package web_test

// Observes the cross-origin gate around Router (#48): SameSite=Lax does not stop a POST
// from a sibling *.d-ma.be origin, so the router itself must refuse a non-safe request
// whose Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site says it did not come from this site's own pages.

import (
	"context"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"net/url"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

// foreign is a header set a browser sends for a form post made by another page.
var foreign = map[string]map[string]string{
	"sibling subdomain, Sec-Fetch-Site": {"Origin": "https://evil.d-ma.be", "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-site"},
	"other site, Sec-Fetch-Site":        {"Origin": "https://evil.example", "Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site"},
	"sibling subdomain, Origin only":    {"Origin": "https://evil.d-ma.be"},
	"opaque origin":                     {"Origin": "null"},
}

// own is a header set for the app's own pages (or a non-browser client): must pass.
var own = map[string]map[string]string{
	"same-origin Sec-Fetch-Site": {"Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin", "Origin": "http://example.com"},
	"matching Origin only":       {"Origin": "http://example.com"},
	"no browser headers":         {},
}

func withHeaders(req *http.Request, h map[string]string) *http.Request {
	for k, v := range h {
		req.Header.Set(k, v)
	}
	return req
}

func userCount(t *testing.T) int {
	t.Helper()
	var n int
	require.NoError(t, rawPool(t).QueryRow(context.Background(), `SELECT count(*) FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&n))
	return n
}

func TestCrossOrigin_ARefusedDeleteAccountPostLeavesTheAccountInPlace(t *testing.T) {
	for name, h := range foreign {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			app, _ := newAccountApp(t)
			resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
			seedConnection(t, app, "youtube", "ada@channel", "ref")

			rec := do(t, app, withHeaders(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/account/delete", nil), h))

			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
			assert.Equal(t, 1, userCount(t), "the account must survive a refused post")
		})
	}
}

func TestCrossOrigin_ASameOriginOrHeaderlessDeleteAccountPostIsServed(t *testing.T) {
	for name, h := range own {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			app, _ := newAccountApp(t)
			resetDB(t, rawPool(t))
			seedConnection(t, app, "youtube", "ada@channel", "ref")

			rec := do(t, app, withHeaders(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/account/delete", nil), h))

			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusSeeOther, rec.Code)
			assert.Equal(t, "/auth/logout", rec.Header().Get("Location"))
		})
	}
}

func TestCrossOrigin_ARefusedUploadPostSubmitsNoJob(t *testing.T) {
	for name, h := range foreign {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			app, sub := newUploadApp(t, audioOK, 200<<20)

			rec := do(t, app, withHeaders(uploadReq(t, "m", "m.wav", []byte("RIFF....WAVE")), h))

			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
			assert.Empty(t, sub.jobs, "a refused post must not enqueue transcription")
		})
	}
}

func TestCrossOrigin_ARefusedUploadChatPostCallsNoModel(t *testing.T) {
	for name, h := range foreign {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			app, fc := newUploadChatApp(t)
			id := seedUpload(t, userID, "Roadmap sync", "done", meetingText)

			req := chatPost("/uploads/"+id+"/chat", url.Values{"message": {"hej"}})
			rec := do(t, app, withHeaders(req, h))

			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
			assert.Zero(t, fc.callCount)
		})
	}
}

func TestCrossOrigin_AForeignPostIsRefusedOnEachListedStateChangingPath(t *testing.T) {
	routes := []string{
		"/account/disconnect/youtube",
		"/account/summarize-mode",
		"/register",
		"/paste",
		"/v/abc/action",
		"/v/abc/summarize",
		"/v/abc/retry-now",
		"/v/abc/chat",
	}
	for _, path := range routes {
		t.Run(path, func(t *testing.T) {
			app := newApp(t)
			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader(""))
			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
			rec := do(t, app, withHeaders(req, foreign["sibling subdomain, Sec-Fetch-Site"]))
			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
		})
	}
}

// A login redirect comes back to /auth/callback as a cross-site GET navigation, and
// health probes carry no headers: safe methods must never be refused on origin grounds.
func TestCrossOrigin_ACrossSiteGETIsNotRefused(t *testing.T) {
	app := newApp(t)
	for _, path := range []string{"/healthz", "/welcome"} {
		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil)
		req.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, do(t, app, req).Code, path)
	}
}