes (#6) so
+		// they never fetch concurrently — the single-fetcher invariant (ADR-018).
+		runUser := serialize(&sync.Mutex{}, rawRunUser)
+		// Onboarding burst (Feature 1): after the connect-triggered discovery pass,
+		// summarize up to OnboardSummarizeCount of the user's NEWEST unsummarized
+		// videos so a fresh account gets real summaries in its first session. Hard
+		// cap; explicit, so it bypasses the recency window — but every fetch still
+		// goes through globalFetchGate via the Processor. No-op when disabled
+		// (count 0) or queue-only (no Processor).
+		onboard := func(ctx context.Context, userID string) {
+			if cfg.OnboardSummarizeCount <= 0 || app.Processor == nil {
+				return
+			}
+			ids, err := st.NewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs(ctx, userID, cfg.OnboardSummarizeCount)
+			if err != nil {
+				log.Warn("onboarding: list newest unsummarized", "user", userID, "err", err)
+				return
+			}
+			for _, id := range ids {
+				if err := app.Processor.ProcessVideo(ctx, userID, id); err != nil {
+					log.Warn("onboarding: summarize", "user", userID, "video", id, "err", err)
+				}
+			}
+			if len(ids) > 0 {
+				log.Info("onboarding burst complete", "user", userID, "summarized", len(ids), "cap", cfg.OnboardSummarizeCount)
+			}
+		}
+		if app.Connect != nil {
+			app.Connect.Discovery = &discoveryTrigger{ctx: ctx, run: runUser, onboard: onboard, log: log}
+			log.Info("connect-triggered discovery enabled", "onboard_cap", cfg.OnboardSummarizeCount)
+		}
+		go runScheduler(ctx, cfg.DiscoveryInterval, st, runUser, log)
+	} else {
+		log.Info("scheduled discovery disabled (TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL unset or 0)")
+	}
+
 	srv := &http.Server{
 		Addr:              cfg.HTTPAddr,
 		Handler:           app.Router(),

cmd/tapir/processor.go

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/llm"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/secrets"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/summarizer"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/youtube"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/config"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/ports"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/usecase"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/web"
+)
+
+// videoFetcher adapts the YouTube adapter to web.VideoFetcher for the paste flow
+// (Feature 2). It builds a per-user adapter bound to that user's token ref and
+// resolves a single video's metadata via the Data API — ungated; only the later
+// transcript fetch goes through globalFetchGate.
+type videoFetcher struct {
+	cfg     config.Config
+	secrets ports.SecretStore
+}
+
+func (f videoFetcher) FetchVideo(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (domain.Video, error) {
+	a := youtube.New(youtube.Config{
+		ClientID:       f.cfg.YTClientID,
+		ClientSecret:   f.cfg.YTClientSecret,
+		TokenSecretRef: web.YouTubeTokenRef(userID),
+	}, f.secrets)
+	return a.VideoByID(ctx, userID, videoID)
+}
+
+// buildProcessor wires the summarization engine — YouTube source (captions-first),
+// AI-router summarizer, store sink — shared by `tapir run` and the web
+// "Summarize now" path so the wiring lives in one place. It returns (nil, nil) —
+// not an error — when the config cannot support live summarization (no gateway
+// URL, no YouTube client credentials, or no secrets file). That nil is the
+// queue-only fallback: the web UI keeps working (the button just queues) and
+// `tapir run` reports the gap via its own ValidateForRun. Missing engine config
+// is never an error here.
+// buildSummarizer wires the summarization endpoint chain (ADR-022) shared by the
+// web "Summarize now" path and the scheduler's per-user runners. The chain is:
+// primary (local, fast) → local fallback → cloud fallback (worst case). Each
+// endpoint reaches the same LiteLLM gateway with a different model alias — the
+// gateway fronts both llama-swap and berget — so a fallback is just a different
+// alias, not a second client config. Empty model entries are skipped, so a
+// client deployment can set the cloud fallback empty to keep content local.
+func buildSummarizer(cfg config.Config) *summarizer.Summarizer {
+	mk := func(model string) summarizer.Endpoint {
+		return summarizer.Endpoint{
+			Client:   llm.New(cfg.GatewayURL, cfg.GatewayKey, model, cfg.SummarizerTimeout, llm.WithMaxTokens(cfg.SummaryMaxTokens)),
+			Provider: providerOf(model),
+			Model:    model,
+		}
+	}
+	eps := []summarizer.Endpoint{mk(cfg.SummarizerModel)}
+	if cfg.FallbackModel != "" && cfg.FallbackModel != cfg.SummarizerModel {
+		eps = append(eps, mk(cfg.FallbackModel))
+	}
+	if cfg.CloudFallbackModel != "" && cfg.CloudFallbackModel != cfg.SummarizerModel {
+		eps = append(eps, mk(cfg.CloudFallbackModel))
+	}
+	return summarizer.NewChain(eps, cfg.MaxTranscriptChars)
+}
+
+// providerOf maps a model alias to the domain AIProvider recorded on summaries.
+// A "berget/" alias is an external provider; everything else is the local stack.
+func providerOf(model string) string {
+	if strings.HasPrefix(model, "berget/") {
+		return "berget"
+	}
+	return "local"
+}
+
+func buildProcessor(cfg config.Config, st *store.Store) (*usecase.Engine, error) {
+	if cfg.GatewayURL == "" || cfg.YTClientID == "" || cfg.YTClientSecret == "" || cfg.SecretsFile == "" {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	secretStore := secrets.NewFileStore(cfg.SecretsFile)
+	src := youtube.New(youtube.Config{
+		ClientID:           cfg.YTClientID,
+		ClientSecret:       cfg.YTClientSecret,
+		TokenSecretRef:     cfg.YTTokenRef,
+		PreferredLanguages: []string{"en"},
+		MinVideoSeconds:    cfg.MinVideoSeconds,
+	}, secretStore)
+
+	sum := buildSummarizer(cfg)
+
+	// The store is both the summary sink and the shared transcript cache (ADR-021):
+	// the engine reads stored transcripts before any caption fetch and writes
+	// resolved ones back, so re-analysis never re-touches YouTube.
+	eng := usecase.NewEngine(src, sum, st)
+	eng.Transcripts = st
+	return eng, nil
+}
+
+// engineProcessor adapts the engine (which works in terms of a domain.Video) to
+// the web.Processor port (which works in terms of a stored video id): it loads the
+// video row, runs the engine, and — on a produced summary — clears the manual
+// queue flag, mirroring the runner so the video is not re-summarized on the next
+// `tapir run` and the UI drops the "Queued" chip. A skip (no transcript) leaves
+// the flag set so a later run can retry.
+type engineProcessor struct {
+	engine *usecase.Engine
+	store  *store.Store
+}
+
+func (p *engineProcessor) ProcessVideo(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) error {
+	row, err := p.store.GetVideoRow(ctx, userID, videoID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("load video %q: %w", videoID, err)
+	}
+
+	v := domain.Video{
+		ID:              row.VideoID,
+		UserID:          userID,
+		Provider:        domain.Provider(row.Channel),
+		ProviderVideoID: row.ProviderVideoID,
+		Title:           row.Title,
+		URL:             row.URL,
+		PublishedAt:     row.PublishedAt,
+	}
+
+	res, err := p.engine.ProcessNewVideo(ctx, v)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("process video %q: %w", videoID, err)
+	}
+	if res.Summary != nil {
+		if err := p.store.ClearSummarizeRequested(ctx, userID, videoID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("clear summarize flag %q: %w", videoID, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

cmd/tapir/processor_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/config"
+)
+
+// TestBuildProcessorNilOnIncompleteConfig asserts the queue-only fallback: when a
+// required input is missing, buildProcessor returns (nil, nil) — never an error —
+// so the web UI degrades to queue-only instead of failing to start.
+func TestBuildProcessorNilOnIncompleteConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	// A complete config (the fields buildProcessor gates on). The store is nil:
+	// buildProcessor must not touch it on the incomplete paths, and the complete
+	// path only stores the pointer (no connection), so nil is fine for this test.
+	complete := config.Config{
+		GatewayURL:     "http://gw/v1",
+		YTClientID:     "id",
+		YTClientSecret: "secret",
+		SecretsFile:    "/tmp/secrets.json",
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		mutate  func(config.Config) config.Config
+		wantNil bool
+	}{
+		{"complete", func(c config.Config) config.Config { return c }, false},
+		{"no gateway url", func(c config.Config) config.Config { c.GatewayURL = ""; return c }, true},
+		{"no yt client id", func(c config.Config) config.Config { c.YTClientID = ""; return c }, true},
+		{"no yt client secret", func(c config.Config) config.Config { c.YTClientSecret = ""; return c }, true},
+		{"no secrets file", func(c config.Config) config.Config { c.SecretsFile = ""; return c }, true},
+		{"empty config", func(config.Config) config.Config { return config.Config{} }, true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			engine, err := buildProcessor(tt.mutate(complete), nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("buildProcessor returned an error, want nil: %v", err)
+			}
+			if (engine == nil) != tt.wantNil {
+				t.Fatalf("engine == nil is %v, want %v", engine == nil, tt.wantNil)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/tapir/report.go

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"text/tabwriter"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+// gateThreshold is the Stage-0 gate (VISION/ADR-016): usage in >= 2 distinct
+// weeks. The gate passes when any user reaches it.
+const gateThreshold = 2
+
+// runReport prints the Stage-0 usage gate: per-user distinct active weeks (reads
+// UNION acts) and the pass/fail verdict. Read-only, cross-user — needs only
+// TAPIR_DB_DSN (not TAPIR_USER_ID; the report enumerates all users itself).
+func runReport(ctx context.Context, _ []string) error {
+	dsn := os.Getenv(envDSN)
+	if dsn == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s is required", envDSN)
+	}
+	s, err := store.New(ctx, dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer s.Close()
+
+	rows, err := s.ActiveWeeks(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return formatReport(os.Stdout, rows)
+}
+
+// formatReport renders the per-user week counts and the gate verdict. Pure: no DB,
+// no env — so the layout and verdict logic are unit-testable without Postgres.
+func formatReport(w io.Writer, rows []store.UserActiveWeeks) error {
+	if len(rows) == 0 {
+		_, err := fmt.Fprintln(w, "no users yet")
+		return err
+	}
+
+	tw := tabwriter.NewWriter(w, 0, 4, 2, ' ', 0)
+	_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(tw, "USER\tNAME\tACTIVE_WEEKS\tGATE")
+	passed := false
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		gate := "-"
+		if r.ActiveWeeks >= gateThreshold {
+			gate = "PASS"
+			passed = true
+		}
+		_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(tw, "%s\t%s\t%d\t%s\n", r.UserID, orDash(r.DisplayName), r.ActiveWeeks, gate)
+	}
+	if err := tw.Flush(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	verdict := fmt.Sprintf("\nGate (usage in >= %d distinct weeks): NOT YET MET\n", gateThreshold)
+	if passed {
+		verdict = fmt.Sprintf("\nGate (usage in >= %d distinct weeks): PASSED\n", gateThreshold)
+	}
+	_, err := fmt.Fprint(w, verdict)
+	return err
+}

cmd/tapir/report_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+func TestFormatReportColumnsAndGatePass(t *testing.T) {
+	rows := []store.UserActiveWeeks{
+		{UserID: "user-a", DisplayName: "Ada", ActiveWeeks: 3},
+		{UserID: "user-b", DisplayName: "", ActiveWeeks: 1},
+	}
+
+	var b strings.Builder
+	require.NoError(t, formatReport(&b, rows))
+	out := b.String()
+
+	require.Contains(t, out, "USER")
+	require.Contains(t, out, "ACTIVE_WEEKS")
+	require.Contains(t, out, "Ada")
+	require.Contains(t, out, "PASSED", "a user at >= 2 weeks passes the gate")
+
+	// The >=2 user is marked PASS; the 1-week user is not.
+	require.Contains(t, lineContaining(t, out, "user-a"), "PASS")
+	require.NotContains(t, lineContaining(t, out, "user-b"), "PASS")
+	require.Contains(t, lineContaining(t, out, "user-b"), "-", "no display name falls back to dash")
+}
+
+func TestFormatReportGateNotMet(t *testing.T) {
+	rows := []store.UserActiveWeeks{{UserID: "user-a", ActiveWeeks: 1}}
+
+	var b strings.Builder
+	require.NoError(t, formatReport(&b, rows))
+	require.Contains(t, b.String(), "NOT YET MET", "no user at >= 2 weeks fails the gate")
+}
+
+func TestFormatReportEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	var b strings.Builder
+	require.NoError(t, formatReport(&b, nil))
+	require.Contains(t, b.String(), "no users yet")
+}

cmd/tapir/scheduler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"time"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/youtube"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/config"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/ports"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/runner"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/usecase"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/web"
+)
+
+// buildUserRunner constructs a runner.Runner for one user, reusing the same
+// engine wiring as buildProcessor but bound to that user's own YouTube refresh
+// token (web.YouTubeTokenRef(userID)) — the Stage-1 per-tenant ref, not the
+// Stage-0 single ref. It returns an error (not nil) when the global config can't
+// support live summarization (gateway, YouTube client creds, secrets file), so
+// the scheduler can skip that user gracefully. A user who simply hasn't connected
+// YouTube yet builds fine here; their token ref fails to resolve at RunOnce time,
+// surfacing as a per-user error the scheduler logs and skips.
+func buildUserRunner(cfg config.Config, st *store.Store, secretStore ports.SecretStore, userID string, log *slog.Logger) (*runner.Runner, error) {
+	if cfg.GatewayURL == "" || cfg.YTClientID == "" || cfg.YTClientSecret == "" || cfg.SecretsFile == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("buildUserRunner: incomplete summarization config (gateway, youtube credentials, secrets file)")
+	}
+
+	src := youtube.New(youtube.Config{
+		ClientID:           cfg.YTClientID,
+		ClientSecret:       cfg.YTClientSecret,
+		TokenSecretRef:     web.YouTubeTokenRef(userID),
+		PreferredLanguages: []string{"en"},
+		MinVideoSeconds:    cfg.MinVideoSeconds,
+	}, secretStore)
+
+	engine := usecase.NewEngine(src, buildSummarizer(cfg), st)
+	// Share the transcript cache (ADR-021) on the scheduler path too — without
+	// this every scheduled pass re-fetches transcripts it already had, burning the
+	// scarce per-IP caption budget (ADR-014) and starving other users. The web
+	// "Summarize now" path already sets this; the scheduler omitting it was a bug.
+	engine.Transcripts = st
+
+	return runner.New(src, st, engine, userID, log,
+		runner.WithBackoff(cfg.FetchBackoff),
+		runner.WithAutoWindow(cfg.AutoSummarizeWindow),
+		runner.WithCaptionMemory(cfg.ChannelCaptionlessThreshold, cfg.ChannelCaptionlessWindow)), nil
+}
+
+// userLister enumerates every registered user and reports a user's video
+// connections. *store.Store satisfies it via ListAllUsers + ConnectionsForUser.
+// A small local interface keeps the scheduler testable with a fake.
+type userLister interface {
+	ListAllUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]store.UserIdentity, error)
+	ConnectionsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]store.Connection, error)
+}
+
+// runDiscoveryPass runs one discovery pass for every user. runUser performs a
+// single user's pass (production: build a runner and RunOnce). Per-user failures
+// — including a buildUserRunner error or a RunOnce error — are logged and skipped
+// so one bad user, channel, or video never aborts the others (ADR-018 failure
+// isolation). Returns the stats summed across users.
+func runDiscoveryPass(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	pass int,
+	lister userLister,
+	runUser func(context.Context, string) (runner.Stats, error),
+	log *slog.Logger,
+) runner.Stats {
+	users, err := lister.ListAllUsers(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Error("scheduler: list users failed", "err", err)
+		return runner.Stats{}
+	}
+
+	// Keep only users with a video connection. A pass for a connectionless user
+	// (e.g. a stale Dex-era orphan identity) only tries to resolve a token that
+	// was never minted, logging a spurious "ref not found" every tick. Filtering
+	// here — BEFORE rotation — also keeps fairness honest: rotation is over the
+	// users that actually consume the caption budget, so a dead identity can't eat
+	// a rotation slot and skew the lead share.
+	var connected []store.UserIdentity
+	for _, u := range users {
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return runner.Stats{} // shutting down
+		}
+		conns, err := lister.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, u.UserID)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Warn("scheduler: list connections failed", "user", u.UserID, "err", err)
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(conns) == 0 {
+			log.Debug("scheduler: skipping user with no video connections", "user", u.UserID)
+			continue
+		}
+		connected = append(connected, u)
+	}
+
+	// Rotate who goes first each pass. Caption fetches share one per-egress-IP
+	// rate budget (ADR-014); whoever runs first each pass spends the pre-throttle
+	// window, so a FIXED order permanently starves whoever is last (a new pilot
+	// user got 0 fetches for 12h while the first-listed user got all of them).
+	// Rotation over the connected set gives each real user the lead in turn.
+	connected = rotateUsers(connected, pass)
+
+	log.Info("scheduler: starting discovery pass", "users", len(connected))
+	var total runner.Stats
+	for _, u := range connected {
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			break // shutting down: stop enumerating
+		}
+		stats, err := runUser(ctx, u.UserID)
+		total = sumStats(total, stats)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Warn("scheduler: user discovery pass had errors", "user", u.UserID, "err", err)
+		}
+	}
+	log.Info("scheduler: pass complete",
+		"candidates", total.Candidates, "summarized", total.Summarized,
+		"skipped_seen", total.SkippedSeen, "skipped_no_text", total.SkippedNoText,
+		"skipped_manual", total.SkippedManual, "skipped_too_old", total.SkippedTooOld,
+		"skipped_rate_limited", total.SkippedRateLimited,
+		"skipped_no_caption_channel", total.SkippedNoCaptionChannel,
+		"channel_unavailable", total.ChannelUnavailable, "errors", total.Errors)
+	return total
+}
+
+// runScheduler runs a discovery pass on startup, then once every interval until
+// ctx is cancelled (pod SIGTERM exits the loop cleanly). A non-positive interval
+// disables scheduling entirely (no startup pass) so dev/tests never auto-fetch.
+// It reuses the existing runner.Runner via runUser — the only new behaviour over
+// runner.Loop is iterating all users per tick (ADR-018).
+func runScheduler(
+	ctx context.Context,
+	interval time.Duration,
+	lister userLister,
+	runUser func(context.Context, string) (runner.Stats, error),
+	log *slog.Logger,
+) {
+	if interval <= 0 {
+		return // disabled
+	}
+
+	pass := 0
+	runDiscoveryPass(ctx, pass, lister, runUser, log)
+
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
+	defer ticker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-ticker.C:
+			pass++
+			runDiscoveryPass(ctx, pass, lister, runUser, log)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// rotateUsers left-rotates users by pass positions so a different user leads each
+// pass. With n users, user i leads on every pass where pass ≡ i (mod n). A pass
+// offset that is negative or exceeds n is normalised. Order within the rotation
+// is otherwise preserved, so the set of users run is unchanged — only who is
+// first (and thus wins the scarce caption-fetch budget) rotates.
+func rotateUsers(users []store.UserIdentity, pass int) []store.UserIdentity {
+	n := len(users)
+	if n <= 1 {
+		return users
+	}
+	off := ((pass % n) + n) % n
+	if off == 0 {
+		return users
+	}
+	out := make([]store.UserIdentity, 0, n)
+	out = append(out, users[off:]...)
+	out = append(out, users[:off]...)
+	return out
+}
+
+// sumStats adds two passes' stats field-wise, so runDiscoveryPass can report a
+// per-tick aggregate across all users.
+func sumStats(a, b runner.Stats) runner.Stats {
+	return runner.Stats{
+		Candidates:              a.Candidates + b.Candidates,
+		Summarized:              a.Summarized + b.Summarized,
+		SkippedSeen:             a.SkippedSeen + b.SkippedSeen,
+		SkippedNoText:           a.SkippedNoText + b.SkippedNoText,
+		SkippedManual:           a.SkippedManual + b.SkippedManual,
+		SkippedTooOld:           a.SkippedTooOld + b.SkippedTooOld,
+		SkippedRateLimited:      a.SkippedRateLimited + b.SkippedRateLimited,
+		SkippedNoCaptionChannel: a.SkippedNoCaptionChannel + b.SkippedNoCaptionChannel,
+		ChannelUnavailable:      a.ChannelUnavailable + b.ChannelUnavailable,
+		Errors:                  a.Errors + b.Errors,
+	}
+}

cmd/tapir/scheduler_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/runner"
+)
+
+func quietLog() *slog.Logger {
+	return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
+}
+
+// fakeLister returns a fixed user set (or an error) for the scheduler under test.
+type fakeLister struct {
+	users  []store.UserIdentity
+	err    error
+	noConn map[string]bool // users that have NOT connected a video source
+}
+
+func (f fakeLister) ListAllUsers(context.Context) ([]store.UserIdentity, error) {
+	return f.users, f.err
+}
+
+// ConnectionsForUser reports a single youtube connection for every user except
+// those in noConn, which return zero — the connection-less case the scheduler
+// must skip instead of running (and failing to resolve a token for).
+func (f fakeLister) ConnectionsForUser(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]store.Connection, error) {
+	if f.noConn[userID] {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	return []store.Connection{{Provider: "youtube"}}, nil
+}
+
+// countingRunUser records how many passes each user got, optionally failing for
+// specific users, under a mutex so it is safe across the scheduler goroutine.
+type countingRunUser struct {
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	calls   map[string]int
+	order   []string // userIDs in the order they were run, across all passes
+	failFor map[string]bool
+}
+
+func newCountingRunUser(failFor ...string) *countingRunUser {
+	c := &countingRunUser{calls: map[string]int{}, failFor: map[string]bool{}}
+	for _, u := range failFor {
+		c.failFor[u] = true
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+func (c *countingRunUser) run(_ context.Context, userID string) (runner.Stats, error) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	c.calls[userID]++
+	c.order = append(c.order, userID)
+	if c.failFor[userID] {
+		return runner.Stats{Errors: 1}, errors.New("boom")
+	}
+	return runner.Stats{Summarized: 1}, nil
+}
+
+func (c *countingRunUser) runOrder() []string {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	return append([]string(nil), c.order...)
+}
+
+func (c *countingRunUser) count(userID string) int {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	return c.calls[userID]
+}
+
+func (c *countingRunUser) total() int {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	n := 0
+	for _, v := range c.calls {
+		n += v
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func usersN(ids ...string) []store.UserIdentity {
+	out := make([]store.UserIdentity, len(ids))
+	for i, id := range ids {
+		out[i] = store.UserIdentity{UserID: id, DexSubject: "dex|" + id}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func TestDiscoveryPassRunsEveryUserOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b", "c")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	stats := runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("a"))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("b"))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("c"))
+	require.Equal(t, 3, stats.Summarized, "stats are summed across users")
+}
+
+// Caption fetches share one per-IP budget; a fixed user order starves whoever is
+// last. Each pass must rotate which user leads so the lead slot is shared.
+func TestDiscoveryPassRotatesLeadUser(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b", "c")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+	runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 1, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+	runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 2, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"a", "b", "c", "b", "c", "a", "c", "a", "b"}, rc.runOrder(),
+		"each pass left-rotates the user order so every user leads in turn")
+	// Fairness: over a full rotation cycle every user ran the same number of times.
+	require.Equal(t, 3, rc.count("a"))
+	require.Equal(t, 3, rc.count("b"))
+	require.Equal(t, 3, rc.count("c"))
+}
+
+// A connectionless orphan must not consume a rotation slot: rotation is over the
+// connected users only, so two real users alternate the lead 50/50 even with a
+// dead identity listed between them.
+func TestDiscoveryPassRotationIgnoresConnectionlessUsers(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "orphan", "c"), noConn: map[string]bool{"orphan": true}}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+	runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 1, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"a", "c", "c", "a"}, rc.runOrder(),
+		"only connected users rotate; the orphan never runs and never holds a slot")
+	require.Equal(t, 0, rc.count("orphan"))
+}
+
+func TestDiscoveryPassSkipsUsersWithoutConnections(t *testing.T) {
+	// b never connected a video source (e.g. a stale Dex-era orphan identity).
+	// It must be skipped silently — not run and logged as a token error every pass.
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b", "c"), noConn: map[string]bool{"b": true}}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	stats := runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("a"))
+	require.Equal(t, 0, rc.count("b"), "a user with no connection must be skipped, not run")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("c"))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, stats.Summarized, "only connected users contribute")
+	require.Equal(t, 0, stats.Errors, "skipping is silent — no spurious error stat")
+}
+
+func TestDiscoveryPassOneUserFailureDoesNotStopOthers(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b", "c")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser("b") // user b's pass errors
+
+	stats := runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("a"))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("b"))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, rc.count("c"), "a failing user must not abort the rest")
+	require.Equal(t, 2, stats.Summarized) // a + c
+	require.Equal(t, 1, stats.Errors)     // b
+}
+
+func TestDiscoveryPassListerErrorIsContained(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{err: errors.New("db down")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	stats := runDiscoveryPass(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, 0, rc.total(), "no users enumerated → no passes")
+	require.Equal(t, runner.Stats{}, stats)
+}
+
+func TestSchedulerIntervalZeroDisablesEntirely(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	runScheduler(context.Background(), 0, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+
+	require.Equal(t, 0, rc.total(), "interval 0 must not run even a startup pass")
+}
+
+func TestSchedulerRunsStartupPassThenStopsOnCancel(t *testing.T) {
+	lister := fakeLister{users: usersN("a", "b", "c")}
+	rc := newCountingRunUser()
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	done := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		// A long interval so only the startup pass runs before we cancel.
+		runScheduler(ctx, time.Hour, lister, rc.run, quietLog())
+		close(done)
+	}()
+
+	// The startup pass is synchronous at the top of runScheduler; once all three
+	// users have a pass it has completed and the loop is parked on the ticker.
+	require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return rc.total() == 3 }, time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond)
+
+	cancel()
+	select {
+	case <-done:
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("scheduler did not exit after ctx cancel")
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, 3, rc.total(), "no extra passes fired between startup and cancel")
+}

docs/architecture/architecture.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ adapter behind an interface (Clean Architecture ports & adapters).
 ```mermaid
 graph TB
     subgraph tapir["Tapir (Go)"]
-        http["HTTP server<br/>OAuth callbacks +<br/>user-facing API"]
+        http["tapir serve<br/>(HTMX+Templ web surface:<br/>read summaries, connect,<br/>account, summarize)"]
         watcher["Watcher<br/>detects new videos<br/>(WebSub + poll)"]
         engine["Summarization engine<br/>(use-case core)"]
         resolver["Transcript resolver<br/>(captions-first)"]
@@ -95,6 +95,163 @@ two codebases (ADR-003).
 
 ---
 
+## Web surface — `tapir serve` (Stage 1, ADR-011 → ADR-012)
+
+A later transport added over the **unchanged** engine/ports/sinks core (ADR-003): `tapir serve`
+is an HTMX+Templ reader/writer (`internal/web`) over the existing `store`. It added no business
+logic to the engine — it reads the store and, for one action, kicks the existing engine. ADR-011
+shipped it single-user; ADR-012 opened multi-user with DB-enforced (RLS) isolation.
+
+```mermaid
+graph TB
+    browser["Browser<br/>(Dex-authenticated user)"]
+    subgraph web["internal/web (tapir serve)"]
+        oidc["oidc<br/>Dex OIDC session<br/>(authenticate-only)"]
+        gate["registration gate<br/>new subject -> /register"]
+        pages["summary list + detail<br/>(read) + actions"]
+        connect["/oauth/youtube/callback<br/>per-user token connect"]
+        account["account<br/>(disconnect, delete)"]
+        summarize["Summarize button<br/>-> background goroutine"]
+    end
+    store[("store<br/>(Postgres, RLS per user)")]
+    engine["Summarization engine<br/>(unchanged core)"]
+    secrets["SecretStore<br/>(per-user token refs)"]
+
+    browser --> oidc
+    oidc --> gate
+    gate --> pages
+    pages --> store
+    connect --> secrets
+    connect --> store
+    account --> store
+    account --> secrets
+    summarize -->|background| engine
+    summarize -->|HTMX status poll| store
+    engine --> store
+```
+
+- **Dex OIDC session layer** (`internal/web/oidc`) — **authenticate-only** (ADR-012). It proves
+  *who*; authorization/isolation is the DB's job (RLS), not the session's.
+- **Registration gate** — a Dex subject with no `users` row is routed to `/register`, which
+  creates the `users` row + the `user_identities` mapping (migration 004). Returning subjects
+  pass straight through.
+- **Web-initiated YouTube connect** — `/oauth/youtube/connect` → `/oauth/youtube/callback`
+  persists a **per-user** refresh-token ref (`youtube/<userID>/refresh_token`) via `SecretStore`
+  and a `video_connections` row (ADR-006, migration 005). Distinct from the CLI `tapir auth`.
+- **Account management** — `/account` offers disconnect and **delete account**. Delete removes
+  only Tapir-side state (cascade across the user's tables + secret refs); the shared Dex identity
+  is left intact (ADR-013).
+- **Immediate summarization** — the web "Summarize" button (`POST /v/{id}/summarize`) fires the
+  engine in a **background goroutine** inside `serve`; the page HTMX-polls `/v/{id}/status`,
+  showing a Charmbracelet spinner while in-flight (and an honest "queued/waiting" state under
+  rate-limiting — ADR-014).
+- **Summarization mode** — `users.auto_summarize` (migration 006). Default is **true** for new
+  users (migration 011, ADR-018); all existing rows were back-filled via migration 012. Auto:
+  new videos **published within the recency window** (`TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW`, default ~7d,
+  ADR-020) are summarized automatically; older videos are discovered and listed but wait for an
+  explicit "Summarize". Manual: new videos appear unsummarized; the button sets
+  `videos.summarize_requested`, which the next `tapir run` processes and clears. A manual request
+  bypasses the recency bound. Both the click path and the batch `tapir run` drive the same
+  unchanged engine.
+- **List surface (ADR-020)** — the list reads `ListVideos` ordered summarized-first, then
+  `published_at DESC NULLS LAST`. The web layer collapses the noise so summaries are not buried:
+  un-summarized videos older than the recency window fold into one "Show N older videos"
+  disclosure, and caption-less videos collapse to a single count line. Copy surfaces scarcity
+  honestly (queue counts, gradual-fill note) — it never implies the feed is fuller than it is.
+
+The engine, ports, and sink adapters are **untouched** by all of the above — the web surface only
+reads the store and triggers the existing engine. Adding it changed wiring, not the core (ADR-003).
+
+---
+
+## In-process scheduler (ADR-018)
+
+`cmdServe` launches a background goroutine when `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL > 0`. On each tick
+it calls `store.ListAllUsers` (un-RLS'd admin query), builds a per-user `runner.Runner`, and
+calls `RunOnce` for each registered user in sequence.
+
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant S as Scheduler goroutine
+    participant DB as Postgres (RLS)
+    participant YT as YouTube timedtext
+    participant LLM as LiteLLM gateway
+
+    loop every TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL
+        S->>DB: ListAllUsers() [un-RLS'd]
+        loop per user
+            S->>DB: GetAutoSummarize(userID)
+            S->>YT: ListSubscriptions + NewVideos
+            Note over S,DB: auto: skip videos published before<br/>TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW (ADR-020);<br/>older ones listed, await manual request
+            Note over S,YT: WaitFetchGate(ctx) throttles<br/>all fetches to TAPIR_FETCH_RATE
+            alt transcript available
+                S->>LLM: Summarize
+                S->>DB: Deliver(summary)
+            else 429
+                S->>DB: SetTranscriptStatus(rate_limited)
+            end
+        end
+    end
+```
+
+**Single-replica constraint (load-bearing).** The scheduler lives in the web process;
+`replicas: 1` in the k3s deployment manifest is not cosmetic — running `tapir serve` at
+>1 replica makes every replica run the full discovery loop, causing every registered user
+to be fetched in parallel from the same egress IP (429s + duplicate work). Do not scale
+`serve` past 1 replica without first moving discovery to a k8s CronJob or adding leader
+election. The process logs a `Warn` at startup when scheduled discovery is enabled as a
+reminder.
+
+---
+
+## Process-wide timedtext rate gate
+
+**`internal/adapters/youtube/gate.go`** (ADR-014 item 2): a single `rate.Limiter`
+(`golang.org/x/time/rate`) shared across **all** Adapter instances. Every `httpDo` call for
+a caption fetch passes through `WaitFetchGate(ctx)` before hitting YouTube. This serialises
+the scheduler loop AND the web click-path through the same per-egress-IP budget. Configured
+via `TAPIR_FETCH_RATE` (Go duration, default `2s`). Setting it to `0` disables the gate
+(dev/tests only).
+
+This is the precondition that makes scheduled auto-summarize safe: without the gate, a
+multi-user scheduler pass could fire many concurrent timedtext requests from the same IP
+within seconds, triggering 429s for all users.
+
+### Two-path summarisation model
+
+Both paths share `globalFetchGate` — rate limiting is **respected in both**, not routed around.
+
+| Path | Trigger | Order | Rationale |
+|------|---------|-------|-----------|
+| **Foreground** | User clicks "Summarize" on any non-summarized card (`POST /v/{id}/retry-now` for rate-limited; `POST /v/{id}/summarize` for pending) | Single chosen video | On-demand value: user picks a specific video to read now — bypasses the recency bound |
+| **Background batch** | Scheduled discovery pass every `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL` | **Newest-first across all channels** (see below), **bounded to the recency window** (ADR-020) | Onboarding prioritisation within bounded load: recent videos auto-fill; the older back-catalogue stays on-demand |
+
+The rationale for both paths is **onboarding prioritisation under an honest, bounded load** — a
+new user gets summaries of their most recent videos automatically, while the older back-catalogue
+is listed but summarised only on demand, so it never re-drives the shared rate gate every cycle.
+
+### Newest-first batch ordering (ADR-018)
+
+Within each scheduled pass, `RunOnce` uses a three-phase structure:
+
+1. **Discover + persist**: walk all channels, `UpsertVideo` every candidate (so it appears in
+   the list), apply pre-filters (seen/manual/backoff/**recency**), collect surviving candidates.
+   The recency pre-filter (ADR-020) drops auto-mode videos published before
+   `now - TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW` unless they are explicitly requested; an undated video is
+   never aged out. They remain persisted/listed — only auto-summarisation is skipped.
+2. **Sort**: order candidates `published_at DESC, NULLS LAST, discovery_pos ASC`. Videos with
+   no publish date (schema 001: nullable) sort after all dated content. The sort is in-memory
+   (`slices.SortStableFunc`) — at current scale this is fine.
+3. **Process**: feed candidates to the engine in sorted order through `globalFetchGate`.
+
+Before (per-channel inline): `[chanA-old, chanA-mid, chanB-new, chanB-null]`
+After  (newest-first):       `[chanB-new, chanA-mid, chanA-old, chanB-null]`
+
+The set of *processed* videos now also excludes auto-mode back-catalogue beyond the recency
+window (those stay listed, summarised on demand); within the processed set, only order changes.
+
+---
+
 ## Sequence — core use case: new video summarized
 
 ```mermaid
@@ -191,6 +348,8 @@ Gherkin features in `docs/use-cases/`).
 
 - Audio-download + speech-to-text resolver (ADR-007) — would be an additional `VideoSource`
   fallback path, drawn when built.
-- Multi-tenant isolation primitives (per-tenant Postgres role, NetworkPolicy, tenant label)
+- Per-user isolation is **live, not deferred**: Postgres RLS `FORCE`d on every user-owned table
-  — activate at Stage 1 (ADR-002); single-user Stage 0 doesn't exercise them.
+  (ADR-012, migration 003), realising ADR-002's per-tenant intent at the DB layer. The coarser
+  multi-tenant primitives (per-namespace NetworkPolicy, Kyverno, tenant label) remain a
+  Stage-2 hardening item, not exercised yet.
 - Public SaaS surface (sign-up, billing) — Future C, not built (ADR-008).

docs/data-model.md

@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@ only opaque references to them; the secret material lives in ESO/1Password (ADR-
 
 ## Design decisions baked into this model
 
-- **Per-user isolation, not a shared global video table.** The earlier draft proposed a
+- **Per-user isolation for everything except transcripts.** The earlier draft proposed a
-  global `videos`/`transcripts` table deduped across tenants. Rejected for Future B: it
+  global `videos`/`transcripts` table deduped across tenants. **Videos** stay per-user and
-  reintroduces exactly the cross-domain coupling the homelab architecture review is
+  RLS-scoped — a shared video table reintroduces exactly the cross-domain coupling the homelab
-  removing, and at 1–5 users the cost of occasionally re-summarizing the same video is
+  architecture review is removing. **Transcripts**, however, are now shared (ADR-021): keyed by
-  trivial compared to the isolation it would cost. Each user's data is self-contained.
+  `(provider, provider_video_id)`, no `user_id`, **not** RLS-scoped. The cost avoided there is
-  (Revisit only if Future C makes GPU/transcription cost dominate — a new ADR, not a default.)
+  not LLM re-summarization but a rate-gated, reputation-risky caption fetch (ADR-010/014), which
+  is paid per re-fetch regardless of user count — so persisting public caption content once and
+  sharing it strictly beats the coupling it removes. Everything else each user owns is
+  self-contained; `rls_test.go` proves transcripts is the single exception.
 - **Secrets by reference only.** Tables hold a `secret_ref` (opaque string/UUID resolved via
   the `SecretStore` port), never tokens or keys.
 - **The brain sink is just a delivery target.** No brain-specific tables. Whether a summary
@@ -23,27 +26,39 @@ only opaque references to them; the secret material lives in ESO/1Password (ADR-
 
 ## Entities
 
+Solid entities below are **persisted today** (migrations 001–013). `AI_CREDENTIAL` and
+`SUBSCRIPTION` are **planned, not yet a table** — kept in the model for intent; see the notes.
+
 ```mermaid
 erDiagram
+    USER ||--|| USER_IDENTITY : "logs in via (Dex subject)"
     USER ||--o{ VIDEO_CONNECTION : has
-    USER ||--o{ AI_CREDENTIAL : has
+    USER ||--o{ SUMMARY_ACTION : records
-    VIDEO_CONNECTION ||--o{ SUBSCRIPTION : exposes
+    USER ||--o{ AI_CREDENTIAL : "has (planned)"
+    VIDEO_CONNECTION ||--o{ SUBSCRIPTION : "exposes (planned)"
     SUBSCRIPTION ||--o{ VIDEO : "produces (per user)"
-    VIDEO ||--o| TRANSCRIPT : "has at most one"
+    VIDEO }o--o| TRANSCRIPT : "shares one by (provider, provider_video_id) — not FK (ADR-021)"
     VIDEO ||--o| SUMMARY : "has at most one"
     SUMMARY ||--o{ SINK_DELIVERY : "delivered via"
+    USER ||--o{ CHANNEL_ERROR : "reports unavailable channels"
 
     USER {
         uuid id PK
         text display_name
+        bool auto_summarize "default true for new users (migration 011, ADR-018)"
+        timestamptz created_at
+    }
+    USER_IDENTITY {
+        text dex_subject PK
+        uuid user_id FK "UNIQUE -> USER, ON DELETE CASCADE; NOT RLS-enabled"
         timestamptz created_at
     }
     VIDEO_CONNECTION {
         uuid id PK
-        uuid user_id FK
+        uuid user_id FK "-> USER, ON DELETE CASCADE"
         text provider "youtube | vimeo"
-        text provider_account
+        text provider_account "nullable"
-        text token_secret_ref "-> SecretStore, never the token"
+        text token_ref "-> SecretStore, never the token"
         text status "active | revoked | error"
         timestamptz connected_at
     }
@@ -66,28 +81,31 @@ erDiagram
     }
     VIDEO {
         uuid id PK
-        uuid user_id FK
+        uuid user_id FK "-> USER, ON DELETE CASCADE"
-        uuid subscription_id FK
+        uuid subscription_id "nullable; no FK at Stage 0"
         text provider
         text provider_video_id
         text title
         int duration_s
         timestamptz published_at
         text url
+        bool summarize_requested "default false -> manual-mode queue flag (migration 006)"
         timestamptz seen_at
+        text transcript_status "none|rate_limited|fetched (migration 007)"
+        timestamptz rate_limited_at "backoff clock for 429 retries (migration 007)"
     }
     TRANSCRIPT {
-        uuid video_id PK_FK
+        text provider PK "part of shared key (ADR-021)"
-        uuid user_id FK
+        text provider_video_id PK "part of shared key — the cross-user dedup key"
         text source "captions | none"
         text language
         text content "null when source = none"
-        timestamptz resolved_at
+        timestamptz fetched_at
     }
     SUMMARY {
         uuid id PK
         uuid user_id FK
-        uuid video_id FK
+        uuid video_id "no FK to videos; (user_id, video_id) UNIQUE is the dedup key"
         text summary
         jsonb highlights
         jsonb takeaways
@@ -98,41 +116,117 @@ erDiagram
     }
     SINK_DELIVERY {
         uuid id PK
-        uuid summary_id FK
+        uuid summary_id FK "-> SUMMARY, ON DELETE CASCADE; ownership derived via this FK"
         text sink "store | brain"
         text status "pending | delivered | error"
         text detail "nullable; error message etc"
         timestamptz updated_at
     }
+    SUMMARY_ACTION {
+        uuid id PK
+        uuid user_id FK "-> USER"
+        text video_id "TEXT, not FK (mirrors summaries' standalone key)"
+        text action "watched | skipped | saved"
+        timestamptz acted_at
+    }
+    CHANNEL_ERROR {
+        uuid user_id FK
+        text channel_id
+        text channel_name
+        timestamptz first_seen
+        timestamptz last_seen
+    }
 ```
 
+`SUMMARY_ACTION` has `UNIQUE (user_id, video_id, action)`; `VIDEO_CONNECTION` has
+`UNIQUE (user_id, provider)` (one connection per provider — reconnect upserts in place).
+RLS (`ENABLE` + `FORCE`) is on **every solid user-owned table above** — `users`, `videos`,
+`transcripts`, `summaries`, `summary_actions`, `video_connections`, `channel_errors`.
+`sink_deliveries` is RLS'd via an `EXISTS` on its parent summary; `user_identities` is
+intentionally **not** RLS'd (auth plumbing). See the *Isolation invariant* section for the
+mechanism.
+
 ## Notes per entity
 
-- **USER** — at Stage 0 there is exactly one row. At Stage 1, identity comes via Dex; this
+- **USER** — one row per registered user (Stage 1, ADR-012; no longer single-row). The Tapir-side
-  table holds the Tapir-side profile keyed to the Dex subject.
+  profile; the Dex identity is held separately in `USER_IDENTITY`, not on this row. `auto_summarize`
-- **VIDEO_CONNECTION** — a connected YouTube/Vimeo account. `token_secret_ref` resolves to
+  (migration 006) is the per-user mode flag: `TRUE` = auto-summarize new videos **published within
-  the OAuth refresh token via `SecretStore`. Revocation flips `status`, doesn't delete history.
+  the recency window** (`TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW`, default ~7d, ADR-020); older videos are
-- **AI_CREDENTIAL** — optional, per provider, per user (ADR-004's Fallback). Absent for users
+  listed but summarised on demand. Default is **true** for new users (migration 011, ADR-018);
-  who only use the local stack. One row per provider max.
+  existing rows were back-filled via migration 012 with RLS bypass.
-- **SUBSCRIPTION** — a watched channel. `websub_expires` tracks the YouTube push lease so the
+- **USER_IDENTITY** (migration 004) — the `dex_subject → user_id` map. `dex_subject` is the PK,
-  watcher knows when to re-subscribe; null for poll-based (Vimeo).
+  `user_id` a `UNIQUE` FK to `users` with `ON DELETE CASCADE`. This is the bridge resolved at login
+  *before* a `user_id` is known, so it is **deliberately not RLS-enabled** (it holds no user data;
+  RLS here would deadlock the lookup that yields the id used for scoping). Account deletion cascades
+  the mapping away (ADR-013).
+- **VIDEO_CONNECTION** (migration 005) — a connected YouTube/Vimeo account. `token_ref` resolves to
+  the OAuth refresh token via `SecretStore` (per-user scheme `youtube/<userID>/refresh_token`).
+  `UNIQUE (user_id, provider)`: one connection per provider, reconnect upserts. Revocation/disconnect
+  flips `status`, doesn't delete history. FORCE RLS'd.
+- **AI_CREDENTIAL** — *planned, no table yet.* Optional, per provider, per user (ADR-004's Fallback).
+  BYO keys are currently resolved via `SecretStore` refs without a dedicated table; this entity is
+  modelled for when per-credential metadata is needed.
+- **SUBSCRIPTION** — *planned, no table yet.* A watched channel; `websub_expires` would track the
+  YouTube push lease. At Stage 0/1 `videos.subscription_id` is a nullable column with **no FK** (the
+  subscriptions table is not part of the shipped store-sink slice — migration 001).
 - **VIDEO** — one row per (user, video) — note `user_id`, reflecting the per-user-isolation
   decision. The same video seen by two users is two rows. `seen_at` is when Tapir detected it.
-- **TRANSCRIPT** — at most one per video. `source = none` records "checked, no usable
+  `summarize_requested` (migration 006) is the manual-mode queue flag: the web "Summarize" button
-  transcript" so the watcher doesn't reprocess (ADR-007). `content` null in that case.
+  sets it `TRUE`; the next `tapir run` picks it up, summarizes, and clears it back to `FALSE`.
+  `transcript_status` and `rate_limited_at` (migration 007) track caption-fetch outcomes for
+  rate-limit backoff: `NULL` = not attempted; `rate_limited` = 429 seen, skip until
+  `NOW() - rate_limited_at > TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF`; `fetched` = resolved; `none` = no transcript.
+- **TRANSCRIPT** — shared public caption content, one row per `(provider, provider_video_id)`,
+  **not** RLS-scoped and carrying no `user_id` (ADR-021). Two users who watch the same video
+  share the one row; the summarize path reads it before any caption fetch, so re-analysis never
+  re-touches YouTube (ADR-010/014). `source = none` records "checked, no usable transcript" so
+  no one reprocesses (ADR-007); `content` null in that case. A transient 429 is never stored
+  here — it stays a per-user retry via `VIDEO.transcript_status`.
 - **SUMMARY** — at most one per video. `fallback_used` + `ai_provider`/`ai_model` make the
   "is local good enough?" question queryable (the Stage 0 quality signal). `highlights`/
   `takeaways` as jsonb to stay schema-flexible while the output format settles.
 - **SINK_DELIVERY** — one row per (summary, sink) attempt. This is where "also sent to brain"
   lives — no brain tables, just a delivery row with `sink = brain`. Sinks fail independently;
-  a failed brain delivery doesn't fail the store delivery.
+  a failed brain delivery doesn't fail the store delivery. No own `user_id`; RLS ownership is
+  derived from the parent summary via `EXISTS` (migration 003).
+- **SUMMARY_ACTION** (migration 002) — records the maintainer's act on a summary (watch / skip /
+  save) — the column that makes the Stage-0 headline metric ("acts on ≥1 summary") queryable
+  (ui-spec.md §5, ADR-011). `video_id` is `TEXT` and **not** FK-constrained, mirroring summaries'
+  standalone `(user_id, video_id)` key. `UNIQUE (user_id, video_id, action)`. FORCE RLS'd.
+- **CHANNEL_ERRORS** (migration 013) — channels that returned HTTP 404 (deleted or private) on
+  the most recent discovery pass. Upserted per scheduler pass (`last_seen` refreshed each run);
+  surfaced on the account page as a warning. Cascades on user deletion. Primary key is
+  `(user_id, channel_id)`. FORCE RLS'd.
+- **LOGIN_EVENTS** (migration 010) — throttled one-row-per-(user, date) login stamp. Used by the
+  Stage-0 gate query (VISION §Stage 0: "returned and used in ≥2 distinct weeks").
 
-## Isolation invariant (Stage 1+)
+## Isolation invariant (Stage 1+) — LIVE
 
-Every user-owned table carries `user_id`. At Stage 1, this is enforced at the DB layer via a
+Every user-owned table carries `user_id`, and isolation is **enforced at the DB layer**, not
-per-tenant Postgres role + row grants (architecture review SC7), not only in application code.
+only in application code. ADR-011 shipped this surface single-user (one allowlisted subject,
-At Stage 0 (single user) the column exists but the enforcement is dormant. The isolation test
+enforcement dormant); **ADR-012 opened Stage 1 and turned enforcement on in the same slice.**
-in VISION Stage 2 asserts user A cannot read user B's rows.
+
+Enforcement is **Postgres Row-Level Security** (migration `003_rls.up.sql`):
+
+- RLS is `ENABLE`d **and** `FORCE`d on every user-owned table — `users`, `videos`,
+  `transcripts`, `summaries`, `summary_actions`, `video_connections`, `channel_errors`.
+  `FORCE` is load-bearing: the app connects as the table **owner** (`tapir` role), and owners
+  bypass RLS unless forced.
+- Each policy keys off the per-request GUC `tapir.current_user_id`, set transaction-locally by
+  the store's `withUser` helper via `set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true)` — it
+  auto-resets on commit/rollback, so it never leaks across a pooled connection.
+- `current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)` uses `missing_ok = true`: an **unset** GUC
+  yields `NULL`, the predicate matches no rows, and access **denies by default**.
+- `sink_deliveries` has no `user_id`; its policy derives ownership from the parent summary via
+  `EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM summaries …)`.
+- `user_identities` (the Dex-subject → user_id map) is **deliberately not RLS-enabled** — it is
+  auth plumbing read *before* a user_id is known; putting RLS there would deadlock. It holds no
+  user data.
+
+The Stage-2 isolation bar is **pulled forward, not deferred**: `internal/adapters/store/rls_test.go`
+runs two users against a non-superuser, non-`BYPASSRLS` role and asserts user A reads/writes zero
+of user B's rows across every table. It ships green with the multi-user features (ADR-012); no
+multi-user feature merges ahead of it passing.
 
 ## Job / processing state
 
@@ -144,7 +238,8 @@ queue, doesn't replace it). Deferred until there's a reason.
 
 ## Explicitly out of scope (Future C)
 
-- Global cross-tenant video/transcript dedup (rejected above).
+- Global cross-tenant *video* dedup (rejected above). Note: cross-tenant *transcript* sharing
+  is now in scope and shipped (ADR-021); only the videos half stays per-user.
 - Sharding / per-tenant physical databases.
 - Soft-delete + full audit trail on connections/credentials (a Stage 2 hardening item; add
   via ADR when Stage 2 work starts).

docs/homelab-integration.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 The concrete endpoints, conventions, and identifiers Tapir depends on, so an independent
 session doesn't have to rediscover them. **Verify anything marked "confirm" before relying on
-it** — endpoints and aliases drift, and this file is a snapshot (2026-06-02), not a live source.
+it** — endpoints and aliases drift, and this file is a snapshot (2026-06-06), not a live source.
 
 ## Local AI (the Primary in `llm.Router`)
 
@@ -27,6 +27,28 @@ it** — endpoints and aliases drift, and this file is a snapshot (2026-06-02),
   `iguana/deepseek-r1-14b`) is preferred for summary quality if its latency/output is acceptable.
   The `max_tokens` fix below means thinking models no longer return empty content, so they are now
   viable choices, not blocked ones. Do not assume a coder alias is right for prose.
+- **Summarizer fallback chain (ADR-022).** The primary alias is the *first* of an ordered chain;
+  on failure or unparseable output the summarizer advances to the next model. All reached through
+  the same gateway by alias.
+  - `TAPIR_FALLBACK_MODEL` — local fallback. **Default `koala/phi4-14b`.** Empty disables it.
+  - `TAPIR_CLOUD_FALLBACK_MODEL` — worst-case EXTERNAL fallback. **Default `berget/mistral-small`.**
+    **Set this empty (`""`) for any client/NDA deployment** so content never leaves the local
+    stack — the chain then contains only local endpoints.
+  - `TAPIR_SUMMARY_MAX_TOKENS` — per-summary completion budget. **Default `1500`.** Small on
+    purpose: with the old 8192 budget, prompt + completion overflowed `phi4-mini`'s 8k window.
+  - `TAPIR_MAX_TRANSCRIPT_CHARS` — transcript truncation budget sent to the model. **Default
+    `18000`** (~fits an 8k-context model). `0` disables truncation. Prevents the context-overflow
+    HTTP 400 a long transcript caused on `phi4-mini`.
+- **Discovery low-value filter (ADR-023).** `TAPIR_MIN_VIDEO_SECONDS` — **default `60`**. At
+  discovery, `NewVideos` enriches candidates with one cheap `videos.list` call (quota API, NOT
+  the timedtext 429 path) and drops videos shorter than this plus any live/upcoming broadcast,
+  so the scarce caption-fetch budget isn't spent on Shorts. `0` disables the filter. The
+  paste-a-URL path is never filtered.
+- **Per-channel caption memory (ADR-024).** `TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_THRESHOLD` — **default
+  `5`** consecutive no-caption results before a channel is suppressed (its videos listed but not
+  caption-fetched). `TAPIR_CHANNEL_CAPTIONLESS_WINDOW` — **default `336h`** (14d) suppression
+  before one video is re-probed. `THRESHOLD=0` disables. A successful fetch resets the channel;
+  a 429 does not count; an explicit manual request bypasses suppression.
 - **Thinking models need an explicit `max_tokens`.** qwen3 / deepseek-r1 spend the budget on
   reasoning and return **empty content** if `max_tokens` is too low (or unset). The summarizer's
   parser treats an empty summary as an error for exactly this reason. **Done (2026-06-02, Worker F):**
@@ -79,6 +101,14 @@ This maps directly onto the copied `llm` package: `Client` is the OpenAI-compati
     `SecretStore` port (`youtube.New(cfg, secrets)`). Pinning the actual vault-item name only
     changes wiring/config, not the adapter — so this `confirm` does not block the adapter. Decide
     the name when wiring the live connection and record it here.
+  - **Per-user token-ref scheme (Stage 1 web connect):** the web connect flow
+    (`/oauth/youtube/connect` → `/oauth/youtube/callback`) persists each user's refresh token
+    under a **per-user ref `youtube/<userID>/refresh_token`** (`web.YouTubeTokenRef`), not the
+    Stage-0 single `youtube/refresh_token`. This is what keeps tokens isolated across tenants
+    behind the `SecretStore` port; the `video_connections` row stores only this opaque
+    `token_ref`, never the token. The connect callback URL is
+    `TAPIR_YT_CONNECT_REDIRECT_URL` (default `https://tapir.d-ma.be/oauth/youtube/callback`) and
+    must be in the Google OAuth client's authorized redirects for live connect.
 
 ## Hosts (for reference)
 
@@ -152,5 +182,59 @@ allow per-provider when a user connects one.
 
 ---
 
-_Snapshot date 2026-06-02. Items marked **confirm** were not verified to a pinned source at
+_Snapshot date 2026-06-06. Items marked **confirm** were not verified to a pinned source at
 snapshot time — check brain or the live cluster before depending on them._
+
+## Stage 1 — multi-user facts (verified 2026-06-03)
+
+### Postgres RLS (ADR-012)
+- **The deployed DSN MUST connect as a non-superuser, non-BYPASSRLS role.** The
+  app uses the `tapir` role (table owner, non-superuser). `FORCE ROW LEVEL
+  SECURITY` is applied on all user-owned tables; a superuser DSN silently bypasses
+  FORCE and isolation is dead in prod. Verify: `SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_roles
+  WHERE rolname = 'tapir'` must return `f`.
+- Scoping is via `set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $userID, true)` (transaction-
+  local, auto-resets on commit — never leaks across a pooled connection).
+
+### Per-user YouTube token persistence
+- Stage-1 uses the **file-backed SecretStore** at `TAPIR_SECRETS_FILE=/data/secrets.json`
+  mounted from a **PVC** (`tapir-secrets`, 64Mi, RWO). Tokens survive pod restarts.
+  Upgrading to an ESO-backed per-user SecretStore is backlog (infra#86).
+- Per-user token ref scheme: `youtube/<userID>/refresh_token` (Worker C, ADR-006).
+  The Stage-0 single ref `youtube/refresh_token` is no longer used by `serve`; it
+  remains valid for the CLI `tapir run` (single-user, host-side).
+
+### Web YouTube connect
+- Redirect URI (registered in Google OAuth client, type Web): `https://tapir.d-ma.be/oauth/youtube/callback`.
+- Config env: `TAPIR_YT_CONNECT_REDIRECT_URL=https://tapir.d-ma.be/oauth/youtube/callback`.
+  `TAPIR_YT_CLIENT_ID` / `TAPIR_YT_CLIENT_SECRET` from the Web client (not the Desktop client used for the CLI).
+
+### Identity resolution
+- `user_identities(dex_subject → user_id)` table is **intentionally NOT RLS-enabled**
+  (it's auth plumbing, holds no user data; data isolation is on the user-owned tables).
+  All data access after subject resolution goes through `withUser`.
+
+## Scheduled discovery (ADR-018, verified 2026-06-05)
+
+`tapir serve` runs discovery for **all users** in-process on a timer (no CronJob). Three env
+knobs plus one load-bearing deployment constraint:
+
+- `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL` — Go duration, e.g. `2h`. The cadence the serve process runs a
+  discovery pass for every registered user (run-once-on-startup, then every interval).
+  **Unset or `0` = disabled** (dev/tests never auto-fetch).
+- `TAPIR_FETCH_RATE` — Go duration, default `2s`. The **process-wide per-egress-IP caption-fetch
+  rate gate** (ADR-014 item 2). Every caption fetch — scheduler runners *and* the web "Summarize"
+  click-path — serialises through this one limiter so the pod cannot collectively trip 429s. `0`
+  = unlimited (dev/tests). This is the precondition that makes auto-summarize-on-a-schedule safe;
+  do not raise it aggressively without watching for 429s.
+- `TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF=4h` — per-video rate-limit retry window; default `1h`. A video that
+  returns HTTP 429 on a caption fetch is skipped for this duration before being retried. The
+  scheduler checks `NOW() - rate_limited_at > TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF` before attempting to fetch
+  a video marked `transcript_status = rate_limited`. Longer values reduce 429 pressure at the
+  cost of slower recovery after a throttling episode.
+- **SINGLE-REPLICA WARNING (load-bearing).** The scheduler lives in the web process, so
+  `replicas: 1` in the deployment manifest is load-bearing: running `tapir serve` at >1 replica
+  makes **every** replica run the discovery loop → every user fetched in parallel from the same
+  egress IP (429s + duplicate work). Do **not** scale `serve` past 1 replica without first moving
+  discovery to a k8s CronJob or adding leader election. The process logs a `Warn` at startup when
+  scheduled discovery is enabled, as a reminder.

docs/specs/landing-page-and-doc-reconciliation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+# Spec — Landing page + documentation reconciliation
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-03
+**Status:** Ready to build
+**Scope:** Two parallel workstreams — (A) a public landing page; (B) reconciling the
+requirements / use-case / architecture / data-model docs against the deployed reality
+(v0.4.0). These are separate concerns; do not let one worker do both, or the audit gets
+done cursorily.
+
+All work: read `CLAUDE.md` + `DECISIONS.md` first. TBD — commit directly to `main`, one
+logical change per commit, conventional commits, `task check` green before every commit.
+After editing any `.templ`, run `templ generate` (the repo commits both `views.templ` and the
+generated `views_templ.go`).
+
+---
+
+## Workstream A — Public landing page
+
+### Goal
+A public landing page at `/welcome`, in the established bubbletea aesthetic, that lets a
+visitor sign in (one Dex flow) and, if already logged in, jump to their Tapir page or log out.
+New public transport surface only — no engine/core change (ADR-003).
+
+### Verified facts (read from `internal/web/oidc/oidc.go` @ main — do not re-guess)
+- Auth endpoints are exactly `/auth/login`, `/auth/callback`, `/auth/logout`.
+- `isPublicPath(p)` = `p == "/healthz" || strings.HasPrefix(p, "/auth/")` — the single
+  public-route chokepoint inside `DexAuth.Middleware`.
+- `DexAuth.CurrentUser(r) (web.User, bool)` reads the session cookie and does NOT redirect —
+  this is the "peek" the landing page uses to branch logged-in vs logged-out.
+- `handleCallback` redirects to `/` on success (correct — leave as-is).
+- `handleLogout` currently redirects to `loginPath` (`/auth/login`) — this is wrong for this
+  feature (see A3).
+- There is NO separate "sign up" against Dex/OIDC: one authorization flow. Registration is
+  Tapir's own `/register` step (ADR-012), reached after first login for an unknown subject.
+
+### Tasks
+**A1 — make `/welcome` public.** In `oidc.go`, extend `isPublicPath`:
+```go
+func isPublicPath(p string) bool {
+    return p == "/healthz" || p == "/welcome" || strings.HasPrefix(p, "/auth/")
+}
+```
+
+**A2 — unauthenticated bare-`/` → `/welcome`; deep links unchanged.** In `DexAuth.Middleware`,
+the unauthenticated branch currently always calls `redirectToLogin`. Change it so that when
+`r.URL.Path == "/"` an unauthenticated visitor is redirected to `/welcome`; for any other
+guarded path keep `redirectToLogin` (so a shared `/v/{id}` deep link still bounces through Dex
+and returns to the destination). Keep the `isPublicPath` check first (redirect-loop guard).
+
+**A3 — logout lands on `/welcome`, not login.** In `handleLogout`, change the final redirect
+from `loginPath` to `/welcome`. As written it sends the user to `/auth/login`, which
+immediately starts a fresh Dex login — visibly failing to log out. This intentionally breaks
+the existing logout test (oidc_test.go) which asserts redirect to `/auth/login`; update that
+test to expect `/welcome`. That break is expected, not a regression.
+
+**A4 — mount the landing handler** in `internal/web/handlers.go` `Router()`, on `root`,
+OUTSIDE `Auth.Middleware`, alongside `/healthz`:
+```go
+root.HandleFunc("GET /welcome", a.handleWelcome)
+```
+`handleWelcome` peeks `a.Auth.CurrentUser(r)` and renders `WelcomePage(user, ok)`. Not behind
+`Auth.Middleware` or `registrationGate`.
+
+**A5 — `WelcomePage` templ component** in `views.templ`. Reuse the existing shared
+layout/header partial and the established aesthetic (#7653FC purple rounded ╭─╮╰─╯ box, pink
+tapir mascot, #0EF9B6 mint accents) — match the existing pages, do not reinvent styling.
+- Logged out (`ok == false`): tapir mascot + tagline; one primary CTA **"Get Started"** →
+  `/auth/login`; honest sub-text: "New here? You'll set up your account right after signing in
+  — returning users go straight through." One button only (see verified facts: no separate
+  Dex sign-up; two buttons to the same URL would mislead).
+- Logged in (`ok == true`): "Go to my Tapir" → `/`; "Log Out" → `/auth/logout`. May greet via
+  `user.Email`.
+
+**A6 — tests** (extend `handlers_test.go` patterns). Note `StubAuth.CurrentUser` always returns
+true; for the logged-out case use a fake Auth returning `(web.User{}, false)`.
+- `GET /welcome`, no session → "Get Started" → `/auth/login`.
+- `GET /welcome`, with session → "Go to my Tapir" + "Log Out".
+- Unauthenticated `GET /` → 302 `/welcome`.
+- Unauthenticated `GET /v/{id}` → still 302 `/auth/login` (deep link preserved).
+- Authenticated `GET /` → still serves the list, unchanged.
+- oidc: `handleLogout` → 302 `/welcome` (update the existing test).
+
+**A out of scope:** no Dex config change, no new auth/session logic, no sign-up backend.
+
+---
+
+## Workstream B — Documentation reconciliation
+
+### Why
+The guardrail docs were written before Stage 1 and the web surface. Several now describe the
+opposite of the deployed reality (v0.4.0). Stale guardrail docs are worse than none — a future
+cold session (human or agent) trusts them. This workstream brings requirements, use cases,
+architecture, and data-model back in sync with `main`. Each fix is one commit; cite the ADR or
+migration that is the source of truth.
+
+### Known drift to fix (verified this session — not exhaustive; the worker confirms against code)
+**B1 — `internal/web/auth.go` comments.** The `User.Subject` doc and package doc still say
+"single-user allowlist (ADR-011)" / "Stage-0". Code is multi-user (ADR-012). Update the
+comments to describe the current multi-user reality; reference ADR-012.
+
+**B2 — `docs/data-model.md` isolation status.** It says isolation enforcement is "dormant at
+Stage 0". It is now LIVE: Postgres RLS, `FORCE`d on all user-owned tables, with a passing
+two-user isolation test (ADR-012, migration 003). Rewrite that section to describe enforced
+RLS as the current state; keep the history honest (was dormant at Stage 0, enforced from
+Stage 1).
+
+**B3 — `docs/data-model.md` schema completeness.** The doc predates migrations 002–006. Add
+the entities/columns that now exist: `summary_actions` (002), RLS (003), `user_identities`
+(004, dex_subject→user_id), `video_connections` (005), `users.auto_summarize` +
+`videos.summarize_requested` (006). The ER section should match the live schema. Cross-check
+against `internal/adapters/store/migrations/*.up.sql` — those are ground truth.
+
+**B4 — `docs/architecture/architecture.md`.** Predates the entire web surface. Update the C4
+container diagram and text to include: `tapir serve` (HTMX+Templ web reader/writer), the Dex
+OIDC session layer (`internal/web/oidc`), registration gate, web-initiated YouTube connect,
+account management, and the immediate-processing path (web "Summarize" button → background
+goroutine → status poll). The engine/ports/sinks core is unchanged (ADR-003) — show the web
+surface as a new transport over the same core, not a core change.
+
+**B5 — `docs/use-cases/*.feature`.** Add scenarios for the behaviours now live and unspecced:
+register (new subject → registration → user row; returning user straight through), connect
+YouTube (web OAuth), disconnect, delete-account (cascade + secret purge, Dex untouched —
+ADR-013), manual-vs-auto summarize mode + the Summarize button, and the landing page
+(logged-out CTA; logged-in shortcuts). Keep them as executable-style Gherkin consistent with
+the existing files.
+
+**B6 — `DECISIONS.md` ADR ordering (cosmetic).** ADR-010 sits before ADR-009/011 (append
+order). Reorder to numeric while you're in the file. Pure tidy, no content change.
+
+**B7 — requirements check.** If a requirements doc exists (e.g. `docs/ui-spec.md`, referenced
+by ADR-011), reconcile it with what shipped: note where the build deviated (e.g. the spinner /
+immediate processing / summarize mode were beyond the original spec) so the spec reflects
+reality or explicitly records the deviation. Do not silently rewrite history — record
+deviations as deviations.
+
+### B working method
+- Source of truth order: migrations + code > ADRs > prose docs. When a prose doc disagrees
+  with code, the code wins and the doc is corrected (unless the code is the bug — then flag it,
+  don't quietly doc around it).
+- One logical doc per commit. Cite the ADR/migration that justifies each change in the commit
+  body.
+- This is an audit, not a rewrite: preserve the docs' structure and the "rejected alternatives
+  / history" honesty. The goal is *current and trustworthy*, not *pretty*.
+
+---
+
+## Coordination
+A and B touch mostly different files (A: oidc.go, handlers.go, views.templ, tests; B: docs/* +
+auth.go comments). The one overlap is `auth.go` (B1 edits comments) vs A (reads it) — no
+conflict. Run A and B in parallel; commit independently to `main`.
+
+If anything in B reveals that code, not docs, is wrong (e.g. an isolation gap, a migration that
+doesn't match the data-model intent), STOP and surface it — that's a finding, not a doc edit.

docs/specs/newest-first-ordering.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Spec — Newest-first batch ordering + honest "Try now" / prioritisation docs
+
+> **Extended by ADR-020 (2026-06-08).** This spec covers the *batch processing* order within a
+> pass. ADR-020 adds (a) a recency pre-filter — auto mode skips videos published before
+> `TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW`, listed but summarised on demand — and (b) the same
+> `published_at DESC NULLS LAST` ordering on the **list read** (`ListVideos`), which previously
+> sorted by `seen_at`. See `DECISIONS.md` ADR-020.
+
+**Repo:** tapir · **Size:** small · **Solo session.**
+
+**Why.** Product intent (maintainer, 2026-06-06): a new user should get summaries of their
+**newest** videos quickly, while the older back-catalogue fills in behind — all within the one
+shared rate gate. Today the foreground path ("Try now" button) lets a user hand-pick a video,
+but the **background batch processes in subscription/channel order, not newest-first** — so a new
+user with a large candidate set sees the batch summarise whatever channel is first in their
+subscription list, not their newest videos. This slice makes the batch agree with the intent, and
+fixes the docs to describe the real rationale (onboarding prioritisation), not the
+traffic-disguising framing a prior session wrote.
+
+Read `CLAUDE.md` + `DECISIONS.md` (ADR-014, ADR-018) first. TBD, conventional commits,
+`task check` green per commit, `templ generate` if views change.
+
+## 1. Newest-first batch ordering (the build)
+In `internal/runner/runner.go` `RunOnce`: today the loop processes each video inline while
+walking subscriptions channel-by-channel (`for sub → NewVideos → for v → process`). Change so
+that, within a pass, **candidates are processed newest-first across ALL channels**:
+- Collect the candidate videos across channels first (after dedup/seen/manual/rate-limit
+  filtering as today), then **sort by `published_at` descending before processing**, then process
+  in that order through the engine + shared `globalFetchGate`.
+- **`published_at` is nullable** (schema 001). Sort **NULLS LAST** — videos with no publish date
+  must not jump ahead of dated newest videos. Decide a stable tiebreak (e.g. `seen_at DESC`) for
+  equal/again-null dates.
+- Keep all existing behaviour: per-item failure isolation, the rate-limit backoff skip, manual
+  mode, channel-unavailable handling, stats. Ordering is the only change — not what gets
+  processed, just the order.
+- At 868 candidates a collect-then-sort in memory is fine; do **not** build a streaming/external
+  sort. Keep it simple.
+- The shared rate gate (`globalFetchGate`) is unchanged and still governs fetch pacing — ordering
+  does not bypass or weaken it.
+
+**Optional (only if cheap and clearly correct):** a soft cap so the *first* pass for a brand-new
+user summarises the newest N (e.g. 20) quickly and defers the long tail to subsequent passes — so
+onboarding value lands fast without waiting for the whole sorted set. If this adds real
+complexity, SKIP it and just do the newest-first ordering; the ordering alone delivers the intent.
+
+## 2. Tests
+- Given candidates across multiple channels with mixed `published_at` (incl. some NULL), assert
+  the processing order is newest-first, NULLS LAST, with the chosen tiebreak. Use the existing
+  fake VideoStore/Processor pattern in `runner_test.go`.
+- Assert ordering does not change *which* videos are processed vs. today (same set, new order).
+- Rate-gate / backoff / manual-mode behaviour unchanged (existing tests stay green).
+
+## 3. Docs — describe the REAL rationale (replace prior framing)
+The "Try now" button and the discovery batch together implement **onboarding prioritisation**:
+foreground (user-clicked "Try now") summarises a specific video on demand; background batch
+summarises newest-first; both honour the shared rate gate. **Update the docs to state this intent
+— and explicitly REMOVE/replace any framing that describes "Try now" as making traffic "look
+organic to YouTube" or evading rate limits.** That is not the rationale. The rationale is: *get
+the user a few summaries of their newest, most relevant videos fast; process the back-catalogue in
+the background; always within the honest shared rate limit.* Rate limiting is **respected**, not
+evaded.
+- `docs/ui-spec.md`: "Try now" = on-demand foreground summarisation of a chosen (typically newer)
+  video; rationale = fast onboarding value, not traffic shaping.
+- `docs/architecture/architecture.md`: document the two-path model — foreground on-demand vs.
+  background newest-first batch, both through `globalFetchGate` — and the newest-first ordering.
+- Any requirements/use-case doc mentioning discovery order: state newest-first.
+- If a brain note or `wiki` entry captured the "looks organic" rationale, correct it there too.
+
+## Boundaries
+- Do NOT increase fetch rate or weaken the rate gate. Account-safety constraint stands: the
+  caption endpoint is unofficial (ADR-010) and must be treated with honest backoff, never evasion.
+- Do NOT touch RLS, credentials, or the Dex surface.
+- Ordering change is within a pass only — no persisted priority queue, no new table.
+
+## Out of scope
+Per-user configurable ordering; priority weighting beyond newest-first; the soft-cap if it proves
+non-trivial.

docs/specs/scheduled-discovery.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# Spec — In-process scheduled discovery + auto-summarize + rate-gate finish
+
+> **Extended by ADR-020 (2026-06-08).** Auto-summarize is no longer "every unseen video": the
+> scheduler now skips videos published before `TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW` (default ~7d) unless
+> explicitly requested, so a back-catalogue does not re-drive the rate gate every cycle. See
+> `DECISIONS.md` ADR-020.
+
+**Repo:** tapir · **Size:** medium · **Solo session** (not a swarm).
+
+**Why this exists.** The Stage-0 gate ("me or a friend returns and reads/acts in ≥2 separate
+weeks") cannot be met because the system is not usable *unprompted*: discovery (`tapir run`) is
+host-side manual, so a newly onboarded user sees an empty list and never comes back. This slice
+makes Tapir watch on its own — the thing that makes the gate experiment actually runnable.
+
+Read `CLAUDE.md` + `DECISIONS.md` (esp. ADR-012, ADR-014, and the new ADR-018) first. TBD —
+commit directly to `main`, one logical change per commit, conventional commits, `task check`
+green before each commit. `templ generate` if any view changes.
+
+## Decisions already made (do not reopen)
+- **In-process scheduler**, NOT a k8s CronJob (maintainer's call: simpler deploy, acceptable
+  coupling at 3 users). The known cost — discovery shares the web process's lifetime and egress
+  — is accepted and recorded in ADR-018.
+- **Auto-summarize ON** for the maintainer + onboarded friends (zero-friction: the list fills
+  and summarizes itself).
+- **Gate clock resets** to when this ships (ADR-018) — until unprompted use is possible, the
+  prior window measured nothing.
+
+## 1. In-process scheduled discovery (core)
+- In `tapir serve` startup, launch a background goroutine that runs discovery for ALL users on
+  an interval: env `TAPIR_DISCOVERY_INTERVAL` (Go duration, e.g. `2h`). **Unset or 0 = disabled**
+  (so dev/tests never auto-fetch).
+- **Reuse the existing `runner.Runner` + `Loop`/`RunOnce`. Do NOT write a new scheduler.** The
+  per-user Runner already exists; the new work is **iterating users** and running one pass each
+  per tick. Enumerate users from the un-RLS'd `user_identities` (the same enumerate-then-act
+  pattern the login_events gate query established), then run each user's pass **inside that
+  user's RLS scope** (`withUser`).
+- **Stateless timing:** run-once-on-startup, then every interval — exactly the existing `Loop`
+  shape. Do NOT persist schedule state; a pod restart just restarts the cycle. Acceptable at this
+  scale. Do not build cron-in-Go.
+- **Graceful shutdown:** the goroutine respects `ctx` cancellation so a pod term doesn't wedge.
+- **Failure isolation in the loop:** one user's pass failing (or one channel/video) must not
+  abort the other users or crash `serve` — log and continue. (RunOnce already collects per-item
+  errors; preserve that at the per-user level too.)
+
+## 2. Auto-summarize default ON for Future-B users
+- New registrations default `auto_summarize = true` (so onboarded friends get zero-friction);
+  keep the account-page toggle so a user can switch to manual. One-off update existing user rows
+  to `true` as well (maintainer + any current users).
+- Consequence (intended): scheduled discovery both discovers AND summarizes new videos — which
+  is the point, and is why §3 is mandatory in the same slice.
+
+## 3. Finish/confirm the ADR-014 shared per-egress-IP rate gate (NOW load-bearing)
+- In-process scheduling + auto-summarize + multiple users = all caption fetches leave the **one
+  web pod's egress IP**, concurrently with any live "Summarize" button clicks. The timedtext
+  endpoint rate-limits per IP (ADR-010/014). Without a shared gate this self-inflicts 429s every
+  cycle.
+- **Confirm in code whether ADR-014 item 2 (a single PROCESS-WIDE rate gate) exists.**
+  Reconciliation flagged it as possibly built only as per-*video* backoff. If it is not a
+  process-wide gate, **build it now**: ONE shared limiter (token-bucket / min-interval) that
+  every timedtext/caption fetch passes through — scheduler loop AND click-path alike. Per-process,
+  not per-user, not per-video.
+- Keep the existing per-video 429 backoff (`rate_limited_at` + retry window) — complementary: the
+  gate prevents tripping 429; the backoff handles it if one still happens.
+- Honest UX (ADR-014 item 3) still applies: a fetch waiting on the gate shows "queued/waiting",
+  never a stuck spinner.
+
+## 4. Gate-clock reset — already recorded in ADR-018; verify VISION reflects it
+- ADR-018 (committed) resets the Stage-0 3–4 week window to start when this ships, and revises the
+  check-in date. VISION Stage 0 carries a pointer to it. The build doesn't re-decide this; just
+  ensure nothing in docs still implies the clock started earlier.
+
+## Tests
+- **Scheduler:** fake clock + fake Runner → N users each get one pass per tick; one user's failure
+  doesn't stop the others; `ctx` cancel stops the loop; interval=0 disables it entirely.
+- **Rate gate:** concurrent fetches (scheduler + simulated click) are serialized/limited through
+  the ONE gate — assert max-in-flight / min-interval honored regardless of caller.
+- **Auto-summarize default:** new registration → `auto_summarize = true`; account-page toggle
+  still flips it.
+
+## Out of scope / known constraints
+- No CronJob / k8s objects (in-process chosen).
+- **SINGLE-REPLICA ASSUMPTION (load-bearing).** In-process scheduling means if `tapir serve` ever
+  runs >1 replica, every replica runs the discovery loop → every user fetched in parallel (429s +
+  duplicate work). At 3 users this is single-replica, fine — but the build MUST note this
+  constraint in ADR-018 / deploy docs so a future scale-up doesn't silently double-run.
+- No persisted schedules, no multi-pod coordination.
+
+## Fallback if the session runs short
+Ship the scheduler with **auto-summarize OFF** (discovery only; manual Summarize button) until the
+process-wide rate gate (§3) is confirmed/built. NEVER ship auto-summarize-on-a-schedule without the
+gate — that combination self-inflicts 429s for every user every cycle. Auto-summarize ON is gated
+on §3 being done.

docs/specs/stage0-usage-measurement.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Spec — Stage 0 usage measurement (login events)
+
+**Date:** 2026-06-03
+**Status:** Ready to build · **Repo:** tapir · **Size:** small (one migration + middleware + query)
+**Why:** The Stage 0 gate (VISION, ADR-016) is *return usage in ≥2 separate weeks*. `summary_actions`
+captures *acts* (watch/skip/save) but not *reads* — a friend who logs in weekly and reads summaries
+without clicking anything is invisible. For a **reading** product that is the most important signal.
+This adds the missing data so the gate is measurable as written. Solo session, not a swarm.
+
+Read `CLAUDE.md` + ADR-016 first. TBD, conventional commits, `task check` green before each commit.
+
+## Scope (resist sprawl — this is NOT analytics)
+
+A lightweight, append-only record of *when each user was active*, enough to answer
+"returned/read in ≥N distinct weeks". Not page-level events, not click tracking, not a funnel.
+
+### 1. Migration — `login_events` (append-only)
+```
+login_events (
+  id        UUID PK default gen_random_uuid(),
+  user_id   UUID NOT NULL,          -- per-user; RLS like every user-owned table
+  seen_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL default NOW()
+)
+INDEX (user_id, seen_at)
+```
+- **RLS:** `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, same policy/pattern as the other user-owned tables (the
+  `tapir.current_user_id` GUC via the `withUser` seam — match migration 003). A reporting query that
+  needs cross-user counts runs as the owner/maintainer outside the per-user scope, or via a dedicated
+  read — decide consistently with how existing admin-ish reads are done.
+- Append-only: no updates, no deletes except the user-delete cascade. **Add to the delete-account
+  cascade** (ADR-013) — `login_events` has no FK (mirrors `summary_actions`), so `DeleteUser` needs an
+  explicit delete for it, and the delete test must assert it's covered. *Do not forget this* — it's the
+  exact footgun the last delete work caught.
+
+### 2. Middleware — throttled stamp
+- In the authenticated request path (after `CurrentUserID` resolves, inside the registration-gated
+  app — NOT on `/welcome`/`/healthz`/`/auth`), record one `login_events` row **per user per day**
+  (throttle: skip if a row exists for this user with `seen_at` ≥ start-of-today). One insert per active
+  day, not per request — keeps the table small and the signal clean.
+- Throttle check must itself be RLS-scoped (`withUser`). Keep it cheap (indexed lookup).
+
+### 3. Query — the gate report
+Provide a query (and optionally a tiny `tapir report` CLI subcommand or an admin page — your call,
+CLI is fine) answering, per user:
+```sql
+-- distinct active weeks from reads (login_events) AND acts (summary_actions), unioned
+WITH weeks AS (
+  SELECT user_id, date_trunc('week', seen_at) AS wk FROM login_events
+  UNION
+  SELECT user_id, date_trunc('week', acted_at) FROM summary_actions
+)
+SELECT user_id, COUNT(DISTINCT wk) AS active_weeks
+FROM weeks GROUP BY user_id
+ORDER BY active_weeks DESC;
+```
+Gate passes when any user_id (maintainer or friend) reaches `active_weeks >= 2` within the window.
+
+## Honesty caveats to carry (from VISION/ADR-016)
+- **"Unprompted" is not measurable here.** login_events records *that* a user returned, not *why*. A
+  nudged return looks identical to an organic one. This build does not close that gap and must not
+  claim to — the VISION measurement note stands: count returns, read a nudged return as weaker signal.
+  (If prompt-tracking is ever wanted, that's a separate decision, not this build.)
+- **Data accrues from deploy onward.** The gate window's read-data starts when this ships — so ship
+  soon (maintainer's call) rather than batching with the infra tooling session.
+- **`date_trunc('week')` is ISO/timezone-sensitive** and noisy at low volume (N=3). Two visits days
+  apart can fall in the same or different weeks. Acceptable, but don't over-read a single-week-margin
+  pass/fail.
+
+## Out of scope
+Page/event analytics; prompt-vs-organic tracking; dashboards beyond the one gate query; anything
+touching the engine or sinks (this is web/store only — ADR-003 holds).
+
+## Tests
+- Migration up/down; RLS on `login_events` (extend the two-user isolation test to cover it).
+- Throttle: N requests same day → 1 row; next day → 2nd row.
+- `DeleteUser` removes the user's `login_events` and leaves others' intact (extend the delete test).
+- The gate query returns correct distinct-week counts across a seeded reads+acts fixture.

docs/specs/video-card-states.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Spec — Unify video-card states: one "Summarize now" verb, honest no-captions state
+
+> **Superseded in part by ADR-020 (2026-06-08).** The five card states still hold, but the copy
+> changed: the nudge verb is now **"Summarize"** (not "Summarize now"), the rate-limited state
+> reads **"In queue"** (not "Fetching soon…"), and the queued state reads **"summarizing
+> shortly"** (not "waiting for the next run"). The list also now collapses older un-summarized
+> and caption-less videos. See `DECISIONS.md` ADR-020 and `views.templ` (`VideoCard`) for the
+> current copy; this doc is kept as the original design record.
+
+**Repo:** tapir · **Size:** small, **view-layer only** (`views.templ` + a little CSS in
+`view.go`; regenerate `views_templ.go`). No handler, store, or DB change. The two existing
+handlers (`/summarize`, `/retry-now`) stay exactly as they are — only what the card *shows*
+changes.
+
+**Why.** The video card today presents two different verbs — "Try now" (`.btn-retry`, on
+rate-limited videos) and "Summarize" (`.btn-secondary`, on pending videos) — for what the user
+experiences as one intent: *"summarize this video now."* The user doesn't know or care about the
+internal pipeline state (rate-limited vs. manual-queue); two differently-labelled, differently-
+styled buttons leak that state machine into the UI as a choice. Also: a **no-captions video
+(`TranscriptStatus == "none"`) currently falls into the `else` branch and wrongly shows a
+"Summarize" button** that, if clicked, tries and fails — there are no captions to fetch. That's
+the confusing dead-end to remove.
+
+In normal use the maintainer is in **auto mode**, so these buttons are *exceptions*, not the main
+path — videos summarize themselves. So the card should be **status-first**: the state is what the
+user reads constantly; the manual nudge is a small, quiet affordance for impatience, not a
+prominent call-to-action.
+
+## The honest per-state card model (footer of `VideoCard`)
+
+Restructure the footer branch in `VideoCard` (in `internal/web/views.templ`) to these states.
+The branch ORDER matters (summarized first, then terminal/no-action states, then actionable):
+
+1. **Summarized** — preview + provider chip + fallback badge + actions. **No button.** (unchanged)
+2. **No captions** (`r.TranscriptStatus == "none"`) — **NEW branch.** Quiet status text, e.g.
+   `No transcript available` (use a muted `.card-state`/`.chip-retry`-style treatment, NOT a
+   button). This is a terminal honest dead-end — the user can do nothing, so offer nothing.
+3. **Queued / requested** (`r.SummarizeRequested`) — "Queued · waiting for the next run". **No
+   button.** (unchanged)
+4. **Rate-limited** (`r.TranscriptStatus == "rate_limited"`) — quiet status (keep the
+   "fetching soon" sense) + a **quiet "Summarize now"** button POSTing to `retryNowURL` (clears
+   backoff then processes). Same quiet style as state 5.
+5. **Pending** (else — discovered, not yet attempted) — quiet "Not summarized" + a **quiet
+   "Summarize now"** button POSTing to `summarizeURL` (flips the queue flag then processes).
+
+## Unify the verb and the style
+- **One label everywhere a manual nudge is offered: "Summarize now"** (states 4 and 5). Drop the
+  "Try now" wording entirely.
+- **One quiet style** for both: use the understated `.btn-retry` pattern (small, pill, outline,
+  transparent bg) — NOT `.btn-secondary`/`.btn` (heavier). Rename the CSS class to something
+  state-neutral (e.g. `.btn-quiet` or `.btn-summarize-now`) so it no longer reads as
+  "retry"-specific; keep the same visual. The point: the nudge is subtle, status is primary.
+- Keep both `<form>`s posting to their respective existing handler URLs
+  (`retryNowURL` for rate-limited, `summarizeURL` for pending) with the existing HTMX
+  attributes (`hx-post`, `hx-target=#video-{id}`, `hx-swap=outerHTML`) — only the button
+  label/class change. The backend side-effect difference (clear-backoff vs. set-flag) stays
+  invisible to the user, which is correct.
+- Drop the engineer-facing `title="Fetch transcript now through the shared rate gate"` tooltip;
+  if a hint is wanted, make it user-facing ("Summarize this one now").
+
+## Quietness check (the design intent)
+The summary content and the per-state *status* are the card's primary information. The "Summarize
+now" button is a minor affordance. Do not make it a prominent solid-accent CTA — it must read as
+"you can nudge this if you're impatient", not "action required". Status text uses muted styling;
+the button uses the quiet outline style.
+
+## Tests
+- `videocard_internal_test.go` (exists): assert each of the 5 states renders the expected
+  footer — summarized (no button), no-captions (status, NO button, no `summarize`/`retry-now`
+  URL present), queued (no button), rate-limited ("Summarize now" → retry-now URL), pending
+  ("Summarize now" → summarize URL). The key new assertion: **a `none`-status video renders no
+  action button and no POST URL.**
+- Assert the label string "Try now" no longer appears anywhere in rendered output.
+
+## Out of scope
+Handler/DB changes; the detail-page action buttons (watched/skipped/saved — unrelated); the
+pipeline stats bar wording; auto/manual mode behaviour. Verb/label/style/no-captions-state only.

docs/ui-spec.md

@@ -72,13 +72,21 @@ summary_actions
   and join into the existing `SummaryRow` reads so list/detail show current state.
 - This column is what makes the Stage-0 metric ("did I act on a summary?") queryable.
 
-## 6. Auth (Dex OIDC, single-user authz)
+## 6. Auth (Dex OIDC)
+
+Authentication is delegated to the homelab OIDC provider at `TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER` —
+**Authentik** since the Dex→Authentik migration (infra ADR-0001; ADR-019). It offers a
+Google upstream and Authentik-managed accounts (incl. its invite flow); Tapir no longer
+provisions accounts itself. Any authenticated subject can register a Tapir account
+(ADR-012: allowlist removed). The `oidc`/`DexAuth` package keeps its name for now (rename
+deferred, ADR-019).
 
 - **Flow:** standard Authorization Code. Use `coreos/go-oidc` + `golang.org/x/oauth2`
   (justify the deps in the commit; both are the homelab-standard OIDC libs and small).
 - Discover issuer `https://auth.d-ma.be` (`TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER`); scopes `openid profile email`.
-- On callback: verify ID token, extract `sub` (and email); **allowlist check** against
+- On callback: verify ID token, extract `sub` (and email). **ADR-012 superseded the
-  `TAPIR_ALLOWED_SUBJECT` (the maintainer's Dex subject) — reject everyone else with 403.
+  ADR-011 single-subject allowlist:** any Dex-authenticated subject may sign in; a subject
+  with no tapir user is routed to explicit registration (see `internal/web` registration gate).
 - **Session:** signed, httpOnly, Secure cookie (HS256 with `TAPIR_SESSION_SECRET`); short TTL
   + sliding refresh. Server-side session store can be in-memory at Stage 0 (single replica).
 - **Middleware** guards every route except `/healthz` and `/auth/*`.
@@ -89,8 +97,9 @@ summary_actions
 
 `TAPIR_HTTP_ADDR` (`:8080`), `TAPIR_PUBLIC_URL` (`https://tapir.d-ma.be`),
 `TAPIR_OIDC_ISSUER` (`https://auth.d-ma.be`), `TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_ID`, `TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_SECRET`,
-`TAPIR_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL` (`https://tapir.d-ma.be/auth/callback`), `TAPIR_SESSION_SECRET`,
+`TAPIR_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL` (`https://tapir.d-ma.be/auth/callback`), `TAPIR_SESSION_SECRET`.
-`TAPIR_ALLOWED_SUBJECT`. Reuses existing `TAPIR_DB_DSN`, `TAPIR_USER_ID`. No secrets committed.
+Reuses existing `TAPIR_DB_DSN`, `TAPIR_USER_ID` (the StubAuth dev subject only). No secrets
+committed. (`TAPIR_ALLOWED_SUBJECT` was removed by ADR-012; use the keys above.)
 
 ## 8. Deployment — k3s + Flux GitOps
 
@@ -117,7 +126,7 @@ summary_actions
 
 1. **Register a Dex static client** `tapir-web` in the Dex config (in `infra`) with redirect
    `https://tapir.d-ma.be/auth/callback`; client id/secret → 1P `TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_ID` /
-   `TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_SECRET`. Capture your Dex `sub` for `TAPIR_ALLOWED_SUBJECT`.
+   `TAPIR_DEX_CLIENT_SECRET`. (No allowlist subject to capture — ADR-012 dropped it.)
 2. **DNS/edge** for `tapir.d-ma.be` → the k3s ingress (piguard NPM perimeter / existing
    `*.d-ma.be` pattern) + TLS cert.
 3. Confirm the **registry** host/path the gitea CI pushes to and the Flux path
@@ -145,3 +154,29 @@ Gate (lane A) commits first; B/C/D follow.
 
 `task check` green per lane; B/C/D rebase on A. Deploy (D) lands last, after the binary serves
 locally.
+
+---
+
+## Deviations and additions (as-built)
+
+This spec describes the **Stage-0 single-user reader** (ADR-011). What actually shipped through
+v0.4.0 went further — Stage 1 (ADR-012) opened multi-user, and several UX features were added on
+top. Recorded here (append-only; the spec above is left intact) so intent and reality stay
+distinguishable.
+
+| As-built feature | What it is | Why | Covered by |
+|------------------|-----------|-----|------------|
+| **Multi-user + RLS isolation** | Several Dex users per deployment; isolation enforced by Postgres RLS, not the single-subject allowlist of §6. | Maintainer opened Stage 1 ahead of the formal Stage-0 gate, with DB-enforced isolation as the guardrail that keeps it safe. | ADR-012; migration 003 (`6775e5f`, `f28fdc0`, `2ae66da`) |
+| **Registration gate** | A Dex subject with no `users` row is routed to `/register`, which creates the `users` row + a `user_identities` mapping. (§2 listed "sign-up / user CRUD" as a non-goal.) | Explicit registration is how a multi-user surface stays honest — no just-in-time row creation. | ADR-012; `f396e01` |
+| **Per-user YouTube web connect** | `/oauth/youtube/connect` → `/oauth/youtube/callback` stores a per-user refresh-token ref + a `video_connections` row. (The spec assumed a host-side `tapir auth` only.) | Multi-user means each user connects their own account from the browser. | ADR-006, ADR-012; migration 005 (`0c9531a`, `2aad79b`) |
+| **Account management** | `/account` page with **disconnect** and **delete account**; delete removes only Tapir-side state and leaves the Dex identity intact. (§2 listed isolation/CRUD as non-goals.) | A real account needs a way out; deletion semantics are deliberately Tapir-side only. | ADR-013; `22eafcf`, `c7624d9`, `17d5e8c` |
+| **Immediate web summarization** | A quiet "Summarize now" button on non-summarized video cards. Pending cards POST to `/v/{id}/summarize` (queues + triggers engine); rate-limited cards POST to `/v/{id}/retry-now` (clears backoff + triggers engine). Both use the same `.btn-quiet` style and label — the internal pipeline distinction is invisible to the user. The page HTMX-polls `GET /v/{id}/status` while processing. Videos with `TranscriptStatus == "none"` show "No transcript available" with no button — this is a terminal honest state. (§2 said "triggering runs from the browser … do NOT build".) | Reading a list you can't act on is half a product; on-demand summarize closes the loop without waiting for a batch `tapir run`. | ADR-012, ADR-014; `25215cb`, `8c6c7ca` |
+| **Charmbracelet tapir spinner** | An animated in-flight indicator (charm palette) shown while a summarize is processing; an honest "queued/waiting" state under rate-limiting rather than a stuck spinner. | The spinner must tell the truth when the timedtext endpoint rate-limits (429), not imply imminence. | ADR-014; `25215cb`, `a4aeb5e` |
+| **Auto/manual summarization mode** | Per-user `auto_summarize`; manual lists new videos unsummarized and queues via `summarize_requested`; a mode toggle at `/account/summarize-mode`. Default is **true** for new users (migration 011, ADR-018); existing rows back-filled via migration 012. | Control over compute/noise — only summarize what the user cares about. | migration 006 (`748d5eb`, `bdbdce7`, `3014ee0`, `a269d4a`); migration 011/012 |
+| **Public landing page** | `/welcome` mounted **outside** the auth guard; unauthenticated `/` redirects there; logout returns there (not `/auth/login`). (The spec guarded everything except `/healthz` and `/auth/*`.) | A first-time visitor needs a public "what is this / get started" page before the login wall. | `d83943c`, `0fdf2f7`, `3a27bf1`, `d208110`, `8ca374e`, `f15f57f` |
+| **Invite onboarding** | **Removed from Tapir (ADR-019).** Invites are owned by the IdP (Authentik) now, not Tapir — the Dex local-password provisioning path (`tapir invite` CLI, `/invite/{token}` web flow, `internal/adapters/dex`) was deleted when the homelab migrated Dex→Authentik (infra ADR-0001). A new user is invited via Authentik's invite flow, logs into Tapir via OIDC, and is captured by the existing `/register` (display-name) gate. | Onboarding belongs to the identity provider; keeps Tapir out of the shared identity provider's write path. | ADR-019; infra ADR-0001 |
+| **Summarized-only filter** | `?summarized=1` query param on the list view. When set, only videos with a completed summary (`SummaryRow.Summarized = true`) are shown. Rendered as a "Summarized only" checkbox in the filter form. Summarized videos also sort to the top of the unfiltered list (`ORDER BY (s.id IS NOT NULL) DESC, seen_at DESC`). | Lets users focus on videos that are ready to read; newly landing summaries are visible at the top without filtering. | `internal/web/view.go` (`Filter.OnlySummarized`, `ListVideos` ORDER BY) |
+| **"Summarize now" foreground path** | Unified quiet nudge button on actionable non-summarized cards. Five explicit card states — (1) summarized: chip + no button; (2) no captions (`transcript_status = 'none'`): "No transcript available", no button; (3) queued: "Queued" chip, no button; (4) rate-limited: "Fetching soon…" + "Summarize now" → `POST /v/{id}/retry-now` (clears `rate_limited_at`, triggers engine); (5) pending: "Not summarized" + "Summarize now" → `POST /v/{id}/summarize` (queues + triggers engine). One verb, one style (`.btn-quiet`); backend difference invisible to user. Both handlers call `ProcessVideo` through `globalFetchGate`. Rate gate respected, not bypassed — this is onboarding prioritisation. | Fast onboarding value; honest dead-end for no-captions videos (no button that fails). | `internal/web/handlers.go` (`handleRetryNow`, `handleRequestSummarize`); `internal/web/views.templ` (`VideoCard`) |
+| **Pipeline stats bar** | A one-line status bar above the video list: `N summarized · M fetching soon · K no captions`. Computed from the unfiltered row set; hidden when all videos are summarized. Gives the user a clear read on pipeline state without any interaction. | Replaces the "why is nothing happening?" confusion when most videos are pending or rate-limited. | `internal/web/view.go` (`PipelineStats`, `pipelineStats`) |
+| **Unavailable channels (account page)** | The `/account` page shows a "Unavailable channels" section when any channels returned HTTP 404 on the last discovery pass. Lists channel name, an "unavailable" badge, and the first-seen date. Data sourced from the `channel_errors` table (migration 013). | Surfaces silent failures so users know why some subscribed channels produce no new videos. | migration 013; `internal/web/account.go`; `internal/adapters/youtube/youtube.go` (`domain.ErrChannelUnavailable`) |
+| **Recency window + sparse-state honesty (ADR-020)** | Supersedes the copy/sort in the rows above. Auto-summarize is bounded to videos published within `TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW` (~7d); older un-summarized videos collapse behind a single "Show N older videos — summarize on demand" disclosure, and caption-less videos collapse to a one-line count (not N cards). List order is now `summarized-first, published_at DESC NULLS LAST`. Copy reframed for honest scarcity: pipeline bar reads "N ready · M in queue · K no captions" (no "fetching soon"); a gradual-fill note explains the rate limit; the nudge verb is "Summarize" (not "Summarize now"); the queued card says "summarizing shortly"; the empty-connected state drops the impossible `tapir run` instruction. Detail leads with Takeaways. Filters slimmed (no date pickers; hidden when empty); watched/skipped segmented; back link on detail; empty terms checkbox removed. | Make the sparse reality legible and honest instead of implying abundance/imminence; bound auto load so the back-catalogue doesn't re-drive the caption gate. Never fetch harder — scarcity is surfaced, not engineered around. | ADR-020; `2384c47`, `3df0459`, `40b703e`, `a1a5217`, `4a0a56e`, `9bf1c31`, `980638d`, `12fb031`, `f775441`, `51aa5d9` |

docs/use-cases/ai_routing.feature

@@ -31,5 +31,17 @@ Feature: Local-first AI with optional BYO fallback
     When any transcript is summarized
     Then my content is only ever sent to the local AI stack
 
-  # "Reliably" is operationalized as: Primary returned without error within timeout.
+  Scenario: A model returns unparseable output and the next endpoint succeeds
+    Given the local AI stack is available
+    But the primary model returns output that cannot be parsed into a summary
+    And a fallback model is configured
+    When a transcript is summarized
+    Then Tapir falls back to the next model in the chain
+    And the summary records fallback_used as true
+
+  # "Reliably" is operationalized as: an endpoint returned a PARSEABLE summary
+  # within timeout. A 200 with malformed JSON (or highlights emitted as a bare
+  # string) counts as a failure and advances the chain (ADR-022). Endpoints are
+  # tried in order, locals first, so the external worst-case model only ever sees
+  # content after every local endpoint has failed.
   # Quality scoring may be added later without changing these scenarios.

docs/use-cases/connect_account.feature

@@ -10,12 +10,26 @@ Feature: Connect and manage video accounts
     And my refresh token is stored only as a secret reference
     And my subscriptions are synced
 
+  @pending
+  # Vimeo connect is not built yet (provider label exists; no connect flow or test).
   Scenario: Connect a Vimeo account
     Given I have no connected video accounts
     When I connect my Vimeo account
     Then the connection is stored with status "active"
     And my subscriptions are synced
 
+  Scenario: Connecting an account discovers videos immediately
+    Given I have no connected video accounts
+    When I connect my YouTube account
+    Then a discovery pass for my account is triggered right away
+    And I do not have to wait for the next scheduled pass to see my videos
+
+  Scenario: Connecting summarizes my newest videos right away
+    Given I have no connected video accounts
+    When I connect my YouTube account
+    Then up to the onboarding cap of my newest videos are summarized through the rate gate
+    And the rest are left to the scheduled recency-bounded pass
+
   Scenario: Tokens are never stored in the clear
     When I connect any video account
     Then no OAuth token value is stored in the database
@@ -28,6 +42,9 @@ Feature: Connect and manage video accounts
     And no new videos are watched for that connection
     And my existing summaries remain readable
 
+  @pending
+  # Per-provider BYO credential config is not built as a web flow yet (the summarizer
+  # supports a fallback endpoint, but there is no user-facing BYO setup + its test).
   Scenario Outline: BYO AI credential is optional and per-provider
     When I configure a BYO provider "<provider>"
     Then the credential is stored only as a secret reference

docs/use-cases/landing_page.feature

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+Feature: Public landing page
+  As a first-time visitor
+  I want a public welcome page before I log in
+  So that I understand what Tapir is and how to get started without hitting a login wall
+
+  Scenario: An unauthenticated visit to the root is sent to the welcome page
+    Given I am not logged in
+    When I open the root path "/"
+    Then I am redirected to "/welcome"
+
+  Scenario: The welcome page invites an unauthenticated visitor to start
+    Given I am not logged in
+    When I open "/welcome"
+    Then I see a "Get Started" call to action
+
+  Scenario: An authenticated user on the welcome page sees their way in and out
+    Given I am logged in
+    When I open "/welcome"
+    Then I see a link to my summaries
+    And I see a way to log out
+
+  @pending
+  # Behaviour ships (logout redirects to /welcome) but is not unit-tested: logout lives in
+  # the OIDC Auth impl and StubAuth has no routes to exercise it cheaply.
+  Scenario: Logging out returns to the welcome page
+    Given I am logged in
+    When I log out
+    Then I am returned to "/welcome"
+
+  # /welcome is mounted outside the auth guard so it is reachable without a session;
+  # the root and all data routes stay behind it (commits around the WelcomePage work).

docs/use-cases/paste_url.feature

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+Feature: Paste a YouTube URL to summarize any video
+  As a user
+  I want to paste a YouTube link and get a summary
+  So that I can pull the specific video I want now, even from channels I don't follow
+
+  Scenario: Paste a valid YouTube URL
+    Given I am connected
+    When I paste a valid YouTube video URL
+    Then the video is added to my feed scoped to me
+    And it is queued for summarization through the shared rate gate
+
+  Scenario: Pasting an invalid link is rejected
+    When I paste something that is not a YouTube video URL
+    Then I get a clear error and nothing is added
+
+  Scenario: Pasting a video that cannot be found is honest
+    When I paste a URL whose video cannot be found
+    Then I am told it couldn't be found and nothing is added
+
+  Scenario: Pasting the same video twice does not duplicate it
+    Given I have pasted a video
+    When I paste the same video again
+    Then my feed still has exactly one entry for it
+
+  @pending
+  # Covered by the engine's ADR-010 no-transcript terminal state (degrade-never-error);
+  # there is no paste-specific test for it.
+  Scenario: A pasted video with no captions resolves honestly
+    When I paste a video that has no captions
+    Then it resolves to the "no transcript available" terminal state

docs/use-cases/registration.feature

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Feature: Register and manage a multi-user account
+  As one of a handful of trusted users
+  I want my own account, isolated from everyone else's
+  So that Tapir can serve several people from one deployment without leaking data
+
+  # Stage 1 (ADR-012): Dex authenticates, Tapir authorizes per user. A Dex subject
+  # with no users row is a new user and must register before reaching any data.
+
+  Scenario: A new Dex subject is routed to registration
+    Given I am authenticated by Dex with a subject that has no Tapir account
+    When I open any page that requires an account
+    Then I am routed to the registration page
+    And no summaries are shown until I register
+
+  Scenario: Registering creates the account and its identity mapping
+    Given I am authenticated by Dex with a subject that has no Tapir account
+    When I complete registration
+    Then a user row is created for me
+    And a user_identities row maps my Dex subject to that user
+    And I am taken into the app as a registered user
+
+  Scenario: A returning subject passes straight through
+    Given I am authenticated by Dex with a subject that already has a Tapir account
+    When I open the app
+    Then I am not asked to register again
+    And I see my own summaries
+
+  Scenario: Deleting an account removes only my data and leaves other users untouched
+    Given I am a registered user with summaries, a connected account, and recorded actions
+    And another user exists with their own summaries
+    When I delete my account
+    Then all of my rows are removed across every user-owned table
+    And my stored secret references are removed
+    And the other user's data remains intact
+    And my Dex identity is left intact
+
+  @pending
+  # Re-registration after delete is supported by design (delete leaves the Dex identity,
+  # ADR-013) but has no dedicated end-to-end test yet.
+  Scenario: A deleted user can register again as a fresh account
+    Given I deleted my Tapir account but my Dex identity still exists
+    When I sign in again
+    Then I am routed to the registration page as a new user
+    And registering creates a fresh user row with none of my old data
+
+  # Isolation is DB-enforced (Postgres RLS, ADR-012, migration 003): a user can never
+  # read or write another user's rows even if an application WHERE clause is wrong.
+  # Deletion is Tapir-side only — the shared Dex directory is never modified (ADR-013).

docs/use-cases/summarize_mode.feature

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Feature: Choose how new videos get summarized
+  As a user who wants control over compute and noise
+  I want to pick whether new videos are summarized automatically or on demand
+  So that I only spend summarization on the videos I actually care about
+
+  Background:
+    Given I am a registered user with a connected video account
+
+  Scenario: Auto mode summarizes recent new videos automatically
+    Given my summarization mode is "auto"
+    When a subscribed channel posts a new video with captions within the recency window
+    Then Tapir summarizes it without my asking
+    And the summary appears in my list
+
+  Scenario: Auto mode lists older videos without summarizing them
+    Given my summarization mode is "auto"
+    When discovery finds a video published before the recency window
+    Then the video appears in my list with no summary
+    And it is not summarized automatically
+    And I can still summarize it on demand with "Summarize"
+
+  Scenario: Automatic is the default for a new user
+    Given I have just registered
+    Then my summarization mode is "auto"
+
+  Scenario: Manual mode leaves new videos unsummarized
+    Given my summarization mode is "manual"
+    When a subscribed channel posts a new video with captions
+    Then the video appears in my list with no summary
+    And nothing is summarized until I request it
+
+  Scenario: Requesting a summary in manual mode queues it for the next run
+    Given my summarization mode is "manual"
+    And a new video is in my list with no summary
+    When I click "Summarize" on that video
+    Then the video is marked as requested
+    And the next run summarizes it
+    And the request flag is cleared after it is processed
+
+  # auto_summarize is a per-user setting and summarize_requested is a per-video queue
+  # flag (migration 006). The web button sets the flag; `tapir run` processes both the
+  # auto videos and the manually queued ones, then clears the flag.
+  #
+  # Recency bound (ADR-020): in auto mode the scheduler only summarizes videos published
+  # within TAPIR_AUTO_SUMMARIZE_WINDOW (default ~7d); older videos are discovered and
+  # listed but wait for an explicit "Summarize" — so a back-catalogue does not re-drive
+  # the per-IP caption gate (ADR-014) every cycle. A manual request bypasses the bound.

docs/use-cases/summarize_new_video.feature

@@ -31,5 +31,16 @@ Feature: Summarize new videos from subscribed channels
     When the watcher sees "Designing for Attention" again
     Then Tapir does not produce a second summary for it
 
+  Scenario: Re-analyzing a stored video does not re-fetch its transcript
+    Given a transcript for "Designing for Attention" is already stored
+    When the video is summarized again
+    Then Tapir reads the stored transcript
+    And Tapir does not fetch captions from YouTube
+
   # Captions-first is the core path (ADR-007). Audio-download + speech-to-text is
   # deferred and intentionally has no scenario here yet.
+  #
+  # Transcript persistence (ADR-021): the stored transcript is shared, keyed by
+  # (provider, provider_video_id) and read before any caption fetch, so the
+  # re-analysis scenario above also covers paste-a-URL and the onboarding burst —
+  # both summarize through the same engine chokepoint.

docs/ux-review/UX-REVIEW-stage0-recency.md

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+# Tapir — Heuristic Review (Stage-0, sparse + recency-bounded)
+
+_Findings document, not a build spec. The maintainer filters; a spec follows separately.
+Reviewed against `VISION.md` (Stage-0 gate), `docs/ui-spec.md`, `internal/web/views.templ` +
+`view.go`, the prior `UX-REVIEW.md` pass, and the current screenshots. Written for the product
+**as it actually is**: ~283 discovered, ~15 summarized, ~256 in queue behind a respected per-IP
+caption rate limit, ~12 no-captions; single-user (maintainer) with friends pending; recency-
+bounded auto-summarize about to ship (auto = recent ~7d, older browsable + manual on demand)._
+
+## Reviewer stance
+
+The Stage-0 gate is **return usage**. So every finding is judged by one question: does this make
+the maintainer (or a friend) come back to an honestly-sparse feed? The visual layer is already
+decent — dark mode, cards, the constrained reader were all fixed in the prior pass. The open
+problems are **expectation-setting, honesty-of-scale, and the recency feed** — not pixels.
+
+**The single biggest risk:** a new user connects, sees `15 summarized · 256 fetching soon`,
+nothing visibly moves, and never returns. The whole gate dies at that moment. Most P0s below
+attack that one moment.
+
+## Tagging
+
+- **`[NOW]`** — improves the product as it is today (sparse, recency-bounded, single-user). Ships
+  in the upcoming bundle.
+- **`[LATER]`** — improves the product we hope it becomes (abundance, engagement, multiple users).
+  Valuable but premature until real usage validates the core loop.
+
+Severity: 🔴 breaks the core loop · 🟠 hurts it · 🟡 noticeable · 🔵 polish.
+
+---
+
+## P0 — fix before/with the recency ship
+
+### 1. 🔴 Empty-connected state tells the user to run a CLI command they can't run — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** After connecting YouTube, the empty list says: *"Run `tapir run` to discover your
+subscriptions."* A friend on the web has no shell. And post-ADR-018 discovery is an in-process
+scheduled loop — so the instruction is wrong *even for the maintainer*. It is the first thing a
+newly-onboarded user sees, and it is an impossible, stale instruction.
+**Principle.** Match between system and the real world; help users recognize, not be blocked
+(Nielsen #1, #2, #9).
+**Proposal.** Replace with a passive, honest "we're working" state: *"Your account is connected.
+Tapir is finding your subscriptions and fetching captions — summaries appear here gradually. Check
+back later."* No command. No imperative the user can't satisfy.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `summaryList` → `.empty-connected`.
+
+### 2. 🔴 No expectation set for *gradual* fill — the return loop breaks at the cliff — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** Captions are rate-limited by design; the backlog trickles over days. Nothing tells
+the user this. A first visit shows few/no summaries and no "come back" framing. The Stage-0 gate
+is literally about returns, and the product never asks for one or explains why patience is
+warranted.
+**Principle.** Visibility of system status (#1). And: the gate can't be cleared if the UX doesn't
+survive first contact.
+**Proposal.** One honest sentence near the pipeline bar / empty state: *"Tapir fetches captions
+slowly on purpose, to respect YouTube's limits. New summaries land gradually — usually best to
+check back tomorrow."* Turns confusing emptiness into intentional design. Highest-leverage change
+in the review.
+
+### 3. 🟠 "256 fetching soon" overstates imminence — a lie of scale — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** The pipeline bar and rate-limited cards both say "fetching soon." For 256 items
+behind a per-IP throttle, "soon" is false — they trickle over days/weeks. Exactly the abundance-
+implying language the mandate forbids, inverted: it makes the *queue* look imminent.
+**Principle.** Honesty of scarcity (project mandate); #1.
+**Proposal.** Relabel by scale. Bar: `15 ready · 256 in queue · 12 no captions`. Card state:
+"In queue" / "Waiting its turn", not "Fetching soon…". Reserve "soon" for items actually next.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `pipelineBar`; card State 4.
+
+### 4. 🟠 Recency boundary is invisible in the feed — `[NOW, ships with recency]`
+**Problem.** Once auto-summarize is bounded to ~7d, a 6-month-old pending video and a 2-day-old
+pending video render identically ("Not summarized" + button). But only one is in the auto path;
+the other will *never* process unless clicked. The user can't tell "be patient, this is coming"
+from "this is yours to trigger or ignore."
+**Principle.** Visibility of system status; predictability (#1).
+**Proposal.** Bucket the list into two sections: **Recent** (auto, will fill itself) and
+**Older — browse / summarize on demand**. Card status language should encode *which side of the
+line it's on*, not the pipeline internals. Central IA decision of the recency change.
+
+### 5. 🟠 The un-summarized mass buries the ~15 readable summaries — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** ~268 of 283 cards are not readable (pending / queued / no-captions). Summarized-first
+ordering helps, but the page is still 95% noise below the fold. "Attention is the scarce resource"
+is the product's own principle — and the default view violates it.
+**Principle.** Aesthetic/minimalist design; signal-to-noise (#8).
+**Proposal.** Default view = readable summaries + the Recent bucket. Collapse the older
+un-summarized mass behind *"Show 256 older un-summarized videos."* Collapse the 12 no-caption
+videos into a single line: *"12 videos have no captions"* (terminal, never readable — they don't
+deserve 12 full cards).
+
+---
+
+## P1 — high, near-term
+
+### 6. 🟠 "Summarize now" overpromises against the rate gate — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** Button says "Summarize now" (title: "Summarize this one now"). Backend queues it
+behind the shared per-IP gate. Click 10 older videos and they all sit at "Fetching soon…". The
+verb sells immediacy the system can't honor.
+**Principle.** Honesty; match system/reality (#1).
+**Proposal.** Drop "now" → "Summarize". On click the card should honestly become "Queued" (it
+already can). Optionally show queue position once the queue is real. Don't engineer the gate
+harder — just stop the verb from lying.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` card States 4 & 5; `handlers.go` `handleRetryNow`,
+`handleRequestSummarize`.
+
+### 7. 🟠 Welcome-page copy is stale and misleading post-ADR-019 — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** Landing sub-copy: *"If you have an invite link, it will set up your account
+automatically."* Invites moved to Authentik (ADR-019); Tapir no longer handles invite links. The
+"Get Started" button goes straight to OIDC. The copy promises a flow that no longer exists.
+**Principle.** Match between system and reality (#2); honesty.
+**Proposal.** Rewrite: *"Tapir is invite-only right now. If you've been invited, sign in below."*
+Single CTA. Also set the gradual-fill expectation here (ties to #2) so it lands before the wall,
+not after.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `WelcomePage` → `.welcome-sub`.
+
+### 8. 🟡 "Queued · waiting for the next run" leaks system jargon — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** "the next run" exposes the discovery-loop concept; a user doesn't know what a "run"
+is.
+**Principle.** Speak the user's language (#2).
+**Proposal.** "Queued — summarizing shortly." Hide the scheduler.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` card State 3.
+
+### 9. 🟡 Filters render before there's anything to filter — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** The fresh/empty state shows the full Channel/From/To/Filter bar *above* "Connect
+YouTube." Power tooling stacked on top of the one action that matters.
+**Principle.** Progressive disclosure; minimalist design (#8).
+**Proposal.** Hide the filter bar when there are 0 rows (and arguably below ~20). Show the connect
+CTA alone.
+**Evidence.** `fixes/03-empty-fresh.png`; `ListPage` renders `filterForm` unconditionally.
+
+### 10. 🟡 Date-range filters are dead weight at this scale — `[NOW]` demote / `[LATER]` rebuild
+**Problem.** From/To date pickers + a free-text exact-match Channel field are corpus-scale tools.
+With 15 summaries they're noise; channel-as-freetext is unguessable. (Confirm the prior review's
+#7 is resolved — that `Channel` shows a real channel name, not the `provider` string; seeded
+screenshots suggest it is, live data may differ.)
+**Principle.** Match tool to task; minimalist design.
+**Proposal.** `[NOW]`: reduce to the "Summarized only" toggle (+ maybe channel chips derived from
+present rows). Drop date pickers until the corpus justifies them. `[LATER]`: real channel facets +
+search when there's volume.
+
+---
+
+## P2 — reading experience & polish
+
+### 11. 🟡 Detail leads with Summary; the attention-saving payload (Takeaways) is last — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** Product promise is "decide what's worth your time." The element that answers that —
+Takeaways / verdict — sits at the bottom. The user reads a full summary to reach the point.
+**Principle.** Lead with the user's actual job-to-be-done.
+**Proposal.** Reorder or add a one-line TL;DR/verdict at top. Takeaways → Highlights → Summary, or
+a "Worth watching?" lede. Data already exists; a reorder, not new machinery.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `DetailPage`.
+
+### 12. 🔵 No "back to Summaries" on detail — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** Only the brand returns home, losing any filter context.
+**Proposal.** Explicit "← Summaries" link on the detail page.
+
+### 13. 🔵 Auto/manual toggle copy will be wrong after recency — `[NOW, with recency]`
+**Problem.** Account copy: *"Automatic summarizes every new video as it is discovered."* Becomes
+false once auto is bounded to ~7d.
+**Proposal.** *"Automatic summarizes new videos from the last ~7 days. Older videos stay
+browsable — summarize them on demand."*
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `AccountPage` summarization section.
+
+### 14. 🔵 Register step asks acceptance of nonexistent terms — `[NOW]`
+**Problem.** "I accept the terms of use" — no terms linked. For a friends-only tool, ceremony
+accepting nothing.
+**Proposal.** Either link real terms or drop the checkbox at this stage.
+**Evidence.** `views.templ` `RegisterPage`.
+
+### 15. 🔵 watched/skipped mutual exclusivity unsignaled — `[NOW]` low
+**Problem.** Three independent-looking buttons; watched↔skipped are exclusive (carryover from
+prior review #14).
+**Proposal.** Segmented control for watched/skipped; keep Saved separate.
+
+---
+
+## `[LATER]` — premature until the core loop is validated
+
+_(abundance / engagement / multiple users)_
+
+- **Return-nudges (digest email / push).** 🔴 **Caution, not just defer.** A notification that
+  drives returns *contaminates the exact signal the gate measures* — VISION wants *unprompted*
+  returns and admits it can't distinguish prompted from organic. Building a nudge now poisons the
+  experiment. Defer until after the gate reads. `[LATER]`
+- **Full-text search across summaries** — needs volume to matter. `[LATER]`
+- **Channel facets / saved filters / sorting** — corpus-scale tooling (#10). `[LATER]`
+- **Read/unread + "new since last visit"** — genuinely helps returns, but only meaningful once
+  there is throughput to be "new." `[LATER]`
+- **Saved/queue view, collections** — engagement surface; no payoff at 15 items. `[LATER]`
+- **Richer card previews (top-takeaway as preview, 2–3 lines)** — triage aid that only pays off
+  with many cards to triage. `[LATER]`
+- **Backlog progress heartbeat ("N summarized this week", queue burn-down)** — rewards returning,
+  but needs real throughput to show motion; a static "last updated X ago" is the only `[NOW]`-worthy
+  slice. `[LATER]`
+- **Onboarding tour / multi-step welcome** — over-built for one user + a few friends. `[LATER]`
+
+---
+
+## What's already right (don't regress)
+
+Pipeline-bar concept, the honest "No transcript available" terminal state, the queued/waiting
+spinner instead of a fake-imminent one, the Unavailable-channels surface, the constrained-width
+reader, dark mode, the account danger-zone behind a disclosure. The honesty instincts are present
+— the P0s are about making that honesty *legible and correctly-scaled*, not adding it.
+
+## Two judgment calls to settle first
+
+1. **#4 (Recent/Older split) and #5 (collapse the older mass) are one decision viewed twice.**
+   Settle the recency-feed IA once and both fall out.
+2. **The return-nudge caution (`[LATER]` list, item 1) is the one to put in writing now** — before
+   someone "helpfully" ships an email digest to juice the gate and destroys the signal.

go.mod

@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ require (
 	github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4 v4.19.1
 	github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.9.2
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0
 	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
+	golang.org/x/time v0.15.0
 )
 
 require (

go.sum

@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.37.0 h1:HLdcFNbRQBE2imdSEgm/kwqmQj1Or1l/7bW6mx
 go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace v1.37.0/go.mod h1:TlgrlQ+PtQO5XFerSPUYG0JSgGyryXewPGyayAWSBS0=
 go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
 go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0 h1:jMBrvKuj23MTlT0bQEOBcAE0mjg8mK9RXFhRH6nyF3Q=
+golang.org/x/crypto v0.45.0/go.mod h1:XTGrrkGJve7CYK7J8PEww4aY7gM3qMCElcJQ8n8JdX4=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0 h1:kr88TuHDroi+UVf+0hZnirlk8o8T+4MrK6mr60WkH/I=
@@ -99,6 +101,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0 h1:Ivj+2Cp/ylzLiEU89QhWblYnOE9zerudt9Ftecq2C6k=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.41.0/go.mod h1:OgkHotnGiDImocRcuBABYBEXf8A9a87e/uXjp9XT3ks=
 golang.org/x/text v0.31.0 h1:aC8ghyu4JhP8VojJ2lEHBnochRno1sgL6nEi9WGFGMM=
 golang.org/x/text v0.31.0/go.mod h1:tKRAlv61yKIjGGHX/4tP1LTbc13YSec1pxVEWXzfoeM=
+golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 h1:bbrp8t3bGUeFOx08pvsMYRTCVSMk89u4tKbNOZbp88U=
+golang.org/x/time v0.15.0/go.mod h1:Y4YMaQmXwGQZoFaVFk4YpCt4FLQMYKZe9oeV/f4MSno=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntNwaWcugrBjAiHlqqRiVk=
 gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=

internal/adapters/llm/client.go

@@ -34,15 +34,35 @@ type Client struct {
 	httpClient *http.Client
 }
 
+// Option configures a Client at construction. Variadic so the existing 4-arg
+// call sites stay valid as new knobs are added.
+type Option func(*Client)
+
+// WithMaxTokens overrides the per-request completion budget. The summarizer uses
+// this to cap completion for small-context models (e.g. koala/phi4-mini, 8k):
+// with the default 8192 budget, prompt + max_tokens overflows an 8k context and
+// the gateway returns HTTP 400. A non-positive n is ignored (keeps the default).
+func WithMaxTokens(n int) Option {
+	return func(c *Client) {
+		if n > 0 {
+			c.maxTokens = n
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // New constructs a Client.
-func New(baseURL, apiKey, model string, timeout time.Duration) *Client {
+func New(baseURL, apiKey, model string, timeout time.Duration, opts ...Option) *Client {
-	return &Client{
+	c := &Client{
 		baseURL:    strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
 		apiKey:     apiKey,
 		model:      model,
 		maxTokens:  defaultMaxTokens,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{Timeout: timeout},
 	}
+	for _, opt := range opts {
+		opt(c)
+	}
+	return c
 }
 
 type chatRequest struct {

internal/adapters/llm/client_test.go

@@ -64,6 +64,27 @@ func TestClient_SendsMaxTokens(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestClient_WithMaxTokens overrides the completion budget — the summarizer caps
+// it small so prompt + max_tokens fits a small-context model's window (8k).
+func TestClient_WithMaxTokens(t *testing.T) {
+	var body chatRequest
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body)
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+			"choices": []map[string]any{{"message": map[string]any{"content": "ok"}}},
+		})
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	c := New(srv.URL, "", "test-model", 10*time.Second, WithMaxTokens(1500))
+	if _, err := c.Complete(context.Background(), "sys", "user"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Complete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if body.MaxTokens != 1500 {
+		t.Errorf("max_tokens = %d, want 1500", body.MaxTokens)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestClient_ReturnsErrorOnNon200(t *testing.T) {
 	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "overloaded", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)

internal/adapters/secrets/file.go

@@ -89,6 +89,43 @@ func (s *FileStore) Put(ref, value string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// Delete removes the secret stored under ref, persisting the file atomically
+// (temp file + rename) with 0600 permissions. Deleting an absent ref — or one in
+// a file that does not exist yet — is a no-op, not an error. Used by account
+// management (disconnect / delete-account) to purge a user's OAuth tokens.
+func (s *FileStore) Delete(ref string) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	m, err := s.load()
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+			return nil // nothing to delete
+		}
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, ok := m[ref]; !ok {
+		return nil // already absent
+	}
+	delete(m, ref)
+
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(s.path), 0o700); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("secrets: create dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	b, err := json.Marshal(m)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("secrets: marshal: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmp := s.path + ".tmp"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, b, 0o600); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("secrets: write temp: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmp, s.path); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("secrets: rename: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // load reads the backing file. A missing file yields an empty map (not an
 // error) for Get's caller, except Put distinguishes os.ErrNotExist.
 func (s *FileStore) load() (map[string]string, error) {

internal/adapters/secrets/file_test.go

@@ -49,6 +49,40 @@ func TestPutIsOwnerOnly(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestDeleteRemovesRefAndLeavesOthers(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secrets.json")
+	s := secrets.NewFileStore(path)
+	if err := s.Put("youtube/u1/refresh_token", "rt-1"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.Put("youtube/u2/refresh_token", "rt-2"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Put: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := s.Delete("youtube/u1/refresh_token"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Delete: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The deleted ref is gone (persisted: re-open from disk)...
+	s2 := secrets.NewFileStore(path)
+	if _, err := s2.Get(context.Background(), "youtube/u1/refresh_token"); !errors.Is(err, secrets.ErrNotFound) {
+		t.Errorf("Get deleted ref: err = %v, want ErrNotFound", err)
+	}
+	// ...and the other user's secret survives.
+	if got, err := s2.Get(context.Background(), "youtube/u2/refresh_token"); err != nil || got != "rt-2" {
+		t.Errorf("Get surviving ref = (%q, %v), want (%q, nil)", got, err, "rt-2")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDeleteAbsentRefIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	// Deleting an unknown ref — or from a file that does not exist yet — is a
+	// no-op, not an error (mirrors store.DeleteConnection semantics).
+	s := secrets.NewFileStore(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secrets.json"))
+	if err := s.Delete("missing"); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("Delete absent ref: %v, want nil", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestPutMergesEntries(t *testing.T) {
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secrets.json")
 	s := secrets.NewFileStore(path)

internal/adapters/store/account.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// DeleteUser permanently removes a user and all of their data. It runs through
+// withUser so RLS confines every statement to the calling user's own rows.
+//
+// Deleting the users row cascades (ON DELETE CASCADE) to videos, summaries
+// (→ sink_deliveries), video_connections, and the user_identities map —
+// referential-integrity cascades bypass RLS, so a user's child rows are removed
+// even though the deleting connection is scoped. Transcripts are NOT removed:
+// since ADR-021 they are shared public content keyed by (provider,
+// provider_video_id) with no user_id, so another user may still reference the
+// same row — a user deletion must not strip shared caption content. summary_actions and login_events
+// are the exceptions: each carries a user_id but has NO foreign key to users
+// (migrations 002 and 010), so the cascade does not reach them; they are deleted
+// explicitly in the same scoped transaction. Deleting an absent user is a no-op
+// (idempotent).
+//
+// This is tapir-side only (decision 2026-06-03): it removes all tapir data; the
+// Dex login identity is left untouched — a later login simply re-enters
+// registration. The user's secrets (OAuth tokens) live in the SecretStore, not
+// the DB, and are removed by the caller (the account handler).
+func (s *Store) DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`DELETE FROM summary_actions WHERE user_id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: delete summary_actions: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`DELETE FROM login_events WHERE user_id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: delete login_events: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: delete user: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// DisplayName returns the user's registered display name (empty if unset). Scoped
+// by user_id via withUser, like every read in this package.
+func (s *Store) DisplayName(ctx context.Context, userID string) (string, error) {
+	var name string
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		return tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+			`SELECT COALESCE(display_name, '') FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&name)
+	}); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: display name: %w", err)
+	}
+	return name, nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/account_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// seedIdentity inserts the un-RLS'd dex_subject → user_id mapping for a user, so
+// the cascade-on-delete to user_identities can be asserted.
+func seedIdentity(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, subject, userID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, err := p.Exec(context.Background(),
+		`INSERT INTO user_identities (dex_subject, user_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, subject, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+// countFor counts rows owned by userID in table. The users table is keyed on its
+// own id; every other isolated table on user_id.
+func countFor(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, table, userID string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	col := "user_id"
+	if table == "users" {
+		col = "id"
+	}
+	var n int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM `+table+` WHERE `+col+` = $1`, userID).Scan(&n))
+	return n
+}
+
+func countDeliveries(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, summaryID string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	var n int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM sink_deliveries WHERE summary_id = $1`, summaryID).Scan(&n))
+	return n
+}
+
+func countIdentities(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, userID string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	var n int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM user_identities WHERE user_id = $1`, userID).Scan(&n))
+	return n
+}
+
+// TestDeleteUserRemovesAllRowsForUserOnly is the account-deletion isolation proof
+// (Worker N+M): DeleteUser wipes every row owned by the target user — across the
+// cascade-linked tables, the user_identities map (ON DELETE CASCADE), AND
+// summary_actions (which has NO FK to users, so the users-row cascade does not
+// reach it and DeleteUser must delete it explicitly) — while leaving another
+// user's rows completely intact.
+func TestDeleteUserRemovesAllRowsForUserOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	newStore(t) // apply migrations
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+
+	a := seedUser(t, super, userA)
+	b := seedUser(t, super, userB)
+	seedIdentity(t, super, "subject-a", userA)
+	seedIdentity(t, super, "subject-b", userB)
+
+	s := newStore(t)
+	require.NoError(t, s.DeleteUser(ctx, userA))
+
+	// Every user-keyed isolated table: zero rows for A, exactly one for B.
+	for _, table := range userIsolatedTables {
+		require.Equal(t, 0, countFor(t, super, table, userA),
+			"A's %s rows must be deleted", table)
+		require.Equal(t, 1, countFor(t, super, table, userB),
+			"B's %s rows must survive A's deletion", table)
+	}
+
+	// sink_deliveries is keyed by summary, not user_id (cascade from summaries).
+	require.Equal(t, 0, countDeliveries(t, super, a.summaryID), "A's deliveries must cascade-delete")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, countDeliveries(t, super, b.summaryID), "B's deliveries must survive")
+
+	// The cascade must reach user_identities (explicitly asserted per the mission).
+	require.Equal(t, 0, countIdentities(t, super, userA), "A's identity mapping must cascade-delete")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, countIdentities(t, super, userB), "B's identity mapping must survive")
+}
+
+func TestDeleteUserIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	// Deleting an absent user is a no-op, not an error.
+	require.NoError(t, s.DeleteUser(ctx, userA))
+}
+
+func TestDisplayNameReturnsRegisteredName(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+	_, err := p.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO users (id, display_name) VALUES ($1, $2)`, userA, "Ada")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	name, err := s.DisplayName(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "Ada", name)
+}

internal/adapters/store/actions.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package store
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
 )
 
 // allowedActions is the closed set of action verbs persisted in summary_actions.
@@ -39,12 +41,7 @@ func (s *Store) SetAction(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID, action string) e
 		return err
 	}
 
-	tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("store: begin set action: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck // no-op after Commit
-
 		if opposite, ok := oppositeAction[action]; ok {
 			if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
 				`DELETE FROM summary_actions
@@ -61,11 +58,8 @@ func (s *Store) SetAction(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID, action string) e
 			userID, videoID, action); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("store: set action: %w", err)
 		}
-
-	if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("store: commit set action: %w", err)
-	}
 		return nil
+	})
 }
 
 // ClearAction removes an action for (user, video). Clearing an action that is
@@ -74,13 +68,15 @@ func (s *Store) ClearAction(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID, action string)
 	if err := validateAction(action); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if _, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx,
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
 			`DELETE FROM summary_actions
 			  WHERE user_id = $1 AND video_id = $2 AND action = $3`,
 			userID, videoID, action); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("store: clear action: %w", err)
 		}
 		return nil
+	})
 }
 
 // ActionsFor returns the active actions per video for the given user, keyed by
@@ -91,25 +87,30 @@ func (s *Store) ActionsFor(ctx context.Context, userID string, videoIDs []string
 	if len(videoIDs) == 0 {
 		return out, nil
 	}
-	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx,
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
 			`SELECT video_id, action FROM summary_actions
 			  WHERE user_id = $1 AND video_id = ANY($2)
 			  ORDER BY video_id, action`,
 			userID, videoIDs)
 		if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: actions for: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: actions for: %w", err)
 		}
 		defer rows.Close()
 
 		for rows.Next() {
 			var videoID, action string
 			if err := rows.Scan(&videoID, &action); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: scan action: %w", err)
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan action: %w", err)
 			}
 			out[videoID] = append(out[videoID], action)
 		}
 		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: iterate actions: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate actions: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	return out, nil
 }

internal/adapters/store/channel_caption.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// CaptionlessChannels returns the set of channel ids currently suppressed for the
+// user — channels whose recent videos all yielded no captions, within their
+// suppression window (ADR-024). The runner skips caption fetches for these
+// channels' videos. A channel whose window has expired is not returned, so its
+// next video is re-probed (auto-recovery).
+func (s *Store) CaptionlessChannels(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]bool, error) {
+	out := map[string]bool{}
+	err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
+			SELECT channel_id FROM channel_caption_state
+			WHERE user_id = $1 AND captionless_until IS NOT NULL AND captionless_until > now()`,
+			userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: caption-less channels: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var ch string
+			if err := rows.Scan(&ch); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan caption-less channel: %w", err)
+			}
+			out[ch] = true
+		}
+		return rows.Err()
+	})
+	return out, err
+}
+
+// RecordChannelCaptionOutcome updates a channel's caption-availability memory
+// after a fetch attempt (ADR-024). hadCaptions resets the channel (consecutive
+// count to 0, suppression cleared). Otherwise the consecutive no-caption count is
+// incremented; once it reaches threshold the channel is suppressed for window.
+// threshold <= 0 is a no-op (feature disabled). An empty channelID is ignored
+// (some sources may not carry one).
+func (s *Store) RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID string, hadCaptions bool, threshold int, window time.Duration) error {
+	if channelID == "" || threshold <= 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if hadCaptions {
+			_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
+				INSERT INTO channel_caption_state (user_id, channel_id, consecutive_none, captionless_until, updated_at)
+				VALUES ($1, $2, 0, NULL, now())
+				ON CONFLICT (user_id, channel_id)
+				DO UPDATE SET consecutive_none = 0, captionless_until = NULL, updated_at = now()`,
+				userID, channelID)
+			if err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: reset channel caption state: %w", err)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		// No captions: increment the streak; suppress once it reaches threshold.
+		// captionless_until is set from the NEW count inside the same statement so
+		// the decision is atomic with the increment.
+		until := time.Now().Add(window)
+		_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO channel_caption_state (user_id, channel_id, consecutive_none, captionless_until, updated_at)
+			VALUES ($1, $2, 1, CASE WHEN 1 >= $3 THEN $4::timestamptz ELSE NULL END, now())
+			ON CONFLICT (user_id, channel_id)
+			DO UPDATE SET
+				consecutive_none = channel_caption_state.consecutive_none + 1,
+				captionless_until = CASE
+					WHEN channel_caption_state.consecutive_none + 1 >= $3 THEN $4::timestamptz
+					ELSE channel_caption_state.captionless_until
+				END,
+				updated_at = now()`,
+			userID, channelID, threshold, until)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: record channel no-caption: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}

internal/adapters/store/channel_caption_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestChannelCaptionMemory_SuppressesAfterThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	seedUser(t, super, userA)
+
+	const threshold = 3
+	window := time.Hour
+
+	// Below threshold: not yet suppressed.
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanX", false, threshold, window))
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanX", false, threshold, window))
+	got, err := s.CaptionlessChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, got, "chanX", "2 < threshold 3: not suppressed yet")
+
+	// Crossing the threshold suppresses the channel.
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanX", false, threshold, window))
+	got, err = s.CaptionlessChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, got, "chanX", "3 consecutive no-caption results suppress the channel")
+
+	// A successful caption fetch resets it.
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanX", true, threshold, window))
+	got, err = s.CaptionlessChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, got, "chanX", "a captioned video clears suppression")
+}
+
+func TestChannelCaptionMemory_WindowExpiryReProbes(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	seedUser(t, super, userA)
+
+	// A negative window means captionless_until lands in the past — modelling an
+	// elapsed suppression window, which must make the channel eligible again.
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanY", false, 1, -time.Hour))
+	got, err := s.CaptionlessChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, got, "chanY", "an expired window re-enables the channel for a re-probe")
+}
+
+func TestChannelCaptionMemory_DisabledThresholdIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	seedUser(t, super, userA)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.RecordChannelCaptionOutcome(ctx, userA, "chanZ", false, 0, time.Hour))
+	got, err := s.CaptionlessChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, got, "threshold 0 disables the memory — nothing recorded")
+}

internal/adapters/store/channel_errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// ChannelError is a channel that returned HTTP 404 on a discovery pass.
+type ChannelError struct {
+	ChannelID   string
+	ChannelName string
+	FirstSeen   time.Time
+	LastSeen    time.Time
+}
+
+// UpsertChannelError records (or refreshes) a 404 channel for the current user.
+// Called by the runner inside a withUser scope; RLS guards user isolation.
+func (s *Store) UpsertChannelError(ctx context.Context, userID, channelID, channelName string) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO channel_errors (user_id, channel_id, channel_name)
+			VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
+			ON CONFLICT (user_id, channel_id)
+			DO UPDATE SET channel_name = EXCLUDED.channel_name, last_seen = now()`,
+			userID, channelID, channelName)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: upsert channel error: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// ListChannelErrors returns all 404-flagged channels for the user, newest first.
+func (s *Store) ListChannelErrors(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]ChannelError, error) {
+	var out []ChannelError
+	err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
+			SELECT channel_id, channel_name, first_seen, last_seen
+			FROM channel_errors
+			WHERE user_id = $1
+			ORDER BY last_seen DESC`, userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: list channel errors: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var ce ChannelError
+			if err := rows.Scan(&ce.ChannelID, &ce.ChannelName, &ce.FirstSeen, &ce.LastSeen); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan channel error: %w", err)
+			}
+			out = append(out, ce)
+		}
+		return rows.Err()
+	})
+	return out, err
+}

internal/adapters/store/connections.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// Connection is one connected video account (data-model.md VIDEO_CONNECTION).
+// TokenRef is the opaque SecretStore reference that resolves to the OAuth refresh
+// token — never the token itself. ConnectedAt is set by the DB and is read-only
+// on writes (UpsertConnection ignores it).
+type Connection struct {
+	Provider        string
+	ProviderAccount string
+	TokenRef        string
+	Status          string
+	ConnectedAt     time.Time
+}
+
+// UpsertConnection records (or refreshes) the user's connection to a provider,
+// keyed on (user_id, provider): re-connecting the same provider overwrites the
+// token_ref/status/account and bumps connected_at, never duplicating. Like every
+// access in this package it routes through withUser, so RLS scopes the write to
+// the calling user — a connection can only be written for the current user.
+func (s *Store) UpsertConnection(ctx context.Context, userID string, c Connection) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO video_connections
+			     (user_id, provider, provider_account, token_ref, status)
+			 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
+			 ON CONFLICT (user_id, provider) DO UPDATE SET
+			     provider_account = EXCLUDED.provider_account,
+			     token_ref        = EXCLUDED.token_ref,
+			     status           = EXCLUDED.status,
+			     connected_at     = now()`,
+			userID, c.Provider, nullIfEmpty(c.ProviderAccount), c.TokenRef, c.Status,
+		); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: upsert connection: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// ConnectionsForUser returns the user's connections, most-recently-connected
+// first. Scoped by user_id via withUser: one user never sees another's.
+func (s *Store) ConnectionsForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]Connection, error) {
+	var out []Connection
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			`SELECT provider, COALESCE(provider_account, ''), token_ref, status, connected_at
+			   FROM video_connections
+			  WHERE user_id = $1
+			  ORDER BY connected_at DESC, provider`,
+			userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: connections for user: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var c Connection
+			if err := rows.Scan(&c.Provider, &c.ProviderAccount, &c.TokenRef, &c.Status, &c.ConnectedAt); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan connection: %w", err)
+			}
+			out = append(out, c)
+		}
+		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate connections: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteConnection removes the user's connection to a provider. Deleting an
+// absent connection is a no-op (no error).
+func (s *Store) DeleteConnection(ctx context.Context, userID, provider string) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`DELETE FROM video_connections WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = $2`,
+			userID, provider); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: delete connection: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// nullIfEmpty maps "" to a SQL NULL so an unknown provider_account is stored as
+// NULL (the column is nullable) rather than an empty string.
+func nullIfEmpty(s string) *string {
+	if s == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return &s
+}

internal/adapters/store/connections_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+// seedUserRow inserts a bare users row (FK target for a connection) as the
+// superuser pool, which bypasses RLS.
+func seedUserRow(t *testing.T, userID string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, err := rawPool(t).Exec(context.Background(),
+		`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestUpsertConnectionInsertsRow(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+	seedUserRow(t, userA)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.UpsertConnection(ctx, userA, store.Connection{
+		Provider:        "youtube",
+		ProviderAccount: "chan@example.com",
+		TokenRef:        "youtube/" + userA + "/refresh_token",
+		Status:          "active",
+	}))
+
+	conns, err := s.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, conns, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, "youtube", conns[0].Provider)
+	require.Equal(t, "chan@example.com", conns[0].ProviderAccount)
+	require.Equal(t, "youtube/"+userA+"/refresh_token", conns[0].TokenRef)
+	require.Equal(t, "active", conns[0].Status)
+	require.False(t, conns[0].ConnectedAt.IsZero(), "connected_at set by the DB default")
+}
+
+func TestUpsertConnectionIsIdempotentOnUserProvider(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+	seedUserRow(t, userA)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.UpsertConnection(ctx, userA, store.Connection{
+		Provider: "youtube", TokenRef: "ref-1", Status: "active",
+	}))
+	// Re-connect the same provider: must update in place, not duplicate.
+	require.NoError(t, s.UpsertConnection(ctx, userA, store.Connection{
+		Provider: "youtube", TokenRef: "ref-2", Status: "revoked",
+	}))
+
+	var count int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM video_connections WHERE user_id = $1 AND provider = 'youtube'`,
+		userA).Scan(&count))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, count, "second connect must update, not duplicate")
+
+	conns, err := s.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, conns, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, "ref-2", conns[0].TokenRef, "token_ref overwritten")
+	require.Equal(t, "revoked", conns[0].Status, "status overwritten")
+}
+
+func TestDeleteConnection(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	seedUserRow(t, userA)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.UpsertConnection(ctx, userA, store.Connection{
+		Provider: "youtube", TokenRef: "ref", Status: "active",
+	}))
+	require.NoError(t, s.DeleteConnection(ctx, userA, "youtube"))
+
+	conns, err := s.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, conns)
+
+	// Deleting an absent connection is a no-op, not an error.
+	require.NoError(t, s.DeleteConnection(ctx, userA, "youtube"))
+}
+
+func TestConnectionsForUserIsScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	seedUserRow(t, userA)
+	seedUserRow(t, userB)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.UpsertConnection(ctx, userA, store.Connection{
+		Provider: "youtube", TokenRef: "a-ref", Status: "active",
+	}))
+
+	// User B must not see user A's connection.
+	connsB, err := s.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, userB)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, connsB, "user B must not see user A's connections")
+
+	connsA, err := s.ConnectionsForUser(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, connsA, 1)
+}

internal/adapters/store/identity.go

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// ErrSubjectRegistered is returned by RegisterUser when the Dex subject already
+// maps to a tapir user. Registration is explicit and once-per-subject (ADR-012).
+var ErrSubjectRegistered = errors.New("store: subject already registered")
+
+// UserBySubject resolves a Dex subject to its tapir user_id via the un-RLS'd
+// user_identities map. It runs as a plain pool query WITHOUT withUser: this is
+// the pre-scope lookup whose result becomes the GUC for every subsequent
+// user-scoped access, so it cannot itself depend on that GUC being set. found is
+// false (no error) when the subject has no mapping yet — the caller routes such
+// requests to registration.
+func (s *Store) UserBySubject(ctx context.Context, subject string) (userID string, found bool, err error) {
+	err = s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT user_id FROM user_identities WHERE dex_subject = $1`, subject).Scan(&userID)
+	if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+		return "", false, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", false, fmt.Errorf("store: user by subject: %w", err)
+	}
+	return userID, true, nil
+}
+
+// UserIdentity is one (userID, dexSubject) pair from the un-RLS'd
+// user_identities map — the unit the scheduler enumerates to run a discovery
+// pass per user (ADR-018).
+type UserIdentity struct {
+	UserID     string
+	DexSubject string
+}
+
+// ListAllUsers returns every (userID, dexSubject) pair from user_identities. It
+// runs as a plain pool query WITHOUT withUser — intentional and legitimate:
+// user_identities is un-RLS'd auth plumbing (like UserBySubject), and the
+// scheduler enumerating all users to run their discovery passes is an admin
+// operation that cannot be scoped to any single user. Order is unspecified.
+func (s *Store) ListAllUsers(ctx context.Context) ([]UserIdentity, error) {
+	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx,
+		`SELECT user_id, dex_subject FROM user_identities`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: list all users: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+
+	var users []UserIdentity
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var u UserIdentity
+		if err := rows.Scan(&u.UserID, &u.DexSubject); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: scan user identity: %w", err)
+		}
+		users = append(users, u)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: iterate user identities: %w", err)
+	}
+	return users, nil
+}
+
+// RegisterUser creates the tapir user for a Dex subject and the identity mapping
+// that points to it, returning the new user_id. It errors with
+// ErrSubjectRegistered if the subject already maps.
+//
+// Bootstrapping note (generate-uuid-then-scope): the users table is FORCE'd RLS
+// with a WITH CHECK that defaults to the USING predicate id =
+// current_setting('tapir.current_user_id') (migration 003). A users row can
+// therefore only be inserted while the connection is ALREADY scoped to that
+// row's own id — a chicken-and-egg if the id were DB-generated. So we generate
+// the UUID app-side, scope to it via withUser(newID, ...), and insert the users
+// row inside that scope so the WITH CHECK passes. The user_identities row is
+// un-RLS'd auth plumbing; it is written in the SAME transaction so a user and
+// its mapping are always consistent.
+func (s *Store) RegisterUser(ctx context.Context, subject, displayName string) (userID string, err error) {
+	newID, err := newUUIDv4()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: register user: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Fast, clear rejection of a re-registration. The dex_subject PRIMARY KEY is
+	// the authoritative guard (a concurrent insert would still violate it); this
+	// check just turns the common case into a meaningful error instead of a raw
+	// constraint violation.
+	if _, found, err := s.UserBySubject(ctx, subject); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	} else if found {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrSubjectRegistered, subject)
+	}
+
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, newID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO users (id, display_name) VALUES ($1, $2)`, newID, displayName); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: insert user: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO user_identities (dex_subject, user_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
+			subject, newID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: insert identity: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return newID, nil
+}
+
+// newUUIDv4 returns a random RFC-4122 v4 UUID string. Generated app-side (stdlib
+// crypto/rand, no new dependency) so the id is known before the row is scoped and
+// inserted — see RegisterUser's bootstrapping note.
+func newUUIDv4() (string, error) {
+	var b [16]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate uuid: %w", err)
+	}
+	b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40 // version 4
+	b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80 // variant 10
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%x-%x-%x-%x-%x", b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+const (
+	subjectA = "dex|alice-123"
+	subjectB = "dex|bob-456"
+)
+
+func TestUserBySubjectUnknownReturnsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	id, found, err := s.UserBySubject(ctx, subjectA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, found)
+	require.Empty(t, id)
+}
+
+func TestRegisterUserCreatesUserAndIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+
+	id, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, id)
+
+	// Exactly one users row with the returned id and the given display name.
+	var users int
+	var name string
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*), coalesce(max(display_name), '') FROM users WHERE id = $1`, id).
+		Scan(&users, &name))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, users)
+	require.Equal(t, "Alice", name)
+
+	// Exactly one identity row mapping the subject to that id.
+	var idents int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM user_identities WHERE dex_subject = $1 AND user_id = $2`,
+		subjectA, id).Scan(&idents))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, idents)
+
+	// And it now resolves straight through.
+	got, found, err := s.UserBySubject(ctx, subjectA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, found)
+	require.Equal(t, id, got)
+}
+
+func TestRegisterUserRejectsDuplicateSubject(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+
+	first, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice Again")
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.True(t, errors.Is(err, store.ErrSubjectRegistered))
+
+	// No second user was created; the original mapping is intact.
+	var users, idents int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM users`).Scan(&users))
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM user_identities`).Scan(&idents))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, users)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, idents)
+
+	got, found, err := s.UserBySubject(ctx, subjectA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, found)
+	require.Equal(t, first, got)
+}
+
+func TestListAllUsersReturnsEveryIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	empty, err := s.ListAllUsers(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, empty, "no registrations yet → empty slice")
+
+	const subjectC = "dex|carol-789"
+	idA, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	idB, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectB, "Bob")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	idC, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectC, "Carol")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	users, err := s.ListAllUsers(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, users, 3)
+
+	// Order is unspecified; compare as a set of (userID, subject) pairs.
+	got := make(map[string]string, len(users))
+	for _, u := range users {
+		got[u.DexSubject] = u.UserID
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, map[string]string{
+		subjectA: idA,
+		subjectB: idB,
+		subjectC: idC,
+	}, got)
+}
+
+func TestRegisterUserDistinctSubjectsGetDistinctUsers(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+
+	idA, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	idB, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectB, "Bob")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEqual(t, idA, idB)
+
+	var users int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM users`).Scan(&users))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, users)
+}

internal/adapters/store/login.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// StampLogin records that the user was active today, throttled to one row per
+// user per day. It is the read-side counterpart to SetAction: the middleware
+// calls it on every authenticated request, but the append happens at most once a
+// day so login_events stays small and the signal clean (one row = one active
+// day, not one request).
+//
+// The check-and-insert is a single atomic statement: the INSERT ... SELECT ...
+// WHERE NOT EXISTS only writes when no row for this user has seen_at in today
+// (date_trunc('day', NOW()), server timezone). It runs through withUser, so the
+// NOT EXISTS probe is itself RLS-scoped to the calling user via the
+// tapir.current_user_id GUC — one user's stamp can never be suppressed or
+// triggered by another user's rows. The explicit user_id predicate also keeps the
+// probe on the (user_id, seen_at) index.
+//
+// A unique constraint is deliberately not used: under concurrent same-day
+// requests the worst case is two rows for one day, which the gate query collapses
+// to a single week bucket anyway — not worth a write-blocking constraint.
+func (s *Store) StampLogin(ctx context.Context, userID string) error {
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		_, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO login_events (user_id)
+			 SELECT $1
+			 WHERE NOT EXISTS (
+			     SELECT 1 FROM login_events
+			      WHERE user_id = $1 AND seen_at >= date_trunc('day', NOW())
+			 )`, userID)
+		return err
+	}); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: stamp login: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/login_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// countLoginEvents counts a user's login_events via the superuser pool, which
+// bypasses RLS — so the assertion sees the true row count regardless of scope.
+func countLoginEvents(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, userID string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	var n int
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM login_events WHERE user_id = $1`, userID).Scan(&n))
+	return n
+}
+
+// TestStampLoginThrottlesToOnePerDay: repeated stamps within the same day insert
+// exactly one row — the throttle that keeps login_events one-row-per-active-day.
+func TestStampLoginThrottlesToOnePerDay(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	_, err := super.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1)`, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
+		require.NoError(t, s.StampLogin(ctx, userA))
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, 1, countLoginEvents(t, super, userA),
+		"three same-day stamps must collapse to one row")
+}
+
+// TestStampLoginRecordsOncePerNewDay: with yesterday's row already present, a
+// stamp today is NOT throttled — it appends the day's row, so distinct active days
+// accumulate (the substrate the gate's distinct-week count reads).
+func TestStampLoginRecordsOncePerNewDay(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	_, err := super.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1)`, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Seed an event dated yesterday (before today's start), so the throttle's
+	// "row exists with seen_at >= start-of-today" probe finds nothing for today.
+	_, err = super.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO login_events (user_id, seen_at) VALUES ($1, NOW() - INTERVAL '1 day')`, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.StampLogin(ctx, userA))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, countLoginEvents(t, super, userA),
+		"a stamp on a new day must append a second row")
+
+	// A second stamp the same day is throttled again.
+	require.NoError(t, s.StampLogin(ctx, userA))
+	require.Equal(t, 2, countLoginEvents(t, super, userA),
+		"the same-day repeat must not add a third row")
+}
+
+// TestStampLoginIsUserScoped: one user's stamp lands only on that user's rows —
+// the throttle probe is RLS-scoped, so user B's existing same-day row neither
+// suppresses nor is touched by user A's stamp.
+func TestStampLoginIsUserScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	_, err := super.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1), ($2)`, userA, userB)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// B already has a same-day row; it must not throttle A's first stamp.
+	_, err = super.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO login_events (user_id) VALUES ($1)`, userB)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.StampLogin(ctx, userA))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, countLoginEvents(t, super, userA), "A's stamp must record despite B's same-day row")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, countLoginEvents(t, super, userB), "A's stamp must not touch B's rows")
+}

internal/adapters/store/migrate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4"
+	migratepgx "github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4/database/pgx/v5"
+	"github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4/source/iofs"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib" // register the "pgx" database/sql driver
+)
+
+// fileMigrator builds a golang-migrate instance from the on-disk migration files
+// (not the embedded FS the production Migrate uses), so a test can step the schema
+// up and down. os.DirFS(".") is rooted at the package dir; the SQL lives under
+// "migrations". Mirrors store.Migrate's construction otherwise.
+func fileMigrator(t *testing.T) *migrate.Migrate {
+	t.Helper()
+	db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
+
+	drv, err := migratepgx.WithInstance(db, &migratepgx.Config{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	src, err := iofs.New(os.DirFS("."), "migrations")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	m, err := migrate.NewWithInstance("iofs", src, "pgx", drv)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = m.Close() })
+	return m
+}
+
+// loginEventsExists reports whether the login_events relation is present.
+func loginEventsExists(t *testing.T) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	var reg *string
+	require.NoError(t, rawPool(t).QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT to_regclass('public.login_events')::text`).Scan(&reg))
+	return reg != nil
+}
+
+// TestMigration010LoginEventsUpDown proves migration 010 is reversible: the down
+// migration drops login_events cleanly and the up migration recreates it. A rotten
+// down migration (forgotten DROP, dangling policy) would fail here rather than in
+// production during a rollback. The test restores the schema to latest before
+// returning so the shared embedded-postgres stays at HEAD for sibling tests.
+func TestMigration010LoginEventsUpDown(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t) // ensure the schema is migrated to latest (011 applied)
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "login_events must exist at latest migration")
+
+	m := fileMigrator(t)
+	// 011..016 sit above 010; step them down first so 010 is exercised in isolation.
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 016 drops channel_caption_state, login_events intact")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "016 down leaves login_events intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 015 reshapes transcripts, login_events intact")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "015 down leaves login_events intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 014 drops channel_title, login_events intact")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "014 down leaves login_events intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 013 drops channel_errors, login_events intact")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "013 down leaves login_events intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 012 is a no-op, login_events intact")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "012 down leaves login_events intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 011 must not touch login_events")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "011 down leaves login_events intact")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 010 must drop login_events")
+	require.False(t, loginEventsExists(t), "login_events must be gone after the down migration")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(7), "up must recreate 010 then re-apply 011..016")
+	require.True(t, loginEventsExists(t), "login_events must be restored after the up migration")
+}
+
+// autoSummarizeDefault reads the users.auto_summarize column default as text
+// ("true"/"false"), so the migration's default flip is verifiable directly.
+func autoSummarizeDefault(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	var def string
+	require.NoError(t, rawPool(t).QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT column_default FROM information_schema.columns
+		  WHERE table_name = 'users' AND column_name = 'auto_summarize'`).Scan(&def))
+	return def
+}
+
+// TestMigration011AutoSummarizeDefaultUpDown proves migration 011 is reversible:
+// up sets the auto_summarize column default to TRUE (ADR-018), down restores
+// FALSE. The down intentionally does not revert existing rows — only the default.
+func TestMigration011AutoSummarizeDefaultUpDown(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t) // latest (013 applied)
+	require.Equal(t, "true", autoSummarizeDefault(t), "011 sets the default to TRUE")
+
+	m := fileMigrator(t)
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 016 drops channel_caption_state")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 015 reshapes transcripts")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 014 drops channel_title")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 013 drops channel_errors")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 012 is a no-op")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 011 reverts the column default")
+	require.Equal(t, "false", autoSummarizeDefault(t), "default is FALSE after the down migration")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 011 re-applies the TRUE default")
+	require.Equal(t, "true", autoSummarizeDefault(t))
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 012 runs clean (no FORCE RLS on fresh schema)")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 013 creates channel_errors")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 014 recreates channel_title")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 015 reshapes transcripts to shared")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 016 recreates channel_caption_state (HEAD)")
+}
+
+// channelTitleExists reports whether videos.channel_title is present.
+func channelTitleExists(t *testing.T) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	var exists bool
+	require.NoError(t, rawPool(t).QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
+		  WHERE table_name = 'videos' AND column_name = 'channel_title')`).Scan(&exists))
+	return exists
+}
+
+// TestMigration014VideoChannelTitleUpDown proves 014 is reversible: down drops
+// videos.channel_title, up recreates it.
+func TestMigration014VideoChannelTitleUpDown(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t) // latest (014 applied)
+	require.True(t, channelTitleExists(t), "channel_title exists at latest migration")
+
+	m := fileMigrator(t)
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 016 drops channel_caption_state, channel_title intact")
+	require.True(t, channelTitleExists(t), "016 down leaves channel_title intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 015 reshapes transcripts, channel_title intact")
+	require.True(t, channelTitleExists(t), "015 down leaves channel_title intact")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 014 must drop channel_title")
+	require.False(t, channelTitleExists(t), "channel_title must be gone after the down migration")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 014 must recreate channel_title")
+	require.True(t, channelTitleExists(t), "channel_title must be restored after the up migration")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 015 restores the shared transcripts shape")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 016 recreates channel_caption_state (HEAD)")
+}
+
+// TestMigration012FixAutoSummarizeRLS proves 012 runs cleanly and flips any
+// remaining auto_summarize=FALSE rows to TRUE (the back-fill blocked by RLS in 011).
+func TestMigration012FixAutoSummarizeRLS(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t) // apply all migrations including 012
+	require.Equal(t, "true", autoSummarizeDefault(t), "column default is TRUE after 012")
+
+	// Round-trip: down 012, then up 012 — must be idempotent.
+	m := fileMigrator(t)
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(-1), "down 012 must not error")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Steps(1), "up 012 must re-apply cleanly")
+	require.Equal(t, "true", autoSummarizeDefault(t), "default still TRUE after 012 re-applied")
+}

internal/adapters/store/migrations/003_rls.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS sink_deliveries_isolation ON sink_deliveries;
+ALTER TABLE sink_deliveries NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE sink_deliveries DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS summary_actions_isolation ON summary_actions;
+ALTER TABLE summary_actions NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE summary_actions DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS summaries_isolation ON summaries;
+ALTER TABLE summaries NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE summaries DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS transcripts_isolation ON transcripts;
+ALTER TABLE transcripts NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE transcripts DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS videos_isolation ON videos;
+ALTER TABLE videos NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE videos DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS users_isolation ON users;
+ALTER TABLE users NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE users DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/003_rls.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+-- Migration 003: enforce per-user isolation at the DB layer via row-level
+-- security (ADR-012, data-model.md "Isolation invariant"). Stage 1 ships
+-- multi-user WITH this enforcement; it is the proof that user A cannot read or
+-- write user B's rows even if application-level WHERE clauses are wrong.
+--
+-- How it works:
+--   * Every policy keys off the per-request GUC tapir.current_user_id, set by the
+--     store's withUser helper via set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true)
+--     (transaction-local — auto-reset on commit/rollback, never leaks across a
+--     pooled connection's requests).
+--   * current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true) uses missing_ok = true: an
+--     UNSET GUC yields NULL, so the predicate is NULL → no rows match → deny-all.
+--     That is the safe default and is asserted in rls_test.go.
+--   * FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY: the app connects as the table OWNER (tapir), and
+--     owners BYPASS RLS unless forced. Without FORCE the policies below are dead
+--     for the production user. FORCE makes the owner subject to them. (A superuser
+--     DSN still bypasses RLS regardless — the test connects as a non-superuser,
+--     non-BYPASSRLS role so the enforcement is real, not theatre.)
+
+-- users: the row's own id IS the user_id for this table.
+ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE users FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY users_isolation ON users
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);
+
+ALTER TABLE videos ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE videos FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY videos_isolation ON videos
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);
+
+ALTER TABLE transcripts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE transcripts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY transcripts_isolation ON transcripts
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);
+
+ALTER TABLE summaries ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE summaries FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY summaries_isolation ON summaries
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);
+
+ALTER TABLE summary_actions ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE summary_actions FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY summary_actions_isolation ON summary_actions
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);
+
+-- sink_deliveries has NO user_id of its own; ownership is derived from the
+-- summary it belongs to. We key the policy directly off the GUC via EXISTS
+-- (rather than `summary_id IN (SELECT id FROM summaries)`) so it is self-contained
+-- and does not silently depend on summaries' own RLS being applied to the
+-- subquery. The WITH CHECK clause (defaulting to USING under FOR ALL) means a
+-- delivery row can only be inserted/updated when its summary is owned by the
+-- current user.
+ALTER TABLE sink_deliveries ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE sink_deliveries FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY sink_deliveries_isolation ON sink_deliveries
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (
+        EXISTS (
+            SELECT 1 FROM summaries s
+             WHERE s.id = sink_deliveries.summary_id
+               AND s.user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid
+        )
+    );

internal/adapters/store/migrations/004_user_identities.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_identities;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/004_user_identities.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-- Migration 004: the Dex-subject → tapir-user map (ADR-012 Stage 1, multi-user).
+-- A Dex-authenticated subject is the login identity; the tapir user_id (UUID) is
+-- what every user-owned, force-RLS table keys off. This table is the bridge:
+-- resolve subject → user_id here (auth plumbing, pre-scope), THEN scope all data
+-- access by that id via the store's withUser helper.
+--
+-- INTENTIONALLY NOT RLS-ENABLED. The forced-RLS isolation (migration 003) guards
+-- the user-OWNED data tables. user_identities holds no user data — only an opaque
+-- (dex_subject ↔ user_id) pair — and must be readable BEFORE a user_id is known
+-- (that lookup is what yields the id used to set tapir.current_user_id). Putting
+-- RLS here would be a chicken-and-egg deadlock (you'd need the GUC to read the row
+-- that tells you the GUC). Data isolation lives on the user-owned tables, not here.
+CREATE TABLE user_identities (
+    dex_subject TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id     UUID NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    created_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE user_identities IS
+    'Dex subject -> tapir user_id map. Auth plumbing, deliberately NOT RLS-enabled '
+    '(no user data; must be read pre-scope to resolve the id used for RLS). '
+    'ON DELETE CASCADE so deleting a user cleans up its identity mapping.';

internal/adapters/store/migrations/005_video_connections.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS video_connections;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/005_video_connections.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-- Migration 005: video_connections — a user's connected video account
+-- (data-model.md VIDEO_CONNECTION). The OAuth refresh token never lives here;
+-- token_ref is the opaque SecretStore reference that resolves to it. Revocation
+-- flips status, it does not delete the row (history is kept).
+--
+-- One connection per (user, provider): re-connecting the same provider upserts
+-- in place (the connect flow's ON CONFLICT (user_id, provider) target).
+CREATE TABLE video_connections (
+    id               UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    user_id          UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    provider         TEXT NOT NULL,
+    provider_account TEXT,
+    token_ref        TEXT NOT NULL,
+    status           TEXT NOT NULL,
+    connected_at     TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    CONSTRAINT video_connections_user_provider_unique UNIQUE (user_id, provider)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_video_connections_user_id ON video_connections(user_id);
+
+-- Per-user isolation, identical to migration 003's pattern: this is user-owned
+-- data, so user A must never read or write user B's connections even with a wrong
+-- application-level WHERE. ENABLE + FORCE so the table owner (tapir) is subject to
+-- the policy too; the policy keys off the per-request GUC tapir.current_user_id
+-- set by the store's withUser helper. An unset GUC yields NULL -> deny-all.
+ALTER TABLE video_connections ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE video_connections FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY video_connections_isolation ON video_connections
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);

internal/adapters/store/migrations/006_summarization_mode.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE videos DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS summarize_requested;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auto_summarize;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/006_summarization_mode.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-- Migration 006: summarization mode (per-user auto/manual + per-video queue).
+--
+-- auto_summarize is a per-user setting (not a global one): multi-user ready per
+-- ADR-012. FALSE default makes MANUAL the out-of-the-box behavior — `tapir run`
+-- discovers new videos but only summarizes the ones the user explicitly queued.
+--
+-- summarize_requested is the per-video manual queue flag. The web "Summarize"
+-- button sets it TRUE; the next `tapir run` picks it up, summarizes, and clears
+-- it back to FALSE. In auto mode it is unused.
+--
+-- No RLS policy changes needed: both columns are added to tables that already
+-- carry user_id and have ENABLE + FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY (migration 003). A new
+-- column on an RLS-protected table inherits that protection automatically — the
+-- existing users_isolation / videos_isolation policies gate every row, so these
+-- columns are only ever readable/writable for the row's own user.
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN auto_summarize BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
+ALTER TABLE videos ADD COLUMN summarize_requested BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/007_transcript_status.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE videos DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS rate_limited_at;
+ALTER TABLE videos DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS transcript_status;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/007_transcript_status.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-- Migration 007: per-video transcript fetch status, for rate-limit backoff.
+--
+-- transcript_status records the outcome of the last transcript attempt:
+--   NULL          = not yet attempted
+--   'none'        = checked, no usable transcript (permanent — SourceNone)
+--   'fetched'     = transcript resolved and summarized (summary_id not null)
+--   'rate_limited'= the caption endpoint returned 429; retry after a backoff window
+--
+-- rate_limited_at stamps WHEN the 429 was seen, so the runner can skip re-fetching
+-- a still-throttled video until NOW() - rate_limited_at exceeds TAPIR_FETCH_BACKOFF.
+-- It is cleared (set NULL) whenever the status moves off 'rate_limited'.
+--
+-- No RLS policy changes needed: videos already has ENABLE + FORCE ROW LEVEL
+-- SECURITY (migration 003) with the videos_isolation policy. New columns inherit
+-- that protection automatically.
+ALTER TABLE videos ADD COLUMN transcript_status TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE videos ADD COLUMN rate_limited_at TIMESTAMPTZ;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/009_invitations.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS invitations;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/009_invitations.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-- Migration 009: invitations — an email-based invite to join Tapir (Stage-1
+-- onboarding gate). Mathias mints one with `tapir invite <email>`; the recipient
+-- visits /invite/{token}, sets a password, and Tapir creates their Dex account.
+--
+-- Deliberately NOT user-owned and NOT under RLS: an invitation exists BEFORE the
+-- user does, so there is no user_id to scope by and no authenticated user context
+-- when the invite is created (host CLI) or consumed (public /invite handler, no
+-- Dex session). The token itself is the capability — a 32-byte crypto-random,
+-- single-use, time-boxed secret. Hence no `user_id` FK and no ENABLE/FORCE ROW
+-- LEVEL SECURITY here (unlike every user-owned table in migrations 003/005).
+CREATE TABLE invitations (
+    id         UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    email      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    token      TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    used_at    TIMESTAMPTZ
+);
+
+-- Lookups are by token (both the claim and the form preview); the UNIQUE
+-- constraint already creates an index, this names one explicitly for clarity.
+CREATE INDEX idx_invitations_token ON invitations(token);

internal/adapters/store/migrations/010_login_events.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS login_events_isolation ON login_events;
+ALTER TABLE login_events NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE login_events DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS login_events;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/010_login_events.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+-- Migration 010: login_events records THAT a user was active (returned and read)
+-- on a given day — the Stage-0 signal summary_actions misses. summary_actions
+-- captures *acts* (watch/skip/save); a reader who logs in weekly and clicks
+-- nothing is otherwise invisible, yet for a reading product that return IS the
+-- signal the gate ("usage in >=2 distinct weeks", VISION/ADR-016) is defined on.
+--
+-- Append-only: one row per user per active day (the request-path throttle in the
+-- web layer enforces that cadence), never updated. Per-user isolation like every
+-- user-owned table.
+--
+-- NO foreign key to users (mirrors summary_actions, migration 002): user_id is
+-- carried for RLS/scoping but the table is decoupled so a stamp never blocks on a
+-- users row. The cost of that decoupling: the users-row cascade does NOT reach
+-- login_events, so DeleteUser must delete it explicitly (see account.go) — the
+-- exact footgun the summary_actions delete work caught.
+CREATE TABLE login_events (
+    id       UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    user_id  UUID NOT NULL,
+    seen_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+-- (user_id, seen_at) serves both the per-user-per-day throttle lookup
+-- (seen_at >= start-of-today) and the gate query's per-user week bucketing.
+CREATE INDEX idx_login_events_user_seen ON login_events(user_id, seen_at);
+
+-- RLS: identical GUC-keyed policy/pattern to migration 003. FORCE so the table
+-- owner (tapir, non-superuser in prod) is subject to it; an unset GUC yields NULL
+-- → no rows match → deny-all.
+ALTER TABLE login_events ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE login_events FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY login_events_isolation ON login_events
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);

internal/adapters/store/migrations/011_auto_summarize_default.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-- Revert the column default to FALSE. Existing rows are intentionally NOT
+-- reverted: flipping live users back to manual on a rollback would be a
+-- surprising regression (they may have come to rely on auto). The default change
+-- is the reversible part; data stays as the user left it.
+ALTER TABLE users ALTER COLUMN auto_summarize SET DEFAULT FALSE;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/011_auto_summarize_default.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-- Migration 011: flip auto_summarize default to TRUE (ADR-018, Future-B).
+--
+-- Scheduled discovery (ADR-018) makes Tapir watch unprompted. For onboarded
+-- friends that only delivers zero-friction value if the list also SUMMARIZES
+-- itself — a manual default would mean the scheduler discovers videos a user
+-- still has to click through one by one, which is the empty-list problem again.
+-- So new users default to AUTO. The account-page toggle still lets a user switch
+-- to manual (SetAutoSummarize), so this only changes the out-of-the-box state.
+--
+-- Safe only because the process-wide caption-fetch rate gate (ADR-014 item 2)
+-- now exists: auto + scheduled + multi-user would otherwise self-inflict 429s
+-- every cycle. The gate is the precondition for shipping this default.
+ALTER TABLE users ALTER COLUMN auto_summarize SET DEFAULT TRUE;
+
+-- Bring existing rows (maintainer + any current registrations) onto the new
+-- default so they benefit immediately, not just users created after this point.
+UPDATE users SET auto_summarize = TRUE WHERE auto_summarize = FALSE;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/012_fix_auto_summarize_rls.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+-- No data revert: do not flip users back to manual on rollback.

internal/adapters/store/migrations/012_fix_auto_summarize_rls.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-- Migration 011's UPDATE ran without tapir.current_user_id set, so FORCE RLS
+-- blocked all rows and zero users were updated. Temporarily drop FORCE so the
+-- table owner (tapir role) can bypass RLS for this back-fill, then restore it.
+ALTER TABLE users NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+UPDATE users SET auto_summarize = TRUE WHERE auto_summarize = FALSE;
+ALTER TABLE users FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/013_channel_errors.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS channel_errors;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/013_channel_errors.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-- channel_errors: channels that returned HTTP 404 (deleted/private) on the most
+-- recent scheduler pass. Surfaced on the account page so users know why some
+-- subscribed channels produce no videos. Upserted per-pass; cleared when the
+-- channel starts returning results again (runner calls UpsertChannelError only
+-- on 404, so a recovered channel simply stops appearing after its row ages out
+-- or the user takes action). ON DELETE CASCADE keeps rows tidy on account deletion.
+CREATE TABLE channel_errors (
+    user_id      UUID        NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id)  ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    channel_id   TEXT        NOT NULL,
+    channel_name TEXT        NOT NULL,
+    first_seen   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    last_seen    TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_channel_errors_user_id ON channel_errors(user_id);
+
+ALTER TABLE channel_errors ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE channel_errors FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY channel_errors_isolation ON channel_errors
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);

internal/adapters/store/migrations/014_video_channel_title.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ALTER TABLE videos DROP COLUMN channel_title;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/014_video_channel_title.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-- Store the source channel's title per video so the list can offer a real
+-- channel filter (multi-select of the user's channels) instead of the dead
+-- free-text field that only ever matched the provider string. Nullable: existing
+-- rows backfill on the next discovery pass (UpsertVideo writes it); pasted videos
+-- get it immediately from videos.list. No FK to a channels table at Stage 0 — the
+-- title is a denormalised display/filter value, consistent with the existing
+-- subscription_id-stays-NULL stance (data-model.md).
+ALTER TABLE videos ADD COLUMN channel_title TEXT;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/015_shared_transcripts.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- Down 015: restore the per-user RLS-scoped transcripts shape (001 + 003).
+DROP TABLE transcripts;
+
+CREATE TABLE transcripts (
+    video_id    UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES videos(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    user_id     UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    source      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    language    TEXT,
+    content     TEXT,
+    resolved_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_transcripts_user_id ON transcripts(user_id);
+
+ALTER TABLE transcripts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE transcripts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY transcripts_isolation ON transcripts
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);

internal/adapters/store/migrations/015_shared_transcripts.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-- Migration 015: transcripts become SHARED public-content storage (ADR-021).
+--
+-- The per-user transcripts table from 001 (PK videos.id, user_id NOT NULL, RLS
+-- FORCEd in 003) was dead: no application code ever read or wrote it — only the
+-- transcript_status columns on `videos` (007) carried fetch outcomes. ADR-021
+-- repurposes it as the single shared store of public caption content, keyed by
+-- the cross-user dedup key (provider, provider_video_id) — the video's public
+-- identity, not Tapir's per-user videos.id — so re-analysis never re-fetches
+-- from YouTube (ADR-010/014).
+--
+-- It holds ONLY public caption content + the video's public id (nothing
+-- user-identifying), so it is deliberately NOT RLS-scoped: no user_id, no
+-- policy, no FORCE. This is the single, intentional exception to the ADR-012
+-- isolation boundary; rls_test.go asserts the boundary is exactly here and
+-- nowhere else. Dropping the old table drops its RLS policy with it; it held no
+-- real data, so drop+recreate loses nothing.
+DROP TABLE transcripts;
+
+CREATE TABLE transcripts (
+    provider          TEXT NOT NULL,
+    provider_video_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+    source            TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'captions' (content set) | 'none' (no captions; content NULL)
+    language          TEXT,
+    content           TEXT,
+    fetched_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (provider, provider_video_id)
+);
+
+COMMENT ON TABLE transcripts IS
+    'Shared public caption content keyed by (provider, provider_video_id). NOT RLS-scoped — public content only, de-facto cross-user dedup (ADR-021).';

internal/adapters/store/migrations/016_channel_caption_state.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE channel_caption_state;

internal/adapters/store/migrations/016_channel_caption_state.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+-- Migration 016: per-(user, channel) caption-availability memory (ADR-024).
+--
+-- Some channels never publish English captions (foreign-language news, music,
+-- etc.). Each of their new videos still costs ONE rate-limited caption fetch
+-- (ADR-014) before resolving to "none" — and on a throttled egress IP that fetch
+-- may 429 and churn through the backoff machinery first. This table remembers
+-- channels that repeatedly yield no captions so discovery can stop attempting
+-- their videos, freeing the scarce fetch budget for channels that do have them.
+--
+-- consecutive_none counts no-caption outcomes in a row; a successful fetch resets
+-- it to 0. Once it crosses the threshold the channel is suppressed until
+-- captionless_until, after which one video is re-probed (auto-recovery for a
+-- channel that starts adding captions). Per-user + RLS-scoped, consistent with
+-- the rest of the user-owned schema (subscriptions are per-user; ADR-012).
+CREATE TABLE channel_caption_state (
+    user_id           UUID        NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    channel_id        TEXT        NOT NULL,
+    consecutive_none  INT         NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    captionless_until TIMESTAMPTZ,
+    updated_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (user_id, channel_id)
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX idx_channel_caption_state_user_id ON channel_caption_state(user_id);
+
+ALTER TABLE channel_caption_state ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE channel_caption_state FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+CREATE POLICY channel_caption_state_isolation ON channel_caption_state
+    FOR ALL
+    USING (user_id = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id', true)::uuid);

internal/adapters/store/reads.go

@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ var ErrNotFound = errors.New("store: summary not found")
 // JOIN source — callers already fall back gracefully on an empty Channel.
 type SummaryRow struct {
 	VideoID         string
+	ProviderVideoID string    // videos.provider_video_id; empty when no videos row
 	Title           string    // videos.title; empty when no videos row
 	Channel         string    // videos.provider for now; empty when no videos row
+	ChannelTitle    string    // videos.channel_title; the source channel, for display + filtering
 	URL             string    // videos.url; empty when no videos row
 	PublishedAt     time.Time // videos.published_at; zero when absent
 	Summary         string
@@ -38,6 +40,20 @@ type SummaryRow struct {
 	FallbackUsed    bool
 	CreatedAt       time.Time
 	Actions         []string // current active actions for this video; nil when none
+
+	// Summarized reports whether a summary exists for this video. The summary-only
+	// reads (ListSummaries/GetSummaryByVideo) always yield true; the all-videos
+	// read (ListVideos) yields false for a discovered-but-unsummarized video, whose
+	// Summary/Highlights/AIProvider fields are then empty.
+	Summarized bool
+	// SummarizeRequested reflects videos.summarize_requested: the manual queue flag
+	// set by the web "Summarize" button and cleared by the next `tapir run`. Only
+	// populated by ListVideos/GetVideoRow (summary-only reads leave it false).
+	SummarizeRequested bool
+	// TranscriptStatus mirrors videos.transcript_status (migration 007): "" (unset),
+	// "none", "rate_limited", or "fetched". Drives the "Retrying later" list badge.
+	// Only populated by ListVideos/GetVideoRow ("" on summary-only reads).
+	TranscriptStatus string
 }
 
 // selectSummary is the shared projection for both reads. videos is LEFT JOINed
@@ -45,6 +61,7 @@ type SummaryRow struct {
 // crosses users and a missing videos row yields nulls, not a dropped summary.
 const selectSummary = `
 	SELECT s.video_id,
+	       COALESCE(v.provider_video_id, ''),
 	       COALESCE(v.title, ''),
 	       COALESCE(v.provider, ''),
 	       COALESCE(v.url, ''),
@@ -66,27 +83,32 @@ func (s *Store) ListSummaries(ctx context.Context, userID string, limit int) ([]
 	if limit <= 0 {
 		limit = 50
 	}
-	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx,
+	var out []SummaryRow
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
 			selectSummary+`
 			 WHERE s.user_id = $1
 			 ORDER BY s.created_at DESC
 			 LIMIT $2`,
 			userID, limit)
 		if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: list summaries: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: list summaries: %w", err)
 		}
 		defer rows.Close()
 
-	var out []SummaryRow
 		for rows.Next() {
 			row, err := scanSummaryRow(rows)
 			if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
+				return err
 			}
 			out = append(out, row)
 		}
 		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: iterate summaries: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate summaries: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	if err := s.attachActions(ctx, userID, out); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -94,29 +116,199 @@ func (s *Store) ListSummaries(ctx context.Context, userID string, limit int) ([]
 	return out, nil
 }
 
-// GetSummaryByVideo returns the full summary for (userID, videoID), including
+// selectVideo is the all-videos projection: it drives from the videos table and
-// highlights and takeaways. Returns ErrNotFound when the user has no such
+// LEFT JOINs the (at most one) summary, so a discovered-but-unsummarized video
-// summary. Scoped by user_id.
+// still appears with empty summary fields. The column order mirrors selectSummary
-func (s *Store) GetSummaryByVideo(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (*SummaryRow, error) {
+// for the shared fields, then appends summarized + summarize_requested. created_at
-	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx,
+// falls back to the video's seen_at when there is no summary, so the read-side row
-		selectSummary+`
+// always carries a sortable timestamp.
-		 WHERE s.user_id = $1 AND s.video_id = $2`,
+const selectVideo = `
+	SELECT v.id,
+	       v.provider_video_id,
+	       COALESCE(v.title, ''),
+	       v.provider,
+	       COALESCE(v.url, ''),
+	       v.published_at,
+	       COALESCE(s.summary, ''),
+	       s.highlights,
+	       s.takeaways,
+	       COALESCE(s.ai_provider, ''),
+	       COALESCE(s.ai_model, ''),
+	       COALESCE(s.fallback_used, FALSE),
+	       COALESCE(s.created_at, v.seen_at),
+	       (s.id IS NOT NULL) AS summarized,
+	       v.summarize_requested,
+	       COALESCE(v.transcript_status, ''),
+	       COALESCE(v.channel_title, '')
+	  FROM videos v
+	  LEFT JOIN summaries s ON s.video_id = v.id AND s.user_id = v.user_id`
+
+// ListVideos returns ALL of the user's videos — summarized first, then by
+// published_at DESC with undated videos last, then seen_at DESC as a tiebreak —
+// capped at limit (non-positive defaults to 500). The published_at ordering
+// aligns the list with the recency framing (newest content first); seen_at
+// breaks ties and orders same/!undated rows deterministically. Unsummarized
+// videos come back with Summarized=false and empty summary fields, so the list
+// view can render them with a "Summarize" affordance. Scoped by user_id.
+func (s *Store) ListVideos(ctx context.Context, userID string, limit int) ([]SummaryRow, error) {
+	if limit <= 0 {
+		limit = 500
+	}
+	var out []SummaryRow
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			selectVideo+`
+			 WHERE v.user_id = $1
+			 ORDER BY (s.id IS NOT NULL) DESC, v.published_at DESC NULLS LAST, v.seen_at DESC
+			 LIMIT $2`,
+			userID, limit)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: list videos: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		for rows.Next() {
+			row, err := scanVideoRow(rows)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			out = append(out, row)
+		}
+		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate videos: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := s.attachActions(ctx, userID, out); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// GetVideoRow returns a single video row (summarized or not) for (userID,
+// videoID), used to re-render one card after queuing it. Returns ErrNotFound when
+// the user has no such video. Scoped by user_id.
+func (s *Store) GetVideoRow(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (*SummaryRow, error) {
+	var (
+		row   SummaryRow
+		found bool
+	)
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			selectVideo+`
+			 WHERE v.user_id = $1 AND v.id = $2`,
 			userID, videoID)
 		if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: get summary: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: get video: %w", err)
 		}
 		defer rows.Close()
 
 		if !rows.Next() {
 			if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: get summary: %w", err)
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: get video: %w", err)
 			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		row, err = scanVideoRow(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		found = true
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !found {
 		return nil, ErrNotFound
 	}
-	row, err := scanSummaryRow(rows)
+	holder := []SummaryRow{row}
-	if err != nil {
+	if err := s.attachActions(ctx, userID, holder); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+	return &holder[0], nil
+}
+
+// scanVideoRow reads one row in the selectVideo column order. published_at is
+// nullable so it scans through a pointer.
+func scanVideoRow(rows pgx.Row) (SummaryRow, error) {
+	var (
+		row         SummaryRow
+		highlights  []byte
+		takeaways   []byte
+		publishedAt *time.Time
+	)
+	if err := rows.Scan(
+		&row.VideoID,
+		&row.ProviderVideoID,
+		&row.Title,
+		&row.Channel,
+		&row.URL,
+		&publishedAt,
+		&row.Summary,
+		&highlights,
+		&takeaways,
+		&row.AIProvider,
+		&row.AIModel,
+		&row.FallbackUsed,
+		&row.CreatedAt,
+		&row.Summarized,
+		&row.SummarizeRequested,
+		&row.TranscriptStatus,
+		&row.ChannelTitle,
+	); err != nil {
+		return SummaryRow{}, fmt.Errorf("store: scan video: %w", err)
+	}
+	if publishedAt != nil {
+		row.PublishedAt = *publishedAt
+	}
+	var err error
+	if row.Highlights, err = unmarshalList(highlights); err != nil {
+		return SummaryRow{}, fmt.Errorf("store: unmarshal highlights: %w", err)
+	}
+	if row.Takeaways, err = unmarshalList(takeaways); err != nil {
+		return SummaryRow{}, fmt.Errorf("store: unmarshal takeaways: %w", err)
+	}
+	return row, nil
+}
+
+// GetSummaryByVideo returns the full summary for (userID, videoID), including
+// highlights and takeaways. Returns ErrNotFound when the user has no such
+// summary. Scoped by user_id.
+func (s *Store) GetSummaryByVideo(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (*SummaryRow, error) {
+	var (
+		row   SummaryRow
+		found bool
+	)
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			selectSummary+`
+			 WHERE s.user_id = $1 AND s.video_id = $2`,
+			userID, videoID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: get summary: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		if !rows.Next() {
+			if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: get summary: %w", err)
+			}
+			return nil
+		}
+		row, err = scanSummaryRow(rows)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		found = true
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return nil, ErrNotFound
+	}
 	holder := []SummaryRow{row}
 	if err := s.attachActions(ctx, userID, holder); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -135,6 +327,7 @@ func scanSummaryRow(rows pgx.Row) (SummaryRow, error) {
 	)
 	if err := rows.Scan(
 		&row.VideoID,
+		&row.ProviderVideoID,
 		&row.Title,
 		&row.Channel,
 		&row.URL,

internal/adapters/store/report.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// UserActiveWeeks is one row of the Stage-0 gate report: how many DISTINCT
+// calendar weeks a user was active in, counting reads (login_events) AND acts
+// (summary_actions) together. The gate (VISION/ADR-016) passes when any user
+// reaches ActiveWeeks >= 2.
+type UserActiveWeeks struct {
+	UserID      string
+	DisplayName string
+	ActiveWeeks int
+}
+
+// ActiveWeeks computes per-user distinct-active-weeks for the gate report, most
+// active first.
+//
+// Why per-user iteration rather than one cross-user GROUP BY: the user-owned
+// tables are FORCE RLS (migration 003/010) and the production role is a non-
+// superuser owner, so a single un-scoped query sees nothing (deny-all). Instead we
+// enumerate users from the deliberately un-RLS'd identity map (user_identities,
+// migration 004) and count each user's weeks inside withUser, where the GUC scopes
+// login_events + summary_actions to that user. No privilege escalation, no policy
+// change — the same isolation seam every other read flows through.
+//
+// Scope note: the enumeration covers users with a Dex identity (the web users the
+// gate is about). A CLI-only user created by the store sink without an identity
+// row would not appear — out of scope for this gate.
+func (s *Store) ActiveWeeks(ctx context.Context) ([]UserActiveWeeks, error) {
+	userIDs, err := s.identityUserIDs(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	out := make([]UserActiveWeeks, 0, len(userIDs))
+	for _, uid := range userIDs {
+		row, err := s.activeWeeksFor(ctx, uid)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		out = append(out, row)
+	}
+
+	// Most active first; user_id as a stable tie-break for deterministic output.
+	sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if out[i].ActiveWeeks != out[j].ActiveWeeks {
+			return out[i].ActiveWeeks > out[j].ActiveWeeks
+		}
+		return out[i].UserID < out[j].UserID
+	})
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// identityUserIDs lists every tapir user_id from the un-RLS'd identity map. It
+// runs directly on the pool (no withUser): user_identities carries no user data
+// and is intentionally not RLS-enabled, so it is the one table that can be read
+// pre-scope to discover who exists.
+func (s *Store) identityUserIDs(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, `SELECT user_id FROM user_identities ORDER BY user_id`)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: list identity users: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+
+	var ids []string
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var id string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: scan identity user: %w", err)
+		}
+		ids = append(ids, id)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: iterate identity users: %w", err)
+	}
+	return ids, nil
+}
+
+// activeWeeksFor counts one user's distinct active weeks (reads UNION acts) and
+// reads their display name, RLS-scoped via withUser. The UNION dedups a week that
+// has both a login and an action so it counts once.
+func (s *Store) activeWeeksFor(ctx context.Context, userID string) (UserActiveWeeks, error) {
+	res := UserActiveWeeks{UserID: userID}
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+			`WITH weeks AS (
+			     SELECT date_trunc('week', seen_at) AS wk
+			       FROM login_events WHERE user_id = $1
+			     UNION
+			     SELECT date_trunc('week', acted_at)
+			       FROM summary_actions WHERE user_id = $1
+			 )
+			 SELECT count(DISTINCT wk) FROM weeks`, userID).Scan(&res.ActiveWeeks); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: count active weeks: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+			`SELECT COALESCE(display_name, '') FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&res.DisplayName); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: read display name: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return UserActiveWeeks{}, err
+	}
+	return res, nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/report_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// seedReportUser inserts a user + its identity mapping (the enumeration source
+// ActiveWeeks reads). display_name is optional.
+func seedReportUser(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, userID, subject, name string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	_, err := p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO users (id, display_name) VALUES ($1, NULLIF($2, ''))`, userID, name)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO user_identities (dex_subject, user_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, subject, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+// TestActiveWeeksCountsDistinctWeeksAcrossReadsAndActs is the gate-query proof.
+// It seeds, with fixed timestamps in known ISO weeks:
+//   - user A: reads in week of Jan 5 and Jan 12, acts in week of Jan 12 (dup) and
+//     Jan 19 → the UNION across both tables collapses the shared week → 3 distinct.
+//   - user B: a single read in the week of Jan 5 → 1 distinct (below the gate).
+//
+// It verifies the count is correct, dedups the cross-table shared week, and orders
+// most-active first.
+func TestActiveWeeksCountsDistinctWeeksAcrossReadsAndActs(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p) // TRUNCATE ... users CASCADE also clears user_identities
+
+	seedReportUser(t, p, userA, "subject-a", "Ada")
+	seedReportUser(t, p, userB, "subject-b", "")
+
+	// Reads (login_events) — fixed dates in distinct ISO weeks.
+	_, err := p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO login_events (user_id, seen_at) VALUES
+		   ($1, '2026-01-05T09:00:00Z'),
+		   ($1, '2026-01-12T09:00:00Z'),
+		   ($2, '2026-01-05T09:00:00Z')`, userA, userB)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Acts (summary_actions) — one in A's week-of-Jan-12 (shared with a read, must
+	// dedup) and one in a new week (Jan 19).
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO summary_actions (user_id, video_id, action, acted_at) VALUES
+		   ($1, 'vid-1', 'watched', '2026-01-12T18:00:00Z'),
+		   ($1, 'vid-2', 'saved',   '2026-01-19T18:00:00Z')`, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	got, err := s.ActiveWeeks(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, got, 2, "both identity users must appear")
+
+	require.Equal(t, userA, got[0].UserID, "most-active user first")
+	require.Equal(t, "Ada", got[0].DisplayName)
+	require.Equal(t, 3, got[0].ActiveWeeks, "3 distinct weeks across reads+acts, shared week deduped")
+
+	require.Equal(t, userB, got[1].UserID)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, got[1].ActiveWeeks, "single read = 1 distinct week (below gate)")
+}
+
+// TestActiveWeeksEmptyWhenNoUsers: no identities → no rows (not an error).
+func TestActiveWeeksEmptyWhenNoUsers(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	got, err := s.ActiveWeeks(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, got)
+}

internal/adapters/store/rls_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// This is the isolation proof for ADR-012: per-user isolation is enforced by the
+// database (migration 003 RLS policies), not merely by application WHERE clauses.
+//
+// CRITICAL: embedded-postgres's default user (postgres) is a SUPERUSER, which
+// BYPASSES RLS regardless of FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY. A test that ran scoped
+// queries as postgres would be fake-green — it would pass even with the policies
+// removed. So this test creates a dedicated NON-SUPERUSER, non-BYPASSRLS role
+// ("app", mirroring the production table-owner role tapir which FORCE subjects to
+// RLS) and runs every scoped query as that role. The deny-all sanity check below
+// (no GUC set → zero rows) proves the enforcement path is live, not bypassed.
+
+// userIsolatedTables are the tables that carry a user_id and whose policy keys
+// directly off the tapir.current_user_id GUC. transcripts is deliberately ABSENT
+// — ADR-021 made it shared public content (non-RLS); TestTranscriptsTableIsSharedNotRLS
+// proves that is the only place the isolation boundary moved.
+var userIsolatedTables = []string{
+	"users", "videos", "summaries", "summary_actions", "login_events", "video_connections",
+}
+
+// allIsolatedTables adds sink_deliveries, whose ownership is derived from its
+// summary (no user_id column of its own).
+var allIsolatedTables = append(append([]string{}, userIsolatedTables...), "sink_deliveries")
+
+// seeded captures the DB-generated ids for one user's row chain.
+type seeded struct {
+	userID    string
+	videoID   string // videos.id (UUID), reused as summaries.video_id
+	summaryID string
+}
+
+// seedUser inserts one full chain (user → video → summary → action → delivery)
+// as the superuser pool, which bypasses RLS so both users' data lands regardless
+// of the GUC. Transcripts are NOT seeded here: they are shared, non-RLS public
+// content (ADR-021), so they have no place in a per-user isolation chain.
+func seedUser(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, userID string) seeded {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	_, err := p.Exec(ctx, `INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1)`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var videoID string
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO videos (user_id, provider, provider_video_id, title)
+		 VALUES ($1, 'youtube', $2, 'title') RETURNING id`,
+		userID, "vid-"+userID).Scan(&videoID))
+
+	var summaryID string
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO summaries (user_id, video_id, summary) VALUES ($1, $2, 'sum')
+		 RETURNING id`, userID, videoID).Scan(&summaryID))
+
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO summary_actions (user_id, video_id, action)
+		 VALUES ($1, $2, 'watched')`, userID, videoID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO login_events (user_id) VALUES ($1)`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO sink_deliveries (summary_id, sink, status)
+		 VALUES ($1, 'store', 'delivered')`, summaryID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = p.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO video_connections (user_id, provider, token_ref, status)
+		 VALUES ($1, 'youtube', $2, 'active')`, userID, "youtube/"+userID+"/refresh_token")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return seeded{userID: userID, videoID: videoID, summaryID: summaryID}
+}
+
+// appPool creates a non-superuser role with DML grants and returns a pool
+// connected AS that role, so RLS is actually enforced for it.
+func appPool(t *testing.T, super *pgxpool.Pool) *pgxpool.Pool {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Idempotent across tests AND runs: the role persists for the TestMain PG and
+	// owns granted privileges, so a plain DROP ROLE fails once any GRANT exists
+	// (and more than one test now builds an app pool). Create only if absent; the
+	// GRANTs below are themselves idempotent.
+	_, err := super.Exec(ctx,
+		`DO $$ BEGIN
+		    IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'app') THEN
+		        CREATE ROLE app LOGIN PASSWORD 'app';
+		    END IF;
+		 END $$`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = super.Exec(ctx, `GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA public TO app`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = super.Exec(ctx,
+		`GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO app`)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	appDSN := strings.Replace(dsn, "postgres:postgres@", "app:app@", 1)
+	p, err := pgxpool.New(ctx, appDSN)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(p.Close)
+
+	// Sanity: the app role must NOT be a superuser / must not bypass RLS, else
+	// this whole test is theatre.
+	var isSuper bool
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT rolsuper FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = current_user`).Scan(&isSuper))
+	require.False(t, isSuper, "app role must be non-superuser or RLS is bypassed")
+	return p
+}
+
+// scopedCount counts rows in table as the app role, optionally scoped to a user
+// via the transaction-local GUC. An empty scope sets no GUC (deny-all path).
+func scopedCount(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, scope, table string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tx, err := p.Begin(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck
+
+	if scope != "" {
+		_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true)`, scope)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	var n int
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT count(*) FROM `+table).Scan(&n))
+	return n
+}
+
+// scopedRowsAffected runs a write as the app role scoped to scope and returns the
+// rows affected, so we can assert a cross-user write touches zero rows.
+func scopedRowsAffected(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, scope, sql string, args ...any) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	tx, err := p.Begin(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck
+
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true)`, scope)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	ct, err := tx.Exec(ctx, sql, args...)
+	require.NoError(t, err) // RLS hides the rows; it is NOT a permission error
+	require.NoError(t, tx.Commit(ctx))
+	return ct.RowsAffected()
+}
+
+func TestRLSEnforcesPerUserIsolation(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t) // apply migrations (incl. 003 RLS) as superuser
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+
+	a := seedUser(t, super, userA)
+	b := seedUser(t, super, userB)
+	app := appPool(t, super)
+
+	// 1. Deny-all: with NO GUC set, every isolated table returns zero rows. This
+	//    proves RLS is actually ON (a bypassed/superuser path would see all rows).
+	for _, table := range allIsolatedTables {
+		require.Equal(t, 0, scopedCount(t, app, "", table),
+			"unset tapir.current_user_id must yield deny-all on %s", table)
+	}
+
+	// 2. Scoped reads: A sees exactly its own one row per table; likewise B. A
+	//    seeing B's row (or vice versa) would mean isolation is broken.
+	for _, table := range allIsolatedTables {
+		require.Equal(t, 1, scopedCount(t, app, userA, table),
+			"user A scoped read must see exactly its own row in %s", table)
+		require.Equal(t, 1, scopedCount(t, app, userB, table),
+			"user B scoped read must see exactly its own row in %s", table)
+	}
+
+	// 3. Cross-user writes are invisible: scoped to A, an UPDATE/DELETE aimed at
+	//    B's rows affects zero rows (RLS hides them from the write, too).
+	writes := []struct {
+		name string
+		sql  string
+		arg  any // identifies B's row(s)
+	}{
+		{"update users", `UPDATE users SET display_name = 'hacked' WHERE id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"update videos", `UPDATE videos SET title = 'hacked' WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"queue videos summarize", `UPDATE videos SET summarize_requested = TRUE WHERE id = $1`, b.videoID},
+		{"update summaries", `UPDATE summaries SET summary = 'hacked' WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"update summary_actions", `UPDATE summary_actions SET action = 'skipped' WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"update login_events", `UPDATE login_events SET seen_at = NOW() WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"update sink_deliveries", `UPDATE sink_deliveries SET status = 'hacked' WHERE summary_id = $1`, b.summaryID},
+		{"update video_connections", `UPDATE video_connections SET token_ref = 'hacked' WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"delete summaries", `DELETE FROM summaries WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"delete summary_actions", `DELETE FROM summary_actions WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"delete login_events", `DELETE FROM login_events WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+		{"delete sink_deliveries", `DELETE FROM sink_deliveries WHERE summary_id = $1`, b.summaryID},
+		{"delete video_connections", `DELETE FROM video_connections WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID},
+	}
+	for _, w := range writes {
+		require.Equal(t, int64(0), scopedRowsAffected(t, app, userA, w.sql, w.arg),
+			"user A scoped %s must touch zero of user B's rows", w.name)
+	}
+
+	// 4. B's rows survived unchanged (the writes above neither modified nor
+	//    deleted them), verified via the superuser pool which bypasses RLS.
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	var bSummary string
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT summary FROM summaries WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID).Scan(&bSummary))
+	require.Equal(t, "sum", bSummary, "B's summary must be untouched by A's writes")
+
+	var bSummaries, bActions, bLogins, bDeliveries, bConnections int
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM summaries WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID).Scan(&bSummaries))
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM summary_actions WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID).Scan(&bActions))
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM login_events WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID).Scan(&bLogins))
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		fmt.Sprintf(`SELECT count(*) FROM sink_deliveries WHERE summary_id = '%s'`, b.summaryID)).Scan(&bDeliveries))
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT count(*) FROM video_connections WHERE user_id = $1 AND token_ref <> 'hacked'`, b.userID).Scan(&bConnections))
+	require.Equal(t, 1, bSummaries, "A's DELETE must not have removed B's summary")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, bActions, "A's DELETE must not have removed B's action")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, bLogins, "A's DELETE must not have removed B's login event")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, bDeliveries, "A's DELETE must not have removed B's delivery")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, bConnections, "A's writes must not have touched B's connection")
+
+	var bRequested bool
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT summarize_requested FROM videos WHERE user_id = $1`, b.userID).Scan(&bRequested))
+	require.False(t, bRequested, "A scoped must not have queued B's video for summarization")
+
+	_ = a // a's ids are seeded for the symmetric read assertions above
+}
+
+// TestTranscriptsTableIsSharedNotRLS is the ADR-021 isolation proof: transcripts
+// is the ONE shared, non-RLS surface, and the public-content classification
+// leaked to nothing else. It is the inverse of TestRLSEnforcesPerUserIsolation —
+// where that asserts deny-all on every user-owned table, this asserts transcripts
+// is readable and writable with no user scope at all, holds no user_id, and is
+// the single table with row-level security switched off.
+func TestTranscriptsTableIsSharedNotRLS(t *testing.T) {
+	newStore(t)
+	super := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, super)
+	app := appPool(t, super)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// 1. Shared + non-RLS: with NO GUC set, the app role both writes and reads a
+	//    transcript. On an RLS table this would be deny-all (zero rows), exactly as
+	//    the main isolation test asserts for every user-owned table.
+	_, err := app.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO transcripts (provider, provider_video_id, source, content)
+		 VALUES ('youtube', 'shared-vid', 'captions', 'public words')`)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "app role must write shared transcript content with no user scope")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, scopedCount(t, app, "", "transcripts"),
+		"transcripts must be readable with NO user scope — it is shared, non-RLS (ADR-021)")
+
+	// 2. No user_id column: the table holds only public caption content + the
+	//    video's public id, nothing user-identifying.
+	var hasUserID bool
+	require.NoError(t, super.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
+		                 WHERE table_name = 'transcripts' AND column_name = 'user_id')`).Scan(&hasUserID))
+	require.False(t, hasUserID, "transcripts must carry no user_id (ADR-021 public content)")
+
+	// 3. The boundary is EXACTLY here: every user-owned table still has row-level
+	//    security enabled; transcripts alone has it off. This is the proof the
+	//    non-RLS classification was applied to transcripts and leaked nowhere else.
+	for _, table := range allIsolatedTables {
+		require.True(t, rlsEnabled(t, super, table),
+			"%s must still enforce row-level security — isolation must not have regressed", table)
+	}
+	require.False(t, rlsEnabled(t, super, "transcripts"),
+		"transcripts must be the single table with row-level security OFF (the one shared surface)")
+}
+
+// rlsEnabled reports whether a public table has ROW LEVEL SECURITY enabled.
+func rlsEnabled(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, table string) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	var enabled bool
+	require.NoError(t, p.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		`SELECT relrowsecurity FROM pg_class
+		  WHERE relname = $1 AND relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace`, table).Scan(&enabled))
+	return enabled
+}

internal/adapters/store/store.go

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4"
 	migratepgx "github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4/database/pgx/v5"
 	"github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4/source/iofs"
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
 	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
 
 	_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib" // register the "pgx" database/sql driver for migrate
@@ -90,6 +91,46 @@ func (s *Store) Close() {
 // Name identifies this sink in delivery records.
 func (s *Store) Name() string { return "store" }
 
+// withUser is the single choke point through which EVERY DB access in this
+// package flows, so per-user isolation is structural — not a per-query opt-in
+// someone can forget. It:
+//
+//   - BEGINs a transaction,
+//   - sets the per-request GUC tapir.current_user_id via
+//     set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true). The set_config form is used
+//     instead of `SET LOCAL` because it is parameterizable (SET cannot bind a
+//     value through the driver); the third arg true = local = transaction-scoped,
+//     so it auto-resets on commit/rollback and a pooled connection never leaks one
+//     request's user into the next,
+//   - runs fn against that transaction,
+//   - COMMITs (or ROLLBACKs on error).
+//
+// The migration-003 RLS policies key off this GUC: a row is visible/writable only
+// when its owner = current_setting('tapir.current_user_id'). RLS enforces only
+// when the app connects as a non-superuser, non-BYPASSRLS role (in production the
+// table owner tapir, made subject via FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY). A superuser DSN
+// bypasses RLS regardless — see rls_test.go, which connects as a dedicated
+// non-superuser role to prove the enforcement is real.
+func (s *Store) withUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, fn func(pgx.Tx) error) error {
+	tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: begin: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck // no-op after Commit
+
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+		`SELECT set_config('tapir.current_user_id', $1, true)`, userID); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: scope user: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := fn(tx); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: commit: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // Deliver upserts the summary idempotently on (user_id, video_id) and records the
 // store delivery. Re-delivering the same summary updates in place — it never
 // errors or duplicates. The whole write is one transaction so a summary and its
@@ -104,14 +145,9 @@ func (s *Store) Deliver(ctx context.Context, sum domain.Summary) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("store: marshal takeaways: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
+	return s.withUser(ctx, sum.UserID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
-	if err != nil {
+		// Ensure the owning user exists (FK target). The store sink receives only
-		return fmt.Errorf("store: begin: %w", err)
+		// a Summary, so a minimal user row is enough at Stage 0.
-	}
-	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck // no-op after Commit
-
-	// Ensure the owning user exists (FK target). The store sink receives only a
-	// Summary, so a minimal user row is enough at Stage 0.
 		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
 			`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
 			sum.UserID); err != nil {
@@ -147,20 +183,19 @@ func (s *Store) Deliver(ctx context.Context, sum domain.Summary) error {
 			summaryID); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("store: record delivery: %w", err)
 		}
-
-	if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("store: commit: %w", err)
-	}
 		return nil
+	})
 }
 
 // HasSummary reports whether a summary already exists for (userID, videoID).
 // This is the per-video durable dedup check.
 func (s *Store) HasSummary(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (bool, error) {
 	var exists bool
-	if err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		return tx.QueryRow(ctx,
 			`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM summaries WHERE user_id = $1 AND video_id = $2)`,
-		userID, videoID).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
+			userID, videoID).Scan(&exists)
+	}); err != nil {
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("store: has summary: %w", err)
 	}
 	return exists, nil
@@ -170,23 +205,28 @@ func (s *Store) HasSummary(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (bool, e
 // user. The watcher uses it to skip re-summarizing across restarts. Scoped by
 // user_id, so one user never sees another's videos.
 func (s *Store) SeenVideoIDs(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]bool, error) {
-	rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx,
+	seen := make(map[string]bool)
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
 			`SELECT video_id FROM summaries WHERE user_id = $1`, userID)
 		if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: seen video ids: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: seen video ids: %w", err)
 		}
 		defer rows.Close()
 
-	seen := make(map[string]bool)
 		for rows.Next() {
 			var id string
 			if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: scan video id: %w", err)
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan video id: %w", err)
 			}
 			seen[id] = true
 		}
 		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("store: iterate video ids: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate video ids: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}
 	return seen, nil
 }

internal/adapters/store/store_test.go

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func rawPool(t *testing.T) *pgxpool.Pool {
 func resetDB(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool) {
 	t.Helper()
 	_, err := p.Exec(context.Background(),
-		`TRUNCATE summary_actions, sink_deliveries, summaries, transcripts, videos, users CASCADE`)
+		`TRUNCATE login_events, summary_actions, sink_deliveries, summaries, transcripts, videos, users CASCADE`)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 }
 

internal/adapters/store/summarize_mode.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// SetAutoSummarize sets the user's auto/manual summarization mode. TRUE =
+// automatic (every new video is summarized by `tapir run`); FALSE = manual (the
+// user queues videos individually). Per-user, not global (ADR-012). Scoped via
+// withUser, so RLS confines the UPDATE to the calling user's own row.
+func (s *Store) SetAutoSummarize(ctx context.Context, userID string, enabled bool) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		// Ensure the row exists (FK/identity target) before the UPDATE — mirrors
+		// the Deliver/UpsertVideo paths, so toggling mode works even before the
+		// first summary lands.
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
+			userID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: upsert user: %w", err)
+		}
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`UPDATE users SET auto_summarize = $1 WHERE id = $2`, enabled, userID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: set auto summarize: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// GetAutoSummarize reports the user's summarization mode (TRUE = automatic). An
+// absent user row reads as FALSE (manual), the safe default. Scoped via withUser.
+func (s *Store) GetAutoSummarize(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error) {
+	var enabled bool
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+			`SELECT auto_summarize FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			enabled = false
+			return nil
+		}
+		return err
+	}); err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("store: get auto summarize: %w", err)
+	}
+	return enabled, nil
+}
+
+// RequestSummarize queues a single video for manual summarization by setting its
+// summarize_requested flag. The next `tapir run` picks it up and clears the flag.
+// Returns ErrNotFound when the video does not exist or is not owned by the user
+// (RLS hides another user's row, so the UPDATE matches zero rows). Scoped via
+// withUser.
+func (s *Store) RequestSummarize(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		ct, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`UPDATE videos SET summarize_requested = TRUE WHERE id = $1`, videoID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: request summarize: %w", err)
+		}
+		if ct.RowsAffected() == 0 {
+			return ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// RequestedVideoIDs returns the set of the user's video ids currently flagged for
+// manual summarization. The run loop loads it once per pass (mirroring
+// SeenVideoIDs) to decide which discovered videos to process in manual mode.
+// Scoped by user_id.
+func (s *Store) RequestedVideoIDs(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]bool, error) {
+	requested := make(map[string]bool)
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			`SELECT id FROM videos WHERE user_id = $1 AND summarize_requested = TRUE`, userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: requested video ids: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var id string
+			if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan requested id: %w", err)
+			}
+			requested[id] = true
+		}
+		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate requested ids: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return requested, nil
+}
+
+// ClearSummarizeRequested resets a video's manual queue flag, called by the run
+// loop after a queued video is successfully summarized so it is not re-processed
+// and the list view drops the "Queued" chip. Scoped via withUser.
+func (s *Store) ClearSummarizeRequested(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) error {
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`UPDATE videos SET summarize_requested = FALSE WHERE id = $1`, videoID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: clear summarize requested: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}

internal/adapters/store/summarize_mode_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+// seedBareVideo inserts a videos row with no summary, so the all-videos read and
+// the manual-queue flag can be exercised without a delivered summary.
+func seedBareVideo(t *testing.T, p *pgxpool.Pool, userID, videoID, title string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, err := p.Exec(context.Background(),
+		`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = p.Exec(context.Background(),
+		`INSERT INTO videos (id, user_id, provider, provider_video_id, title)
+		 VALUES ($1, $2, 'youtube', $3, $4)`,
+		videoID, userID, "pv-"+videoID[:8], title)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestAutoSummarizeRoundTripDefaultsFalse(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	// Unknown / fresh user defaults to manual (false).
+	got, err := s.GetAutoSummarize(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, got, "default mode is manual")
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetAutoSummarize(ctx, userA, true))
+	got, err = s.GetAutoSummarize(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, got, "set to automatic round-trips")
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetAutoSummarize(ctx, userA, false))
+	got, err = s.GetAutoSummarize(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, got, "set back to manual round-trips")
+}
+
+func TestRegisteredUserDefaultsAutoSummarizeOn(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	// A real registration creates the users row, so the column default (migration
+	// 011: TRUE) drives the mode — onboarded friends get auto out of the box.
+	id, err := s.RegisterUser(ctx, subjectA, "Alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	got, err := s.GetAutoSummarize(ctx, id)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, got, "new registrations default to auto-summarize (ADR-018)")
+
+	// The account-page toggle still works: a user can switch to manual.
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetAutoSummarize(ctx, id, false))
+	got, err = s.GetAutoSummarize(ctx, id)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, got, "the manual toggle still flips it off")
+}
+
+func TestRequestSummarizeSetsFlag(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+	seedBareVideo(t, p, userA, videoX, "X Title")
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.RequestSummarize(ctx, userA, videoX))
+
+	requested, err := s.RequestedVideoIDs(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, map[string]bool{videoX: true}, requested)
+
+	// Clearing drops it from the requested set.
+	require.NoError(t, s.ClearSummarizeRequested(ctx, userA, videoX))
+	requested, err = s.RequestedVideoIDs(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, requested)
+}
+
+func TestRequestSummarizeMissingVideo(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	err := s.RequestSummarize(ctx, userA, videoX)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, store.ErrNotFound, "queuing a non-existent video reports not found")
+}
+
+func TestListVideosReturnsSummarizedAndUnsummarized(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+
+	// videoX: discovered AND summarized. videoY: discovered, not yet summarized.
+	seedBareVideo(t, p, userA, videoX, "Summarized One")
+	seedBareVideo(t, p, userA, videoY, "Pending One")
+	require.NoError(t, s.Deliver(ctx, summary(userA, videoX, "body x")))
+	require.NoError(t, s.RequestSummarize(ctx, userA, videoY))
+
+	rows, err := s.ListVideos(ctx, userA, 50)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, rows, 2, "both summarized and unsummarized videos are listed")
+
+	byID := map[string]store.SummaryRow{}
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		byID[r.VideoID] = r
+	}
+
+	require.True(t, byID[videoX].Summarized)
+	require.Equal(t, "body x", byID[videoX].Summary)
+	require.False(t, byID[videoX].SummarizeRequested)
+
+	require.False(t, byID[videoY].Summarized, "no summary -> Summarized false")
+	require.Empty(t, byID[videoY].Summary, "unsummarized row has empty summary")
+	require.True(t, byID[videoY].SummarizeRequested, "queued video carries the flag")
+}
+
+// TestListVideosOrderedByPublishedDescNullsLast: summarized videos sort first
+// (regardless of their date), then unsummarized by published_at DESC with
+// undated (NULL) videos last — the recency-aligned list order (UX review B2).
+func TestListVideosOrderedByPublishedDescNullsLast(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+
+	const (
+		vSummOld = "cccccccc-cccc-cccc-cccc-cccccccccccc" // summarized, oldest date
+		vNewer   = "dddddddd-dddd-dddd-dddd-dddddddddddd" // unsummarized, newest
+		vOlder   = "eeeeeeee-eeee-eeee-eeee-eeeeeeeeeeee" // unsummarized, older
+		vUndated = "ffffffff-ffff-ffff-ffff-ffffffffffff" // unsummarized, no date
+	)
+	// Deliver first so the userA row exists (the videos FK needs it); the
+	// summarized video carries the OLDEST date yet must still sort first because
+	// it is summarized, proving summarized-first dominates the date sort.
+	require.NoError(t, s.Deliver(ctx, summary(userA, vSummOld, "body")))
+	seedVideo(t, p, userA, vSummOld, "Summarized Old", "youtube", "https://s", time.Date(2025, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+	seedVideo(t, p, userA, vNewer, "Newer", "youtube", "https://n", time.Date(2026, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+	seedVideo(t, p, userA, vOlder, "Older", "youtube", "https://o", time.Date(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+	seedVideo(t, p, userA, vUndated, "Undated", "youtube", "https://u", time.Time{})
+
+	rows, err := s.ListVideos(ctx, userA, 50)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, rows, 4)
+
+	got := []string{rows[0].VideoID, rows[1].VideoID, rows[2].VideoID, rows[3].VideoID}
+	require.Equal(t, []string{vSummOld, vNewer, vOlder, vUndated}, got,
+		"summarized first, then published_at DESC, NULL dates last")
+}
+
+func TestListVideosIsUserScoped(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	p := rawPool(t)
+	resetDB(t, p)
+	seedBareVideo(t, p, userA, videoX, "A only")
+
+	rows, err := s.ListVideos(ctx, userB, 50)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, rows, "user B must not see user A's videos")
+}
+
+func TestGetVideoRowNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	_, err := s.GetVideoRow(ctx, userA, videoX)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, store.ErrNotFound)
+}

internal/adapters/store/transcript.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
+)
+
+// GetTranscript returns the shared, stored transcript for a video keyed by the
+// cross-user dedup key (provider, providerVideoID), and whether one exists
+// (ADR-021). It reads via the raw pool, NOT withUser: the table holds public
+// content with no user_id and no RLS policy, so it is shared across users by
+// construction. A stored SourceNone is a real hit (ok == true, HasText() ==
+// false) — a known caption-less video, so the caller skips without re-fetching.
+func (s *Store) GetTranscript(ctx context.Context, provider, providerVideoID string) (domain.Transcript, bool, error) {
+	var source, lang, content string
+	err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT source, COALESCE(language, ''), COALESCE(content, '')
+		   FROM transcripts WHERE provider = $1 AND provider_video_id = $2`,
+		provider, providerVideoID).Scan(&source, &lang, &content)
+	if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+		return domain.Transcript{}, false, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return domain.Transcript{}, false, fmt.Errorf("store: get transcript: %w", err)
+	}
+	return domain.Transcript{
+		Source:   domain.TranscriptSource(source),
+		Language: lang,
+		Content:  content,
+	}, true, nil
+}
+
+// SaveTranscript upserts the shared transcript for (provider, providerVideoID).
+// Only terminal outcomes belong here: SourceCaptions (with text) or SourceNone
+// (no captions). A transient SourceRateLimited is rejected so persistence never
+// masks a 429 as a permanent absence — that stays a per-user retry (ADR-014).
+// Last write wins on conflict (a later re-fetch may correct an entry). It writes
+// via the raw pool, NOT withUser — public content, shared, non-RLS (ADR-021).
+func (s *Store) SaveTranscript(ctx context.Context, provider, providerVideoID string, t domain.Transcript) error {
+	switch t.Source {
+	case domain.SourceCaptions, domain.SourceNone:
+		// terminal — persist
+	case domain.SourceRateLimited:
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: refusing to persist transient rate-limited transcript for %s/%s", provider, providerVideoID)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: invalid transcript source %q", t.Source)
+	}
+	_, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO transcripts (provider, provider_video_id, source, language, content)
+		      VALUES ($1, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''), NULLIF($5, ''))
+		 ON CONFLICT (provider, provider_video_id)
+		 DO UPDATE SET source     = EXCLUDED.source,
+		               language   = EXCLUDED.language,
+		               content    = EXCLUDED.content,
+		               fetched_at = NOW()`,
+		provider, providerVideoID, string(t.Source), t.Language, t.Content)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: save transcript: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/transcript_status.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+)
+
+// validTranscriptStatuses bounds SetTranscriptStatus input. "" clears the status
+// (column NULL); the three named states mirror migration 007's documented values.
+var validTranscriptStatuses = map[string]bool{
+	"":             true,
+	"none":         true,
+	"rate_limited": true,
+	"fetched":      true,
+}
+
+// SetTranscriptStatus records the outcome of the last transcript attempt for a
+// video (migration 007). When status is "rate_limited" it also stamps
+// rate_limited_at = NOW() so the runner can back off; every other status clears
+// that timestamp. "" unsets the status (column NULL). An unknown status is
+// rejected. Scoped via withUser, so RLS confines the UPDATE to the caller's own
+// video; ErrNotFound when the user has no such video.
+func (s *Store) SetTranscriptStatus(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID, status string) error {
+	if !validTranscriptStatuses[status] {
+		return fmt.Errorf("store: invalid transcript status %q", status)
+	}
+	return s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		ct, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`UPDATE videos
+			    SET transcript_status = NULLIF($1, ''),
+			        rate_limited_at = CASE WHEN $1 = 'rate_limited' THEN NOW() ELSE NULL END
+			  WHERE id = $2`,
+			status, videoID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: set transcript status: %w", err)
+		}
+		if ct.RowsAffected() == 0 {
+			return ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}
+
+// GetTranscriptStatus returns a video's transcript_status ("" when unset/NULL).
+// Returns ErrNotFound when the user has no such video. Scoped via withUser.
+func (s *Store) GetTranscriptStatus(ctx context.Context, userID, videoID string) (string, error) {
+	var status string
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+			`SELECT COALESCE(transcript_status, '') FROM videos WHERE id = $1`, videoID).Scan(&status)
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			return ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return err
+	}); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
+			return "", ErrNotFound
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: get transcript status: %w", err)
+	}
+	return status, nil
+}
+
+// RateLimitedVideoIDs returns the user's videos currently in the "rate_limited"
+// state, mapped to when the 429 was stamped (rate_limited_at). The run loop loads
+// it once per pass (mirroring SeenVideoIDs) to skip re-fetching a video still
+// inside the backoff window, saving caption requests. Scoped by user_id.
+func (s *Store) RateLimitedVideoIDs(ctx context.Context, userID string) (map[string]time.Time, error) {
+	out := make(map[string]time.Time)
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			`SELECT id, rate_limited_at FROM videos
+			  WHERE user_id = $1 AND transcript_status = 'rate_limited' AND rate_limited_at IS NOT NULL`,
+			userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: rate limited video ids: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var (
+				id string
+				at time.Time
+			)
+			if err := rows.Scan(&id, &at); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan rate limited id: %w", err)
+			}
+			out[id] = at
+		}
+		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: iterate rate limited ids: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/transcript_status_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+)
+
+func TestSetTranscriptStatus_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	id, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, ytVideo(userA, "rt12345", "round trip"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Unset by default.
+	got, err := s.GetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "", got)
+
+	for _, status := range []string{"none", "fetched", "rate_limited", ""} {
+		require.NoError(t, s.SetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id, status))
+		got, err := s.GetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.Equal(t, status, got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSetTranscriptStatus_RejectsInvalid(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	id, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, ytVideo(userA, "bad12345", "bad status"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.Error(t, s.SetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id, "bogus"))
+
+	// The rejected write left the status untouched.
+	got, err := s.GetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, "", got)
+}
+
+func TestSetTranscriptStatus_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	require.ErrorIs(t, s.SetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, videoX, "fetched"), store.ErrNotFound)
+
+	_, err := s.GetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, videoX)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, store.ErrNotFound)
+}
+
+func TestRateLimitedVideoIDs_StampsAndClears(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	id, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, ytVideo(userA, "rl12345", "rate limited"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Marking rate_limited stamps rate_limited_at, so the video appears.
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id, "rate_limited"))
+	rl, err := s.RateLimitedVideoIDs(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, rl, id)
+	require.False(t, rl[id].IsZero(), "rate_limited_at must be stamped")
+
+	// Moving off rate_limited clears the timestamp, so it drops out.
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetTranscriptStatus(ctx, userA, id, "fetched"))
+	rl, err = s.RateLimitedVideoIDs(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, rl, id)
+}

internal/adapters/store/transcript_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package store_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/adapters/store"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/ports"
+)
+
+// Static check: Store satisfies the shared TranscriptStore port (ADR-021).
+var _ ports.TranscriptStore = (*store.Store)(nil)
+
+func TestSaveAndGetTranscript_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	want := domain.Transcript{Source: domain.SourceCaptions, Language: "en", Content: "the words"}
+	require.NoError(t, s.SaveTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-1", want))
+
+	got, ok, err := s.GetTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-1")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, ok, "a saved transcript must be found")
+	require.Equal(t, domain.SourceCaptions, got.Source)
+	require.Equal(t, "en", got.Language)
+	require.Equal(t, "the words", got.Content)
+	require.True(t, got.HasText())
+}
+
+func TestGetTranscript_Miss(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	_, ok, err := s.GetTranscript(context.Background(), "youtube", "absent")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "a miss is not an error")
+	require.False(t, ok)
+}
+
+// A stored "no captions" outcome is a real hit: callers must skip without
+// re-fetching, so ok is true even though there is no text (ADR-021 / ADR-007).
+func TestSaveAndGetTranscript_NoneIsAStoredHit(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.SaveTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-none", domain.Transcript{Source: domain.SourceNone}))
+
+	got, ok, err := s.GetTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-none")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, ok, "a stored SourceNone is a hit, not a miss")
+	require.Equal(t, domain.SourceNone, got.Source)
+	require.False(t, got.HasText())
+}
+
+// A transient 429 must never be persisted as a terminal transcript, or a later
+// read would mask the rate-limit as a permanent "no transcript" (ADR-014).
+func TestSaveTranscript_RejectsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	err := s.SaveTranscript(context.Background(), "youtube", "vid-429",
+		domain.Transcript{Source: domain.SourceRateLimited})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+
+	_, ok, _ := s.GetTranscript(context.Background(), "youtube", "vid-429")
+	require.False(t, ok, "a rejected rate-limited save must leave nothing stored")
+}
+
+func TestSaveTranscript_UpsertLastWriteWins(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.SaveTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-up", domain.Transcript{Source: domain.SourceNone}))
+	require.NoError(t, s.SaveTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-up",
+		domain.Transcript{Source: domain.SourceCaptions, Language: "en", Content: "now resolved"}))
+
+	got, ok, err := s.GetTranscript(ctx, "youtube", "vid-up")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	require.Equal(t, domain.SourceCaptions, got.Source)
+	require.Equal(t, "now resolved", got.Content)
+}

internal/adapters/store/videos.go

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
+
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
 )
 
@@ -29,40 +31,36 @@ func (s *Store) UpsertVideo(ctx context.Context, v domain.Video) (string, error)
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: upsert video: empty provider video id")
 	}
 
-	tx, err := s.pool.Begin(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: begin: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer tx.Rollback(ctx) //nolint:errcheck // no-op after Commit
-
-	// Ensure the owning user exists (FK target) — same as the Deliver path.
-	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
-		v.UserID); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: upsert user: %w", err)
-	}
-
 	provider := string(v.Provider)
 	if provider == "" {
 		provider = string(domain.ProviderYouTube)
 	}
 
 	var id string
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, v.UserID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		// Ensure the owning user exists (FK target) — same as the Deliver path.
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
+			`INSERT INTO users (id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
+			v.UserID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: upsert user: %w", err)
+		}
+
 		if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
-		`INSERT INTO videos (user_id, provider, provider_video_id, title, url, published_at)
+			`INSERT INTO videos (user_id, provider, provider_video_id, title, url, published_at, channel_title)
-		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
+			 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
 			 ON CONFLICT (user_id, provider, provider_video_id) DO UPDATE SET
 			     title         = EXCLUDED.title,
 			     url           = EXCLUDED.url,
-		     published_at = EXCLUDED.published_at
+			     published_at  = EXCLUDED.published_at,
+			     channel_title = COALESCE(NULLIF(EXCLUDED.channel_title, ''), videos.channel_title)
 			 RETURNING id`,
-		v.UserID, provider, v.ProviderVideoID, v.Title, v.URL, nullTime(v.PublishedAt),
+			v.UserID, provider, v.ProviderVideoID, v.Title, v.URL, nullTime(v.PublishedAt), v.ChannelTitle,
 		).Scan(&id); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: upsert video: %w", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: upsert video: %w", err)
 		}
-
+		return nil
-	if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+	}); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("store: commit: %w", err)
+		return "", err
 	}
 	return id, nil
 }
@@ -75,3 +73,69 @@ func nullTime(t time.Time) *time.Time {
 	}
 	return &t
 }
+
+// NewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs returns up to limit of the user's videos that have
+// no summary yet, newest first (published_at DESC, NULLS LAST). It caps the
+// connect-time onboarding burst (Feature 1) at a fixed count: the caller marks
+// these for summarization through the shared rate gate. RLS-scoped via withUser,
+// so it only ever sees the requesting user's rows. limit <= 0 returns nil.
+func (s *Store) NewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs(ctx context.Context, userID string, limit int) ([]string, error) {
+	if limit <= 0 {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	var ids []string
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			`SELECT v.id
+			   FROM videos v
+			  WHERE v.user_id = $1
+			    AND NOT EXISTS (
+			          SELECT 1 FROM summaries su
+			           WHERE su.user_id = v.user_id AND su.video_id = v.id)
+			  ORDER BY v.published_at DESC NULLS LAST, v.seen_at DESC
+			  LIMIT $2`, userID, limit)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: newest unsummarized: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var id string
+			if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan newest unsummarized: %w", err)
+			}
+			ids = append(ids, id)
+		}
+		return rows.Err()
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return ids, nil
+}
+
+// DistinctChannels returns the user's distinct, non-empty source channel titles
+// (the channels they have videos from), alphabetically — the option list for the
+// feed's channel filter. RLS-scoped via withUser.
+func (s *Store) DistinctChannels(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]string, error) {
+	var out []string
+	if err := s.withUser(ctx, userID, func(tx pgx.Tx) error {
+		rows, err := tx.Query(ctx,
+			`SELECT DISTINCT channel_title FROM videos
+			  WHERE user_id = $1 AND channel_title IS NOT NULL AND channel_title <> ''
+			  ORDER BY channel_title`, userID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("store: distinct channels: %w", err)
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var c string
+			if err := rows.Scan(&c); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("store: scan channel: %w", err)
+			}
+			out = append(out, c)
+		}
+		return rows.Err()
+	}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}

internal/adapters/store/videos_test.go

@@ -81,3 +81,61 @@ func TestUpsertVideo_PerUserIsolation(t *testing.T) {
 
 	require.NotEqual(t, idA, idB, "same provider video for two users must be two distinct rows")
 }
+
+func TestNewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	mk := func(user, pid string, day int) string {
+		v := ytVideo(user, pid, pid)
+		v.PublishedAt = time.Date(2026, 6, day, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+		id, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, v)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		return id
+	}
+
+	_ = mk(userA, "a1vid000001", 1)
+	id2 := mk(userA, "a2vid000002", 2)
+	id3 := mk(userA, "a3vid000003", 3)
+	id4 := mk(userA, "a4vid000004", 4)
+	mk(userB, "b1vid000009", 9) // userB's newest — must never leak via RLS
+
+	// The newest (v4) is summarized, so it's excluded from "unsummarized".
+	require.NoError(t, s.Deliver(ctx, summary(userA, id4, "done")))
+
+	// Cap 2, newest-first unsummarized: v3 then v2 (v4 excluded; userB excluded).
+	got, err := s.NewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs(ctx, userA, 2)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{id3, id2}, got)
+
+	none, err := s.NewestUnsummarizedVideoIDs(ctx, userA, 0)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, none, "limit 0 returns nothing")
+}
+
+func TestUpsertVideoPersistsChannelAndDistinctChannels(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	s := newStore(t)
+	resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
+
+	mk := func(pid, channel string) {
+		v := ytVideo(userA, pid, pid)
+		v.ChannelTitle = channel
+		_, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, v)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	mk("aa11111aaaa", "Acme Talks")
+	mk("bb22222bbbb", "Acme Talks") // same channel
+	mk("cc33333cccc", "Zeta Channel")
+	// userB's channel must not leak.
+	vb := ytVideo(userB, "dd44444dddd", "x")
+	vb.ChannelTitle = "Bravo Only"
+	_, err := s.UpsertVideo(ctx, vb)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	got, err := s.DistinctChannels(ctx, userA)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, []string{"Acme Talks", "Zeta Channel"}, got,
+		"distinct, alphabetical, user-scoped (no Bravo Only)")
+}

internal/adapters/summarizer/summarizer.go

@@ -1,17 +1,21 @@
 // Package summarizer implements ports.Summarizer backed by the copied llm
-// package's local-Primary -> BYO-Fallback routing (ADR-004). It is the only
+// package's routing (ADR-004, extended by ADR-022). It is the only place content
-// place content ever leaves the engine toward an AI model, so it is also the
+// ever leaves the engine toward an AI model, so it is also the enforcement point
-// enforcement point for the local-first guarantee in
+// for the local-first guarantee in docs/use-cases/ai_routing.feature: endpoints
-// docs/use-cases/ai_routing.feature: a user with no BYO provider configured has
+// are tried in order, locals first, so content only reaches an external model
-// their content sent to the local stack and nowhere else.
+// after every local endpoint has failed — and never at all when no external
+// endpoint is configured.
 package summarizer
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
 )
@@ -29,19 +33,41 @@ type Endpoint struct {
 	Model    string // resolved alias, e.g. "iguana/deepseek-r1-14b"
 }
 
-// Summarizer routes a transcript through the local endpoint first, then the
+// Summarizer routes a transcript through an ordered chain of endpoints, trying
-// optional BYO endpoint. It owns its routing (rather than delegating to
+// each in turn until one returns a parseable summary. It owns its routing
-// llm.Router) so it can record which provider answered and whether the fallback
+// (rather than delegating to llm.Router) so it can record which provider answered
-// was used — information llm.Router collapses away.
+// and whether a fallback was used — information llm.Router collapses away. The
+// chain ordering is the local-first guarantee: callers place local endpoints
+// first and any external endpoint last, so content only reaches an external model
+// after every local endpoint has failed.
 type Summarizer struct {
-	primary  Endpoint
+	endpoints     []Endpoint
-	fallback *Endpoint // nil => no BYO; primary errors are returned, never sent externally
+	maxInputChars int // transcript truncation budget; 0 = no limit
 	now           func() time.Time
 }
 
-// New constructs a Summarizer. fallback may be nil (no BYO provider configured).
+// New constructs a Summarizer from a primary endpoint and an optional fallback
+// (the historical local-Primary -> BYO-Fallback shape, ADR-004). A nil fallback
+// means a single-endpoint chain: errors are returned, content never leaves it.
 func New(primary Endpoint, fallback *Endpoint) *Summarizer {
-	return &Summarizer{primary: primary, fallback: fallback, now: time.Now}
+	eps := []Endpoint{primary}
+	if fallback != nil {
+		eps = append(eps, *fallback)
+	}
+	return &Summarizer{endpoints: eps, now: time.Now}
+}
+
+// NewChain constructs a Summarizer over an ordered endpoint chain (ADR-022).
+// endpoints are tried in order; the first to return a parseable summary wins, and
+// FallbackUsed is recorded true for any endpoint past the first. maxInputChars
+// bounds the transcript text sent to every endpoint (0 = unbounded), so a long
+// transcript does not overflow a small-context primary model's window. It panics
+// on an empty chain — a wiring bug, not a runtime condition.
+func NewChain(endpoints []Endpoint, maxInputChars int) *Summarizer {
+	if len(endpoints) == 0 {
+		panic("summarizer: NewChain requires at least one endpoint")
+	}
+	return &Summarizer{endpoints: endpoints, maxInputChars: maxInputChars, now: time.Now}
 }
 
 const systemPrompt = `You are Tapir, a video-summarization assistant.
@@ -53,31 +79,35 @@ Respond with ONLY a JSON object, no prose and no code fences:
 - "takeaways": the actionable conclusions a viewer should leave with.
 Output the JSON object and nothing else.`
 
-// Summarize implements ports.Summarizer.
+// Summarize implements ports.Summarizer. It walks the endpoint chain in order:
+// the first endpoint whose reply parses into a non-empty summary wins. An
+// endpoint is considered failed — and the next one tried — when the model call
+// errors OR when its reply cannot be parsed (a 200 with malformed JSON or a
+// highlights field the model emitted as a bare string). Truncation is applied
+// once, up front, so every endpoint sees the same bounded prompt. When the whole
+// chain fails, the joined error is returned so the engine queues the work for
+// retry and delivers no summary.
 func (s *Summarizer) Summarize(ctx context.Context, v domain.Video, t domain.Transcript) (domain.Summary, error) {
 	if !t.HasText() {
 		return domain.Summary{}, fmt.Errorf("summarize: transcript for video %s has no text", v.ID)
 	}
-	user := buildUserPrompt(v, t)
+	user := buildUserPrompt(v, t, s.maxInputChars)
 
-	// Primary = local stack. Only on its failure is anything sent externally,
+	var errs []error
-	// and only when a BYO fallback is configured.
+	for i, ep := range s.endpoints {
-	out, err := s.primary.Client.Complete(ctx, systemPrompt, user)
+		out, err := ep.Client.Complete(ctx, systemPrompt, user)
-	if err == nil {
+		if err != nil {
-		return s.build(v, s.primary, false, out)
+			errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("%s/%s call: %w", ep.Provider, ep.Model, err))
+			continue
 		}
-
+		sum, perr := s.build(v, ep, i > 0, out)
-	if s.fallback == nil {
+		if perr != nil {
-		// No BYO: content was sent to the local stack only. Surface the error so
+			errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("%s/%s output: %w", ep.Provider, ep.Model, perr))
-		// the engine can queue the work for retry; deliver no summary.
+			continue
-		return domain.Summary{}, fmt.Errorf("summarize: local AI failed and no BYO provider configured: %w", err)
 		}
-
+		return sum, nil
-	out, ferr := s.fallback.Client.Complete(ctx, systemPrompt, user)
-	if ferr != nil {
-		return domain.Summary{}, fmt.Errorf("summarize: local AI failed: %w; BYO %s failed: %v", err, s.fallback.Provider, ferr)
 	}
-	return s.build(v, *s.fallback, true, out)
+	return domain.Summary{}, fmt.Errorf("summarize: all %d endpoint(s) failed: %w", len(s.endpoints), errors.Join(errs...))
 }
 
 func (s *Summarizer) build(v domain.Video, ep Endpoint, fallbackUsed bool, raw string) (domain.Summary, error) {
@@ -89,8 +119,8 @@ func (s *Summarizer) build(v domain.Video, ep Endpoint, fallbackUsed bool, raw s
 		UserID:       v.UserID,
 		VideoID:      v.ID,
 		Summary:      parsed.Summary,
-		Highlights:   parsed.Highlights,
+		Highlights:   []string(parsed.Highlights),
-		Takeaways:    parsed.Takeaways,
+		Takeaways:    []string(parsed.Takeaways),
 		AIProvider:   ep.Provider,
 		AIModel:      ep.Model,
 		FallbackUsed: fallbackUsed,
@@ -98,20 +128,94 @@ func (s *Summarizer) build(v domain.Video, ep Endpoint, fallbackUsed bool, raw s
 	}, nil
 }
 
-func buildUserPrompt(v domain.Video, t domain.Transcript) string {
+func buildUserPrompt(v domain.Video, t domain.Transcript, maxInputChars int) string {
 	var b strings.Builder
 	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "Title: %s\n", v.Title)
 	if v.URL != "" {
 		fmt.Fprintf(&b, "URL: %s\n", v.URL)
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\nTranscript:\n%s", t.Content)
+	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "\nTranscript:\n%s", truncate(t.Content, maxInputChars))
 	return b.String()
 }
 
+// truncate caps content to max bytes on a UTF-8 rune boundary, appending a
+// marker so the model knows the transcript was cut. A non-positive max (or a
+// content already within budget) returns content unchanged. Bounding the input
+// keeps a long transcript from overflowing a small-context model's window — the
+// production failure mode where koala/phi4-mini's 8k context returned HTTP 400 on
+// a 11.6k-token transcript.
+func truncate(content string, max int) string {
+	if max <= 0 || len(content) <= max {
+		return content
+	}
+	cut := max
+	for cut > 0 && !utf8.RuneStart(content[cut]) {
+		cut--
+	}
+	return content[:cut] + "\n…[transcript truncated to fit the model context]"
+}
+
+// flexStrings is a []string that also unmarshals from a single JSON string or a
+// JSON array of scalars. Small local models (koala/phi4-mini) sometimes emit
+// "highlights": "one point" instead of an array, or mix in a number; rather than
+// fail the whole summary on that quirk, coerce to []string. Empty/whitespace
+// elements are dropped.
+type flexStrings []string
+
+func (f *flexStrings) UnmarshalJSON(b []byte) error {
+	b = bytes.TrimSpace(b)
+	if len(b) == 0 || string(b) == "null" {
+		*f = nil
+		return nil
+	}
+	if b[0] == '[' {
+		var raw []json.RawMessage
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &raw); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		out := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
+		for _, r := range raw {
+			s, err := rawToString(r)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if strings.TrimSpace(s) != "" {
+				out = append(out, s)
+			}
+		}
+		*f = out
+		return nil
+	}
+	s, err := rawToString(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
+		*f = nil
+	} else {
+		*f = flexStrings{s}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// rawToString renders a JSON scalar as text: a quoted string is unquoted; any
+// other scalar (number, bool) is kept as its literal source so no content is lost.
+func rawToString(r json.RawMessage) (string, error) {
+	r = bytes.TrimSpace(r)
+	if len(r) > 0 && r[0] == '"' {
+		var s string
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(r, &s); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		return s, nil
+	}
+	return string(r), nil
+}
+
 type parsedSummary struct {
 	Summary    string      `json:"summary"`
-	Highlights []string `json:"highlights"`
+	Highlights flexStrings `json:"highlights"`
-	Takeaways  []string `json:"takeaways"`
+	Takeaways  flexStrings `json:"takeaways"`
 }
 
 // parse extracts the JSON object from a model reply. Thinking models (qwen3,

internal/adapters/summarizer/summarizer_test.go

@@ -129,8 +129,8 @@ func TestSummarize_NoBYO_ContentOnlyLocal(t *testing.T) {
 	local := &fakeClient{reply: goodReply}
 	s := New(Endpoint{Client: local, Provider: "local", Model: "iguana/deepseek-r1-14b"}, nil)
 
-	if s.fallback != nil {
+	if len(s.endpoints) != 1 {
-		t.Fatal("no BYO configured but fallback endpoint is non-nil")
+		t.Fatalf("no BYO configured but chain has %d endpoints, want 1", len(s.endpoints))
 	}
 	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
 		sum, err := s.Summarize(context.Background(), testVideo(), testTranscript())
@@ -176,3 +176,97 @@ func TestParse_EmptySummaryRejected(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("want error for empty summary (thinking model returned no content)")
 	}
 }
+
+// parse tolerates a small model emitting "highlights" as a bare string instead
+// of an array — the production koala/phi4-mini quirk that errored with
+// "cannot unmarshal string into Go struct field ... highlights of type []string".
+func TestParse_ToleratesStringHighlights(t *testing.T) {
+	p, err := parse(`{"summary":"s","highlights":"one big point","takeaways":["a","b"]}`)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(p.Highlights) != 1 || p.Highlights[0] != "one big point" {
+		t.Errorf("highlights = %v, want [\"one big point\"]", p.Highlights)
+	}
+	if len(p.Takeaways) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("takeaways = %v, want 2", p.Takeaways)
+	}
+}
+
+// Chain: an endpoint that returns a 200 with unparseable output is treated as a
+// failure, and the next endpoint in the chain is tried. This is the case the old
+// primary->fallback shape missed — a parse error short-circuited instead of
+// falling back.
+func TestSummarize_FallsBackOnMalformedOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	bad := &fakeClient{reply: `{"summary": not json`}
+	good := &fakeClient{reply: goodReply}
+	s := NewChain([]Endpoint{
+		{Client: bad, Provider: "local", Model: "koala/phi4-mini"},
+		{Client: good, Provider: "local", Model: "koala/phi4-14b"},
+	}, 0)
+
+	sum, err := s.Summarize(context.Background(), testVideo(), testTranscript())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Summarize: %v", err)
+	}
+	if sum.AIModel != "koala/phi4-14b" {
+		t.Errorf("AIModel = %q, want koala/phi4-14b (fell back past malformed primary)", sum.AIModel)
+	}
+	if !sum.FallbackUsed {
+		t.Error("FallbackUsed = false, want true")
+	}
+	if bad.calls != 1 || good.calls != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("calls: bad=%d good=%d, want 1 and 1", bad.calls, good.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+// Chain: when every endpoint fails, no summary is produced and the joined error
+// names each failure so the engine queues the work for retry.
+func TestSummarize_ChainAllEndpointsFail(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &fakeClient{err: errors.New("context overflow")}
+	b := &fakeClient{reply: "not even json"}
+	s := NewChain([]Endpoint{
+		{Client: a, Provider: "local", Model: "m1"},
+		{Client: b, Provider: "berget", Model: "m2"},
+	}, 0)
+
+	if _, err := s.Summarize(context.Background(), testVideo(), testTranscript()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("want error when all endpoints fail")
+	}
+	if a.calls != 1 || b.calls != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("calls: a=%d b=%d, want 1 and 1", a.calls, b.calls)
+	}
+}
+
+// A transcript longer than the chain's input budget is truncated before it
+// reaches any model, so a small-context primary does not overflow its window.
+func TestSummarize_TruncatesLongTranscript(t *testing.T) {
+	local := &fakeClient{reply: goodReply}
+	const budget = 100
+	s := NewChain([]Endpoint{{Client: local, Provider: "local", Model: "m"}}, budget)
+
+	long := domain.Transcript{
+		VideoID: "vid-1", UserID: "user-1", Source: domain.SourceCaptions,
+		Content: strings.Repeat("word ", 1000), // 5000 bytes, well over budget
+	}
+	if _, err := s.Summarize(context.Background(), testVideo(), long); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Summarize: %v", err)
+	}
+	// The prompt carries title/URL framing plus the truncation marker, so allow
+	// headroom over the raw transcript budget — but it must be far below 5000.
+	if len(local.lastUser) > budget+300 {
+		t.Errorf("prompt length = %d, want <= %d (transcript not truncated)", len(local.lastUser), budget+300)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(local.lastUser, "truncated") {
+		t.Error("truncation marker missing from prompt")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewChain_PanicsOnEmptyChain(t *testing.T) {
+	defer func() {
+		if recover() == nil {
+			t.Fatal("want panic on empty endpoint chain")
+		}
+	}()
+	NewChain(nil, 0)
+}

internal/adapters/youtube/captions.go

@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ func (a *Adapter) FetchTranscript(ctx context.Context, v domain.Video) (domain.T
 	if err != nil {
 		return domain.Transcript{}, fmt.Errorf("download caption track for %q: %w", v.ProviderVideoID, err)
 	}
+	if status == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+		// 429 means the IP is rate-limited; record for retry, not a permanent
+		// absence. Degrade gracefully (no error, no text) like SourceNone, but
+		// flag it distinctly so the runner backs off and retries (ADR-007/010).
+		return domain.Transcript{VideoID: v.ID, UserID: v.UserID, Source: domain.SourceRateLimited}, nil
+	}
 	if status != http.StatusOK {
 		// Owner-only 403, region/age gate, or transient unavailability: not an error.
 		return noTranscript(v), nil
@@ -229,6 +235,15 @@ func (a *Adapter) httpDo(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, method, url s
 	for k, v := range headers {
 		req.Header.Set(k, v)
 	}
+	// Process-wide rate gate (ADR-014 item 2): every live caption fetch — player,
+	// watch-page, and timedtext baseUrl — passes the shared per-egress-IP limiter
+	// so the scheduler and the click-path cannot collectively trip 429s. Skipped
+	// when a.transport is set (the test seam) so fakes are not throttled.
+	if a.transport == nil {
+		if err := WaitFetchGate(ctx); err != nil {
+			return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("fetch gate %s %s: %w", method, url, err)
+		}
+	}
 	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%s %s: %w", method, url, err)

internal/adapters/youtube/gate.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package youtube
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
+)
+
+// globalFetchGate is the process-wide rate limiter for outbound timedtext/caption
+// fetches. A single instance is shared by ALL Adapter instances (the scheduler's
+// per-user runners + the web click-path) so they cannot collectively exceed the
+// per-egress-IP cap. ADR-014 item 2: the gate serialises/limits concurrent caption
+// fetches regardless of how many users or goroutines are upstream. The 429 is per
+// IP, not per user — so the gate is process-wide, not per-withUser, not per-video.
+//
+// Default 2s/req (burst 1): the first fetch passes immediately, subsequent fetches
+// are spaced at least 2s apart. Production overrides via SetFetchRate from config.
+var globalFetchGate = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(2*time.Second), 1)
+
+// SetFetchRate replaces the process-wide gate's rate with one token per interval.
+// Call once at startup from config (TAPIR_FETCH_RATE). A non-positive interval
+// installs an unlimited gate (rate.Inf) — used in dev/tests so nothing throttles.
+func SetFetchRate(interval time.Duration) {
+	if interval <= 0 {
+		globalFetchGate = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Inf, 1)
+		return
+	}
+	globalFetchGate = rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(interval), 1)
+}
+
+// WaitFetchGate blocks until the process-wide gate allows one timedtext fetch,
+// respecting ctx cancellation. Called from httpDo before every live outbound
+// caption fetch so the scheduler and the click-path share the same egress budget.
+func WaitFetchGate(ctx context.Context) error {
+	return globalFetchGate.Wait(ctx)
+}

internal/adapters/youtube/gate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package youtube
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
+)
+
+// waitOn drives a test-scoped limiter the same way WaitFetchGate drives the
+// global one, so these tests exercise the gate's behaviour without mutating the
+// process-wide gate (which would pollute sibling tests / the click-path).
+func waitOn(t *testing.T, lim *rate.Limiter) func(context.Context) error {
+	t.Helper()
+	return func(ctx context.Context) error { return lim.Wait(ctx) }
+}
+
+func TestFetchGateSerialisesConcurrentCallers(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		n        = 5
+		interval = 10 * time.Millisecond
+	)
+	lim := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(interval), 1)
+	wait := waitOn(t, lim)
+
+	var (
+		inFlight, maxInFlight atomic.Int32
+		wg                    sync.WaitGroup
+	)
+	start := time.Now()
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			require.NoError(t, wait(context.Background()))
+			cur := inFlight.Add(1)
+			for {
+				old := maxInFlight.Load()
+				if cur <= old || maxInFlight.CompareAndSwap(old, cur) {
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			// Hold the "critical section" briefly so overlap would be observable.
+			time.Sleep(interval / 4)
+			inFlight.Add(-1)
+		}()
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	elapsed := time.Since(start)
+
+	require.Equal(t, int32(1), maxInFlight.Load(),
+		"the gate must admit at most one caller per interval — no overlap")
+	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, time.Duration(n-1)*interval,
+		"N gated callers take at least (N-1)*interval wall time")
+}
+
+func TestFetchGateRespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
+	// A slow gate (1 token/hour, burst already spent) blocks; a cancelled ctx must
+	// unblock Wait with an error rather than hang.
+	lim := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Hour), 1)
+	require.True(t, lim.Allow(), "spend the single burst token")
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+	require.Error(t, waitOn(t, lim)(ctx), "cancelled ctx must fail Wait, not block")
+}
+
+func TestSetFetchRateZeroIsUnlimited(t *testing.T) {
+	// Snapshot and restore the global so this test does not pollute the process.
+	prev := globalFetchGate
+	t.Cleanup(func() { globalFetchGate = prev })
+
+	SetFetchRate(0)
+	require.Equal(t, rate.Inf, globalFetchGate.Limit(), "0 interval = unlimited gate")
+
+	// An unlimited gate never blocks, even back-to-back.
+	for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
+		require.NoError(t, WaitFetchGate(context.Background()))
+	}
+}

internal/adapters/youtube/videobyid_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package youtube
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/domain"
+)
+
+func TestVideoByID(t *testing.T) {
+	const id = "dQw4w9WgXcQ"
+	a, secrets := newTestAdapter(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/videos" {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected path %q (must use videos.list)", r.URL.Path)
+		}
+		if got := r.URL.Query().Get("id"); got != id {
+			t.Errorf("expected id=%s, got %q", id, got)
+		}
+		if got := r.URL.Query().Get("part"); got != "snippet" {
+			t.Errorf("expected part=snippet, got %q", got)
+		}
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"items":[{"snippet":{"title":"Never Gonna Give You Up","channelTitle":"Rick Astley","publishedAt":"2026-05-20T09:00:00Z"}}]}`))
+	})
+
+	v, err := a.VideoByID(context.Background(), "u1", id)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("VideoByID: %v", err)
+	}
+	if v.UserID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("UserID = %q, want u1", v.UserID)
+	}
+	if v.ProviderVideoID != id || v.Title != "Never Gonna Give You Up" {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected video: %+v", v)
+	}
+	if v.ChannelTitle != "Rick Astley" {
+		t.Errorf("ChannelTitle = %q, want Rick Astley", v.ChannelTitle)
+	}
+	if v.Provider != domain.ProviderYouTube || v.URL != "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="+id {
+		t.Errorf("video not wired correctly: %+v", v)
+	}
+	if v.PublishedAt.IsZero() {
+		t.Errorf("expected publishedAt parsed, got zero")
+	}
+	if v.SubscriptionID != "" {
+		t.Errorf("a pasted video must have no subscription, got %q", v.SubscriptionID)
+	}
+	if secrets.byRef == nil {
+		t.Errorf("token must be resolved by reference through the SecretStore")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVideoByIDNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	a, _ := newTestAdapter(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"items":[]}`))
+	})
+	_, err := a.VideoByID(context.Background(), "u1", "missingvid0")
+	if !errors.Is(err, domain.ErrVideoNotFound) {
+		t.Fatalf("VideoByID for missing id = %v, want domain.ErrVideoNotFound", err)
+	}
+}