Infra ADR-0004 renamed the Gitea host. Bulk replace across go.mod and all .go import paths. Build and tests pass unchanged. Closes #20 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dt6aHEDWRjkK14Voi6HnGh
318 lines
10 KiB
Go
318 lines
10 KiB
Go
// Package oidc implements web.Auth against a Dex OIDC provider using the
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// standard Authorization Code flow (docs/ui-spec.md §6, ADR-011). It is the
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// production counterpart to web.StubAuth: handlers depend only on the web.Auth
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// interface, so swapping the stub for Dex is a wiring choice in cmd/tapir, not
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// a code change (ADR-003).
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//
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// Authentication is real (Dex OIDC) and is the only gate: any Dex-authenticated
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// subject may sign in (ADR-012 dropped ADR-011's single-subject allowlist).
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// Authorization/registration is layered on top in internal/web (an authenticated
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// subject with no tapir user is routed to registration). Sessions are STATELESS
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// (ADR-029): the identity + expiry live inside an HMAC-signed (HS256) HttpOnly
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// Secure SameSite=Lax persistent cookie with a long sliding TTL — no server-side
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// table, so a deploy/restart never logs anyone out and the cookie also survives
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// browser-close. Tokens are never logged; logout clears the cookie client-side.
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//
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// This is mcp-chassis's cousin but NOT the same code: mcp-chassis validates
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// inbound Bearer JWTs for MCP APIs; this is a browser session login.
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package oidc
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
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"golang.org/x/oauth2"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/metrics"
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"git.d-ma.be/mathias/tapir/internal/web"
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)
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// Config is the OIDC + session configuration. cmd/tapir maps these from
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// TAPIR_OIDC_*/TAPIR_DEX_*/TAPIR_SESSION_SECRET; this package takes the resolved
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// struct.
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type Config struct {
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// Issuer is the Dex issuer URL, e.g. https://auth.d-ma.be. Discovery
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// (.well-known/openid-configuration) runs against it in New.
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Issuer string
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// ClientID / ClientSecret are the registered Dex static client credentials.
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ClientID string
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ClientSecret string
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// RedirectURL is the absolute callback URL, e.g.
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// https://tapir.d-ma.be/auth/callback. Must match the Dex client config.
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RedirectURL string
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// SessionSecret keys the HS256 session-cookie signature. Never logged.
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SessionSecret string
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}
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const (
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// defaultSessionTTL is generous and sliding: Tapir is a "check back tomorrow"
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// reader, so a short TTL meant a re-login (full IdP redirect dance) on almost
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// every visit. 30 days, slid forward on each request, keeps a regular user
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// logged in indefinitely while an abandoned session still lapses.
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defaultSessionTTL = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
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pendingTTL = 10 * time.Minute
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sessionCookie = "tapir_session"
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loginPath = "/auth/login"
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)
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// DexAuth implements web.Auth against Dex.
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type DexAuth struct {
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cfg Config
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oauth *oauth2.Config
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verifier *oidc.IDTokenVerifier
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pending *pendingStore
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secret []byte
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sessionTTL time.Duration
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now func() time.Time
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insecure bool // tests only: drop the Secure attribute so cookies flow over http
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}
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var _ web.Auth = (*DexAuth)(nil)
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// Option tunes a DexAuth. Production wiring passes none; tests inject a clock,
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// a shorter TTL, or insecure cookies.
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type Option func(*DexAuth)
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// WithClock overrides the time source (sliding-refresh and expiry tests).
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func WithClock(now func() time.Time) Option {
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return func(d *DexAuth) {
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if now != nil {
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d.now = now
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}
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}
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}
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// WithSessionTTL overrides the session lifetime.
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func WithSessionTTL(ttl time.Duration) Option {
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return func(d *DexAuth) {
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if ttl > 0 {
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d.sessionTTL = ttl
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}
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}
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}
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// WithInsecureCookies drops the Secure cookie attribute. TEST ONLY — it lets
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// the session cookie travel over plain http; never use it in production.
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func WithInsecureCookies() Option {
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return func(d *DexAuth) { d.insecure = true }
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}
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// New discovers the issuer and returns a configured DexAuth. ctx bounds the
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// discovery request only.
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func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config, opts ...Option) (*DexAuth, error) {
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for name, val := range map[string]string{
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"issuer": cfg.Issuer,
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"client id": cfg.ClientID,
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"client secret": cfg.ClientSecret,
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"redirect url": cfg.RedirectURL,
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"session secret": cfg.SessionSecret,
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} {
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if strings.TrimSpace(val) == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: missing %s", name)
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}
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}
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provider, err := oidc.NewProvider(ctx, cfg.Issuer)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc: discover issuer: %w", err)
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}
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d := &DexAuth{
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cfg: cfg,
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verifier: provider.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: cfg.ClientID}),
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oauth: &oauth2.Config{
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ClientID: cfg.ClientID,
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ClientSecret: cfg.ClientSecret,
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Endpoint: provider.Endpoint(),
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RedirectURL: cfg.RedirectURL,
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Scopes: []string{oidc.ScopeOpenID, "profile", "email"},
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},
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pending: newPendingStore(),
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secret: []byte(cfg.SessionSecret),
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sessionTTL: defaultSessionTTL,
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now: time.Now,
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}
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for _, o := range opts {
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o(d)
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}
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return d, nil
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}
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// Routes mounts the auth endpoints. Patterns are absolute so the handler works
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// whether the caller mounts it at the root or under the /auth/ subtree.
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func (d *DexAuth) Routes() http.Handler {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/auth/login", d.handleLogin)
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mux.HandleFunc("/auth/callback", d.handleCallback)
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mux.HandleFunc("/auth/logout", d.handleLogout)
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return mux
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}
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// Middleware redirects unauthenticated requests to the login endpoint and lets
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// authenticated ones through, sliding the session expiry forward. /healthz and
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// /auth/* are always public (avoids a redirect loop when the whole mux is
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// wrapped).
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func (d *DexAuth) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if isPublicPath(r.URL.Path) {
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
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if err != nil {
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d.redirectUnauthenticated(w, r)
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return
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}
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user, _, ok := d.decodeSession(c.Value, d.now())
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if !ok {
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d.redirectUnauthenticated(w, r)
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return
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}
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// Sliding refresh: re-issue the cookie with a fresh expiry so an active
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// user never lapses (the expiry lives in the cookie, so sliding = re-sign).
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d.setSessionCookie(w, d.encodeSession(user, d.now().Add(d.sessionTTL)))
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h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// CurrentUser resolves the authenticated principal from the stateless cookie.
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func (d *DexAuth) CurrentUser(r *http.Request) (web.User, bool) {
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c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
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if err != nil {
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return web.User{}, false
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}
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user, _, ok := d.decodeSession(c.Value, d.now())
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return user, ok
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}
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func (d *DexAuth) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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state, err := randToken()
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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nonce, err := randToken()
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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d.pending.put(state, nonce, d.now().Add(pendingTTL))
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http.Redirect(w, r, d.oauth.AuthCodeURL(state, oidc.Nonce(nonce)), http.StatusFound)
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}
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func (d *DexAuth) handleCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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q := r.URL.Query()
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if q.Get("error") != "" {
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http.Error(w, "authentication failed", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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state := q.Get("state")
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nonce, ok := d.pending.take(state, d.now())
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if state == "" || !ok {
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http.Error(w, "invalid or expired state", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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code := q.Get("code")
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if code == "" {
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http.Error(w, "missing authorization code", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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tok, err := d.oauth.Exchange(r.Context(), code)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "token exchange failed", http.StatusBadGateway)
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return
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}
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rawID, ok := tok.Extra("id_token").(string)
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if !ok {
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http.Error(w, "no id token in response", http.StatusBadGateway)
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return
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}
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idToken, err := d.verifier.Verify(r.Context(), rawID)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "invalid id token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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if idToken.Nonce != nonce {
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http.Error(w, "nonce mismatch", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Authentication is the only gate (ADR-012): any Dex-authenticated subject may
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// establish a session. Whether that subject has a tapir user — and routing to
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// registration if not — is decided downstream in internal/web, not here.
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var claims struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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}
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_ = idToken.Claims(&claims) // email is best-effort; subject is the identity
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user := web.User{Subject: idToken.Subject, Email: claims.Email}
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d.setSessionCookie(w, d.encodeSession(user, d.now().Add(d.sessionTTL)))
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metrics.IncLogin()
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusFound)
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}
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func (d *DexAuth) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Stateless sessions: clearing the cookie logs the browser out. There is no
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// server-side record to delete (ADR-029); a copy of the cookie stays valid
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// until its expiry — an accepted trade for the Stage-0 reader app.
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d.clearSessionCookie(w)
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// Land on the public landing page, not the login endpoint: a just-logged-out
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// visitor should see /welcome, not be bounced straight back into a Dex login.
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/welcome", http.StatusFound)
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}
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// redirectUnauthenticated sends an unauthenticated visitor somewhere useful: the
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// bare root goes to the public landing page (/welcome), any deeper guarded path
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// goes to login so the post-login round-trip can return them to it. isPublicPath
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// has already let /welcome and /auth/* through, so this never loops.
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func (d *DexAuth) redirectUnauthenticated(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path == "/" {
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/welcome", http.StatusFound)
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return
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}
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d.redirectToLogin(w, r)
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}
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func (d *DexAuth) redirectToLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Redirect(w, r, loginPath, http.StatusFound)
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}
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// setSessionCookie writes the signed session value as a PERSISTENT cookie
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// (Max-Age set), so it survives the browser/app being closed — a session cookie
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// (no Max-Age) was dropped on iPhone Safari close, forcing re-login. value is the
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// already-signed payload from encodeSession.
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func (d *DexAuth) setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, value string) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: sessionCookie,
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Value: value,
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: !d.insecure,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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MaxAge: int(d.sessionTTL.Seconds()),
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})
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}
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func (d *DexAuth) clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
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Name: sessionCookie,
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Value: "",
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Path: "/",
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HttpOnly: true,
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Secure: !d.insecure,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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MaxAge: -1,
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})
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}
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func isPublicPath(p string) bool {
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return p == "/healthz" || p == "/welcome" || strings.HasPrefix(p, "/auth/")
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}
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