Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
mathiasandClaude Sonnet 5.5 eb8e6d5169 fix(pr_merge): send Gitea's merge_title_field; merge_message_title was silently ignored (gitea-mcp#77)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (pull_request) Successful in 28s
CD / Build & Import (pull_request) Skipped
CD / Deploy via GitOps (pull_request) Skipped
Gitea 1.27's MergePullRequestOption has merge_title_field, not merge_message_title; an unknown field is
dropped without an error, so a custom merge title never took effect. The tool's argument keeps its name.
The new test checks the field name on the wire (the existing fake never did).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZkhi49hfeSqBp5aZJNXsM
2026-10-10 10:48:55 +02:00
mathias e8521c2555 chore(context): restore the root rules in AGENTS.md and system-prompt.txt (#80) (#81)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 12s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 17s
Co-authored-by: Mathias <mthbqv@gmail.com>
2026-10-09 06:02:43 +00:00
mathiasandClaude Sonnet 5.5 e696db2e68 docs: main is protected, ship by PR (local-dev#42)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 13s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
Gitea will refuse direct pushes to main in this repo. Rule 5's reviewed lane was enforced on the merge tools
(tbd_ship / pr_merge, gitea-mcp v0.17.0/v0.18.0) but not on a direct commit; this overrides rule 5's "risk/low straight
to main" for this repo and says why. Derived adapter files regenerated where the repo has them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SZkhi49hfeSqBp5aZJNXsM
2026-10-08 08:34:50 +02:00
mathias d1e501cc64 feat(pr_merge): gate it like tbd_ship — green CI, unprotected base, exactly one risk/low issue (#74) (#76)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 15s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Skipped
Co-authored-by: Mathias <mthbqv@gmail.com>
2026-10-08 06:18:07 +00:00
mathias d3faffc4c4 feat(tbd_ship): gate auto-merge on the risk tier; unclassified is not low (#63) (#73)
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 4s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 11s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Skipped
Co-authored-by: Mathias <mthbqv@gmail.com>
2026-10-08 06:02:34 +00:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 dbf78a3b34 ci: move template expressions out of run: shells (signals#47)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 12s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 6s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
"Derive image tags" expanded ${{ github.ref }} into the run: body. A
ref name may contain $(...) and the expansion happens before the shell
parses the script, so it now arrives via env: REF instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 09:33:44 +02:00
mathias c3f8d6c002 ci: run the check job on pull requests (#68) (#69)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 13s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 6s
Co-authored-by: Mathias <mthbqv@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 07:25:38 +00:00
mathias dc127a05b5 Merge pull request 'fix(tools): reject case-variant arg keys and ref-shaped branch names (#65)' (#66) from fix/65-strict-args-branch-names into main
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 14s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 6s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Skipped
2026-10-05 05:10:51 +00:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 cd61239451 perf(tools): linear duplicate-key scan keyed on SimpleFold orbit
PR #66 review round 2: the pairwise EqualFold loop was quadratic, 7s of
CPU for ~90k keys under the 1 MiB body cap. foldKey maps each rune to
the smallest member of its unicode.SimpleFold orbit, equal exactly when
strings.EqualFold is, so the scan is a map lookup again. The scaling
test fails on the previous code (7.1s).

Refs #65

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 07:05:00 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 31a3dd3e0e fix(tools): fail closed when the key scan cannot read the input
PR #66 review: json.Decoder.Token() fails on a number outside float64
range (1e999), which json.Unmarshal ignores in an unknown key, so a
decoy key ended the scan and the #65 repro wrote to main. The decoder
now uses UseNumber, and any scan error is a validation error. The
duplicate check folds with strings.EqualFold (as encoding/json does)
instead of ToLower, so long s and the Kelvin sign are caught in nested
objects too.

Refs #65

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 07:02:27 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 ae50501ba3 fix(tools): reject case-variant arg keys and ref-shaped branch names
parseArgs now refuses, before any request: two keys equal under
strings.EqualFold in any object (exact duplicates included), and a
top-level key that differs from a schema field only in case. Without
this, encoding/json's case-insensitive last-wins match let
{"branch":"feat/x","Branch":"main"} write to main while a client-side
hook read feat/x.

file_write_branch (branch) and tbd_ship (branch and base) validate the
branch name: ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$ plus no refs/ prefix, HEAD,
"..", "//", "/.", trailing "/" or ".", or ".lock". refs/heads/main
otherwise created refs/heads/refs/heads/main and wedged API writes to
main. tbd_ship's base is the protection-probe key, so a refs/-prefixed
base would also have read as unprotected.

Closes #65

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 06:58:31 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 9396b4daaa chore(context): resync derived adapters from canonical AGENT.md
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 28s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 14s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 6s
Clears ContextAdapterDrift; canonical changed in local-dev 12f694b/218cf0d.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 22:49:57 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 0e2bd3d90e fix(mcp): audit record keeps legacy name/index alias targets
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 15s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 7s
A caller using the #38 aliases (name for repo, index for number) left no
target in the tools/call audit record.

Refs #64

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:41:51 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 b149dccdbe chore(context): re-sync adapters after root brain-scoping correction
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:41:47 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5.5 724a997002 feat(mcp): audit-log every tools/call (OWASP MCP08)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 31s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 14s
tools/call dispatched with no record, so repo_delete, pr_merge and
file_delete left no trail in gitea-mcp; only auth acceptance was logged.

One slog record per call: tool, caller, token fingerprint, target
(owner/repo/number/branch/path/tag), outcome, duration. Every other
argument is reduced to args_bytes so the audit line never copies file
content or issue bodies.

Closes #64

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:34:59 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 59dabc9455 chore(context): adopt canonical context-sync.sh and re-sync adapters
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 13s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 17s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
infra's scripts/context-sync.sh is the estate canonical, and it moved in infra
262369b (a SIGPIPE fix on the placeholder-reporting path: `printf | grep -o |
head -1` became `head -1 < <(grep -o ...)`). Every other repo still carried the
old line, so ContextSyncScriptDrift and ContextAdapterDrift were both firing.

Also picks up the canonical AGENT.md change from local-dev a01ee80 — rule 5's
GitOps review lane and the new precedence rule — which every repo's adapters
need regenerated for regardless of the script.

Refs mathias/infra#470

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 10:36:32 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 6b57a8ba8a chore(context): regenerate derived adapters from the canonical root context
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 41s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 10s
ContextAdapterDrift was firing for 13 repos. Picks up behaviour rule 7
("Finish what's closable"), which landed in ~/dev/.context/AGENT.md and never
reached any repo's derived files.

Where mcp.json changes, it also picks up root MCP config the repo was stale on:
brain/gitea/infra move from public hostnames to tailnet Serve URLs, and gitea's
bearer changes from GITEA_MCP_TOKEN to DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN — gitea-mcp
authenticates by pass-through and 401s on the former, so a harness syncing from
the old file had a dead gitea server and no signal saying so.

No literal secrets: mcp.json carries ${VAR} placeholders only.

CLAUDE.md deliberately unchanged — context-sync writes it from PROJECT.md alone,
since Claude Code walks up to ~/dev/CLAUDE.md for root context.

Refs mathias/infra ContextAdapterDrift

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 07:34:24 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 e1e9a2e30e feat(auth): every accepted request names the path that granted it
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 16s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 16s
Closes #60. Closes #58 (fixed in mcp-chassis v0.7.0, consumed here).

Three auth paths reach this server and none of them said so on success.

PassthroughMiddleware logged nothing at all, success or failure. While verifying
#59 end to end there was no way to confirm from the logs whether calls were
using the new PAT pass-through — the caller's own Gitea PAT, the caller's own
identity — or falling through to the shared JWT/static path. The only available
reasoning was inference from which failures were absent.

    INFO mcp auth accepted auth_path=passthrough caller=alice token_fp=...
    INFO mcp auth accepted auth_path=jwt        caller=mathiasbq token_fp=...
    INFO mcp auth accepted auth_path=static     token_fp=...

The first line matters more than the other two. Pass-through is the path where a
request acts as a SPECIFIC Gitea user; an audit trail that cannot say which
identity performed a write is not an audit trail.

chassisauth.Fingerprint, not a local equivalent. The chassis emits token_fp on
its own accepted and rejected lines, and two different fingerprints for the same
token cannot be correlated — which is the only reason the field exists. Exported
from the chassis in v0.7.1 for exactly this.

A token that is not a valid PAT still falls through SILENTLY. The chassis owns
the verdict, and logging here as well would double-count every static-token
request, since all of them reach this middleware first. Asserted, because "logs
nothing on the failure path" is indistinguishable from "was never called".

Also lands #58 by consuming mcp-chassis v0.7.0: a JWT presented to a server with
no JWT auth configured now reports jwt_auth_not_configured rather than
static_token_mismatch. That log line is what sent a debugging session into
re-running the OAuth flow while the credentials were valid the whole time.

Verified: task check EXIT=0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 20:59:04 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 09bde6df8a fix(health): /healthz answers now, and /readyz takes a degraded pod out
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 30s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 15s
Closes #57. Consumes mcp-chassis v0.6.0 (mcp-chassis#4).

Two halves of one six-day outage. The chassis fix alone would not have fixed
this one.

/HEALTHZ WAS A CONSTANT

newHealthzHandler marshalled its body ONCE at startup and served those bytes for
the process lifetime. On 2026-09-14 it reported jwt.status=degraded for six days
after Authentik had recovered, because the answer was computed before Authentik
was up and could never change. A health endpoint that cannot change its answer
is not a health endpoint.

It now evaluates readiness per request. That is also what drives recovery: the
chassis resolves a pending issuer on demand, so every probe is a retry.

/READYZ IS NEW, AND IT IS THE ACTUAL CONTROL

Through all three occurrences the pod was 1/1 Running and readiness-green while
401ing every OAuth caller. k8s had no signal and kept routing to it. /readyz
answers 503 while JWT auth is degraded, so the pod leaves the Service instead of
serving guaranteed failures, and the kubelet's probe cadence becomes the retry
loop — no background goroutine, no context to own.

/healthz deliberately stays 200. The process is alive; a liveness probe must not
restart it, because restarting does not make the IdP come back sooner.

A server with no issuer configured is always ready. Making readiness depend on an
issuer it was never given would pull every static-token-only MCP out of its
Service — asserted, not assumed.

THE RETRY-WITHOUT-THE-K8S-ISSUER FALLBACK IS GONE

It existed because one unreachable issuer used to fail the whole constructor and
take Authentik auth down with it. Since v0.6.0 each issuer resolves lazily and
independently, so a down issuer degrades only itself. The warning it logged —
"multi-issuer init failed; retrying without the k8s issuer" — was the first line
of today's incident; it no longer has a reason to exist.

A constructor error now means a config error, which exits non-zero rather than
warning and continuing.

TESTS

healthz_live_test.go, written first and red (newReadyzHandler undefined, and
newHealthzHandler's signature could not express a state that changes). The
sharpest assertion is that readiness is evaluated TWICE for two requests — a
handler that caches cannot pass it.

The existing table test is ported, not weakened: same three cases, same expected
statuses, only the mechanism by which state reaches the handler changed.

Verified: task check EXIT=0 (lint, vet, race). The lint failure it surfaced was
pre-existing and is fixed in the preceding commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 20:06:15 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 aaaa4b4d64 fix(lint): reflect.Ptr -> reflect.Pointer, unblocking task check
`task check` has been red at HEAD since 2bb1fef adopted the canonical
.golangci.yml from infra/ci-templates, which enables govet's `inline` analyzer.
Nothing to do with the change it blocks; reproduced against a clean HEAD before
touching it.

reflect.Ptr is the pre-Go-1.18 spelling of reflect.Pointer and is a deprecated
alias for it. Identical constant, no behaviour change.

Separate commit because it is unrelated to the auth work that found it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 20:06:00 +02:00
mathias 2bb1fef543 chore(lint): adopt the canonical .golangci.yml from infra/ci-templates
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
Canonical lives at infra ci-templates/golangci.yml, distributed by the
infra#309 pattern: byte-identical copies, checksum drift gate in infra. Do
not edit this file here -- edit the canonical and run `task ci:sync`.

Verified locally before pushing, not pushed-and-hoped: golangci-lint v2.11.4
against a Go 1.26.1 toolchain (matching CI) reports 0 issues here.

Also applies gofumpt, which this config enables and the golangci-lint v2
default set does not check at all. That gap is why the drift was invisible:
earlier passes ran gofmt, which is weaker. Mechanical, deterministic,
build+vet verified.
2026-09-05 14:42:59 +02:00
mathias ee9ac99c40 style: apply gofmt
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 4s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
Estate-wide consolidation pass. golangci-lint v2 default set enables NO
formatter, so gofmt drift accumulated silently across the estate -- 8 repos
were carrying it, this one included. Same hole that let two files rot in
dma-cli until they were found by hand (dma-cli#12).

Mechanical and deterministic: `gofmt -w`, nothing hand-edited. Verified
before commit -- gofmt -l now reports 0, go build and go vet both pass.

Clears this repo to adopt the canonical .golangci.yml (infra
ci-templates/golangci.yml, infra#309 pattern) in a later wave.
2026-09-05 12:40:34 +02:00
mathias ef7ccc8295 fix(lint): check resp.Body.Close()'s error (errcheck)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 18s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 6s
Caught by CI, not locally -- this sandbox's golangci-lint crashes on any
repo, a pre-existing environment issue unrelated to this code (documented
in dispatch's own session history). gitea-mcp's actual CI run has a
working linter and correctly flagged this.
2026-09-05 11:27:22 +02:00
mathias 4d6597639e feat(admin): local-only stdio MCP server to mint scoped service-account tokens (dispatch#67)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Failing after 4s
CD / Build & Import (push) Skipped
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Skipped
dispatch#67 fix #2 needed a read-only CI credential and hit a hard wall:
Gitea's own token-creation and admin-user endpoints reject token auth
outright -- POST /users/{u}/tokens returns 'auth required', POST
/admin/users returns 'token does not have at least one of required
scope(s), required=[write:admin]' -- for ANY existing token, by design. An
existing token cannot mint another token or create an account; the only
way through either endpoint is real basic auth as an actual site admin.
That is exactly what a sandboxed agent session cannot safely hold.

internal/adminbootstrap: the core bootstrap, HTTP-only, fully testable
against a fake transport (5 tests, no network). Given real admin
username/password, it creates the target account (or resets its password
if it already exists -- deliberately unconditional, gated behind a
required ConfirmServiceAccount flag since that reset is only safe for a
dedicated bot account), mints it a scoped token by authenticating AS that
account (Gitea requires this specifically -- an admin cannot mint on
another account's behalf), grants it read-only collaborator access on
named repos, and stores the result via a SecretStore -- never returning
the token or either password to the caller.

internal/localtools: the MCP tool wrapper (mint_service_account_token) and
the real op-CLI-backed SecretStore (token passed via stdin, never argv,
per the estate's own secret-handling rule). Deliberately its OWN package,
not internal/tools -- this capability is far too dangerous to risk it ever
being wired into RegisterAll and reachable from the shared HTTP gitea-mcp
server, even behind OIDC.

internal/mcp/stdio.go: a stdio JSON-RPC transport (one message per line,
standard MCP stdio framing) for the existing registry.Tool interface --
the only transport gitea-mcp had before this was HTTP (server.go), which a
sandboxed session can reach but a real admin password never should be
piped through.

cmd/gitea-admin-mcp: the binary. Meant to be spawned by a LOCAL Claude Code
session (.mcp.json stdio server) or run by hand, via 'op run --env-file
~/.op-env' so admin credentials arrive just-in-time and never touch a
sandboxed session.

11 new tests total, all passing under -race. Nothing in cmd/gitea-mcp (the
shared HTTP server) changed.
2026-09-05 11:25:41 +02:00
mathias 419ae19cdb fix(context): sync to the estate canonical context-sync.sh, drop Cursor/Aider
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 24s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 14s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 5s
This repo's copy of context-sync.sh was two days stale against the version
Mathias's Cursor/Aider decision (2026-09-01) already landed in dma-cli:
still generated .cursorrules and .aider.conventions.md, and lacked the
--force/placeholder pre-flight and .context/mcp.json root-merge dma-cli's
copy has had since.

Found while building the estate-wide context-sync drift gate (ADR-0019) --
this is exactly the drift the gate exists to catch, found by hand while
establishing the baseline it will check going forward.

- script synced to the canonical hash (dma-cli's current copy)
- .cursorrules, .aider.conventions.md, .aider.conf.yml deleted
- Taskfile's drift assertion and file list narrowed to match
- AGENTS.md, .context/system-prompt.txt regenerated against canonical

task check -> exit 0.
2026-09-05 08:01:07 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 e4d07c106c ci(deploy): refuse to patch a manifest with an empty IMAGE_TAG (infra#311)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 9s
On 2026-08-25 a deploy job ran with an empty IMAGE_TAG, wrote
`image: localhost:5000/gitea-mcp:` into the infra repo and pushed it.
That is invalid YAML, so Flux failed the ENTIRE apps Kustomization --
every app stopped reconciling for about an hour, including three
unrelated deploys queued behind it.

This job's existing check could not catch it. It greps for
`image: <repo>:${IMAGE_TAG}` after the sed, and with IMAGE_TAG empty that
pattern matches the corrupted line itself, so the verification passes
because of the bug rather than despite it.

Asserting the input up front is the fix: an empty tag now fails the job
before anything is written, let alone committed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011PL5XcG68SvQqz3vGVbWbf
2026-08-25 17:25:23 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 1d75bf9b25 fix(ci): no expression syntax in a run: block's comments
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 5s
act interpolates a `run:` block INCLUDING its shell comments, so prose
containing Actions expression syntax is evaluated as an expression. A
comment I added yesterday explaining why a fallback was computed in shell
contained that syntax as an example; act tried to evaluate it, failed
with "Unavailable context: a", and the step then wrote NO outputs at all.

In gitea-mcp that emptied `needs.build.outputs.image-tag`, so its deploy
job committed `image: localhost:5000/gitea-mcp:` to the infra repo --
which is not valid YAML, so Flux's apps Kustomization went Ready:False
and NOTHING in k3s/apps reconciled estate-wide until infra 51ceb7c.

The build still went green throughout, because the shared build-image.sh
falls back to `git rev-parse --short HEAD` when SHA_TAG is empty. A
robust default hid a broken input -- worth remembering as a pattern.

Same comment text removed here; the explanation stays, the syntax does not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011PL5XcG68SvQqz3vGVbWbf
2026-08-25 15:29:40 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 417ab60707 ci: call the shared build-image script instead of an inline copy (infra#309)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 6s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Failing after 1m2s
Wave 2. The buildctl/skopeo step here was one of nineteen near-identical
copies; the implementation now lives in .gitea/build-image.sh,
byte-identical to mathias/infra's ci-templates/build-image.sh and held
there by a drift gate. Labels, tags and build-args are inputs.

Behaviour unchanged: same registry, same :sha/:latest/version tags, same
revision and source labels.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011PL5XcG68SvQqz3vGVbWbf
2026-08-25 12:35:52 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 f6446c2515 ci: drop the k3s ctr smoke test, impossible on the containerized runner
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 6s
The step ran `sudo k3s ctr images pull` / `ctr run` against the host's
containerd. That worked when the runner was the Arch host; since it was
containerized (infra#233) the image has no sudo, no ctr and no containerd
socket, so the step fails with `sudo: command not found`. It only
surfaced now because the buildah wall (infra#241) killed the job before
this step ever ran.

The deploy job's `Verify rollout` and `Confirm pod running new image`
assert the same property against the real workload rather than a 5s
throwaway container, which is why tapir dropped its smoke test under the
same issue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011PL5XcG68SvQqz3vGVbWbf
2026-08-25 06:54:55 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 5 50c447f673 ci(cd): build with buildctl instead of rootless buildah (infra#241)
CD / Build & Import (push) Failing after 14s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 27s
Rootless buildah in the containerized gitea-runner pod cannot remap
UID/GID on a fresh base-image pull and has no OCI runtime, so this
Dockerfile's `RUN apk add` / `RUN go build` cannot execute there at all.
The last green run here (2026-07-22) predates the runner's
containerization (infra#233, 2026-07-29), so the build has been latently
broken since.

buildctl hands the build to koala's host buildkitd over the socket the
pod already mounts; skopeo pushes the resulting OCI archive once per tag,
since buildctl has no `buildah push` equivalent. The VERSION build-arg
carries over as `--opt build-arg:VERSION=`, so the ldflags version stamp
is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011PL5XcG68SvQqz3vGVbWbf
2026-08-25 06:49:47 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Sonnet 5 43714047be fix(auth): owner allowlist trusts pass-through-authenticated callers (#59)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 9s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 25s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
Allowlist.Check now takes ctx: when the caller authenticated with
their own Gitea PAT (pass-through, v0.12.0), it skips the static
GITEA_MCP_ALLOWED_OWNERS check entirely — Gitea's own permission
model already gates that caller's access more precisely than a coarse
owner-name list can. The static list still applies unchanged for the
shared static-token/JWT path, where it's the only defense against the
service token's blast radius.

Mechanical: every tool call site already had ctx in scope, so this is
a signature-only change at 41 call sites, no other tool behavior
changes. Closes the "Deferred" item from #59.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 08:31:43 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Sonnet 5 5601927dc8 feat(auth): per-caller Gitea PAT pass-through (#59)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 10s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 26s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
Replaces the shared GITEA_MCP_DEFAULT_TOKEN for all callers. When a
request's bearer validates directly against Gitea's own /api/v1/user,
that token is used for every upstream call this request makes instead
of the service PAT, and the caller identity comes from Gitea's own
login rather than the proxy header. Any other bearer (static token,
JWT, none) falls through unchanged to the existing chassis auth.

Prep: Authentik now SSOs into Gitea (infra a32801c), so each real user
can mint their own PAT from their own linked account.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 08:22:50 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 a16c5b0537 fix(code_search): replace the fantasy REST endpoint with a real client-side grep
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
code_search was calling GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/search?type=code — an
endpoint that does not exist. Confirmed against a live Gitea 1.25.5 instance's
swagger spec: only /repos/search, /repos/issues/search, /topics/search etc are
real. Gitea's own web UI code search falls back to server-side `git grep`
because no Repository Indexer is enabled here, and that fallback is an
HTML-only route, not JSON API — so no REST endpoint exists to call, working or
not. Every call to code_search 404'd on the real server.

This went undetected because the existing tests mocked the fantasy endpoint
directly (asserting the request path was .../search?type=code and handing back
a canned JSON envelope) — a textbook case of tests validating a fake instead of
the real system, giving false confidence the tool worked.

SearchCode now does the search itself: resolves the default branch, walks the
tree (GetTree), and substring-matches q (case-insensitive, literal — not a
regex, to keep behavior predictable and avoid a ReDoS surface from
user-supplied input) against fetched file contents (GetFileContents) — the same
approach Gitea's own indexer-less fallback uses, just client-side. Bounded by:
- codeSearchMaxFiles (2000) — files scanned per call
- codeSearchMaxFileSize (512KB, checked via the tree listing's own Size field,
  before any fetch) — skip large blobs
- a binary-extension denylist checked before fetch, plus a null-byte content
  check after fetch, for extensions the denylist misses

Pagination is over the full sorted result set, recomputed each call (no
server-side index to page through incrementally) — acceptable for the repo
sizes this targets; documented as a known limitation, not a hidden footgun.

The tool layer (internal/tools/code_search.go) is UNCHANGED — SearchCode's
signature and the []CodeSearchHit contract are identical, so this is fully
isolated to the client layer + its tests.

Tests: match found in tree, case-insensitive matching, binary extension
skipped WITHOUT fetching (asserted via the fake's fetch log, not just absent
from results), oversized file skipped without fetching, null-byte content
skipped after fetching, pagination across a full sorted set, empty-query
validation — plus the tool-layer single-repo and fan-out tests rewritten
against the same real endpoints (GetRepo/GetTree/GetFileContents +
ListRepos), replacing their fantasy-endpoint fakes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 11:29:05 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 1eceb5f7fe ci(cd): skip docs-only pushes; move HOW_GITEA_MCP_WORKS into docs/
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 18s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
Relocate the doc under docs/ and add paths-ignore: ['docs/**'] to the CD push
trigger so documentation-only changes no longer rebuild the image and roll the
pod. Branch pushes with only docs/ changes are skipped; tag (v*) pushes and any
push touching code still deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:43:46 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 09a7fad6ba feat(create_project): dispatch_allow also registers the repo into dispatch's allowlist (#54)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
Extends the existing dispatch_allow flag (which already injects .dispatch-allow,
#43/#51/#53) to also append owner/name to mathias/dispatch's git-tracked
dispatch-repos.txt (dispatch#19) — the second of the two required dispatch
gates. Being listed there is necessary but not sufficient on its own (the repo
still needs its own .dispatch-allow marker) — both are applied independently,
neither implies the other, matching dispatch#3's structural trust-zone design
where both must say yes.

Idempotent: a repo already listed (e.g. dispatch_allow re-requested on resume)
is a no-op, not a duplicate line. Failure is reported in its own
dispatch_allowlist_failure field, distinct from partial_failure (substitution)
and dispatch_allow_failure (the marker file) — the three gates can each fail
independently, never conflated (same principle as #51).

The allowlist owner/repo/path/branch are hardcoded to match mathias/dispatch's
own DISPATCH_ALLOWLIST_* env defaults, confirmed unoverridden in the live
CronJob (2026-07-06) before implementing.

Tests: fresh registration (existing entries preserved, not clobbered),
already-listed no-op (zero writes), allowlist-write failure as a distinct
field, dispatch_allow=false never touches the file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:33:39 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 02af7ee71c docs: add HOW_GITEA_MCP_WORKS — architecture, auth, tools, deploy
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
Explains the request lifecycle (Origin → Bearer → Caller → MCP), multi-issuer
auth (static bearer / Authentik / k8s SA tokens per ADR-0011), the owner
allowlist + caller-attribution footer, the single-service-PAT upstream client,
the ~60 tools + input-hygiene layer, config, health, and the CI/CD + netpol-pilot
deployment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:29:14 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 240c3ec081 feat(auth): trust the k8s cluster OIDC issuer for ServiceAccount tokens (ADR-0011 D1)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 17s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 3s
Additive: gitea-mcp now validates JWTs from a LIST of issuers — the existing
Authentik issuer (DEX_ISSUER_URL) AND, when K8S_ISSUER_URL is set, the in-cluster
k8s OIDC issuer for audience-bound ServiceAccount tokens. Lets in-cluster pods
authenticate with kubelet-rotated projected SA tokens instead of a static bearer.

- config: K8S_ISSUER_URL + K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE.
- cmd/gitea-mcp/k8soidc.go: HTTP client that fetches the k8s OIDC discovery/JWKS
  with the cluster CA + this pod's SA bearer (k3s requires an authed fetch;
  anonymous is 401).
- main.go: build the issuer list; switch NewJWTValidator -> NewMultiJWTValidator.
  The k8s issuer is best-effort — if its client can't be built (not in a pod) or
  its discovery is unreachable at startup, it is DROPPED and we fall back so
  Authentik/static auth is never taken down. Smoke-tested: off-pod it logs the
  skip and starts static-only; static-bearer /mcp returns 400 (auth passed), not 401.
- bump mcp-chassis v0.3.0 -> v0.5.0 (multi-issuer + per-issuer HTTPClient).

Refs infra ADR-0011; enables retiring the in-cluster static bearer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 00:16:39 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 51b823ae79 fix(create_project): idempotent rename write completes a stray write+delete split (#53)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
The rename path (write new path, then delete old path) is two separate,
non-atomic API calls. If a prior partial run's write succeeded but the paired
delete failed — plausible under the same infra#179 flakiness resume (#50)
exists to work around — a resume would recompute the identical rename and
blind-create (no sha) at a path that already exists, hitting a conflict and
getting stuck needing another resume cycle just to re-report the same thing.

renameEntry now reads the new path first: if it already holds the correct
content (prior write succeeded), the write is skipped and only the
outstanding delete of the old path runs; if the new path exists but differs,
it's updated with the fetched sha instead of blind-created; if the old path
is already gone by delete time, that's treated as done, not a failure.
Mirrors injectDispatchAllow's (#51) read-before-write idempotency pattern.

Test: TestCreateProject_Resume_StrayRenamedOldPath_CompletesCleanly — a stray
old path plus an already-correct new path resolves to a single delete, zero
redundant writes, no partial_failure. All prior create_project tests
unaffected (backward compatible).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 14:09:26 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 ac337955e7 fix(issue_label): schema wrongly required labels, blocking label_ids-only callers (#52 review finding)
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
Independent adversarial review of #52 (v0.8.0) caught a schema/implementation
mismatch: the advertised InputSchema marked "labels" as required, but Call
already treated labels/label_ids as either-or. An MCP client that validates
arguments against the advertised schema before dispatch would reject a
label_ids-only call as invalid even though the code was written to serve it —
and that path had zero test coverage either way.

Dropped "labels" from the required array (owner/repo/number remain required);
runtime validation already correctly requires at least one of labels/label_ids.
Added TestIssueLabelAppliesByIDOnly (asserts ListLabels is never called when
IDs are already known) and a schema-lock test for the fixed contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:57:05 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 b288462a1c feat(create_project): resume=true makes substitution durable against infra#179 (#50, #51)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
parallax#1 was the real-world evidence: infra#179's branch-writability stall
(>40s observed) blew past the tool's 5s budget, substitution ran zero files,
and the repo shipped genuinely broken (go.mod still read `module
__MODULE_PATH__`) — recoverable only via a manual clone/sed/git-mv/push.

Adds `resume: bool`. When true, skips template lookup and repo generation
entirely — the destination must already exist — and jumps straight to the
tree-walk substitution. This is safe to re-invoke repeatedly because
substituteEntry already compares against the branch's CURRENT state on every
call (GetTree is re-fetched fresh each time): a file already fixed in a prior
partial pass shows up already-correct or already-renamed and is a no-op. So the
actual blocker to resumability was purely the "destination must NOT exist"
guard on the create path — flipped it for resume, no change needed to the
substitution logic itself.

Consequences of resume existing:
- infra179FinalizeMessage (#46) now points at the concrete recovery — "call
  this tool again with resume=true" — instead of manual clone/sed guidance.
- "no placeholders substituted" only loud-fails on a FRESH create; on resume,
  finding nothing left to do is the expected steady state (success).
- dispatch_allow injection (#43) is now idempotent (read-before-write, update
  with sha if present-but-different, skip if already correct) so a resumed
  call with dispatch_allow=true doesn't error re-creating a path that already
  exists (#51's root cause).
- #51's other ask: dispatch_allow failures now land in their own
  dispatch_allow_failure field, never conflated with substitution's
  partial_failure — the two can independently succeed/fail.

Tests: resume with no destination (error, names "nothing to resume"), resume
continuing a partial substitution (asserts /generate is never re-called, only
the still-wrong file is rewritten), resume when already fully done (success,
not the fresh-create loud-fail), dispatch_allow idempotent re-injection
(two-phase test capturing the real written content, no test-visible knowledge
of the internal constant), and dispatch_allow_failure as a distinct field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:49:38 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 82823aad1e feat(labels): add label_list + issue_label tools (#52)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
Closes #52 — unblocks parallax#3 dispatch labeling, which needs to both
discover a repo's label set and attach labels to an issue by name (the
CAD pipeline doesn't track Gitea's internal numeric label IDs).

- gitea.Client: ListLabels, AddIssueLabels (additive POST, matches
  Gitea's own semantics — no delete-then-post needed); extend the
  existing Label struct with Color for label_list's output.
- tools.LabelList (read-only, allowlisted): lists a repo's labels.
- tools.IssueLabel (allowlisted): resolves label names to IDs via
  ListLabels, so callers pass names (the primary interface) instead of
  hunting for numeric IDs; also accepts label_ids for callers that
  already have them. An unknown name fails closed, naming exactly which
  label wasn't found.
- Bump TestRegisteredToolCount 39 -> 41 in the same commit (this
  project was bitten today by a locked count going stale silently).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 13:44:14 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 64176fe6d7 fix(repo_mirror_push): resolve mirror credential from server env, not the payload (#49)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
The mirror credential no longer has to ride the tool-call payload (which is
persisted to transcript → claudewatcher → brain → gitea history). Adds
remote_password_env: the name of a server-side env var the tool resolves at call
time, so the secret stays in the server process. An env name that resolves to
empty errors loudly rather than silently sending an empty password. Raw
remote_password still works but the schema/description now mark it DISCOURAGED.

Tests: password resolved from the env var (never in output); unset env var →
ErrValidation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 09:00:07 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 6d344c74a8 feat(tbd_ship): idempotent re-invoke — resume existing branch/PR (#48)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
A second tbd_ship for the same change no longer errors on "branch exists":
CreateBranch conflict is tolerated, and if a PR is already open for the head,
CreatePullRequest's conflict/validation error resolves it via ListPullRequests
(matching head.ref). Identical file content on the branch skips the write, so a
resume produces no redundant empty-diff commit. Then the same CI gate runs and
merges if now green — so "poll or re-invoke" (the #40 UX) actually works.

Test: TestTBDShip_Resume_ExistingBranchAndPR (branch+PR exist, content
unchanged → no write, merges when green). First-call paths unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 08:30:30 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 a515f53731 build(version): inject real build version via ldflags (#47)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 6s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
Dockerfile takes ARG VERSION (default "dev") and stamps it into
main.version with -X. CD passes --build-arg VERSION=<git tag on v* builds,
else the short sha>, so the running pod logs the actual build instead of
"dev". Verified locally: `-ldflags -X main.version=...` embeds the string.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 08:28:05 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 f0527c94bc fix(test): bump TestRegisteredToolCount to 39 for tbd_ship (#40)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 8s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Successful in 4s
The registered-tool-count lock still expected 38; tbd_ship makes 39. This is
why the v0.6.0 CD check job went red (build+deploy skipped, pod stayed on
v0.5.2). Count updated; task check green (exit 0).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 00:49:26 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 c40a9d9003 test(tbd_ship): cover review-protected + merge-conflict fail-closed paths (#40)
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Failing after 5s
CD / Build & Import (push) Has been skipped
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
Adds Call-level tests for the two remaining no-merge paths (green CI but the
base requires review, and green CI but the merge returns 409), completing the
acceptance matrix alongside the green/pending/red/no-CI cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 00:41:12 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 8ebad95adf feat(tools): add tbd_ship — CI-gated trunk-based ship (#40)
CD / Build & Import (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Failing after 5s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
An intent verb for the trunk-based loop: branch from base → write the file →
open a PR → auto-merge (squash) → delete the branch. One call instead of
orchestrating file_write_branch + pr_create + workflow_run_status + pr_merge +
branch_delete and remembering the conventions each time.

The load-bearing safety is a pure, fail-closed CI gate (evaluateShipGate):
merge=true ONLY when every workflow run for the PR head commit is
completed+success AND the base branch is not review-protected. Every other
state — CI pending / red / absent, review-required base, or an unclean merge —
fails closed to PR-only and returns the PR with a reason. A change with no CI
gate is never auto-merged to trunk (cf. agentsquad#36: non-compiling code
reviewer-approved straight to main with no CI wall).

- ci_timeout_seconds polls the head commit's runs to completion (default 0 =
  snapshot, returns pending right after opening the PR).
- Derives a deterministic short-lived branch (tbd/<slug>-<hash>); handles new
  and existing files (fetches the blob sha for updates).
- Adds head.sha + mergeable to the PR struct.
- Tests: full gate matrix (green/pending/red/cancelled/none/mixed/protected) +
  Call happy-merge, no-CI fail-closed, red fail-closed, allowlist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 00:40:02 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 169040c073 chore(context): re-sync adapters from root AGENT.md (skills → mathias/skills repo)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 00:39:35 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 834a994af9 chore(housekeeping): canonical git.d-ma.be host + honest version string
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 6s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
- Dockerfile: GOPRIVATE and the http→https insteadOf rewrite now name
  git.d-ma.be (was the pre-rename gitea.d-ma.be; masked at build time only by
  GOPROXY=direct + GOSUMDB=off).
- .context/PROJECT.md Repo URL → git.d-ma.be, adapters regenerated
  (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursorrules, .aider.conventions.md, system-prompt.txt).
- main.go: version is now a `-ldflags -X main.version` overridable var defaulting
  to "dev" instead of a hardcoded, drifting "0.1.0".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 23:58:34 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 0a12e905c9 fix(create_project): drop defunct hyperguild new-project from finalize guidance (#46)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
The infra#179 partial_failure message and the tool descriptor told callers to
"Finalize locally with `hyperguild new-project`" — but that command does not
exist (the hyperguild CLI only has tier/brain/mode; it was specced, never built).
It pointed users at a dead end.

Extracted the message into a pure infra179FinalizeMessage() and reworded it to
name the actual remaining work — cloning the repo and substituting the leftover
__PROJECT_NAME__ / __MODULE_PATH__ placeholders, or retrying — with no reference
to any scaffolding CLI. Descriptor updated to match. Unit-tested the wording.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 23:45:25 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 72ba89be63 feat(auth): adopt chassis v0.3.0 — auth audit logs + 503 on Dex outage (#6, #9)
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
Bumps mcp-chassis to v0.3.0, which adds structured audit logging on every auth
rejection and returns 503 temporarily_unavailable (not a silent 401) when Dex is
unreachable at validation time. Wires slog.SetDefault so those audit lines flow
through gitea-mcp's JSON handler.

Together with the earlier /healthz jwt-status reporting and startup degradation
warning, this closes #6 (Dex-down is now observable and distinct from a bad
token) and #9 (auth failures are audit-logged: reason, IP, token type, hashed
fingerprint — never the raw token).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 23:17:39 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 9b7f53bdda feat(auth): document caller header precedence + warn on conflict (#10)
CallerMiddleware silently preferred X-Auth-Request-User over X-Forwarded-User
with no explanation and no signal when both were set. Documented the precedence
(X-Auth-Request-User is the verified OIDC identity oauth2-proxy sets, so it is
authoritative; X-Forwarded-User is a fallback), and it now takes a *slog.Logger
and warns when both headers are present and disagree, so a proxy
misconfiguration is visible instead of silently resolved. Table-driven tests
cover precedence (both/single/none) and the conflict-warning path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 22:57:24 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 4c1f36f9eb chore(rename): module gitea.d-ma.be → git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp (#39)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 23s
Gitea host renamed (infra ADR-0004); the mcp-chassis dep already migrated
(3329ff3), so the sequencing gate is clear. `go mod edit -module` + bulk import
rewrite across all .go files. gitea-mcp is a server binary (not an imported
library), so no downstream consumers break. build + task check green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 22:48:26 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 99586984bf docs(file_write_branch): clarify direct-to-main + PR-flow in descriptor (#35)
The tool already commits directly to any existing branch (BranchExists→upsert,
no create — covered by TestFileWriteBranchSkipsCreateWhenBranchExists), so
`branch:"main"` is a one-call direct-to-main write. The descriptor said "feature
branch", understating it. pr_create/pr_merge/repo_list already exist, closing the
other two #35 gaps (PR loop + owner repo listing). Descriptor now states both
paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 22:47:37 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 e0bede0547 fix(tools): reject empty repo/name identifier at tool layer (#37)
An empty required repo identifier built a trailing-empty path segment
(`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/`) and leaked gitea's bare 404. parseArgs now
validates, via reflection, that `repo`/`name` string args are non-empty and
returns a typed ErrValidation naming the field. Optional identifiers (e.g.
code_search's owner-wide fan-out `repo`) opt out with `,omitempty`. `owner` is
already enforced by the allowlist check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 22:47:05 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 9f12db3d94 fix(pr_merge): advertise canonical number, demote index to alias (#45)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 22s
pr_merge was the only tool still advertising `index` as its id field while
every other issue/PR tool uses the canonical `number` (#38). Flipped its
schema property + required + struct field/tag `index` -> `number`; the existing
`index`->`number` shim keeps legacy `index` callers working, so no shim change
was needed (no canonical-`index` tool remains). Now the id arg is `number`
uniformly across all per-issue/PR tools.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 21:58:05 +02:00
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 93c32edbb5 feat(tools): make repo the canonical repo-identifier arg; name now an alias (#38)
CD / Deploy via GitOps (push) Has been skipped
CD / Lint / Test / Vet (push) Successful in 7s
CD / Build & Import (push) Successful in 21s
Every caller (claude.ai connector, LLMs primed on gitea/GitHub) sends the repo
identifier as `repo`, but the 33 per-repo identifier tools advertised `name`.
The v0.2.8 shim aliased repo->name so it worked, yet the advertised inputSchema
still said `name` — a misleading contract, with the shim load-bearing.

- Flip all 33 identifier tools: schema property + required + struct field/tag
  from `name` to `repo`. A compliant `repo` caller now matches the struct
  directly; the shim is pure back-compat.
- normalizeAliases is now bidirectional (name<->repo), so legacy `name` callers
  still resolve, and repo_create / create_project_from_template — whose `name`
  means "name of the NEW repo", not an existing-repo id — keep `name` and still
  accept `repo`.
- `number`/`index` left as-is (out of scope; separate pre-existing quirk where
  pr_merge advertises `index` rather than `number`).
- Tests: schema-canonical assertion + flipped alias round-trip (explicit `repo`
  wins over `name`).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 21:42:18 +02:00
159 changed files with 6918 additions and 1762 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
read: .aider.conventions.md
auto-commits: false
-386
View File
@@ -1,386 +0,0 @@
# Agent context — Mathias workspace
<!-- Canonical root context for all AI coding agents.
Lives at: ~/dev/.context/AGENT.md
Applies to every project under ~/dev/ unless overridden.
Run `task context:sync` from ~/dev/ to regenerate harness-specific files.
Project-level context in .context/PROJECT.md layers on top of this. -->
## Who I am
I'm Mathias, a digital product manager and technology consultant based in Sweden.
I build software, research emerging tech, and deliver consulting engagements
for clients under NDA. I work across AI/ML, financial automation, web applications,
and climate/sustainability tech.
## How I work with agents
- I think like a product manager — I care about *why* before *how*
- I want agents to be opinionated and push back, not just execute blindly
- I prefer concise responses; skip ceremony and get to the point
- When I say "build this", I mean production-quality with tests, not a demo
- Ask me before making irreversible changes or adding heavy dependencies
- I work with confidential client data — never send it to cloud APIs unless I explicitly say it's OK
## Behavior rules
These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
0. **Pre-task ritual — before ANY implementation (non-negotiable).** Run this before writing a single line:
- **Query the brain** (`brain_query`) for the domain + symptom. If the result changes your approach, surface it before acting. 5 seconds beats 5 hours.
- **Load the relevant skill** — see trigger table in *Engineering Skills* below.
- **Write the failing test first.** Name the test before the function. If the target is untestable (e.g. `main()` wiring), extract the logic into a testable function first. No implementation without a red test.
- **State the observable success criterion** — what specific behavior, output, or passing test proves this is done?
**TDD is non-negotiable.** "Tests pass" is not proof of correctness — only proof the tests ran. Write tests that would catch the bug before writing code that fixes it.
1. **No assumptions.** Don't hide confusion — surface it. Surface tradeoffs explicitly.
Think before coding; if the problem is unclear, ask or state assumptions before acting.
2. **Minimum viable code.** Solve with the smallest change that works. Nothing
speculative, no "while we're here" cleanups, no premature abstractions. Simplicity first.
3. **Surgical changes.** Touch only what the task requires. Leave unrelated code,
files, and formatting alone. Diffs should be small and reviewable.
4. **Goal-driven execution.** Define clear success criteria up front for every task.
Loop — implement, verify, refine — until those criteria are met. Don't claim
completion without evidence (tests pass, command output, observed behavior).
5. **Trunk-Based Development — commit directly to main.** Every commit is one
logical change (one tool, one fix, one test) with passing tests. Main is always
deployable. Never create long-lived feature branches.
**Exception — parallel agents on same repo:** If another agent is known to be
actively working on the same repo simultaneously, create a short-lived branch
(`agent/<description>`), finish the task, and merge to main within the same
session. Do not leave agent branches open between sessions.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use
PR flow only when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document
the reason in PROJECT.md.
6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
- **Tag + bump SemVer** on the change (annotated tag; minor for a feature or
new/changed ADR, patch for a fix; docs in the same commit). Check the repo's
actual last tag — stated versions in docs drift stale.
- **Push** main and the tag (CI is the gate).
- **Persist generalizable learnings to the brain** (`brain_write`, wing/hall) —
the reusable patterns and the footguns that would bite anyone again, never
project status. See *Knowledge base — when to write* below.
- **File discovered-but-deferred work as tracker issues** on the project's own
repo — token-budget gaps, recorded ADR limitations, v2 follow-ups. Don't let
"out of scope, recorded" rot in a commit message; make it a ticket with a
source pointer.
- Surface the brain entries and issue numbers in the closing summary so the
trail is auditable.
## Default stack
| Layer | Default | Fallback | Last resort |
|-------|---------|----------|-------------|
| Language | Go | Python | TypeScript, Java, C |
| UI | HTMX + Templ | Server-rendered HTML | React (only if SPA is justified) |
| Build | Task (taskfile.dev) | Make | — |
| Containers | Docker Compose (dev), k3s (prod) | — | — |
| DB | PostgreSQL + sqlc | SQLite | — |
| Search | pgvector (vector), BM25 | Qdrant (when >1M vectors or hybrid retrieval) | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | — | — |
| Testing | Table-driven, testify | — | — |
| Agents (Go) | google.golang.org/adk + pkg/litellm adapter | — | — |
Exploratory: Rust, Zig — I'll tell you when I want these.
## Code conventions
- **Go style**: golines, gofumpt, golangci-lint
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return
- **Naming**: stdlib conventions, no stuttering
- **Architecture**: prefer stdlib over frameworks, constructor injection, env-var config parsed into typed structs
- **Git**: conventional commits (`feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`), commit directly to main,
one logical change per commit, CI is the quality gate
- **Never**: long-lived feature branches, PRs for solo work, direct push without
passing `task check` locally first
- **Security**: no secrets in code, govulncheck before adding deps, SOPS for encrypted config
- **Dependencies**: prefer stdlib. testify, slog, templ, sqlc, google.golang.org/adk (agent projects only) are pre-approved; anything else needs justification in the commit message
## Secret handling (every harness, every command)
Tool output is persisted: terminal → `~/.claude/projects` transcripts →
claudewatcher → brain/wiki → gitea history. A secret printed once is
searchable forever, and clearing it means rotating the key. So:
1. **Never print, echo, log, or transform a secret to inspect it.** No
`base64`/`xxd`/`cat` of a key, and never pipe a secret through a transform
to defeat `op run`'s output masking (it masks raw values; base64 hides them
from the mask — that exact trick leaked a key on 2026-06-11).
2. **Secrets stay in the subprocess.** Reference them only as env vars consumed
*inside* `op run --env-file ~/.op-env -- <cmd>`. Never place a literal secret
in a command's argv (it lands in the tool call and the transcript).
3. **Existence check without revealing the value:** `[ -n "$X" ] && echo set` —
never `${X:-...}` (returns the value when set) and never echo a substring of it.
4. **Cross-host secrets:** run the secret-consuming command on the host that has
the secret; do not forward a raw key over ssh argv/stdout.
5. If a secret does leak into output, say so immediately and flag it for rotation —
don't bury it.
## Infrastructure
Three machines on Tailscale:
| Machine | Role | Key specs |
|---------|------|-----------|
| koala | GPU inference, heavy compute | RTX 5070, runs k3s + llama-swap + shared postgres18/pgvector |
| iguana | Services, builds | M2 Ultra Mac |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Mac mini, ~/dev is here |
- **Model routing**: LiteLLM in front of llama-swap (local) + cloud APIs (when permitted)
- **Orchestration**: k3s cluster across all three machines
- **Networking**: Tailscale mesh
## Project landscape
All development repos live at `~/dev/` (softlink from `~/Documents/local-dev/`).
Organized in thematic folders:
| Folder | Focus | Count |
|--------|-------|-------|
| `GO/` | Go web frameworks, API integrations, learning projects | ~10 |
| `AI/` | ML research, AI frameworks (FinRL, DSPy, crawl4ai) | ~6 |
| `AGENTS/` | Autonomous agents, coding agents, MCP servers, infra | ~15 |
| `QKX/` | Invoice processing, financial automation, payment systems | ~13 |
| `XT/` | Climate data, sustainability (Klimatkollen, Garbo) | ~2 |
See `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` for detailed descriptions of each project.
### Key active projects
- **super-koala** (`AGENTS/`) — multi-component agent stack with LangGraph, DSPy, MCP
- **azure-tiger** (`QKX/`) — invoice extraction → ISO 20022 payment instructions
- **gocrwl** (`AGENTS/`) — Go web crawler with containerized deployment
- **koala-ai-stack** (`AGENTS/`) — local AI server infrastructure management
- **klimatkollen** (`XT/`) — Swedish municipal climate data platform
## Knowledge base — actively use it
A persistent brain (BM25 search + LLM-synthesised Q&A) survives across sessions,
hosts, and harnesses. It holds 100+ hard-won entries: infra incident postmortems,
Go pitfalls, framework gotchas, design principles, ADRs. **It is not optional
reference material — query it actively, not just when explicitly told.**
### When to query (treat as a reflex)
- **Before** starting a non-trivial task — search for prior art with the symptom
AND the system component ("how did we solve X in Y?"). 5 seconds beats 5 hours.
- **When debugging** — search for the error string, the stack frame, the affected
service. Past you may have already paid this tax.
- **Before adopting** a pattern, library, framework, or model name — check if it
was tried and rejected, or what the integration footguns are.
- **When making architectural decisions** — search for the domain + "ADR" or
"decision" to find prior reasoning before re-deriving it.
- **When a recommendation feels novel** — challenge yourself: "has this been
documented?" The brain often has it.
### When to write
After you discover something that **future-you would forget** and that **isn't
recoverable from the code, git log, or PR description alone**:
- Bugs whose root cause is non-obvious and generalisable beyond this project.
- Framework / library / model-name quirks that bit you and would bite anyone.
- Design principles validated under fire (e.g. "every `_get` needs a `_list`").
- Postmortems for incidents: what broke, why, how diagnosed, what to do next time.
DON'T write project status, sprint progress, PR summaries, or "what I did this
session" — those rot fast and the originals are in git/gitea anyway. Brain
entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
### How to access (per harness)
| Harness | Query | Write |
|---------|-------|-------|
| **Claude Code, Claude Desktop** | `brain_query` (BM25), `brain_answer` (LLM-synth + sources) MCP tools | `brain_write` MCP tool |
| **Crush, Pi, Antigravity, other MCP-capable** | same MCP server: `ingestion-brain` (via the `mcp__*_brain__*` namespace once authenticated) | same |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
| **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
- **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
berget URL (see knowledge entry on namespace mismatches).
### Quick reflex checks
If you find yourself about to say any of these out loud, you owe yourself a brain query first:
- "I think the issue might be..."
- "Let me try X and see..."
- "I'll just write a script to..."
- "This is probably a new bug..."
- "Has anyone done this before?" — *yes, probably, go check.*
## Client work rules
When working on a project tagged with a client name:
1. Never send code, data, or context to cloud APIs — use local models only
2. Never reference other client projects or their data
3. Keep all artifacts within the client's git org / directory
4. Treat everything as confidential unless told otherwise
## Harness-agnostic principles
This context is designed to work with any AI coding tool:
- Claude Code, Cursor, Aider, Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods/Crush
- Pi Coding Agent, Mistral Vibe, Antigravity
- Any tool that accepts a system prompt or reads a markdown context file
The canonical source is always `.context/AGENT.md` (root) and `.context/PROJECT.md` (per-project).
Derived files are committed (see *How context propagates* below) so a `git pull` on any host yields full agent context with no setup.
## How context propagates
Canonical sources of truth:
- Universal: `~/dev/.context/AGENT.md` (this file)
- Project: `<repo>/.context/PROJECT.md` (per-repo)
Derived files (committed, regenerated by `task context:sync`):
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md`,
`.context/system-prompt.txt`
Workflow:
1. Edit a canonical file. Run `task context:sync`. Commit canonical and
derived together. Push.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Claude Code (tree-walking)
uses `CLAUDE.md`; Crush / Pi / Antigravity (cwd-only) use `AGENTS.md`;
Cursor uses `.cursorrules`; Aider uses `.aider.conventions.md`.
3. `task check` runs `context:sync` then asserts `git status --porcelain`
is empty over the derived files (catches both modified-tracked drift
and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
unconditionally on every host, every harness.
## Engineering Skills
Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. See `~/dev/.skills/SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
**Skill trigger table — load before starting, not after getting stuck:**
| Task type | Load |
|-----------|------|
| Any feature or bug fix | `tdd` |
| Refactor or design | `clean-code` or `solid` |
| Debug | `problem-analysis` |
| Review code or PRs | `code-review` |
| Frame a problem before coding | `problem-analysis` |
---
# Project context
<!-- Canonical project context. Edit this, run `task context:sync`.
Root agent context from ~/dev/.context/AGENT.md is automatically
prepended for harnesses that don't walk the directory tree. -->
## Identity
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
- **Primary language**: Go
- **UI layer**: HTMX + Templ (when applicable)
- **Fallback languages**: Python, TypeScript (justify in PR if used)
- **Build**: Task (taskfile.dev), not Make
- **Containers**: Docker (compose for dev, k3s for deploy)
- **Target infra**: koala (GPU workloads), iguana (services), flamingo (edge)
## Conventions
### Code style
- Go: follow `golines`, `gofumpt`, `golangci-lint` with project config
- Tests: table-driven, in `_test.go` next to source, `testify` for assertions
- Errors: wrap with `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)`, no naked returns
- Naming: stdlib conventions, no stuttering (`http.Client` not `http.HTTPClient`)
### Architecture preferences
- Prefer standard library over frameworks (net/http over gin/echo)
- Dependency injection via constructor functions, not containers
- Configuration via environment variables, parsed at startup into a typed struct
- Structured logging via `slog`
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
### Security
- No secrets in code, ever — use env vars or SOPS-encrypted files
- Client data never leaves local network unless explicitly cleared
- Dependencies: audit with `govulncheck` before adding
## Knowledge base access
This project can query the shared knowledge base via MCP or HTTP:
- **MCP endpoint**: `mcp://localhost:3100/knowledge`
- **HTTP fallback**: `http://localhost:3100/api/v1/search`
- **Scoping**: queries are filtered to collection `personal` + `public`
## Behavior rules
These rules apply to every task in this project, regardless of harness.
1. **No assumptions.** Don't hide confusion — surface it. Surface tradeoffs explicitly.
Think before coding; if the problem is unclear, ask or state assumptions before acting.
2. **Minimum viable code.** Solve with the smallest change that works. Nothing
speculative, no "while we're here" cleanups, no premature abstractions. Simplicity first.
3. **Surgical changes.** Touch only what the task requires. Leave unrelated code,
files, and formatting alone. Diffs should be small and reviewable.
4. **Goal-driven execution.** Define clear success criteria up front for every task.
Loop — implement, verify, refine — until those criteria are met. Don't claim
completion without evidence (tests pass, command output, observed behavior).
## Agent instructions
When acting as a coding agent on this project:
1. Read this file and all `SKILL.md` files in `.skills/` before starting work
2. Run `task check` before committing (lint + test + vet)
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
All v0.2 work is complete and deployed. No active sprint.
### What shipped
| Tag | PR | Tools / fixes |
|-----|----|---------------|
| v0.2.2 | #21 | repo_create, repo_update, repo_mirror_push |
| v0.2.3 | #22 | repo_tree, repo_topics_update, file_read dir fix |
| v0.2.4 | #23 | issue_get, release_create, repo_delete |
| v0.2.5 | #26 | repo_update archived+template, create_project_from_template template_name, pr_files_diff loop fix |
Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
### Next up
1. **`hyperguild new-project` v1** — primary next target.
See brain node `adr-new-project-gitea-first-github-mirror` for full flow spec.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
+17 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Repo**: https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- **Trunk-Based Development:** one logical change per commit, merged to main by PR (`main` is protected, see below).
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Short-lived branches and PRs are how work reaches `main` here (`tbd_ship`/`pr_merge`); no long-lived feature branches.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ When acting as a coding agent on this project:
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
6. Ship by PR (`main` is protected, see below). Run `task check` before every push. Never create
long-lived feature branches.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
@@ -105,3 +105,15 @@ Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
## `main` is protected: ship by PR (local-dev#42, decided 2026-10-08)
Gitea refuses direct pushes to `main` in this repo, and a PR merges only after its CI status (`CD / Lint / Test / Vet (pull_request)`) passes.
**Why:** local-dev rule 5's reviewed lane (risk/medium+ is reviewed by a human) was enforced on the merge tools
(`tbd_ship`, `pr_merge`: gitea-mcp v0.17.0/v0.18.0, merge only for an issue labelled exactly `risk/low` with green CI)
but not on a direct commit to `main`, which bypassed it. This overrides rule 5's "risk/low commits straight to main"
for this repo; control code is where the lane matters.
**How:** `tbd_ship` for a one-file change, or branch -> PR -> `pr_merge` (name the `risk/low` issue); above `risk/low`
open the PR and a human merges it in the Gitea UI after review. Tags are not protected. CD jobs push image tags to
the **infra** repo with deploy keys, never to this repo's `main`. Undo (Mathias only): Settings -> Branches, or
`PATCH /repos/mathias/gitea-mcp/branch_protections/main {"enable_push": true}`.
+9 -4
View File
@@ -2,21 +2,26 @@
"mcpServers": {
"brain": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/mcp",
"url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8443/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN}"
}
},
"gitea": {
"_comment": "gitea-mcp authenticates by PASS-THROUGH: the bearer is a Gitea PAT it validates against Gitea and then acts as. GITEA_MCP_TOKEN -- which this entry used until 2026-09-08 -- 401s against it, so every harness synced from this file had a dead gitea server and no signal saying so. Probed 2026-09-08: GITEA_MCP_TOKEN 401, DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN 200, on both the public and the Serve URL.",
"type": "http",
"url": "https://git-mcp.d-ma.be/mcp",
"url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8446/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${GITEA_MCP_TOKEN}"
"Authorization": "Bearer ${DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN}"
}
},
"infra": {
"_comment": "The bearer is belt-and-braces: this endpoint answers 200 with or without it, since Serve already limits reach to the tailnet. Sending it anyway means the day the server starts enforcing is not the day every harness breaks.",
"type": "http",
"url": "https://infra-mcp.d-ma.be/mcp"
"url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8444/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${INFRA_MCP_TOKEN}"
}
}
}
}
+256 -47
View File
@@ -53,14 +53,51 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
logical change (one tool, one fix, one test) with passing tests. Main is always
deployable. Never create long-lived feature branches.
**Exception — parallel agents on same repo:** If another agent is known to be
actively working on the same repo simultaneously, create a short-lived branch
(`agent/<description>`), finish the task, and merge to main within the same
session. Do not leave agent branches open between sessions.
**The PR trigger is RISK, not concurrency.** `risk/low` work commits straight to
main with CI as the gate — that is most work and is unchanged. `risk/medium` and
above opens a PR, even solo, even with nobody waiting to review it. This mirrors
the tiered merge model in `assessor-loop`
`method/transfer-to-a-regulated-organisation.md` §4.1, so the estate practises
what it sells instead of merging everything on green and claiming otherwise.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use
PR flow only when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document
the reason in PROJECT.md.
**Concurrency is NOT a reason to branch.** Measured 2026-08-29 across three real
collisions between parallel sessions: two were not branching problems at all — a
generated artifact written to the same path by both (branching turns that into a
merge conflict on a 33k-line JSON), and uncommitted work in a shared checkout
(a per-session worktree fixes it) — and the third was an ordinary non-fast-forward
push resolved by rebase in seconds. Use a worktree per session on shared repos and
timestamp generated artifacts. Do not reach for a branch.
Branch+PR flow carries documented costs on solo repos: merging auto-closes gated
issues, review comments live on a thread separate from the issue's, and a
merged-and-deleted branch cannot be amended (brain:
`gitea-pr-merge-autoclose-and-review-comment-footguns`). Those are the price of
the `risk/medium`+ lane — paid deliberately, not incurred by accident.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use PR flow
when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document the reason in
PROJECT.md.
**Exception — a GitOps repo where a branch cannot be reconciled.** In a repo whose
deployment watches one branch (`mathias/infra`: Flux watches `main`), a branch is
invisible to the thing that applies it. A `risk/medium` change to `alerts.yaml` or
`litellm-config.yaml` can be linted on a branch but never *exercised* there, so a
PR would buy a review of a state that was never deployed.
There, `risk/medium`+ work stays on `main` and instead requires a **recorded
adversarial review pass before the push** — `skills:pr-gatekeeper` or equivalent,
reviewing the staged diff. **The reviewer's verdict goes in the issue, not a PR
thread.** No verdict recorded means the lane was not used, and saying "the gate was
green" is not the same claim.
Be honest about what this is: a recorded *independent* pass, not four-eyes in the
sense `assessor-loop` §4.1 means for a regulated organisation, because the reviewer
is an agent. It is more than the repo had and less than the model it mirrors; do not
describe it as the stronger property. (infra#470, decided 2026-09-29.)
This lane depends on the `risk/` label being right. A label that triggers a heavier
lane is load-bearing, not cosmetic — if work that belongs in it is unlabelled, the
lane silently does not apply.
6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
@@ -78,6 +115,120 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
- Surface the brain entries and issue numbers in the closing summary so the
trail is auditable.
**Chat is not a durable store. Never rely on Mathias remembering anything.**
Every gap, caveat, risk, open question and next step must land in one of four
places before the turn ends: **the brain**, **a repo** (code, docs, ADR),
**a tracker issue**, or **a plan file**. A finding stated only in conversation is
lost the moment the session closes — and this estate has repeatedly proved that a
remembered convention is an unreliable control.
This applies hardest to what is tempting to leave as a closing remark: "worth
knowing X isn't enforced yet", "this is a convention, not a gate", "we should
revisit Y". Those are exactly the items that need a locator. If it is worth
saying in a summary, it is worth writing where it can be found again without you.
7. **Finish what's closable — only involve me for a genuine call.** If a
tracker issue, PR, or checklist item is demonstrably resolved — the fix
landed, the state changed, you verified it live — close/merge/check it off
in the same turn. Don't leave it open "for the record" or park it waiting
on me to confirm something that already happened; that's bookkeeping, not
a decision. Reserve asking me (`AskUserQuestion`, a `DECISION NEEDED`
comment, or otherwise pausing) for when it's genuinely mine to call:
irreversible or prod/host-impacting actions, a real judgment call with no
clearly-better option, ambiguous intent, or anything secret-writes/
destructive-git already gate. Before claiming something is closable,
verify it live (re-check the issue, re-run the command) rather than
trusting your own earlier summary (brain: `filed-issue-not-same-as-fixed`).
8. **Control code needs an adversary, not a checklist.** Code whose job is to
refuse, deny, gate or contain is not adequately verified by a green gate.
Rule 5 makes CI the quality gate and that holds for ordinary work — but a
passing suite only asserts what its author already thought of, and for a
control the author is precisely the person whose imagination just failed.
Measured on `dispatch#75`: five review rounds, five real escapes verified by
execution, and **CI was green on every one of them** while `git rm
././.dispatch-allow` deleted the file the control existed to protect. So
route this work through a review with authority to block, instructed to
verify by execution rather than by reading the implementation. Expect to be
blocked more than once; that is the control working, not the reviewer being
difficult. (brain: `a-green-gate-is-not-evidence-for-control-code`; the
practices live in the `pr-gatekeeper` agent.)
9. **A test's name must not claim more than its assertions prove.** Name a test
after the mechanism it observes, not the goal it serves.
`DoesNotInheritEnv` is honest; `IsContained` is a claim the test cannot
support. This is not pedantry about naming — when name and assertion
diverge, the name wins in the reader's head and the gap becomes invisible,
which is what lets the defect survive review. Found three times in one PR,
twice in tests written to fix the previous instance of it; each passed while
the thing it was named for was exploitable. If you cannot name the mechanism,
you do not yet know what the test observes.
10. **Short sessions, one rc per repo, edit only in a locked worktree of the repo
you are changing** (ADR-0002, accepted 2026-10-06).
- One session per issue or task, ending with rule 6's close ritual. Related
issues may share a session only when they share a worktree and an owner.
State that must outlive the session goes in an issue, not the chat.
- Start `claude rc` in the repo you will edit (`infra`, `trucker-ecommerce`,
`hyperguild`, ...), not in `~/dev`: the rc worktree is a worktree of the
launch directory's repo, so launched from `~/dev` it protects nothing you
edit (measured: 73% of edits landed in shared checkouts). Start it only
while working there.
- Keep at most one thin `~/dev` coordinator session. It files issues and hands
out tasks; it reads and edits no sub-repo code.
- Split cross-repo work per repo. The contract between the halves lives in an
issue on each repo.
- Edit in a worktree of that repo, locked at creation:
`scripts/wt.sh add <repo> <task>` does it (fetch, `wt/<task>` from origin/main, lock);
`scripts/wt.sh done <repo>-<task>` removes it after the push and refuses dirty or
unpushed work. By hand: `git worktree add ~/worktrees/<name> -b <branch> origin/main`
then `git worktree lock --reason "manual: <purpose>" ~/worktrees/<name>`.
- Before working a repo another session may touch, announce your issue list to
that session (`SendMessage`) and ask for theirs.
- Auto-memory is keyed by cwd, so a repo rc starts without it. Cross-repo
working rules live in brain (`wiki/homelab/decisions/2026-10-06-062416-auto.md`, wing homelab, hall
decisions) and the section below, not in per-directory memory.
## Standing footguns
Each cost real time once. Detail and evidence: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/2026-10-06-062416-auto.md` (title standing-working-rules).
- **Gate then commit with `&&`, never `;`.** "Green" means exit code 0 and
`grep -c FAIL` is 0, not a filtered grep.
- **Stage by path, never `git add -A` or `git add .`** (they stage from the repo
root and swept in other sessions' work twice). Check `git status --porcelain` first.
- **Before committing in a shared checkout:** `git branch --show-current`.
- **Before tagging:** `git fetch origin --tags`, then `git describe --tags --abbrev=0 <sha>`
and `git tag --sort=-v:refname | head`; go above both. Never take the last tag
from a report.
- **Run only what the project's gate runs.** No repo-wide formatter unless the gate
runs it.
- **Reproduce a CI red at the cited commit before applying an issue's prescribed fix.**
- **Read an issue's comments (`issue_list_comments`), not just its body, before working it.**
- **A comment naming a control ("behind branch protection") is not evidence; query
the control.** A working detector can hide a missing preventer.
- **On koala the MCP servers are `mcp__plugin_skills_{brain,gitea,infra}__*`.** The
per-turn auth reminder is not evidence; call the tool or run `claude mcp list`.
Brain writes always pass `wing` + `hall`.
- **`cat /etc/hostname` before assuming which host you are on.**
- **Never run bare `git remote -v` or `git config --list`** (url.insteadOf expands
into a live token); use `git config --get remote.origin.url`.
- **On koala `sudo` is denied outright; k8s exec, env dumps and flux reconcile need
per-action approval; decrypting a SOPS file and printing in one Bash call is
hook-blocked.** Do the repo-side work and hand the host-side step over in an issue.
- **`set -o pipefail` plus an optional `grep | head | awk` dies on no match:** append `|| true`.
- **Gitea `file_write_branch` takes plain text, not base64.**
- **`OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN` in the shell is read-only for `op`.** Operational
secrets go in the AgentSecrets vault via `set -a; . ~/.op-agent-write.env; set +a`.
## CAD sprint patterns
Two CAD sprint archetypes (defs: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/continuous-agentic-development-cad-concept-2026-06-16`):
- **Inception Sprint** — birth a new repo. Oath-gated close; tag only once every clause holds. Brain: `.../inception-sprint-and-oath`.
- **Sweep Sprint** — clear an existing backlog. Parallel read-only research per issue → sequential one-issue-per-commit execution. Brain: `.../sweep-sprint-and-oath`.
Shared: decisions that are yours, not the agent's, surface as `DECISION NEEDED` (question/options/recommendation/blocks) — ask live if you're present, else comment and wait, never act past it. Live-breaking regressions get `git revert`, never forward-fixed; host-network work skips even read-only research (solo, synchronous, you present). Rule 6's closing ritual only fires once every Oath clause genuinely holds — blocked = descoped-and-tracked, never marked done.
## Default stack
| Layer | Default | Fallback | Last resort |
@@ -88,7 +239,7 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
| Containers | Docker Compose (dev), k3s (prod) | — | — |
| DB | PostgreSQL + sqlc | SQLite | — |
| Search | pgvector (vector), BM25 | Qdrant (when >1M vectors or hybrid retrieval) | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | — | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | stdlib `logging` w/ structured `extra=` (or structlog) | — |
| Testing | Table-driven, testify | — | — |
| Agents (Go) | google.golang.org/adk + pkg/litellm adapter | — | — |
@@ -97,7 +248,12 @@ Exploratory: Rust, Zig — I'll tell you when I want these.
## Code conventions
- **Go style**: golines, gofumpt, golangci-lint
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return
- **Python style** (fallback language): ruff (format+lint, one tool), mypy --strict (non-negotiable,
matches Go's static typing discipline), pytest + pytest-cov (table-driven via
`@pytest.mark.parametrize`), uv (venv+deps+lock, one tool), pydantic-settings (typed env-var config
— same principle as Go's typed structs), src-layout + `pyproject.toml` only (no `setup.py`)
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return.
Python: `raise X from e` (exception chaining, same principle) — never bare `except`, never silent `pass`
- **Naming**: stdlib conventions, no stuttering
- **Architecture**: prefer stdlib over frameworks, constructor injection, env-var config parsed into typed structs
- **Git**: conventional commits (`feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`), commit directly to main,
@@ -135,35 +291,30 @@ Three machines on Tailscale:
|---------|------|-----------|
| koala | GPU inference, heavy compute | RTX 5070, runs k3s + llama-swap + shared postgres18/pgvector |
| iguana | Services, builds | M2 Ultra Mac |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Mac mini, ~/dev is here |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Apple Silicon Mac, ~/dev is here |
- **Model routing**: LiteLLM in front of llama-swap (local) + cloud APIs (when permitted)
- **Orchestration**: k3s cluster across all three machines
- **Orchestration**: k3s on koala only — single control-plane node, no workers (verified 2026-08-30). iguana and flamingo are on the tailnet but are not cluster members
- **Networking**: Tailscale mesh
## Project landscape
All development repos live at `~/dev/` (softlink from `~/Documents/local-dev/`).
Organized in thematic folders:
Organized by **role**, because the role decides which rules apply (ADR-0003):
| Folder | Focus | Count |
|--------|-------|-------|
| `GO/` | Go web frameworks, API integrations, learning projects | ~10 |
| `AI/` | ML research, AI frameworks (FinRL, DSPy, crawl4ai) | ~6 |
| `AGENTS/` | Autonomous agents, coding agents, MCP servers, infra | ~15 |
| `QKX/` | Invoice processing, financial automation, payment systems | ~13 |
| `XT/` | Climate data, sustainability (Klimatkollen, Garbo) | ~2 |
| Folder | Role | Rules that key off it |
|--------|------|-----------------------|
| `platform/` | infra, brain, hyperguild, gitea-mcp, dispatch, shared tooling | control code (rule 8), GitOps review lane |
| `products/` | tapir, cobalt-dingo, openbanking-api, ... | ordinary trunk-based work |
| `clients/` | client work | local models only, never cloud APIs (Client work rules) |
| `spikes/` | throwaway | no ceremony |
See `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` for detailed descriptions of each project.
### Key active projects
- **super-koala** (`AGENTS/`) — multi-component agent stack with LangGraph, DSPy, MCP
- **azure-tiger** (`QKX/`) — invoice extraction → ISO 20022 payment instructions
- **gocrwl** (`AGENTS/`) — Go web crawler with containerized deployment
- **koala-ai-stack** (`AGENTS/`) — local AI server infrastructure management
- **klimatkollen** (`XT/`) — Swedish municipal climate data platform
New projects are born into a role folder (`task new-project -- <name> <client|personal>
<role-folder>`); a client tag requires `clients/` and `clients/` requires a client tag.
Existing repos still sit in the old `AGENTS/` and `AI/` folders until they are moved one by
one (ADR-0003 step 3). `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` (generated) lists every repo and where it
is. How a session runs on koala (worktrees, rc per repo, the reaper, memory): `docs/working-on-koala.md`.
## Knowledge base — actively use it
@@ -205,10 +356,16 @@ entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
|---------|-------|-------|
| **Claude Code, Claude Desktop** | `brain_query` (BM25), `brain_answer` (LLM-synth + sources) MCP tools | `brain_write` MCP tool |
| **Crush, Pi, Antigravity, other MCP-capable** | same MCP server: `ingestion-brain` (via the `mcp__*_brain__*` namespace once authenticated) | same |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | Tailnet only: `POST https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8443/query` with `{"query":"..."}`, sending `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN` (not yet enforced on REST, hyperguild#149). The public `brain-mcp.d-ma.be` serves `/mcp` only (infra#517). | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","wing":"...","hall":"..."}` |
| **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
- **Scoping — the brain holds no confidential client content.** Nothing on the read path
filters by client: every token holder can read every wing, and `wing` on `brain_query`
is an optional argument, not an access control. Client confidentiality is enforced only
at write time (`capture`'s I1 gate refuses internal/confidential). So never `brain_write`
client material; generalise it first or keep it in the client's own repo. (hyperguild#144,
decided 2026-10-01. This line previously claimed client projects were filtered; they
were not.)
- **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
@@ -234,10 +391,11 @@ When working on a project tagged with a client name:
## Harness-agnostic principles
This context is designed to work with any AI coding tool:
- Claude Code, Cursor, Aider, Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods/Crush
- Pi Coding Agent, Mistral Vibe, Antigravity
- Any tool that accepts a system prompt or reads a markdown context file
Supported harnesses (2026-09-01) — Cursor and Aider were dropped; do not
re-add adapters for them:
- Claude Code, Antigravity, OpenCode, Mistral Vibe, Crush, Pi Coding Agent
- Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods, or any tool that takes a system prompt string
- Any other tool that reads `AGENTS.md`, which is the de facto convention
The canonical source is always `.context/AGENT.md` (root) and `.context/PROJECT.md` (per-project).
Derived files are committed (see *How context propagates* below) so a `git pull` on any host yields full agent context with no setup.
@@ -249,26 +407,65 @@ Canonical sources of truth:
- Project: `<repo>/.context/PROJECT.md` (per-repo)
Derived files (committed, regenerated by `task context:sync`):
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md`,
`.context/system-prompt.txt`
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.context/system-prompt.txt`
Repos still carrying `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md` or
`.aider.conf.yml` are stale: nothing regenerates them. Delete them the next time
you touch the repo, along with their entries in that repo's `task check`
assertion.
Workflow:
1. Edit a canonical file. Run `task context:sync`. Commit canonical and
derived together. Push.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Claude Code (tree-walking)
uses `CLAUDE.md`; Crush / Pi / Antigravity (cwd-only) use `AGENTS.md`;
Cursor uses `.cursorrules`; Aider uses `.aider.conventions.md`.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Which file a harness reads does
NOT split cleanly by lookup strategy, so do not reason from the strategy:
- `CLAUDE.md` — Claude Code (walks up the tree)
- `AGENTS.md` — Crush, Pi, Antigravity (cwd-only), OpenCode (project root,
global at `~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md`), and Mistral Vibe, which **walks
up** from cwd and takes the first `AGENTS.md` it finds
(user-level `~/.vibe/AGENTS.md`)
- `.context/system-prompt.txt` — Open WebUI, Mods, raw API calls; not read by
any harness, it is for pasting
Vibe tree-walks for `AGENTS.md`, so "tree-walkers use CLAUDE.md" is false.
Each repo's `AGENTS.md` embeds the canonical and is the first one found from
inside that repo, so this works — but by construction, not by luck.
3. `task check` runs `context:sync` then asserts `git status --porcelain`
is empty over the derived files (catches both modified-tracked drift
and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
unconditionally on every host, every harness.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply on every
host and every harness.
**Where a project rule contradicts a rule here, the project rule governs — and it
must state its reason.** Both halves matter: the project file wins because it knows
something this file cannot (infra's Flux constraint is real and not visible from
here), and it must say why because a bare override is indistinguishable from drift.
This replaces the previous wording, which said rules here and in `PROJECT.md` both
apply *"unconditionally"*. That was not a tiebreak but a contradiction, and it went
unnoticed until rule 5 and infra's "never create feature branches" had to be obeyed
at the same time (infra#470). A standard can hold two individually sensible clauses
that are jointly unsatisfiable, and survive for as long as everyone reads it
charitably — the same failure the Inception Sprint Oath's G6 had.
## Engineering Skills
Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. See `~/dev/.skills/SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
Shared engineering skills live in the **`mathias/skills`** repo (`git.d-ma.be/mathias/skills`). Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. Browse `SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
**Claude Code** installs the repo as a plugin from the marketplace the same repo hosts. That path also carries the `secret-guard` and `pre-task-ritual` hooks and the brain/gitea/infra MCP servers, which symlinks cannot:
```
/plugin marketplace add https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/skills.git
/plugin install skills@mathias
```
Skills are **namespaced** under Claude Code: load `tdd` as `skills:tdd`. The trigger table below uses bare names — prefix them.
**Crush, Pi and OpenCode** have no plugin system and are wired by `install.sh` as one directory symlink per harness via `~/.agents/skills`. Do not clone the checkout into `~/dev`: that folder is iCloud-shared between the Macs and spans two path roots (`/Users/mathias` vs `/home/mathias` on koala), so a checkout there is a git working tree with two concurrent writers, and any absolute symlink stored in it is broken on one side by construction (skills#23). Leave `SKILLS_CHECKOUT_DIR` at its host-local default.
Check a host with `task doctor` in the skills repo; it also runs automatically at session start via the plugin.
**Skill trigger table — load before starting, not after getting stuck:**
@@ -293,7 +490,7 @@ Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Repo**: https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
@@ -321,9 +518,9 @@ Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- **Trunk-Based Development:** one logical change per commit, merged to main by PR (`main` is protected, see below).
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Short-lived branches and PRs are how work reaches `main` here (`tbd_ship`/`pr_merge`); no long-lived feature branches.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
@@ -363,8 +560,8 @@ When acting as a coding agent on this project:
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
6. Ship by PR (`main` is protected, see below). Run `task check` before every push. Never create
long-lived feature branches.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
@@ -390,4 +587,16 @@ Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
## `main` is protected: ship by PR (local-dev#42, decided 2026-10-08)
Gitea refuses direct pushes to `main` in this repo, and a PR merges only after its CI status (`CD / Lint / Test / Vet (pull_request)`) passes.
**Why:** local-dev rule 5's reviewed lane (risk/medium+ is reviewed by a human) was enforced on the merge tools
(`tbd_ship`, `pr_merge`: gitea-mcp v0.17.0/v0.18.0, merge only for an issue labelled exactly `risk/low` with green CI)
but not on a direct commit to `main`, which bypassed it. This overrides rule 5's "risk/low commits straight to main"
for this repo; control code is where the lane matters.
**How:** `tbd_ship` for a one-file change, or branch -> PR -> `pr_merge` (name the `risk/low` issue); above `risk/low`
open the PR and a human merges it in the Gitea UI after review. Tags are not protected. CD jobs push image tags to
the **infra** repo with deploy keys, never to this repo's `main`. Undo (Mathias only): Settings -> Branches, or
`PATCH /repos/mathias/gitea-mcp/branch_protections/main {"enable_push": true}`.
---
-389
View File
@@ -1,389 +0,0 @@
# Cursor rules — auto-generated
# Do not edit. Run: task context:sync
# Agent context — Mathias workspace
<!-- Canonical root context for all AI coding agents.
Lives at: ~/dev/.context/AGENT.md
Applies to every project under ~/dev/ unless overridden.
Run `task context:sync` from ~/dev/ to regenerate harness-specific files.
Project-level context in .context/PROJECT.md layers on top of this. -->
## Who I am
I'm Mathias, a digital product manager and technology consultant based in Sweden.
I build software, research emerging tech, and deliver consulting engagements
for clients under NDA. I work across AI/ML, financial automation, web applications,
and climate/sustainability tech.
## How I work with agents
- I think like a product manager — I care about *why* before *how*
- I want agents to be opinionated and push back, not just execute blindly
- I prefer concise responses; skip ceremony and get to the point
- When I say "build this", I mean production-quality with tests, not a demo
- Ask me before making irreversible changes or adding heavy dependencies
- I work with confidential client data — never send it to cloud APIs unless I explicitly say it's OK
## Behavior rules
These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
0. **Pre-task ritual — before ANY implementation (non-negotiable).** Run this before writing a single line:
- **Query the brain** (`brain_query`) for the domain + symptom. If the result changes your approach, surface it before acting. 5 seconds beats 5 hours.
- **Load the relevant skill** — see trigger table in *Engineering Skills* below.
- **Write the failing test first.** Name the test before the function. If the target is untestable (e.g. `main()` wiring), extract the logic into a testable function first. No implementation without a red test.
- **State the observable success criterion** — what specific behavior, output, or passing test proves this is done?
**TDD is non-negotiable.** "Tests pass" is not proof of correctness — only proof the tests ran. Write tests that would catch the bug before writing code that fixes it.
1. **No assumptions.** Don't hide confusion — surface it. Surface tradeoffs explicitly.
Think before coding; if the problem is unclear, ask or state assumptions before acting.
2. **Minimum viable code.** Solve with the smallest change that works. Nothing
speculative, no "while we're here" cleanups, no premature abstractions. Simplicity first.
3. **Surgical changes.** Touch only what the task requires. Leave unrelated code,
files, and formatting alone. Diffs should be small and reviewable.
4. **Goal-driven execution.** Define clear success criteria up front for every task.
Loop — implement, verify, refine — until those criteria are met. Don't claim
completion without evidence (tests pass, command output, observed behavior).
5. **Trunk-Based Development — commit directly to main.** Every commit is one
logical change (one tool, one fix, one test) with passing tests. Main is always
deployable. Never create long-lived feature branches.
**Exception — parallel agents on same repo:** If another agent is known to be
actively working on the same repo simultaneously, create a short-lived branch
(`agent/<description>`), finish the task, and merge to main within the same
session. Do not leave agent branches open between sessions.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use
PR flow only when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document
the reason in PROJECT.md.
6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
- **Tag + bump SemVer** on the change (annotated tag; minor for a feature or
new/changed ADR, patch for a fix; docs in the same commit). Check the repo's
actual last tag — stated versions in docs drift stale.
- **Push** main and the tag (CI is the gate).
- **Persist generalizable learnings to the brain** (`brain_write`, wing/hall) —
the reusable patterns and the footguns that would bite anyone again, never
project status. See *Knowledge base — when to write* below.
- **File discovered-but-deferred work as tracker issues** on the project's own
repo — token-budget gaps, recorded ADR limitations, v2 follow-ups. Don't let
"out of scope, recorded" rot in a commit message; make it a ticket with a
source pointer.
- Surface the brain entries and issue numbers in the closing summary so the
trail is auditable.
## Default stack
| Layer | Default | Fallback | Last resort |
|-------|---------|----------|-------------|
| Language | Go | Python | TypeScript, Java, C |
| UI | HTMX + Templ | Server-rendered HTML | React (only if SPA is justified) |
| Build | Task (taskfile.dev) | Make | — |
| Containers | Docker Compose (dev), k3s (prod) | — | — |
| DB | PostgreSQL + sqlc | SQLite | — |
| Search | pgvector (vector), BM25 | Qdrant (when >1M vectors or hybrid retrieval) | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | — | — |
| Testing | Table-driven, testify | — | — |
| Agents (Go) | google.golang.org/adk + pkg/litellm adapter | — | — |
Exploratory: Rust, Zig — I'll tell you when I want these.
## Code conventions
- **Go style**: golines, gofumpt, golangci-lint
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return
- **Naming**: stdlib conventions, no stuttering
- **Architecture**: prefer stdlib over frameworks, constructor injection, env-var config parsed into typed structs
- **Git**: conventional commits (`feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`), commit directly to main,
one logical change per commit, CI is the quality gate
- **Never**: long-lived feature branches, PRs for solo work, direct push without
passing `task check` locally first
- **Security**: no secrets in code, govulncheck before adding deps, SOPS for encrypted config
- **Dependencies**: prefer stdlib. testify, slog, templ, sqlc, google.golang.org/adk (agent projects only) are pre-approved; anything else needs justification in the commit message
## Secret handling (every harness, every command)
Tool output is persisted: terminal → `~/.claude/projects` transcripts →
claudewatcher → brain/wiki → gitea history. A secret printed once is
searchable forever, and clearing it means rotating the key. So:
1. **Never print, echo, log, or transform a secret to inspect it.** No
`base64`/`xxd`/`cat` of a key, and never pipe a secret through a transform
to defeat `op run`'s output masking (it masks raw values; base64 hides them
from the mask — that exact trick leaked a key on 2026-06-11).
2. **Secrets stay in the subprocess.** Reference them only as env vars consumed
*inside* `op run --env-file ~/.op-env -- <cmd>`. Never place a literal secret
in a command's argv (it lands in the tool call and the transcript).
3. **Existence check without revealing the value:** `[ -n "$X" ] && echo set` —
never `${X:-...}` (returns the value when set) and never echo a substring of it.
4. **Cross-host secrets:** run the secret-consuming command on the host that has
the secret; do not forward a raw key over ssh argv/stdout.
5. If a secret does leak into output, say so immediately and flag it for rotation —
don't bury it.
## Infrastructure
Three machines on Tailscale:
| Machine | Role | Key specs |
|---------|------|-----------|
| koala | GPU inference, heavy compute | RTX 5070, runs k3s + llama-swap + shared postgres18/pgvector |
| iguana | Services, builds | M2 Ultra Mac |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Mac mini, ~/dev is here |
- **Model routing**: LiteLLM in front of llama-swap (local) + cloud APIs (when permitted)
- **Orchestration**: k3s cluster across all three machines
- **Networking**: Tailscale mesh
## Project landscape
All development repos live at `~/dev/` (softlink from `~/Documents/local-dev/`).
Organized in thematic folders:
| Folder | Focus | Count |
|--------|-------|-------|
| `GO/` | Go web frameworks, API integrations, learning projects | ~10 |
| `AI/` | ML research, AI frameworks (FinRL, DSPy, crawl4ai) | ~6 |
| `AGENTS/` | Autonomous agents, coding agents, MCP servers, infra | ~15 |
| `QKX/` | Invoice processing, financial automation, payment systems | ~13 |
| `XT/` | Climate data, sustainability (Klimatkollen, Garbo) | ~2 |
See `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` for detailed descriptions of each project.
### Key active projects
- **super-koala** (`AGENTS/`) — multi-component agent stack with LangGraph, DSPy, MCP
- **azure-tiger** (`QKX/`) — invoice extraction → ISO 20022 payment instructions
- **gocrwl** (`AGENTS/`) — Go web crawler with containerized deployment
- **koala-ai-stack** (`AGENTS/`) — local AI server infrastructure management
- **klimatkollen** (`XT/`) — Swedish municipal climate data platform
## Knowledge base — actively use it
A persistent brain (BM25 search + LLM-synthesised Q&A) survives across sessions,
hosts, and harnesses. It holds 100+ hard-won entries: infra incident postmortems,
Go pitfalls, framework gotchas, design principles, ADRs. **It is not optional
reference material — query it actively, not just when explicitly told.**
### When to query (treat as a reflex)
- **Before** starting a non-trivial task — search for prior art with the symptom
AND the system component ("how did we solve X in Y?"). 5 seconds beats 5 hours.
- **When debugging** — search for the error string, the stack frame, the affected
service. Past you may have already paid this tax.
- **Before adopting** a pattern, library, framework, or model name — check if it
was tried and rejected, or what the integration footguns are.
- **When making architectural decisions** — search for the domain + "ADR" or
"decision" to find prior reasoning before re-deriving it.
- **When a recommendation feels novel** — challenge yourself: "has this been
documented?" The brain often has it.
### When to write
After you discover something that **future-you would forget** and that **isn't
recoverable from the code, git log, or PR description alone**:
- Bugs whose root cause is non-obvious and generalisable beyond this project.
- Framework / library / model-name quirks that bit you and would bite anyone.
- Design principles validated under fire (e.g. "every `_get` needs a `_list`").
- Postmortems for incidents: what broke, why, how diagnosed, what to do next time.
DON'T write project status, sprint progress, PR summaries, or "what I did this
session" — those rot fast and the originals are in git/gitea anyway. Brain
entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
### How to access (per harness)
| Harness | Query | Write |
|---------|-------|-------|
| **Claude Code, Claude Desktop** | `brain_query` (BM25), `brain_answer` (LLM-synth + sources) MCP tools | `brain_write` MCP tool |
| **Crush, Pi, Antigravity, other MCP-capable** | same MCP server: `ingestion-brain` (via the `mcp__*_brain__*` namespace once authenticated) | same |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
| **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
- **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
berget URL (see knowledge entry on namespace mismatches).
### Quick reflex checks
If you find yourself about to say any of these out loud, you owe yourself a brain query first:
- "I think the issue might be..."
- "Let me try X and see..."
- "I'll just write a script to..."
- "This is probably a new bug..."
- "Has anyone done this before?" — *yes, probably, go check.*
## Client work rules
When working on a project tagged with a client name:
1. Never send code, data, or context to cloud APIs — use local models only
2. Never reference other client projects or their data
3. Keep all artifacts within the client's git org / directory
4. Treat everything as confidential unless told otherwise
## Harness-agnostic principles
This context is designed to work with any AI coding tool:
- Claude Code, Cursor, Aider, Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods/Crush
- Pi Coding Agent, Mistral Vibe, Antigravity
- Any tool that accepts a system prompt or reads a markdown context file
The canonical source is always `.context/AGENT.md` (root) and `.context/PROJECT.md` (per-project).
Derived files are committed (see *How context propagates* below) so a `git pull` on any host yields full agent context with no setup.
## How context propagates
Canonical sources of truth:
- Universal: `~/dev/.context/AGENT.md` (this file)
- Project: `<repo>/.context/PROJECT.md` (per-repo)
Derived files (committed, regenerated by `task context:sync`):
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md`,
`.context/system-prompt.txt`
Workflow:
1. Edit a canonical file. Run `task context:sync`. Commit canonical and
derived together. Push.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Claude Code (tree-walking)
uses `CLAUDE.md`; Crush / Pi / Antigravity (cwd-only) use `AGENTS.md`;
Cursor uses `.cursorrules`; Aider uses `.aider.conventions.md`.
3. `task check` runs `context:sync` then asserts `git status --porcelain`
is empty over the derived files (catches both modified-tracked drift
and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
unconditionally on every host, every harness.
## Engineering Skills
Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. See `~/dev/.skills/SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
**Skill trigger table — load before starting, not after getting stuck:**
| Task type | Load |
|-----------|------|
| Any feature or bug fix | `tdd` |
| Refactor or design | `clean-code` or `solid` |
| Debug | `problem-analysis` |
| Review code or PRs | `code-review` |
| Frame a problem before coding | `problem-analysis` |
---
# Project context
<!-- Canonical project context. Edit this, run `task context:sync`.
Root agent context from ~/dev/.context/AGENT.md is automatically
prepended for harnesses that don't walk the directory tree. -->
## Identity
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
- **Primary language**: Go
- **UI layer**: HTMX + Templ (when applicable)
- **Fallback languages**: Python, TypeScript (justify in PR if used)
- **Build**: Task (taskfile.dev), not Make
- **Containers**: Docker (compose for dev, k3s for deploy)
- **Target infra**: koala (GPU workloads), iguana (services), flamingo (edge)
## Conventions
### Code style
- Go: follow `golines`, `gofumpt`, `golangci-lint` with project config
- Tests: table-driven, in `_test.go` next to source, `testify` for assertions
- Errors: wrap with `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)`, no naked returns
- Naming: stdlib conventions, no stuttering (`http.Client` not `http.HTTPClient`)
### Architecture preferences
- Prefer standard library over frameworks (net/http over gin/echo)
- Dependency injection via constructor functions, not containers
- Configuration via environment variables, parsed at startup into a typed struct
- Structured logging via `slog`
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
### Security
- No secrets in code, ever — use env vars or SOPS-encrypted files
- Client data never leaves local network unless explicitly cleared
- Dependencies: audit with `govulncheck` before adding
## Knowledge base access
This project can query the shared knowledge base via MCP or HTTP:
- **MCP endpoint**: `mcp://localhost:3100/knowledge`
- **HTTP fallback**: `http://localhost:3100/api/v1/search`
- **Scoping**: queries are filtered to collection `personal` + `public`
## Behavior rules
These rules apply to every task in this project, regardless of harness.
1. **No assumptions.** Don't hide confusion — surface it. Surface tradeoffs explicitly.
Think before coding; if the problem is unclear, ask or state assumptions before acting.
2. **Minimum viable code.** Solve with the smallest change that works. Nothing
speculative, no "while we're here" cleanups, no premature abstractions. Simplicity first.
3. **Surgical changes.** Touch only what the task requires. Leave unrelated code,
files, and formatting alone. Diffs should be small and reviewable.
4. **Goal-driven execution.** Define clear success criteria up front for every task.
Loop — implement, verify, refine — until those criteria are met. Don't claim
completion without evidence (tests pass, command output, observed behavior).
## Agent instructions
When acting as a coding agent on this project:
1. Read this file and all `SKILL.md` files in `.skills/` before starting work
2. Run `task check` before committing (lint + test + vet)
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
All v0.2 work is complete and deployed. No active sprint.
### What shipped
| Tag | PR | Tools / fixes |
|-----|----|---------------|
| v0.2.2 | #21 | repo_create, repo_update, repo_mirror_push |
| v0.2.3 | #22 | repo_tree, repo_topics_update, file_read dir fix |
| v0.2.4 | #23 | issue_get, release_create, repo_delete |
| v0.2.5 | #26 | repo_update archived+template, create_project_from_template template_name, pr_files_diff loop fix |
Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
### Next up
1. **`hyperguild new-project` v1** — primary next target.
See brain node `adr-new-project-gitea-first-github-mirror` for full flow spec.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
+121
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Build an OCI image with buildctl and push it to the local registry.
#
# CANONICAL COPY: mathias/infra ci-templates/build-image.sh (infra#309).
# Every repo carries a byte-identical copy at .gitea/build-image.sh, written by
# `task ci:sync` and held in place by the drift gate. DO NOT EDIT THE COPIES --
# edit here, re-sync, and the gate will tell you which repos still disagree.
#
# Why this exists: this step was hand-copied into a dozen repos, so migrating it
# off rootless buildah (infra#241) meant eleven near-identical commits, eleven
# verifications, and three separate rediscoveries of the same fix in the two
# repo templates and the gitea-ci skill. The differences between the copies were
# incidental -- a label here, a build-arg there -- never intentional. Those are
# inputs now, not forks of the implementation.
#
# Why buildctl and not buildah: the gitea-runner pod runs with
# `capabilities: drop [ALL]` and `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`, which
# unconditionally blocks the setuid-root exec that rootless buildah's uid/gid
# remapping needs, and the pod has no OCI runtime at all. buildctl is a thin
# client -- it hands the build to the host's buildkitd over a socket, so the
# privileged layer work happens on the host and this pod's securityContext is
# not in the picture. buildah is absent from the runner image as of baked-v14
# and its absence is asserted at pod start (infra#308).
#
# Inputs, all via environment:
#
# IMAGE (required) image name, e.g. cobalt-dingo
# REGISTRY default localhost:5000
# SHA_TAG default `git rev-parse --short HEAD`
# VERSION_TAG optional extra tag, e.g. v1.2.3 on a tag build
# PUSH_LATEST default 1; set 0 to skip the :latest tag
# CONTEXT default . -- build context directory
# DOCKERFILE_DIR default $CONTEXT -- directory holding the Dockerfile
# DOCKERFILE_NAME optional, when the file is not named `Dockerfile`
# TARGET optional, multi-stage build target (--opt target=)
# BUILD_ARGS optional, space-separated K=V pairs
# BUILD_SECRETS optional, space-separated buildkit secret specs, each
# `id=NAME,src=PATH`. Pass the SPEC only -- the caller
# writes the secret to PATH itself. A secret VALUE must
# never be passed here: it would land in this script's
# argv and therefore in the CI log.
# EXTRA_LABELS optional, space-separated K=V pairs
# GIT_SHA optional, stamped as org.opencontainers.image.revision
# IMAGE_SOURCE optional, stamped as org.opencontainers.image.source
#
# Note on shell style below: every conditional is a full `if` block, never
# `[ -n "$X" ] && cmd`. Under `set -e` the && form exits the script whenever the
# test is false, which is a real bug this estate has already shipped once.
set -euo pipefail
if [ -z "${IMAGE:-}" ]; then
echo "build-image: IMAGE is required" >&2
exit 2
fi
REGISTRY="${REGISTRY:-localhost:5000}"
BUILDKIT_HOST="${BUILDKIT_HOST:-unix:///run/buildkit/buildkitd.sock}"
CONTEXT="${CONTEXT:-.}"
DOCKERFILE_DIR="${DOCKERFILE_DIR:-$CONTEXT}"
PUSH_LATEST="${PUSH_LATEST:-1}"
VERSION_TAG="${VERSION_TAG:-}"
if [ -z "${SHA_TAG:-}" ]; then
SHA_TAG="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
fi
REF="${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${SHA_TAG}"
TAR_FILE="$(mktemp)"
trap 'rm -f "$TAR_FILE"' EXIT
args=(
--frontend dockerfile.v0
--local "context=${CONTEXT}"
--local "dockerfile=${DOCKERFILE_DIR}"
)
if [ -n "${DOCKERFILE_NAME:-}" ]; then
args+=(--opt "filename=${DOCKERFILE_NAME}")
fi
if [ -n "${TARGET:-}" ]; then
args+=(--opt "target=${TARGET}")
fi
for spec in ${BUILD_SECRETS:-}; do
# Opaque id=NAME,src=PATH -- buildkit reads the file, nothing is echoed.
args+=(--secret "${spec}")
done
if [ -n "${GIT_SHA:-}" ]; then
args+=(--opt "label:org.opencontainers.image.revision=${GIT_SHA}")
fi
if [ -n "${IMAGE_SOURCE:-}" ]; then
args+=(--opt "label:org.opencontainers.image.source=${IMAGE_SOURCE}")
fi
for kv in ${BUILD_ARGS:-}; do
args+=(--opt "build-arg:${kv}")
done
for kv in ${EXTRA_LABELS:-}; do
args+=(--opt "label:${kv}")
done
echo "build-image: building ${REF}"
buildctl --addr "$BUILDKIT_HOST" build "${args[@]}" --output "type=oci,dest=${TAR_FILE}"
# buildctl has no registry-push equivalent to `buildah push`, so skopeo copies
# the OCI archive up -- once per tag, from the same archive, so every tag points
# at bit-identical content.
push_tag() {
echo "build-image: pushing ${1}"
skopeo copy --dest-tls-verify=false "oci-archive:${TAR_FILE}" "docker://${1}"
}
push_tag "$REF"
if [ "$PUSH_LATEST" = "1" ]; then
push_tag "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$VERSION_TAG" ]; then
push_tag "${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${VERSION_TAG}"
fi
echo "✓ build-image: ${REF} pushed"
+53 -28
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ name: CD
push:
branches: [main]
tags: ["v*"]
# Docs-only pushes don't change the image — skip the build/deploy roll.
# (Only applies to branch pushes; tag pushes always trigger.)
paths-ignore:
- 'docs/**'
# gitea-mcp#68: without this a PR never got a CI run, so the risk/medium+
# PR lane merged on local `task check` alone. Only the check job runs for a
# PR -- build and deploy stay push/tag-only (no images, no infra writes,
# no secrets from a PR).
pull_request:
branches: [main]
env:
IMAGE: gitea-mcp
@@ -40,6 +50,7 @@ jobs:
build:
name: Build & Import
needs: check
if: github.event_name == 'push'
runs-on: self-hosted
outputs:
image-tag: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha-tag }}
@@ -48,43 +59,50 @@ jobs:
- name: Derive image tags
id: meta
env:
# signals#47: a ref name can carry $(...); pass it via env, not ${{ }}.
REF: ${{ github.ref }}
run: |
SHA=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)
echo "sha-tag=${SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
REF="${{ github.ref }}"
if [[ "$REF" == refs/tags/v* ]]; then
echo "version-tag=${REF#refs/tags/}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "version=${REF#refs/tags/}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
# The ldflags version stamp: git tag on a v* build, else short
# sha. Computed in shell rather than as a fallback expression in
# YAML, so it cannot depend on how the runner treats an empty step
# output -- a wrong VERSION would be baked into the binary silently.
#
# NOTE: no expression syntax in this comment, deliberately. act
# interpolates a run: block INCLUDING its comments, so prose
# containing that syntax is evaluated as an expression -- it failed
# with "Unavailable context: a", the step wrote no outputs, and the
# deploy job committed an empty image tag that broke Flux
# estate-wide (infra 51ceb7c).
echo "version=${SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
- name: Build and push to local registry
run: |
REGISTRY="localhost:5000"
REF="${REGISTRY}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha-tag }}"
buildah build \
--label "org.opencontainers.image.revision=${{ github.sha }}" \
--label "org.opencontainers.image.source=${{ github.repositoryUrl }}" \
-t ${REF} \
-t ${REGISTRY}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:latest \
.
buildah push --tls-verify=false ${REF}
buildah push --tls-verify=false ${REGISTRY}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:latest
[[ -n "${{ steps.meta.outputs.version-tag }}" ]] && \
buildah push --tls-verify=false \
${REF} \
${REGISTRY}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.version-tag }} || true
echo "✓ Image pushed to ${REF}"
# infra#309: implementation lives in .gitea/build-image.sh, a
# byte-identical copy of mathias/infra's ci-templates/build-image.sh.
# Do not edit it here -- edit the canonical file, run `task ci:sync`,
# and infra's drift gate names any repo still carrying an old copy.
env:
SHA_TAG: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha-tag }}
VERSION_TAG: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.version-tag }}
GIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
IMAGE_SOURCE: ${{ github.repositoryUrl }}
BUILD_ARGS: VERSION=${{ steps.meta.outputs.version }}
run: bash .gitea/build-image.sh
- name: Smoke test
run: |
REGISTRY="localhost:5000"
REF="${REGISTRY}/${{ env.IMAGE }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha-tag }}"
CNAME="smoke-${{ steps.meta.outputs.sha-tag }}"
sudo k3s ctr images pull --plain-http ${REF}
OUTPUT=$(timeout 5 sudo k3s ctr run --rm ${REF} ${CNAME} /gitea-mcp 2>&1 || true)
sudo k3s ctr containers delete ${CNAME} 2>/dev/null || true
echo "$OUTPUT" | grep -q "gitea-mcp" \
&& echo "✓ Smoke test passed" \
|| echo "⚠ Smoke test inconclusive: $OUTPUT"
# No smoke test here. The old one ran `sudo k3s ctr run` against the host's
# containerd: written for the Arch host runner, impossible in the
# containerized runner (infra#233) which has no sudo, no ctr and no
# containerd socket -- it failed with `sudo: command not found` the moment
# infra#241's buildctl migration let the build reach it. The deploy job's
# `Verify rollout` + `Confirm pod running new image` cover the same ground
# more strongly, which is why tapir dropped its smoke test too (infra#241).
# ── 3. Deploy via infra repo + Flux ─────────────────────────────────────────
deploy:
@@ -100,6 +118,13 @@ jobs:
DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.INFRA_DEPLOY_KEY }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# infra#311: fail on an empty tag BEFORE patching anything. The
# grep verification further down CANNOT catch it -- with IMAGE_TAG
# empty its pattern matches the very corruption it exists to reject.
# The result is `image: <repo>:` in the manifest, which is invalid
# YAML, so Flux fails the ENTIRE apps Kustomization and every app
# stops reconciling, not just this one. That happened on 2026-08-25.
[ -n "${IMAGE_TAG:-}" ] || { echo "IMAGE_TAG is empty - refusing to patch"; exit 1; }
mkdir -p ~/.ssh
echo "$DEPLOY_KEY" > ~/.ssh/id_infra
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
# Canonical golangci-lint configuration for the estate's Go repos (infra#309
# pattern: one canonical file here, a byte-identical copy in each adopter,
# and the drift gate in THIS repo comparing sha256).
#
# Why this exists: 26 Go repos, 3 had a lint config, and all three were
# different. The 23 without one ran golangci-lint's v2 default set, which
# does NOT include a formatter -- so gofmt/gofumpt drift went uncaught until
# it was found by hand (dma-cli#12: two files drifted, nothing flagged them).
#
# The two configs this replaces (cobalt-dingo, coo-agent) were near-identical
# copies of each other AND both invalid under v2: they carried v1-style
# `linters-settings` and `issues.exclude-rules` keys, which `golangci-lint
# config verify` rejects outright. Their revive settings and test exclusions
# were therefore not in effect. Consolidating fixes that too.
#
# Per-repo variation does NOT belong here -- this file must stay byte-identical
# across adopters so the gate is a checksum, not a diff a human has to judge.
# A repo with a genuine exception (agentsquad excludes its seeded-bug fixture
# tree, which exists precisely to contain broken code) keeps its own config and
# is not listed as an adopter.
version: "2"
linters:
default: none
enable:
- errcheck # unchecked errors
- govet # suspicious constructs
- staticcheck # broad static analysis
- unused # unused code
- misspell # spelling
- revive # idiomatic Go
- exhaustive # exhaustive switch on enums
settings:
revive:
rules:
- name: var-naming
severity: warning
exclusions:
rules:
# Test files: table-driven cases legitimately carry unused struct fields
# and long functions.
- path: _test\.go
linters:
- revive
- unused
formatters:
enable:
- gofumpt
+256 -47
View File
@@ -48,14 +48,51 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
logical change (one tool, one fix, one test) with passing tests. Main is always
deployable. Never create long-lived feature branches.
**Exception — parallel agents on same repo:** If another agent is known to be
actively working on the same repo simultaneously, create a short-lived branch
(`agent/<description>`), finish the task, and merge to main within the same
session. Do not leave agent branches open between sessions.
**The PR trigger is RISK, not concurrency.** `risk/low` work commits straight to
main with CI as the gate — that is most work and is unchanged. `risk/medium` and
above opens a PR, even solo, even with nobody waiting to review it. This mirrors
the tiered merge model in `assessor-loop`
`method/transfer-to-a-regulated-organisation.md` §4.1, so the estate practises
what it sells instead of merging everything on green and claiming otherwise.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use
PR flow only when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document
the reason in PROJECT.md.
**Concurrency is NOT a reason to branch.** Measured 2026-08-29 across three real
collisions between parallel sessions: two were not branching problems at all — a
generated artifact written to the same path by both (branching turns that into a
merge conflict on a 33k-line JSON), and uncommitted work in a shared checkout
(a per-session worktree fixes it) — and the third was an ordinary non-fast-forward
push resolved by rebase in seconds. Use a worktree per session on shared repos and
timestamp generated artifacts. Do not reach for a branch.
Branch+PR flow carries documented costs on solo repos: merging auto-closes gated
issues, review comments live on a thread separate from the issue's, and a
merged-and-deleted branch cannot be amended (brain:
`gitea-pr-merge-autoclose-and-review-comment-footguns`). Those are the price of
the `risk/medium`+ lane — paid deliberately, not incurred by accident.
**Exception — external contributor or client four-eyes requirement:** Use PR flow
when a human reviewer outside the project is required. Document the reason in
PROJECT.md.
**Exception — a GitOps repo where a branch cannot be reconciled.** In a repo whose
deployment watches one branch (`mathias/infra`: Flux watches `main`), a branch is
invisible to the thing that applies it. A `risk/medium` change to `alerts.yaml` or
`litellm-config.yaml` can be linted on a branch but never *exercised* there, so a
PR would buy a review of a state that was never deployed.
There, `risk/medium`+ work stays on `main` and instead requires a **recorded
adversarial review pass before the push** — `skills:pr-gatekeeper` or equivalent,
reviewing the staged diff. **The reviewer's verdict goes in the issue, not a PR
thread.** No verdict recorded means the lane was not used, and saying "the gate was
green" is not the same claim.
Be honest about what this is: a recorded *independent* pass, not four-eyes in the
sense `assessor-loop` §4.1 means for a regulated organisation, because the reviewer
is an agent. It is more than the repo had and less than the model it mirrors; do not
describe it as the stronger property. (infra#470, decided 2026-09-29.)
This lane depends on the `risk/` label being right. A label that triggers a heavier
lane is load-bearing, not cosmetic — if work that belongs in it is unlabelled, the
lane silently does not apply.
6. **Close the loop — every substantive task ends with the same ritual.** Shipping
the code is not the end of the task; capturing it is. Run this unprompted:
@@ -73,6 +110,120 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
- Surface the brain entries and issue numbers in the closing summary so the
trail is auditable.
**Chat is not a durable store. Never rely on Mathias remembering anything.**
Every gap, caveat, risk, open question and next step must land in one of four
places before the turn ends: **the brain**, **a repo** (code, docs, ADR),
**a tracker issue**, or **a plan file**. A finding stated only in conversation is
lost the moment the session closes — and this estate has repeatedly proved that a
remembered convention is an unreliable control.
This applies hardest to what is tempting to leave as a closing remark: "worth
knowing X isn't enforced yet", "this is a convention, not a gate", "we should
revisit Y". Those are exactly the items that need a locator. If it is worth
saying in a summary, it is worth writing where it can be found again without you.
7. **Finish what's closable — only involve me for a genuine call.** If a
tracker issue, PR, or checklist item is demonstrably resolved — the fix
landed, the state changed, you verified it live — close/merge/check it off
in the same turn. Don't leave it open "for the record" or park it waiting
on me to confirm something that already happened; that's bookkeeping, not
a decision. Reserve asking me (`AskUserQuestion`, a `DECISION NEEDED`
comment, or otherwise pausing) for when it's genuinely mine to call:
irreversible or prod/host-impacting actions, a real judgment call with no
clearly-better option, ambiguous intent, or anything secret-writes/
destructive-git already gate. Before claiming something is closable,
verify it live (re-check the issue, re-run the command) rather than
trusting your own earlier summary (brain: `filed-issue-not-same-as-fixed`).
8. **Control code needs an adversary, not a checklist.** Code whose job is to
refuse, deny, gate or contain is not adequately verified by a green gate.
Rule 5 makes CI the quality gate and that holds for ordinary work — but a
passing suite only asserts what its author already thought of, and for a
control the author is precisely the person whose imagination just failed.
Measured on `dispatch#75`: five review rounds, five real escapes verified by
execution, and **CI was green on every one of them** while `git rm
././.dispatch-allow` deleted the file the control existed to protect. So
route this work through a review with authority to block, instructed to
verify by execution rather than by reading the implementation. Expect to be
blocked more than once; that is the control working, not the reviewer being
difficult. (brain: `a-green-gate-is-not-evidence-for-control-code`; the
practices live in the `pr-gatekeeper` agent.)
9. **A test's name must not claim more than its assertions prove.** Name a test
after the mechanism it observes, not the goal it serves.
`DoesNotInheritEnv` is honest; `IsContained` is a claim the test cannot
support. This is not pedantry about naming — when name and assertion
diverge, the name wins in the reader's head and the gap becomes invisible,
which is what lets the defect survive review. Found three times in one PR,
twice in tests written to fix the previous instance of it; each passed while
the thing it was named for was exploitable. If you cannot name the mechanism,
you do not yet know what the test observes.
10. **Short sessions, one rc per repo, edit only in a locked worktree of the repo
you are changing** (ADR-0002, accepted 2026-10-06).
- One session per issue or task, ending with rule 6's close ritual. Related
issues may share a session only when they share a worktree and an owner.
State that must outlive the session goes in an issue, not the chat.
- Start `claude rc` in the repo you will edit (`infra`, `trucker-ecommerce`,
`hyperguild`, ...), not in `~/dev`: the rc worktree is a worktree of the
launch directory's repo, so launched from `~/dev` it protects nothing you
edit (measured: 73% of edits landed in shared checkouts). Start it only
while working there.
- Keep at most one thin `~/dev` coordinator session. It files issues and hands
out tasks; it reads and edits no sub-repo code.
- Split cross-repo work per repo. The contract between the halves lives in an
issue on each repo.
- Edit in a worktree of that repo, locked at creation:
`scripts/wt.sh add <repo> <task>` does it (fetch, `wt/<task>` from origin/main, lock);
`scripts/wt.sh done <repo>-<task>` removes it after the push and refuses dirty or
unpushed work. By hand: `git worktree add ~/worktrees/<name> -b <branch> origin/main`
then `git worktree lock --reason "manual: <purpose>" ~/worktrees/<name>`.
- Before working a repo another session may touch, announce your issue list to
that session (`SendMessage`) and ask for theirs.
- Auto-memory is keyed by cwd, so a repo rc starts without it. Cross-repo
working rules live in brain (`wiki/homelab/decisions/2026-10-06-062416-auto.md`, wing homelab, hall
decisions) and the section below, not in per-directory memory.
## Standing footguns
Each cost real time once. Detail and evidence: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/2026-10-06-062416-auto.md` (title standing-working-rules).
- **Gate then commit with `&&`, never `;`.** "Green" means exit code 0 and
`grep -c FAIL` is 0, not a filtered grep.
- **Stage by path, never `git add -A` or `git add .`** (they stage from the repo
root and swept in other sessions' work twice). Check `git status --porcelain` first.
- **Before committing in a shared checkout:** `git branch --show-current`.
- **Before tagging:** `git fetch origin --tags`, then `git describe --tags --abbrev=0 <sha>`
and `git tag --sort=-v:refname | head`; go above both. Never take the last tag
from a report.
- **Run only what the project's gate runs.** No repo-wide formatter unless the gate
runs it.
- **Reproduce a CI red at the cited commit before applying an issue's prescribed fix.**
- **Read an issue's comments (`issue_list_comments`), not just its body, before working it.**
- **A comment naming a control ("behind branch protection") is not evidence; query
the control.** A working detector can hide a missing preventer.
- **On koala the MCP servers are `mcp__plugin_skills_{brain,gitea,infra}__*`.** The
per-turn auth reminder is not evidence; call the tool or run `claude mcp list`.
Brain writes always pass `wing` + `hall`.
- **`cat /etc/hostname` before assuming which host you are on.**
- **Never run bare `git remote -v` or `git config --list`** (url.insteadOf expands
into a live token); use `git config --get remote.origin.url`.
- **On koala `sudo` is denied outright; k8s exec, env dumps and flux reconcile need
per-action approval; decrypting a SOPS file and printing in one Bash call is
hook-blocked.** Do the repo-side work and hand the host-side step over in an issue.
- **`set -o pipefail` plus an optional `grep | head | awk` dies on no match:** append `|| true`.
- **Gitea `file_write_branch` takes plain text, not base64.**
- **`OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN` in the shell is read-only for `op`.** Operational
secrets go in the AgentSecrets vault via `set -a; . ~/.op-agent-write.env; set +a`.
## CAD sprint patterns
Two CAD sprint archetypes (defs: brain `wiki/homelab/decisions/continuous-agentic-development-cad-concept-2026-06-16`):
- **Inception Sprint** — birth a new repo. Oath-gated close; tag only once every clause holds. Brain: `.../inception-sprint-and-oath`.
- **Sweep Sprint** — clear an existing backlog. Parallel read-only research per issue → sequential one-issue-per-commit execution. Brain: `.../sweep-sprint-and-oath`.
Shared: decisions that are yours, not the agent's, surface as `DECISION NEEDED` (question/options/recommendation/blocks) — ask live if you're present, else comment and wait, never act past it. Live-breaking regressions get `git revert`, never forward-fixed; host-network work skips even read-only research (solo, synchronous, you present). Rule 6's closing ritual only fires once every Oath clause genuinely holds — blocked = descoped-and-tracked, never marked done.
## Default stack
| Layer | Default | Fallback | Last resort |
@@ -83,7 +234,7 @@ These rules apply to every task across every project, regardless of harness.
| Containers | Docker Compose (dev), k3s (prod) | — | — |
| DB | PostgreSQL + sqlc | SQLite | — |
| Search | pgvector (vector), BM25 | Qdrant (when >1M vectors or hybrid retrieval) | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | — | — |
| Logging | slog (structured) | stdlib `logging` w/ structured `extra=` (or structlog) | — |
| Testing | Table-driven, testify | — | — |
| Agents (Go) | google.golang.org/adk + pkg/litellm adapter | — | — |
@@ -92,7 +243,12 @@ Exploratory: Rust, Zig — I'll tell you when I want these.
## Code conventions
- **Go style**: golines, gofumpt, golangci-lint
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return
- **Python style** (fallback language): ruff (format+lint, one tool), mypy --strict (non-negotiable,
matches Go's static typing discipline), pytest + pytest-cov (table-driven via
`@pytest.mark.parametrize`), uv (venv+deps+lock, one tool), pydantic-settings (typed env-var config
— same principle as Go's typed structs), src-layout + `pyproject.toml` only (no `setup.py`)
- **Errors**: `fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err)` — never naked, never log-and-return.
Python: `raise X from e` (exception chaining, same principle) — never bare `except`, never silent `pass`
- **Naming**: stdlib conventions, no stuttering
- **Architecture**: prefer stdlib over frameworks, constructor injection, env-var config parsed into typed structs
- **Git**: conventional commits (`feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`), commit directly to main,
@@ -130,35 +286,30 @@ Three machines on Tailscale:
|---------|------|-----------|
| koala | GPU inference, heavy compute | RTX 5070, runs k3s + llama-swap + shared postgres18/pgvector |
| iguana | Services, builds | M2 Ultra Mac |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Mac mini, ~/dev is here |
| flamingo | Daily driver, edge | Apple Silicon Mac, ~/dev is here |
- **Model routing**: LiteLLM in front of llama-swap (local) + cloud APIs (when permitted)
- **Orchestration**: k3s cluster across all three machines
- **Orchestration**: k3s on koala only — single control-plane node, no workers (verified 2026-08-30). iguana and flamingo are on the tailnet but are not cluster members
- **Networking**: Tailscale mesh
## Project landscape
All development repos live at `~/dev/` (softlink from `~/Documents/local-dev/`).
Organized in thematic folders:
Organized by **role**, because the role decides which rules apply (ADR-0003):
| Folder | Focus | Count |
|--------|-------|-------|
| `GO/` | Go web frameworks, API integrations, learning projects | ~10 |
| `AI/` | ML research, AI frameworks (FinRL, DSPy, crawl4ai) | ~6 |
| `AGENTS/` | Autonomous agents, coding agents, MCP servers, infra | ~15 |
| `QKX/` | Invoice processing, financial automation, payment systems | ~13 |
| `XT/` | Climate data, sustainability (Klimatkollen, Garbo) | ~2 |
| Folder | Role | Rules that key off it |
|--------|------|-----------------------|
| `platform/` | infra, brain, hyperguild, gitea-mcp, dispatch, shared tooling | control code (rule 8), GitOps review lane |
| `products/` | tapir, cobalt-dingo, openbanking-api, ... | ordinary trunk-based work |
| `clients/` | client work | local models only, never cloud APIs (Client work rules) |
| `spikes/` | throwaway | no ceremony |
See `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` for detailed descriptions of each project.
### Key active projects
- **super-koala** (`AGENTS/`) — multi-component agent stack with LangGraph, DSPy, MCP
- **azure-tiger** (`QKX/`) — invoice extraction → ISO 20022 payment instructions
- **gocrwl** (`AGENTS/`) — Go web crawler with containerized deployment
- **koala-ai-stack** (`AGENTS/`) — local AI server infrastructure management
- **klimatkollen** (`XT/`) — Swedish municipal climate data platform
New projects are born into a role folder (`task new-project -- <name> <client|personal>
<role-folder>`); a client tag requires `clients/` and `clients/` requires a client tag.
Existing repos still sit in the old `AGENTS/` and `AI/` folders until they are moved one by
one (ADR-0003 step 3). `~/dev/PROJECT_SUMMARY.md` (generated) lists every repo and where it
is. How a session runs on koala (worktrees, rc per repo, the reaper, memory): `docs/working-on-koala.md`.
## Knowledge base — actively use it
@@ -200,10 +351,16 @@ entries that age well are about *why*, *how to avoid*, and *what to do when*.
|---------|-------|-------|
| **Claude Code, Claude Desktop** | `brain_query` (BM25), `brain_answer` (LLM-synth + sources) MCP tools | `brain_write` MCP tool |
| **Crush, Pi, Antigravity, other MCP-capable** | same MCP server: `ingestion-brain` (via the `mcp__*_brain__*` namespace once authenticated) | same |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | `POST https://brain-mcp.d-ma.be/query` with `{"query":"..."}` (auth via `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN`) | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","filename":"..."}` |
| **Anything HTTP-only (curl, scripts)** | Tailnet only: `POST https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8443/query` with `{"query":"..."}`, sending `BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN` (not yet enforced on REST, hyperguild#149). The public `brain-mcp.d-ma.be` serves `/mcp` only (infra#517). | `POST .../write` with `{"content":"...","wing":"...","hall":"..."}` |
| **Browser / human inspection** | `https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/hyperguild` → `knowledge/` and `wiki/` markdown files |
- **Scoping**: defaults to `public` collection; client projects filter to `{client}` + `public`.
- **Scoping — the brain holds no confidential client content.** Nothing on the read path
filters by client: every token holder can read every wing, and `wing` on `brain_query`
is an optional argument, not an access control. Client confidentiality is enforced only
at write time (`capture`'s I1 gate refuses internal/confidential). So never `brain_write`
client material; generalise it first or keep it in the client's own repo. (hyperguild#144,
decided 2026-10-01. This line previously claimed client projects were filtered; they
were not.)
- **Routing**: brain_answer's LLM uses berget.ai as primary, iguana ollama as
fallback. Both are configurable in the `supervisor/ingestion-deployment.yaml`
on the koala k3s cluster; don't hardcode local-only model names into the
@@ -229,10 +386,11 @@ When working on a project tagged with a client name:
## Harness-agnostic principles
This context is designed to work with any AI coding tool:
- Claude Code, Cursor, Aider, Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods/Crush
- Pi Coding Agent, Mistral Vibe, Antigravity
- Any tool that accepts a system prompt or reads a markdown context file
Supported harnesses (2026-09-01) — Cursor and Aider were dropped; do not
re-add adapters for them:
- Claude Code, Antigravity, OpenCode, Mistral Vibe, Crush, Pi Coding Agent
- Open WebUI, Charmbracelet Mods, or any tool that takes a system prompt string
- Any other tool that reads `AGENTS.md`, which is the de facto convention
The canonical source is always `.context/AGENT.md` (root) and `.context/PROJECT.md` (per-project).
Derived files are committed (see *How context propagates* below) so a `git pull` on any host yields full agent context with no setup.
@@ -244,26 +402,65 @@ Canonical sources of truth:
- Project: `<repo>/.context/PROJECT.md` (per-repo)
Derived files (committed, regenerated by `task context:sync`):
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md`,
`.context/system-prompt.txt`
- `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.context/system-prompt.txt`
Repos still carrying `.cursorrules`, `.aider.conventions.md` or
`.aider.conf.yml` are stale: nothing regenerates them. Delete them the next time
you touch the repo, along with their entries in that repo's `task check`
assertion.
Workflow:
1. Edit a canonical file. Run `task context:sync`. Commit canonical and
derived together. Push.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Claude Code (tree-walking)
uses `CLAUDE.md`; Crush / Pi / Antigravity (cwd-only) use `AGENTS.md`;
Cursor uses `.cursorrules`; Aider uses `.aider.conventions.md`.
2. On any other host, `git pull` brings both. Which file a harness reads does
NOT split cleanly by lookup strategy, so do not reason from the strategy:
- `CLAUDE.md` — Claude Code (walks up the tree)
- `AGENTS.md` — Crush, Pi, Antigravity (cwd-only), OpenCode (project root,
global at `~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md`), and Mistral Vibe, which **walks
up** from cwd and takes the first `AGENTS.md` it finds
(user-level `~/.vibe/AGENTS.md`)
- `.context/system-prompt.txt` — Open WebUI, Mods, raw API calls; not read by
any harness, it is for pasting
Vibe tree-walks for `AGENTS.md`, so "tree-walkers use CLAUDE.md" is false.
Each repo's `AGENTS.md` embeds the canonical and is the first one found from
inside that repo, so this works — but by construction, not by luck.
3. `task check` runs `context:sync` then asserts `git status --porcelain`
is empty over the derived files (catches both modified-tracked drift
and missing-untracked adapters). A drift fails the check with a
message telling you to stage the regenerated files.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply
unconditionally on every host, every harness.
Behavior rules in this file and per-project rules in `PROJECT.md` apply on every
host and every harness.
**Where a project rule contradicts a rule here, the project rule governs — and it
must state its reason.** Both halves matter: the project file wins because it knows
something this file cannot (infra's Flux constraint is real and not visible from
here), and it must say why because a bare override is indistinguishable from drift.
This replaces the previous wording, which said rules here and in `PROJECT.md` both
apply *"unconditionally"*. That was not a tiebreak but a contradiction, and it went
unnoticed until rule 5 and infra's "never create feature branches" had to be obeyed
at the same time (infra#470). A standard can hold two individually sensible clauses
that are jointly unsatisfiable, and survive for as long as everyone reads it
charitably — the same failure the Inception Sprint Oath's G6 had.
## Engineering Skills
Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. See `~/dev/.skills/SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
Shared engineering skills live in the **`mathias/skills`** repo (`git.d-ma.be/mathias/skills`). Load at task start — not "on demand" but on schedule, before writing code. Browse `SKILLS_INDEX.md` for the full list.
**Claude Code** installs the repo as a plugin from the marketplace the same repo hosts. That path also carries the `secret-guard` and `pre-task-ritual` hooks and the brain/gitea/infra MCP servers, which symlinks cannot:
```
/plugin marketplace add https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/skills.git
/plugin install skills@mathias
```
Skills are **namespaced** under Claude Code: load `tdd` as `skills:tdd`. The trigger table below uses bare names — prefix them.
**Crush, Pi and OpenCode** have no plugin system and are wired by `install.sh` as one directory symlink per harness via `~/.agents/skills`. Do not clone the checkout into `~/dev`: that folder is iCloud-shared between the Macs and spans two path roots (`/Users/mathias` vs `/home/mathias` on koala), so a checkout there is a git working tree with two concurrent writers, and any absolute symlink stored in it is broken on one side by construction (skills#23). Leave `SKILLS_CHECKOUT_DIR` at its host-local default.
Check a host with `task doctor` in the skills repo; it also runs automatically at session start via the plugin.
**Skill trigger table — load before starting, not after getting stuck:**
@@ -288,7 +485,7 @@ Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Repo**: https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
@@ -316,9 +513,9 @@ Shared engineering skills are available in `~/dev/.skills/`. Load at task start
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- **Trunk-Based Development:** one logical change per commit, merged to main by PR (`main` is protected, see below).
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Short-lived branches and PRs are how work reaches `main` here (`tbd_ship`/`pr_merge`); no long-lived feature branches.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
@@ -358,8 +555,8 @@ When acting as a coding agent on this project:
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
6. Ship by PR (`main` is protected, see below). Run `task check` before every push. Never create
long-lived feature branches.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
@@ -384,3 +581,15 @@ Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
## `main` is protected: ship by PR (local-dev#42, decided 2026-10-08)
Gitea refuses direct pushes to `main` in this repo, and a PR merges only after its CI status (`CD / Lint / Test / Vet (pull_request)`) passes.
**Why:** local-dev rule 5's reviewed lane (risk/medium+ is reviewed by a human) was enforced on the merge tools
(`tbd_ship`, `pr_merge`: gitea-mcp v0.17.0/v0.18.0, merge only for an issue labelled exactly `risk/low` with green CI)
but not on a direct commit to `main`, which bypassed it. This overrides rule 5's "risk/low commits straight to main"
for this repo; control code is where the lane matters.
**How:** `tbd_ship` for a one-file change, or branch -> PR -> `pr_merge` (name the `risk/low` issue); above `risk/low`
open the PR and a human merges it in the Gitea UI after review. Tags are not protected. CD jobs push image tags to
the **infra** repo with deploy keys, never to this repo's `main`. Undo (Mathias only): Settings -> Branches, or
`PATCH /repos/mathias/gitea-mcp/branch_protections/main {"enable_push": true}`.
+17 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
- **Name**: gitea-mcp
- **Owner**: Mathias
- **Client**: personal
- **Repo**: https://gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Repo**: https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
- **Status**: active
## Stack
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@
### Git
- Conventional commits: `feat:`, `fix:`, `chore:`, `docs:`, `refactor:`
- **Trunk-Based Development:** commit directly to main. One logical change per commit.
- **Trunk-Based Development:** one logical change per commit, merged to main by PR (`main` is protected, see below).
- Run `task check` locally before every push. CI is the quality gate, not branch protection.
- No feature branches, no PRs for solo/agent work.
- Short-lived branches and PRs are how work reaches `main` here (`tbd_ship`/`pr_merge`); no long-lived feature branches.
- Exception: if a parallel agent session is active on this repo, use a short-lived
`agent/<description>` branch and merge within the same session.
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ When acting as a coding agent on this project:
3. If unsure about a convention, check `DECISIONS.md` or ask
4. Never modify files outside the project root without explicit permission
5. When adding a dependency, explain why in the commit message
6. Commit directly to main. Run `task check` before every push. Never create
feature branches unless a parallel agent is simultaneously active on this repo.
6. Ship by PR (`main` is protected, see below). Run `task check` before every push. Never create
long-lived feature branches.
7. For client projects: never send code or context to cloud APIs — use local models via LiteLLM
## Current state — v0.2.5 (2026-05-17)
@@ -105,3 +105,15 @@ Current main: `e31fd3f`. CI green. Deployed via Flux.
2. **Issue #19** — end-to-end mirror flow verification.
`repo_mirror_push` is implemented but the full flow (create repo → add push mirror → verify sync to GitHub) has not been tested manually. Do this before relying on it in production.
## `main` is protected: ship by PR (local-dev#42, decided 2026-10-08)
Gitea refuses direct pushes to `main` in this repo, and a PR merges only after its CI status (`CD / Lint / Test / Vet (pull_request)`) passes.
**Why:** local-dev rule 5's reviewed lane (risk/medium+ is reviewed by a human) was enforced on the merge tools
(`tbd_ship`, `pr_merge`: gitea-mcp v0.17.0/v0.18.0, merge only for an issue labelled exactly `risk/low` with green CI)
but not on a direct commit to `main`, which bypassed it. This overrides rule 5's "risk/low commits straight to main"
for this repo; control code is where the lane matters.
**How:** `tbd_ship` for a one-file change, or branch -> PR -> `pr_merge` (name the `risk/low` issue); above `risk/low`
open the PR and a human merges it in the Gitea UI after review. Tags are not protected. CD jobs push image tags to
the **infra** repo with deploy keys, never to this repo's `main`. Undo (Mathias only): Settings -> Branches, or
`PATCH /repos/mathias/gitea-mcp/branch_protections/main {"enable_push": true}`.
+7 -4
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,23 @@
FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS build
WORKDIR /src
# Fetch internal gitea-hosted Go modules (e.g. mcp-chassis) without going
# Fetch internal git-hosted Go modules (e.g. mcp-chassis) without going
# through proxy.golang.org and without HTTP→HTTPS surprises. Gitea returns
# http:// in its go-import meta tag, so rewrite to https here and bypass
# the module proxy + sumdb.
RUN apk add --no-cache git && \
git config --global url."https://gitea.d-ma.be/".insteadOf "http://gitea.d-ma.be/"
ENV GOPRIVATE=gitea.d-ma.be
git config --global url."https://git.d-ma.be/".insteadOf "http://git.d-ma.be/"
ENV GOPRIVATE=git.d-ma.be
ENV GOPROXY=direct
ENV GOSUMDB=off
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags='-s -w' -o /out/gitea-mcp ./cmd/gitea-mcp
# Build version stamped in by CI (--build-arg VERSION=<tag|sha>); defaults to
# "dev" for a plain `docker build` (#47).
ARG VERSION=dev
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${VERSION}" -o /out/gitea-mcp ./cmd/gitea-mcp
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot
COPY --from=build /out/gitea-mcp /gitea-mcp
+2 -4
View File
@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ tasks:
echo "✓ context sync: skipped in CI"
else
bash scripts/context-sync.sh
drift=$(git status --porcelain -- AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .cursorrules .aider.conventions.md .context/system-prompt.txt 2>/dev/null)
drift=$(git status --porcelain -- AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .context/system-prompt.txt 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$drift" ]; then
echo "ERROR: derived adapters drifted from canonical context." >&2
echo "$drift" >&2
echo "" >&2
echo "Run: git add AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .cursorrules .aider.conventions.md .context/system-prompt.txt" >&2
echo "Run: git add AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .context/system-prompt.txt" >&2
echo " git commit -m 'chore: re-sync context adapters'" >&2
exit 1
fi
@@ -58,5 +58,3 @@ tasks:
cmds: [bash scripts/context-sync.sh claude]
context:sync:agents:
cmds: [bash scripts/context-sync.sh agents]
context:sync:cursor:
cmds: [bash scripts/context-sync.sh cursor]
+77
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
// Command gitea-admin-mcp is a LOCAL-ONLY stdio MCP server exposing exactly
// one tool: mint_service_account_token.
//
// This exists because dispatch#67 fix #2 hit a hard wall: Gitea's own
// token-creation and admin-user endpoints reject token auth outright — an
// existing API token cannot create another token, or a new account, by
// design (a leaked token being usable to escalate would defeat the point of
// scoping it). The only way through is real basic auth as an actual admin,
// which a sandboxed agent session cannot safely hold. This binary is meant
// to be spawned by a LOCAL Claude Code session (or run by hand) on a machine
// with real, interactive 1Password access — configured as a stdio MCP
// server in .mcp.json, or invoked directly.
//
// Deliberately NOT part of cmd/gitea-mcp (the shared HTTP server): the
// capability here (reset a target account's password, mint it a token) is
// far too dangerous to ever expose over the network, even behind OIDC.
// internal/localtools is a separate package specifically so it can never be
// wired into that server's RegisterAll by accident.
//
// Required env (fetch admin credentials just-in-time, e.g. via
// `op run --env-file ~/.op-env -- gitea-admin-mcp`):
//
// GITEA_BASE_URL e.g. https://git.d-ma.be
// GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME a real site-admin account's username
// GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD that account's real password
// OP_VAULT 1Password vault to store minted tokens in
// (default: AgentSecrets, per the estate's agent-governed
// ops-secrets policy)
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/localtools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
func envOr(key, def string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return def
}
func main() {
// Logs to stderr, never stdout — stdout is the MCP JSON-RPC channel, and
// a stray log line there would corrupt the protocol stream.
logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stderr, nil))
baseURL := os.Getenv("GITEA_BASE_URL")
adminUser := os.Getenv("GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME")
adminPass := os.Getenv("GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD")
if baseURL == "" || adminUser == "" || adminPass == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "GITEA_BASE_URL, GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME, and GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD are all required")
os.Exit(1)
}
b := adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper{
BaseURL: baseURL,
AdminUsername: adminUser,
AdminPassword: adminPass,
Secrets: localtools.OpSecretStore{Vault: envOr("OP_VAULT", "AgentSecrets")},
}
reg := registry.New()
reg.Register(localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(b))
if err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, os.Stdin, os.Stdout); err != nil {
logger.Error("serve stdio", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
+61 -8
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
)
@@ -22,15 +23,67 @@ type jwtStatus struct {
LastError string `json:"last_error,omitempty"`
}
func newHealthzHandler(dexConfigured, validatorReady bool, initErr error) http.HandlerFunc {
status := healthStatus{OK: true, JWT: jwtStatus{Status: jwtStatusFor(dexConfigured, validatorReady)}}
if initErr != nil {
status.JWT.LastError = initErr.Error()
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(status)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// readinessFn reports whether JWT validation is currently possible, and why
// not. chassisauth.JWTValidator.Ready satisfies it.
type readinessFn func(context.Context) (bool, error)
// newHealthzHandler reports the CURRENT state, evaluated per request.
//
// It used to marshal one body at startup and serve those bytes forever. That is
// how gitea-mcp reported jwt.status=degraded for six days after Authentik had
// recovered (mcp-chassis#4): the answer was computed before the IdP was up and
// could never change. Fixing the validator alone would not have fixed this —
// the validator would recover and /healthz would keep saying degraded.
//
// Calling ready() per request is also what drives recovery: the chassis resolves
// a pending issuer on demand, so every probe is a retry.
func newHealthzHandler(dexConfigured bool, ready readinessFn) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
status := healthStatus{OK: true, JWT: jwtStatus{Status: "disabled"}}
if dexConfigured {
ok, err := ready(r.Context())
status.JWT.Status = jwtStatusFor(true, ok)
if err != nil {
status.JWT.LastError = err.Error()
}
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write(body)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(status)
}
}
// newReadyzHandler is the kubelet's probe: 503 while JWT auth is degraded.
//
// /healthz stays 200 deliberately — the process is alive and a liveness probe
// must not restart it, because restarting does not make the IdP come back any
// sooner. Readiness is the right lever: k8s stops routing OAuth callers to a pod
// that would 401 them, and the probe's own cadence becomes the retry loop with
// no background goroutine to own.
//
// A server with no issuer configured is always ready. Making readiness depend on
// an issuer it was never given would pull every static-token-only MCP out of its
// Service.
func newReadyzHandler(dexConfigured bool, ready readinessFn) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !dexConfigured {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
ok, err := ready(r.Context())
if !ok {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
msg := ""
if err != nil {
msg = err.Error()
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(healthStatus{
OK: false,
JWT: jwtStatus{Status: "degraded", LastError: msg},
})
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// readinessFunc is what the handler asks. Named here so the test can drive it.
type fakeReadiness struct{ calls int }
// ready reports not-ready on the first call and ready afterwards — the shape of
// an IdP that was down when the process booted and came back a minute later.
func (f *fakeReadiness) ready(context.Context) (bool, error) {
f.calls++
if f.calls == 1 {
return false, errBoot
}
return true, nil
}
var errBoot = &bootErr{}
type bootErr struct{}
func (*bootErr) Error() string { return "oidc discovery: status 503" }
// A health endpoint that answers from a value captured at startup is not a
// health endpoint.
//
// newHealthzHandler marshalled its body ONCE and served the same bytes for the
// process lifetime. On 2026-09-14 gitea-mcp reported jwt.status=degraded for six
// days after Authentik recovered, because the answer had been computed before
// Authentik was up and could never change. The pod was 1/1 Running and
// readiness-green throughout.
//
// Fixing mcp-chassis#4 alone does not fix this: the validator would recover and
// /healthz would keep saying degraded.
func TestHealthz_ReflectsCurrentState_NotBootState(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeReadiness{}
h := newHealthzHandler(true, f.ready)
first := decodeHealth(t, h)
require.Equal(t, "degraded", first.JWT.Status, "first call: issuer still down")
require.NotEmpty(t, first.JWT.LastError, "degraded must say why")
second := decodeHealth(t, h)
require.Equal(t, "enabled", second.JWT.Status,
"the issuer recovered; /healthz must notice without a restart")
require.Empty(t, second.JWT.LastError)
require.Equal(t, 2, f.calls, "readiness must be evaluated per request, not cached at startup")
}
// With no issuer configured, JWT auth is disabled by choice and readiness is
// never consulted — a static-token-only server must not be reported degraded.
func TestHealthz_NoIssuer_IsDisabledNotDegraded(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeReadiness{}
h := newHealthzHandler(false, f.ready)
got := decodeHealth(t, h)
require.Equal(t, "disabled", got.JWT.Status)
require.Zero(t, f.calls, "no issuer configured means nothing to probe")
}
// readyz is what the kubelet probes. It must FAIL while JWT auth is degraded, so
// k8s stops routing to a pod that will 401 every OAuth caller — and so the
// probe's own cadence becomes the retry loop.
func TestReadyz_FailsWhileDegraded_ThenPasses(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeReadiness{}
h := newReadyzHandler(true, f.ready)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, rec.Code,
"a pod that cannot validate any JWT must not be in the Service")
rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "recovered without a restart")
}
// A static-token-only server is always ready. Making readyz depend on an issuer
// it was never given would take every static-only MCP out of its Service.
func TestReadyz_NoIssuer_AlwaysReady(t *testing.T) {
f := &fakeReadiness{}
h := newReadyzHandler(false, f.ready)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/readyz", nil))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
require.Zero(t, f.calls)
}
func decodeHealth(t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) healthStatus {
t.Helper()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
var got healthStatus
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
return got
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
@@ -43,7 +44,11 @@ func TestHealthzHandler(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
h := newHealthzHandler(tc.dexConfigured, tc.validatorReady, tc.initErr)
// Readiness is now a function the handler calls per request rather
// than two values captured at startup (mcp-chassis#4). The cases
// below are unchanged; only how the state reaches the handler is.
ready := func(context.Context) (bool, error) { return tc.validatorReady, tc.initErr }
h := newHealthzHandler(tc.dexConfigured, ready)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/healthz", nil))
+55
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
package main
import (
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
saCAFile = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
saTokenFile = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token" //nolint:gosec // path, not a secret
)
// k8sBearerRT adds this pod's ServiceAccount bearer to every request. k3s serves
// its OIDC discovery/JWKS over the cluster CA and requires an AUTHENTICATED
// request (anonymous is 401), so the JWKS fetch must carry a token — ADR-0011.
type k8sBearerRT struct {
token string
base http.RoundTripper
}
func (b k8sBearerRT) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+b.token)
return b.base.RoundTrip(r)
}
// k8sOIDCClient builds an HTTP client that can reach the in-cluster k8s OIDC
// discovery + JWKS: it trusts the cluster CA and carries this pod's SA bearer.
// Returns an error (not running in a pod, files unreadable) so the caller can
// skip the k8s issuer without disabling other auth.
func k8sOIDCClient() (*http.Client, error) {
ca, err := os.ReadFile(saCAFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read cluster CA: %w", err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(ca) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse cluster CA: no certs in %s", saCAFile)
}
tok, err := os.ReadFile(saTokenFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read SA token: %w", err)
}
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
Transport: k8sBearerRT{
token: strings.TrimSpace(string(tok)),
base: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}},
},
}, nil
}
+53 -14
View File
@@ -9,17 +9,25 @@ import (
chassisauth "git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis/auth"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/config"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/config"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
)
// version is the build version, overridable via -ldflags "-X main.version=<tag>".
// Defaults to "dev" for local / un-stamped builds (was a hardcoded, drifting
// "0.1.0" — it now tells the truth instead of a stale literal).
var version = "dev"
func main() {
logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
// Route the chassis's package-level slog (auth audit logs, gitea-mcp#9) through
// the same structured handler as the rest of the server.
slog.SetDefault(logger)
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
@@ -29,9 +37,34 @@ func main() {
ctx := context.Background()
jwtValidator, jwtInitErr := chassisauth.NewJWTValidator(ctx, cfg.DexIssuerURL, cfg.MCPAudience)
if jwtInitErr != nil {
logger.Warn("jwt validator init failed; JWT auth degraded", "err", jwtInitErr)
// Build the trusted-issuer list. Authentik (DEX_ISSUER_URL) for interactive/
// web clients; the in-cluster k8s OIDC issuer for ServiceAccount tokens
// (ADR-0011 D1). The k8s issuer is ADDITIVE and best-effort: if its client
// can't be built (not in a pod) or its discovery is unreachable at startup,
// it is dropped so existing Authentik/static auth is never taken down.
var issuers []chassisauth.IssuerConfig
if cfg.DexIssuerURL != "" {
issuers = append(issuers, chassisauth.IssuerConfig{IssuerURL: cfg.DexIssuerURL, Audience: cfg.MCPAudience})
}
if cfg.K8sIssuerURL != "" {
if client, cerr := k8sOIDCClient(); cerr != nil {
logger.Warn("k8s OIDC client init failed; SA-token auth disabled (other auth unaffected)", "err", cerr)
} else {
issuers = append(issuers, chassisauth.IssuerConfig{IssuerURL: cfg.K8sIssuerURL, Audience: cfg.K8sAudience, HTTPClient: client})
}
}
// No retry-without-the-k8s-issuer dance any more, and no "JWT auth degraded"
// warning to act on. Since mcp-chassis v0.6.0 an unreachable issuer does not
// fail construction: each issuer resolves independently and lazily, so one
// down issuer degrades only itself and recovers on its own. The fallback this
// replaced existed precisely because a single unreachable issuer used to take
// the whole validator with it.
jwtValidator, err := chassisauth.NewMultiJWTValidator(ctx, issuers)
if err != nil {
// Only a configuration error can reach here now.
logger.Error("jwt validator config invalid", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
giteaClient := gitea.NewClient(cfg.GiteaBaseURL, cfg.DefaultToken)
@@ -55,18 +88,24 @@ func main() {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.Handle("/mcp", mcp.OriginAllowlist(cfg.OriginAllowlist)(
chassisauth.BearerMiddleware(cfg.StaticToken, jwtValidator, "gitea", resourceMetadataURL,
auth.CallerMiddleware(mcpSrv),
auth.PassthroughMiddleware(giteaClient, mcpSrv,
chassisauth.BearerMiddleware(cfg.StaticToken, jwtValidator, "gitea", resourceMetadataURL,
auth.CallerMiddleware(logger, mcpSrv),
),
),
))
mux.Handle("/healthz", newHealthzHandler(cfg.DexIssuerURL != "", jwtValidator != nil, jwtInitErr))
// Readiness is evaluated per request, and evaluating it is what retries a
// pending issuer — so the kubelet's probe cadence is the recovery loop.
dexConfigured := cfg.DexIssuerURL != ""
mux.Handle("/healthz", newHealthzHandler(dexConfigured, jwtValidator.Ready))
mux.Handle("/readyz", newReadyzHandler(dexConfigured, jwtValidator.Ready))
if cfg.DexIssuerURL != "" {
mux.HandleFunc("GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource",
chassisauth.ProtectedResourceHandler(cfg.MCPResourceURL, cfg.DexIssuerURL))
}
addr := ":" + cfg.Port
logger.Info("gitea-mcp starting", "addr", addr, "version", "0.1.0")
logger.Info("gitea-mcp starting", "addr", addr, "version", version)
if err := http.ListenAndServe(addr, mux); err != nil {
logger.Error("server stopped", "err", err)
os.Exit(1)
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
# gitea-admin-mcp
A separate, local-only stdio MCP server. One tool: `mint_service_account_token`.
## Why this exists
dispatch#67 fix #2 needed a read-only CI credential for a dedicated service
account, and hit a hard wall: Gitea's own `POST /users/{u}/tokens` and
`POST /admin/users` both reject token auth outright —
{"message":"auth required"}
{"message":"token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:admin], ..."}
— by design: an existing API token cannot mint another token, or create an
account, no matter its scope. The only way through either endpoint is real
basic auth as an actual site admin. A sandboxed agent session has no
interactive password and shouldn't be handed one — that's broader exposure
than the job needs. This binary is meant to run where real admin credentials
already exist just-in-time: your own machine, via `op run`.
## What it does
`mint_service_account_token` does the whole bootstrap in one call:
1. Creates the named account if it doesn't exist (admin basic auth), or
resets its password if it does. **This is why `confirm_service_account`
is required and checked first** — the tool unconditionally (re)sets
whatever password the target account has, which is correct for a
dedicated bot account and would be destructive pointed at a real person's
login by mistake.
2. Mints a scoped token for that account, authenticating as the account
itself (Gitea requires this specifically — an admin cannot mint a token
on another account's behalf).
3. Grants the account read-only collaborator access on any named
`owner/repo` targets (admin action, least privilege).
4. Stores the token in 1Password via `op item create`, value passed on
stdin — never as a literal argv element, matching the estate's own
secret-handling rule. Returns only the `op://` reference, never the
token value itself, to the caller.
## Setup
Deliberately **not** wired into `cmd/gitea-mcp` (the shared HTTP server) —
this capability is too dangerous to expose over the network, even behind
OIDC. `internal/localtools` is a separate package specifically so it can
never be wired into that server's `RegisterAll` by accident.
Build:
```
go build -o gitea-admin-mcp ./cmd/gitea-admin-mcp
```
Configure as a local stdio MCP server (Claude Code `.mcp.json`, run where
your real `op` session lives):
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"gitea-admin": {
"command": "op",
"args": ["run", "--env-file", "~/.op-env", "--", "/path/to/gitea-admin-mcp"]
}
}
}
```
Required env (see `~/.op-env`):
| Var | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `GITEA_BASE_URL` | e.g. `https://git.d-ma.be` |
| `GITEA_ADMIN_USERNAME` | a real site-admin account |
| `GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | that account's real password |
| `OP_VAULT` | 1Password vault for minted tokens (default `AgentSecrets`, per the estate's agent-governed ops-secrets policy) |
## Example call
```json
{
"username": "dispatch-bot",
"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
"scopes": ["read:repository", "read:issue"],
"token_name": "dispatch-ci-readonly",
"secret_name": "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
"grant_read_repos": ["mathias/cobalt-dingo"],
"confirm_service_account": true
}
```
Result carries `SecretRef` (e.g. `op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/credential`)
and `GrantedRepos` — never the token or either password.
+216
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
# How gitea-mcp works
`gitea-mcp` is a custom **MCP (Model Context Protocol) front door for Gitea** — a
small Go HTTP service that exposes ~60 Gitea operations as MCP tools over
Streamable HTTP, so a claude.ai connector (or any MCP client) can drive the
homelab's Gitea (`https://git.d-ma.be`) with proper auth, an owner allowlist,
caller attribution, and defensive input handling.
It is **not** a generic Gitea proxy. It is an opinionated, allowlisted, single-
tenant front door built on the shared **`mcp-chassis`** auth library.
---
## 1. Request lifecycle
Everything is wired in `cmd/gitea-mcp/main.go` on a plain `http.ServeMux`:
```
POST /mcp
→ OriginAllowlist (internal/mcp/origin.go) browser Origin gate
→ BearerMiddleware (mcp-chassis auth) authN: static token OR JWT
→ CallerMiddleware (internal/auth/caller.go) extract caller identity
→ MCP server (internal/mcp/server.go) JSON-RPC dispatch → tools
GET /healthz unauthenticated health JSON
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource RFC 9728 metadata (when Dex set)
```
The middleware order is deliberate: Origin first (cheap reject), then authN,
then identity extraction, then the MCP handler. A tool call is a JSON-RPC
`tools/call` that the registry dispatches to a `Tool` handler.
---
## 2. Authentication (`mcp-chassis` `BearerMiddleware`)
`Authorization: Bearer <token>` is checked with this precedence (`auth/bearer.go`
in `mcp-chassis`):
1. **Static bearer** — constant-time compare against `GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN`.
Wins immediately, never emits a `WWW-Authenticate` challenge. This is the
service-to-service path (repo `.mcp.json` files carrying `GITEA_MCP_TOKEN`).
2. **JWT validation** — against a **list of trusted OIDC issuers**
(`NewMultiJWTValidator`, ADR-0011):
- **Authentik** (`DEX_ISSUER_URL` + `MCP_AUDIENCE=claude-ai`) — the claude.ai
web connector after its OAuth handshake.
- **k3s cluster OIDC** (`K8S_ISSUER_URL` + `K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE=gitea-mcp`) — lets
in-cluster pods authenticate with audience-bound projected **ServiceAccount
tokens** instead of a static bearer. The k8s issuer is additive and
best-effort: if the in-cluster OIDC can't be reached at startup it is
dropped so Authentik auth is never taken down (see `cmd/gitea-mcp/main.go`
and `cmd/gitea-mcp/k8soidc.go`).
3. Otherwise **401**. If `MCP_RESOURCE_URL` + `DEX_ISSUER_URL` are set, the 401
carries a `WWW-Authenticate: … resource_metadata=…` header (RFC 9728) so
claude.ai's OAuth discovery can find `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`.
A JWKS/issuer outage yields **503** (`ErrUnavailable`), distinct from a
present-but-invalid token's **401**, so a transient IdP blip is retried rather
than treated as a hard auth failure.
### The k8s SA-token wrinkle (ADR-0011)
k3s serves its OIDC discovery/JWKS over the **cluster CA** and requires an
**authenticated** request (anonymous → 401). So `k8sOIDCClient()` builds an HTTP
client that trusts `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt` and
carries the pod's own SA bearer, passed to the chassis via
`IssuerConfig.HTTPClient`. Proven live: a real `aud=gitea-mcp` SA token → the
running server → HTTP 200.
### Origin allowlist
`OriginAllowlist` (`internal/mcp/origin.go`) rejects any request whose `Origin`
header is not in `GITEA_MCP_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST` (`https://claude.ai`,
`https://api.anthropic.com`). An **empty** Origin (server-side callers) is
allowed — Origin is a browser-only header.
---
## 3. Authorization, identity & attribution
- **Owner allowlist** (`internal/allowlist`) — tools only operate on owners in
`GITEA_MCP_ALLOWED_OWNERS` (default `mathias`). A call for any other owner is
rejected before it reaches Gitea.
- **Caller identity** (`internal/auth/caller.go`) — the authenticated username is
read from reverse-proxy identity headers, `X-Auth-Request-User` (the verified
OIDC identity, authoritative) preferred over `X-Forwarded-User`. Conflicts are
logged, not silently resolved.
- **Identity footer** (`internal/identity/footer.go`) — mutating tools that write
a body (issue/PR comments, creates) append
`_Created via git-mcp on behalf of @<caller>_`, so actions taken through the
front door are attributable even though all upstream calls use one service PAT.
---
## 4. Upstream Gitea access
`internal/gitea/Client` is a thin REST client over `GITEA_BASE_URL`
(`https://git.d-ma.be`). Every upstream call carries a **single service PAT** —
`GITEA_MCP_DEFAULT_TOKEN` — as `Authorization: token <PAT>` (`client.go`). So
gitea-mcp is a *front door*, not a credential pass-through: the caller's identity
is captured for attribution, but Gitea sees one service account. A 60s branch
cache and a 30s HTTP timeout round it out.
Defensive guard: paths with an empty owner/repo segment (`//`) are rejected
locally (`hasEmptySegment`) so callers get a typed validation error instead of
Gitea's opaque `/api/swagger` 404.
---
## 5. Tools
Tools are registered in `internal/tools/registry.go` into a `registry.Registry`;
each implements the `Tool` interface (name, JSON schema, handler). ~60 tools,
by area:
| Area | Tools |
|------|-------|
| Repos | list, get, search, status, create, delete, update, tree, topics_update, mirror_push |
| Files | file_read, file_write_branch, file_delete, dir_list |
| Branches | branch_list, branch_delete, branch_protection_get |
| Issues | list, get, create, edit, close, reopen, comment, label, list_comments |
| PRs | list, get, create, comment, merge, files_diff |
| Labels / Releases / Tags | label_list, release_create, tag_create |
| Workflows (Actions) | run_list, run_status, run_trigger |
| Search / Templates | code_search, create_project_from_template |
| Composite | tbd_ship (trunk-based ship helper) |
**Merge gate: `tbd_ship` (gitea-mcp#63) and `pr_merge` (gitea-mcp#74).** The two merge tools share one gate
(`evaluateShipGate`). A PR is merged only when ALL of: the head commit's CI is fully green, the base branch is not
review-protected, and the issue named in `issue` carries **exactly one** `risk/` label, `risk/low`. No `issue`, no
`risk/` label, several, an unknown value (`risk/lowish`), `risk/medium`, `risk/high`, or an issue that cannot be read
all fail closed: nothing is merged, the result is `merged:false` with a `reason`, the `ci_status` and the `risk` tier.
Unclassified is not low. Above `risk/low` a human reviews and merges in the Gitea UI (which this gate does not touch).
`pr_merge` additionally fails with an error, merging nothing, when the PR or the base's branch-protection state cannot
be read. A merge conflict is still an error.
Both tools bind the merge to the head commit whose CI the gate evaluated (`head_commit_id`), so a push to the PR
branch after the check makes Gitea refuse the merge instead of merging unchecked code.
Limits: the gate enforces the tier of the issue the caller names; it cannot prove that issue is the one the change
belongs to, so the link is the caller's claim (local-dev rule 5's convention still applies). Not gated: merging in the
Gitea UI, and `file_write_branch` committing directly to a branch (`main` included), which is how `risk/low` work
reaches trunk. Platform-level enforcement for those is branch protection on `main` (local-dev#27 option 2).
Shared tool-layer hygiene (`internal/tools/tool.go`):
- **Alias normalization** — `repo`↔`name` and `number`↔`index` are reconciled so
a tool works whichever spelling a caller sends (an explicit canonical wins).
- **Required-identifier validation** — an empty `repo`/`name` is rejected at the
tool layer (avoids the bare-404 leak); `owner` is covered by the allowlist.
- **Page-size cap** — limits are clamped to 50.
---
## 6. Configuration (env)
| Var | Purpose | Example |
|-----|---------|---------|
| `GITEA_MCP_PORT` | listen port | `8080` |
| `GITEA_BASE_URL` | upstream Gitea | `https://git.d-ma.be` |
| `GITEA_MCP_DEFAULT_TOKEN` | **upstream** service PAT (all Gitea calls) | *(secret)* |
| `GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN` | static bearer for service-to-service auth | *(secret)* |
| `GITEA_MCP_ALLOWED_OWNERS` | owner allowlist | `mathias` |
| `GITEA_MCP_ORIGIN_ALLOWLIST` | permitted browser Origins | `https://claude.ai,…` |
| `DEX_ISSUER_URL` / `MCP_AUDIENCE` | Authentik issuer + audience | `…/o/claude-ai/`, `claude-ai` |
| `K8S_ISSUER_URL` / `K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE` | k8s OIDC issuer + audience (SA tokens) | `https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local`, `gitea-mcp` |
| `MCP_RESOURCE_URL` | this server's public URL for `.well-known` metadata | `https://git-mcp.d-ma.be` |
Secrets come from k8s Secrets (`gitea-mcp-secrets`, `gitea-mcp-static-token`);
non-secret values are inlined in the Deployment.
---
## 7. Health & observability
- `GET /healthz` → `{"ok":true,"jwt":{"status":"disabled|enabled|degraded","last_error":"…"}}`.
`degraded` = a JWT issuer was configured but init failed (static-token auth
still works) — distinguishes "IdP unreachable" from "JWT not configured".
- Every auth rejection is audit-logged (`mcp-chassis` `deny`) with the reason,
client IP, token *type*, and a truncated SHA-256 **fingerprint** — never the
raw token, so nothing secret lands in logs.
---
## 8. Deployment & CI/CD
- **Runs in** the `gitea-mcp` k3s namespace (`git.d-ma.be/mathias/infra`
`k3s/apps/gitea-mcp/`): a Deployment on `localhost:5000/gitea-mcp:<sha>`, an
ExternalSecret for tokens, and a **default-deny NetworkPolicy** + an
`allow-ingress-nginx` rule (this namespace is the P6.1 netpol pilot — the only
ingress allowed is from `ingress-nginx`).
- **Public endpoint** `https://git-mcp.d-ma.be` (NPM → ingress-nginx → svc:8080).
- **Pipeline** (`.gitea/workflows/cd.yml`, self-hosted koala runner): quality gate
(test/vet) → `buildah` image → `localhost:5000` → smoke test → the deploy job
clones infra over SSH, `sed`s the image tag in `k3s/apps/gitea-mcp/deployment.yaml`,
commits, and triggers a **Flux** reconcile. Push to `main` ⇒ new image ⇒ rolled.
---
## 9. Operational notes
- **Rollback** = revert the image tag (or the env change) in the infra Deployment;
Flux rolls back. Auth changes are additive, so enabling/disabling the k8s issuer
never affects the Authentik/static paths.
- **NetworkPolicy kill switch** — delete the `gitea-mcp` NetworkPolicies to
restore open ingress if the pilot ever locks something out.
- **claude.ai connector flakiness** — the claude.ai→gitea-mcp MCP path
intermittently hits a Cloudflare "you have been blocked" page (the error names
`anthropic.com`). On the Claude Code CLI, prefer the direct Gitea REST API for
reliability; the MCP connector remains the claude.ai-web path. (brain:
`prefer-rest-api-skills-over-mcp-on-cli-cloudflare-waf`.)
## References
- Auth library: `git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis` (`auth` package) — shared
`BearerMiddleware` + multi-issuer `JWTValidator` + RFC 9728 handler.
- Multi-issuer / SA-token design: infra `docs/decisions/ADR-0011-service-to-service-auth.md`.
- Source map: `cmd/gitea-mcp/{main,healthz,k8soidc}.go`,
`internal/{mcp,auth,gitea,tools,allowlist,identity,registry,config}`.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
module gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
module git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp
go 1.26.2
require (
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.2.0
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.7.1
github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
)
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.2.0 h1:6fLmb7xqRa2nNVWsHaUbbfbArgDXJw/gDhb09clBIjo=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.2.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.5.0 h1:0w3dt4t4r8OtZBHIOoZkR6p6L3L6YDiqhMh9bTI/w/8=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.5.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.6.0 h1:/MuxT9IyzZbN26+COlI2FK0moTyXMLG/qXc/cm0i0Vg=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.7.0 h1:ct31v1F1PMhMCva/V0ErEbgMzwnT+27lYKbug2A/quE=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.7.0/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.7.1 h1:4h8TOBHTA0L/no4IPcr4tLcQtmKUlhE2/cXyPdNFGmM=
git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis v0.7.1/go.mod h1:Ks7EK2UnGAN0H3rJjKUxUagX8/ZBdtLrOlcUbv0RwH8=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
+284
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
// Package adminbootstrap mints a scoped Gitea access token for a dedicated
// service/bot account, end to end, in one auditable call.
//
// dispatch#67 fix #2 needed a read-only CI credential and hit a hard wall:
// Gitea's own token-creation and admin-user endpoints reject token auth
// outright (POST /users/{u}/tokens and POST /admin/users both return
// "auth required" / a required-scope error for an existing token, by
// design — a leaked token being usable to mint further tokens would be a
// privilege-escalation footgun). Neither endpoint has a token-scoped
// workaround. The only way through is real basic auth as an actual admin.
//
// That is exactly what a sandboxed agent session cannot safely have — no
// interactive password, and handing one to a session would be broader
// exposure than the job needs. This package is meant to run LOCALLY, where
// real admin credentials exist just-in-time (1Password, `op run`), as a
// small stdio MCP tool (see cmd/gitea-admin-mcp) rather than ad hoc curl.
package adminbootstrap
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
)
// HTTPDoer is the one method this package needs from *http.Client — narrow
// on purpose, so tests inject a fake transport instead of hitting a network.
type HTTPDoer interface {
Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
}
// SecretStore persists the minted token somewhere durable and returns a
// reference safe to log or display — never the value itself. The real
// implementation (cmd/gitea-admin-mcp) shells out to the local `op` CLI;
// tests use an in-memory fake.
type SecretStore interface {
Store(ctx context.Context, name, value string) (ref string, err error)
}
// RepoRef names a repo to grant the new account read-only collaborator
// access to — least privilege: a service account should see only the repos
// it actually operates against, not every private repo on the instance.
type RepoRef struct {
Owner string
Name string
}
// Request describes one bootstrap. ConfirmServiceAccount is required and
// checked first: this package (re)sets whatever password Username already
// has, which is correct and safe for a dedicated bot account and dangerous
// for anything else.
type Request struct {
Username string
Email string
FullName string
Scopes []string
TokenName string
SecretName string
GrantReadRepos []RepoRef
ConfirmServiceAccount bool
}
// Result reports what happened. SecretRef, never the token value, is what a
// caller (or an MCP tool's text response) should ever surface.
type Result struct {
Username string
Created bool // false if the account already existed (password was reset, not created)
SecretRef string
GrantedRepos []string
}
// Bootstrapper holds the real admin credentials and where to reach Gitea —
// constructed once per invocation, never persisted.
type Bootstrapper struct {
BaseURL string
AdminUsername string
AdminPassword string
HTTP HTTPDoer // nil defaults to http.DefaultClient
Secrets SecretStore
}
func (b Bootstrapper) httpClient() HTTPDoer {
if b.HTTP != nil {
return b.HTTP
}
return http.DefaultClient
}
// Run creates (or resets the password of) Username, mints it a scoped
// token, grants it read-only access to GrantReadRepos, stores the token via
// Secrets, and returns without ever exposing the token value or either
// password to the caller.
func (b Bootstrapper) Run(ctx context.Context, req Request) (Result, error) {
if !req.ConfirmServiceAccount {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("refusing: ConfirmServiceAccount must be true — this resets %q's password unconditionally, which is only safe for a dedicated service/bot account", req.Username)
}
created, err := b.userExists(ctx, req.Username)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("check existing account: %w", err)
}
created = !created // userExists returns true if found; Result.Created means "we created it"
botPassword, err := randomPassword()
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("generate account password: %w", err)
}
if created {
if err := b.createUser(ctx, req, botPassword); err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("create account: %w", err)
}
} else {
if err := b.resetPassword(ctx, req.Username, botPassword); err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("reset existing account's password: %w", err)
}
}
token, err := b.mintToken(ctx, req.Username, botPassword, req.TokenName, req.Scopes)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("mint token: %w", err)
}
var granted []string
for _, r := range req.GrantReadRepos {
if err := b.grantReadAccess(ctx, r, req.Username); err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("grant read access on %s/%s: %w", r.Owner, r.Name, err)
}
granted = append(granted, r.Owner+"/"+r.Name)
}
ref, err := b.Secrets.Store(ctx, req.SecretName, token)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("store token: %w", err)
}
return Result{
Username: req.Username,
Created: created,
SecretRef: ref,
GrantedRepos: granted,
}, nil
}
func randomPassword() (string, error) {
raw := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(raw), nil
}
func (b Bootstrapper) userExists(ctx context.Context, username string) (bool, error) {
resp, err := b.doAdmin(ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/users/"+username, nil)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
switch resp.StatusCode {
case http.StatusOK:
return true, nil
case http.StatusNotFound:
return false, nil
default:
return false, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status %d checking account existence", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func (b Bootstrapper) createUser(ctx context.Context, req Request, password string) error {
body := map[string]any{
"username": req.Username,
"email": req.Email,
"password": password,
"must_change_password": false,
}
if req.FullName != "" {
body["full_name"] = req.FullName
}
resp, err := b.doAdmin(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/users", body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
return statusErr(resp)
}
return nil
}
func (b Bootstrapper) resetPassword(ctx context.Context, username, password string) error {
resp, err := b.doAdmin(ctx, http.MethodPatch, "/api/v1/admin/users/"+username, map[string]any{
"password": password,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
return statusErr(resp)
}
return nil
}
// mintToken authenticates as the SERVICE ACCOUNT itself (not the admin) —
// Gitea's token-creation endpoint requires basic auth as the token's owner,
// and an admin's own credentials cannot mint on another account's behalf.
func (b Bootstrapper) mintToken(ctx context.Context, username, password, tokenName string, scopes []string) (string, error) {
raw, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"name": tokenName, "scopes": scopes})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost,
strings.TrimRight(b.BaseURL, "/")+"/api/v1/users/"+username+"/tokens", bytes.NewReader(raw))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req.SetBasicAuth(username, password)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := b.httpClient().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
return "", statusErr(resp)
}
var parsed struct {
SHA1 string `json:"sha1"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&parsed); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("decode token response: %w", err)
}
if parsed.SHA1 == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("token response carried no sha1 value")
}
return parsed.SHA1, nil
}
// grantReadAccess is an admin action (adding a collaborator to a repo the
// admin owns), so it uses admin auth, not the new account's own.
func (b Bootstrapper) grantReadAccess(ctx context.Context, r RepoRef, username string) error {
path := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/collaborators/%s", r.Owner, r.Name, username)
resp, err := b.doAdmin(ctx, http.MethodPut, path, map[string]any{"permission": "read"})
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
return statusErr(resp)
}
return nil
}
func (b Bootstrapper) doAdmin(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body map[string]any) (*http.Response, error) {
var reader io.Reader
if body != nil {
raw, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reader = bytes.NewReader(raw)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, strings.TrimRight(b.BaseURL, "/")+path, reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.SetBasicAuth(b.AdminUsername, b.AdminPassword)
if body != nil {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
return b.httpClient().Do(req)
}
func statusErr(resp *http.Response) error {
msg, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
return fmt.Errorf("gitea returned %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(msg)))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
package adminbootstrap_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// This exists to close dispatch#67 fix #2's blocker: minting a scoped Gitea
// token needs basic auth (POST /users/{u}/tokens and POST /admin/users both
// reject token auth outright, confirmed live against git.d-ma.be — an
// existing token cannot mint another token, by design). A sandboxed agent
// session has no interactive password, so this package is meant to run
// locally, where a real admin password is available just-in-time (1Password,
// `op run`), and to do the whole bootstrap in one auditable call rather than
// leaving it as ad hoc curl.
//
// Design choice, made explicit rather than silently assumed: this tool
// ALWAYS (re)sets the target account's password via admin basic auth before
// minting, whether the account is new or already existed. That is safe and
// expected for a dedicated service/bot account (its password is a mechanism
// to reach the token endpoint, never a human login credential) and would be
// dangerous pointed at a real person's account by mistake -- which is why
// Request.ConfirmServiceAccount exists and Run refuses to proceed without it.
type call struct {
method, path string
body map[string]any
authUser string // basic-auth username used for this call, "" if token/none
authPass string
}
type fakeTransport struct {
t *testing.T
responses map[string]fakeResponse // key: "METHOD path"
calls []call
}
type fakeResponse struct {
status int
body string
}
func (f *fakeTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
var body map[string]any
if req.Body != nil {
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
if len(raw) > 0 {
require.NoError(f.t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &body))
}
}
user, pass, _ := req.BasicAuth()
f.calls = append(f.calls, call{method: req.Method, path: req.URL.Path, body: body, authUser: user, authPass: pass})
key := req.Method + " " + req.URL.Path
r, ok := f.responses[key]
if !ok {
f.t.Fatalf("unscripted request: %s (have: %v)", key, keys(f.responses))
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: r.status,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(r.body)),
Header: make(http.Header),
}, nil
}
func keys(m map[string]fakeResponse) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {
out = append(out, k)
}
return out
}
// fakeSecretStore records what would have been written to 1Password, without
// ever touching it -- and, critically, asserts the token value itself never
// leaks into anything but this one call.
type fakeSecretStore struct {
stored map[string]string
}
func (f *fakeSecretStore) Store(_ context.Context, name, value string) (string, error) {
if f.stored == nil {
f.stored = map[string]string{}
}
f.stored[name] = value
return "op://AgentSecrets/" + name + "/token", nil
}
func newBootstrapper(t *testing.T, responses map[string]fakeResponse) (adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper, *fakeTransport, *fakeSecretStore) {
ft := &fakeTransport{t: t, responses: responses}
fs := &fakeSecretStore{}
return adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper{
BaseURL: "http://fake.gitea",
AdminUsername: "mathias",
AdminPassword: "admin-pass-not-a-real-secret",
HTTP: &http.Client{Transport: ft},
Secrets: fs,
}, ft, fs
}
func TestRun_CreatesNewAccountMintsTokenAndStoresIt(t *testing.T) {
b, ft, fs := newBootstrapper(t, map[string]fakeResponse{
"GET /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot": {status: 404, body: `{}`},
"POST /api/v1/admin/users": {status: 201, body: `{"login":"dispatch-bot"}`},
"POST /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot/tokens": {status: 201, body: `{"sha1":"tok_abc123"}`},
})
result, err := b.Run(context.Background(), adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: "dispatch-bot",
Email: "dispatch@d-ma.be",
Scopes: []string{"read:repository", "read:issue"},
TokenName: "dispatch-ci-readonly",
SecretName: "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
ConfirmServiceAccount: true,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, result.Created)
assert.Equal(t, "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/token", result.SecretRef)
assert.Equal(t, "tok_abc123", fs.stored["gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly"])
// The account-creation call must use the ADMIN's basic auth, never the
// fresh account's own (unknown at that point) password.
create := findCall(t, ft.calls, "POST", "/api/v1/admin/users")
assert.Equal(t, "mathias", create.authUser)
assert.Equal(t, "dispatch-bot", create.body["username"])
assert.Equal(t, "dispatch@d-ma.be", create.body["email"])
assert.Equal(t, false, create.body["must_change_password"])
// The token-mint call must use basic auth AS THE NEW ACCOUNT -- Gitea
// requires this specifically (an admin token cannot mint on someone
// else's behalf) -- with the password this package generated and set,
// never the admin's own password.
mint := findCall(t, ft.calls, "POST", "/api/v1/users/dispatch-bot/tokens")
assert.Equal(t, "dispatch-bot", mint.authUser)
assert.NotEqual(t, "admin-pass-not-a-real-secret", mint.authPass)
assert.NotEmpty(t, mint.authPass)
assert.Equal(t, "dispatch-ci-readonly", mint.body["name"])
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []any{"read:repository", "read:issue"}, mint.body["scopes"])
}
func TestRun_ExistingAccountGetsPasswordResetNotRecreated(t *testing.T) {
b, ft, _ := newBootstrapper(t, map[string]fakeResponse{
"GET /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot": {status: 200, body: `{"login":"dispatch-bot"}`},
"PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/dispatch-bot": {status: 200, body: `{}`},
"POST /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot/tokens": {status: 201, body: `{"sha1":"tok_new"}`},
})
result, err := b.Run(context.Background(), adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: "dispatch-bot",
Email: "dispatch@d-ma.be",
Scopes: []string{"read:repository"},
TokenName: "dispatch-ci-readonly",
SecretName: "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
ConfirmServiceAccount: true,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, result.Created, "must report the account as pre-existing, not newly created")
// Must PATCH (reset password), never POST (create) for an existing account.
assert.Empty(t, filterCalls(ft.calls, "POST", "/api/v1/admin/users"))
patch := findCall(t, ft.calls, "PATCH", "/api/v1/admin/users/dispatch-bot")
assert.Equal(t, "mathias", patch.authUser, "the reset must be done as the real admin")
assert.NotEmpty(t, patch.body["password"])
}
func TestRun_RefusesWithoutExplicitServiceAccountConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
// Guard against pointing this at a real person's account by accident --
// this tool resets whatever password the target account has.
b, ft, _ := newBootstrapper(t, map[string]fakeResponse{})
_, err := b.Run(context.Background(), adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: "mathias",
Email: "mthbqv@gmail.com",
Scopes: []string{"read:repository"},
TokenName: "whatever",
SecretName: "whatever",
// ConfirmServiceAccount left false/unset
})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "ConfirmServiceAccount")
assert.Empty(t, ft.calls, "must not make any request at all without confirmation")
}
func TestRun_GrantsReadOnlyCollaboratorAccessViaAdminAuth(t *testing.T) {
b, ft, _ := newBootstrapper(t, map[string]fakeResponse{
"GET /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot": {status: 404, body: `{}`},
"POST /api/v1/admin/users": {status: 201, body: `{}`},
"POST /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot/tokens": {status: 201, body: `{"sha1":"tok"}`},
"PUT /api/v1/repos/mathias/cobalt-dingo/collaborators/dispatch-bot": {status: 204, body: ``},
})
result, err := b.Run(context.Background(), adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: "dispatch-bot",
Email: "dispatch@d-ma.be",
Scopes: []string{"read:repository"},
TokenName: "dispatch-ci-readonly",
SecretName: "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
GrantReadRepos: []adminbootstrap.RepoRef{{Owner: "mathias", Name: "cobalt-dingo"}},
ConfirmServiceAccount: true,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"mathias/cobalt-dingo"}, result.GrantedRepos)
grant := findCall(t, ft.calls, "PUT", "/api/v1/repos/mathias/cobalt-dingo/collaborators/dispatch-bot")
assert.Equal(t, "mathias", grant.authUser, "granting collaborator access is an admin action, not the new account's own")
assert.Equal(t, "read", grant.body["permission"])
}
func TestRun_FailsClosedOnUpstreamError(t *testing.T) {
b, _, fs := newBootstrapper(t, map[string]fakeResponse{
"GET /api/v1/users/dispatch-bot": {status: 404, body: `{}`},
"POST /api/v1/admin/users": {status: 500, body: `{"message":"internal error"}`},
})
_, err := b.Run(context.Background(), adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: "dispatch-bot",
Email: "dispatch@d-ma.be",
Scopes: []string{"read:repository"},
TokenName: "x",
SecretName: "x",
ConfirmServiceAccount: true,
})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, fs.stored, "nothing must be written to the secret store if the flow didn't complete")
}
func findCall(t *testing.T, calls []call, method, path string) call {
t.Helper()
for _, c := range calls {
if c.method == method && c.path == path {
return c
}
}
t.Fatalf("no call found: %s %s (have: %+v)", method, path, calls)
return call{}
}
func filterCalls(calls []call, method, path string) []call {
var out []call
for _, c := range calls {
if c.method == method && c.path == path {
out = append(out, c)
}
}
return out
}
+14 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
package allowlist
import "fmt"
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
)
type Allowlist struct {
owners map[string]struct{}
@@ -14,10 +19,17 @@ func New(owners []string) *Allowlist {
return &Allowlist{owners: m}
}
func (a *Allowlist) Check(owner string) error {
// Check gates owner access to the static list — except for a caller
// authenticated with their own Gitea PAT (pass-through, gitea-mcp#59), whose
// access Gitea's own permission model already gates more precisely than a
// coarse owner name list ever could.
func (a *Allowlist) Check(ctx context.Context, owner string) error {
if owner == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("owner required")
}
if _, ok := gitea.TokenFromContext(ctx); ok {
return nil
}
if _, ok := a.owners[owner]; !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("owner %q not in allowlist", owner)
}
+25 -5
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,36 @@
package allowlist_test
import (
"context"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestAllowlistCheck(t *testing.T) {
a := allowlist.New([]string{"mathias", "acme"})
assert.NoError(t, a.Check("mathias"))
assert.NoError(t, a.Check("acme"))
assert.Error(t, a.Check("evil"))
assert.Error(t, a.Check(""))
ctx := context.Background()
assert.NoError(t, a.Check(ctx, "mathias"))
assert.NoError(t, a.Check(ctx, "acme"))
assert.Error(t, a.Check(ctx, "evil"))
assert.Error(t, a.Check(ctx, ""))
}
// A caller authenticated with their own Gitea PAT (pass-through, gitea-mcp#59)
// is gated by Gitea's own permission model, not the MCP's static owner list —
// otherwise a legitimate second user could never touch their own repos.
func TestAllowlistCheckTrustsPassthroughAuthenticatedCaller(t *testing.T) {
a := allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"})
ctx := gitea.WithToken(context.Background(), "someone-elses-pat")
assert.NoError(t, a.Check(ctx, "someone-else"))
}
// Empty owner is a structural input error, not an authz question — still
// rejected even on the pass-through path.
func TestAllowlistCheckStillRejectsEmptyOwnerOnPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
a := allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"})
ctx := gitea.WithToken(context.Background(), "someone-elses-pat")
assert.Error(t, a.Check(ctx, ""))
}
+31 -5
View File
@@ -2,22 +2,48 @@ package auth
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
)
type ctxKey struct{}
func CallerMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
// CallerMiddleware extracts the authenticated username from the reverse-proxy
// identity headers and stashes it in the request context for Caller().
//
// Header precedence: X-Auth-Request-User takes priority over X-Forwarded-User.
// X-Auth-Request-User is the header oauth2-proxy sets from the *verified* OIDC
// identity, so it is authoritative. X-Forwarded-User is a weaker, proxy-set
// convention some setups populate instead; it is used only as a fallback when
// X-Auth-Request-User is absent. If a proxy sets BOTH and they disagree, the
// verified X-Auth-Request-User still wins and we log a warning so the
// misconfiguration is visible rather than silently resolved (#10).
//
// logger may be nil, in which case the conflict warning is skipped.
func CallerMiddleware(logger *slog.Logger, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
user := r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-User")
authUser := r.Header.Get("X-Auth-Request-User")
fwdUser := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-User")
user := authUser
if user == "" {
user = r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-User")
user = fwdUser
}
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKey{}, user)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
if logger != nil && authUser != "" && fwdUser != "" && authUser != fwdUser {
logger.Warn("conflicting caller identity headers; using X-Auth-Request-User",
"x_auth_request_user", authUser,
"x_forwarded_user", fwdUser)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(withCaller(r.Context(), user)))
})
}
func withCaller(ctx context.Context, user string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKey{}, user)
}
func Caller(ctx context.Context) string {
if v, ok := ctx.Value(ctxKey{}).(string); ok {
return v
+65 -11
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,80 @@
package auth_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestCallerFromContext(t *testing.T) {
called := false
h := auth.CallerMiddleware(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
called = true
assert.Equal(t, "mathiasbq", auth.Caller(r.Context()))
}))
func discardLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(bytes.NewBuffer(nil), nil))
}
// Header precedence: X-Auth-Request-User (verified OIDC identity) wins over
// X-Forwarded-User, and X-Forwarded-User is only a fallback when the former is
// absent.
func TestCallerHeaderPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
authReq string
forwarded string
wantCaller string
}{
{"auth-request only", "mathiasbq", "", "mathiasbq"},
{"forwarded fallback", "", "fwduser", "fwduser"},
{"both present, same", "same", "same", "same"},
{"both present, differ → auth-request wins", "authuser", "fwduser", "authuser"},
{"neither", "", "", ""},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var got string
h := auth.CallerMiddleware(discardLogger(), http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
got = auth.Caller(r.Context())
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
if tc.authReq != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", tc.authReq)
}
if tc.forwarded != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", tc.forwarded)
}
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
assert.Equal(t, tc.wantCaller, got)
})
}
}
// When both headers are present and disagree, a warning is logged so the proxy
// misconfiguration is visible rather than silent.
func TestCallerConflictingHeadersLogsWarning(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelWarn}))
h := auth.CallerMiddleware(logger, http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", "mathiasbq")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
assert.True(t, called)
req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", "authuser")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "fwduser")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
logged := buf.String()
assert.Contains(t, logged, "conflicting")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "authuser")
assert.Contains(t, logged, "fwduser")
// No warning when they agree.
buf.Reset()
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
req2.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", "same")
req2.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-User", "same")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req2)
assert.Empty(t, buf.String(), "no warning expected when headers agree")
}
func TestCallerEmptyWhenHeaderMissing(t *testing.T) {
+62
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
chassisauth "git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
)
// TokenValidator asks the upstream service who a bearer token belongs to.
type TokenValidator interface {
ValidateToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (username string, ok bool)
}
// PassthroughMiddleware lets a caller authenticate with their own Gitea PAT:
// if the request's bearer token validates directly against Gitea, it's used
// as-is for every upstream call this request makes (gitea-mcp#59), instead of
// the server's shared default token. Any other bearer (static token, JWT, or
// none) falls through to fallback unchanged — this only adds a capability, it
// never removes the existing auth paths.
func PassthroughMiddleware(validator TokenValidator, onValid, fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
authz := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
token, hasBearer := strings.CutPrefix(authz, "Bearer ")
if hasBearer && token != "" {
if login, ok := validator.ValidateToken(r.Context(), token); ok {
// gitea-mcp#60. This middleware logged nothing at all, so there
// was no way to tell a PAT pass-through request from one that
// fell through to the shared JWT/static path — only inference
// from which failures were absent.
//
// It matters more here than on the other two paths: this is
// where a request acts as a SPECIFIC Gitea user. An audit trail
// that cannot say which identity performed a write is not an
// audit trail.
//
// chassisauth.Fingerprint, not a local equivalent: the chassis
// emits the same field on its own accepted/rejected lines, and
// two different fingerprints for one token cannot be correlated.
slog.Info("mcp auth accepted",
"auth_path", "passthrough",
"caller", login,
"token_fp", chassisauth.Fingerprint(token),
"path", r.URL.Path,
)
ctx := withCaller(r.Context(), login)
ctx = gitea.WithToken(ctx, token)
onValid.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return
}
// A token that is not a valid PAT falls through SILENTLY. The
// chassis owns the verdict; logging here too would double-count
// every static-token request, since all of them reach this
// middleware first.
}
fallback.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
+83
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
package auth
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type stubValidator struct{ login string }
func (s stubValidator) ValidateToken(context.Context, string) (string, bool) {
return s.login, s.login != ""
}
// gitea-mcp#60: PassthroughMiddleware logged nothing at all, success or failure.
//
// While verifying #59 end to end there was no way to confirm from the server
// logs whether calls were using the new PAT pass-through (caller's own Gitea
// PAT, own identity) or falling through to the shared JWT/static path. The only
// way to reason about it was inference. The chassis names its two paths as of
// v0.7.0; this is the third.
//
// This matters more than the other two: pass-through is the path where the
// request acts as a SPECIFIC Gitea user. An audit trail that cannot say which
// identity performed a write is not an audit trail.
func TestPassthroughMiddleware_LogsTheAcceptedPath(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
prev := slog.Default()
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo})))
t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
reached := false
h := PassthroughMiddleware(stubValidator{login: "alice"},
http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { reached = true }),
http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { t.Fatal("must not fall back") }))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/mcp", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer a-real-gitea-pat")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
require.True(t, reached)
var line map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String())), &line))
require.Equal(t, "mcp auth accepted", line["msg"])
require.Equal(t, "passthrough", line["auth_path"])
require.Equal(t, "alice", line["caller"])
require.NotEmpty(t, line["token_fp"], "correlatable without being a credential")
for k, v := range line {
require.NotContains(t, []any{v}, "a-real-gitea-pat",
"the PAT must never appear in any field, including %q", k)
}
}
// A token that is not a valid PAT must fall through silently to the chassis,
// which owns the rejection log. Logging here as well would double-count every
// static-token request — every one of them reaches this middleware first.
func TestPassthroughMiddleware_FallsThroughWithoutLogging(t *testing.T) {
var buf bytes.Buffer
prev := slog.Default()
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo})))
t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
fellBack := false
h := PassthroughMiddleware(stubValidator{},
http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { t.Fatal("must not accept") }),
http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { fellBack = true }))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/mcp", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-pat")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
require.True(t, fellBack)
require.Empty(t, strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()),
"the chassis owns the verdict; logging here too would double-count every static-token call")
}
+82
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
package auth_test
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
type fakeValidator struct {
login string
ok bool
calls int
}
func (f *fakeValidator) ValidateToken(_ context.Context, _ string) (string, bool) {
f.calls++
return f.login, f.ok
}
func TestPassthroughMiddleware_ValidPATGoesStraightToOnValid(t *testing.T) {
validator := &fakeValidator{login: "alice", ok: true}
var gotCaller string
var gotToken string
var gotOK bool
onValid := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotCaller = auth.Caller(r.Context())
gotToken, gotOK = gitea.TokenFromContext(r.Context())
})
fallback := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("fallback should not be called for a valid PAT")
})
h := auth.PassthroughMiddleware(validator, onValid, fallback)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer alices-pat")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
assert.Equal(t, "alice", gotCaller)
assert.True(t, gotOK)
assert.Equal(t, "alices-pat", gotToken)
}
func TestPassthroughMiddleware_InvalidTokenFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
validator := &fakeValidator{ok: false}
fallbackCalled := false
onValid := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("onValid should not be called for an invalid token")
})
fallback := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
fallbackCalled = true
})
h := auth.PassthroughMiddleware(validator, onValid, fallback)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not-a-gitea-pat")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
assert.True(t, fallbackCalled)
}
func TestPassthroughMiddleware_NoBearerFallsThroughWithoutCallingValidator(t *testing.T) {
validator := &fakeValidator{ok: true, login: "alice"}
fallbackCalled := false
onValid := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("onValid should not be called with no Authorization header")
})
fallback := http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
fallbackCalled = true
})
h := auth.PassthroughMiddleware(validator, onValid, fallback)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/mcp", nil)
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
assert.True(t, fallbackCalled)
assert.Equal(t, 0, validator.calls, "validator should not be invoked when there's no bearer to check")
}
+4
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ type Config struct {
DexIssuerURL string // DEX_ISSUER_URL, e.g. https://auth.d-ma.be; empty disables JWT auth
MCPAudience string // MCP_AUDIENCE, JWT audience claim to validate, e.g. claude-ai
MCPResourceURL string // MCP_RESOURCE_URL, this server's public URL for /.well-known metadata
K8sIssuerURL string // K8S_ISSUER_URL, in-cluster OIDC issuer for ServiceAccount-token auth (ADR-0011 D1); empty disables
K8sAudience string // K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE, required audience claim for k8s SA tokens
}
func Load() (Config, error) {
@@ -28,6 +30,8 @@ func Load() (Config, error) {
DexIssuerURL: os.Getenv("DEX_ISSUER_URL"),
MCPAudience: os.Getenv("MCP_AUDIENCE"),
MCPResourceURL: os.Getenv("MCP_RESOURCE_URL"),
K8sIssuerURL: os.Getenv("K8S_ISSUER_URL"),
K8sAudience: os.Getenv("K8S_MCP_AUDIENCE"),
}
return cfg, nil
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package config_test
import (
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/config"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/config"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+39
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package gitea
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
@@ -19,6 +20,21 @@ type Client struct {
branchCache *expirable.LRU[string, string]
}
type ctxTokenKey struct{}
// WithToken overrides the token used for upstream Gitea calls made with the
// returned context, taking precedence over the Client's configured default
// token. Used for per-caller PAT pass-through (gitea-mcp#59).
func WithToken(ctx context.Context, token string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, ctxTokenKey{}, token)
}
// TokenFromContext returns the token set by WithToken, if any.
func TokenFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
v, ok := ctx.Value(ctxTokenKey{}).(string)
return v, ok
}
func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: baseURL,
@@ -28,6 +44,23 @@ func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
}
}
// ValidateToken asks Gitea who a given token belongs to (GET /api/v1/user
// using that token, not the client's configured default token) and returns
// its login name. Used for per-caller PAT pass-through (gitea-mcp#59).
func (c *Client) ValidateToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (string, bool) {
body, status, err := c.doOnce(WithToken(ctx, token), http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/user", nil)
if err != nil || status != http.StatusOK {
return "", false
}
var user struct {
Login string `json:"login"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &user); err != nil || user.Login == "" {
return "", false
}
return user.Login, true
}
// DefaultBranch returns the default branch for a repo. Cached for 60s.
func (c *Client) DefaultBranch(ctx context.Context, owner, name string) (string, error) {
key := owner + "/" + name
@@ -66,6 +99,9 @@ func (c *Client) doOnce(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body []byte) (
return nil, 0, err
}
token := c.token
if override, ok := TokenFromContext(ctx); ok {
token = override
}
if token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+token)
}
@@ -135,6 +171,9 @@ func (c *Client) doRaw(ctx context.Context, method, path string, body []byte) (*
return nil, err
}
token := c.token
if override, ok := TokenFromContext(ctx); ok {
token = override
}
if token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+token)
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ func TestEmptyPathSegmentRejectedBeforeNetwork(t *testing.T) {
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
paths := []string{
"/api/v1/repos/mathias//issues", // empty repo
"/api/v1/repos//gitea-mcp/contents/", // empty owner
"/api/v1/repos/mathias//issues", // empty repo
"/api/v1/repos//gitea-mcp/contents/", // empty owner
"/api/v1/repos/mathias//issues?state=open", // empty repo before query
}
for _, p := range paths {
+44 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -50,6 +50,49 @@ func TestRetryOn5xxGetSucceedsOnSecondAttempt(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, int32(2), atomic.LoadInt32(&attempts))
}
func TestClientPrefersTokenFromContextOverDefaultToken(t *testing.T) {
var gotAuth string
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "default-token")
ctx := gitea.WithToken(context.Background(), "caller-token")
_, status, err := c.GetJSON(ctx, "/api/v1/user")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, 200, status)
assert.Equal(t, "token caller-token", gotAuth)
}
func TestValidateTokenReturnsLoginOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "token candidate-token", r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"login":"alice"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "default-token")
login, ok := c.ValidateToken(context.Background(), "candidate-token")
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, "alice", login)
}
func TestValidateTokenReturnsFalseOn401(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "default-token")
login, ok := c.ValidateToken(context.Background(), "bad-token")
assert.False(t, ok)
assert.Empty(t, login)
}
func TestRetryOnPostNotRetried(t *testing.T) {
var attempts int32
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+135 -15
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
package gitea
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"path"
"sort"
"strings"
)
type CodeSearchHit struct {
@@ -14,30 +17,147 @@ type CodeSearchHit struct {
Score float64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
}
type codeSearchEnvelope struct {
Data []CodeSearchHit `json:"data"`
OK bool `json:"ok"`
// codeSearchMaxFiles bounds how many files a single SearchCode call will fetch
// and scan, so one call against a huge repo can't run indefinitely.
const codeSearchMaxFiles = 2000
// codeSearchMaxFileSize skips blobs larger than this (per the tree listing,
// before any fetch) — almost certainly binary/vendor/generated content, not
// worth the cost of fetching just to reject.
const codeSearchMaxFileSize = 512 * 1024
// codeSearchBinaryExts are skipped WITHOUT fetching — a cheap pre-filter for
// obviously-binary content by extension, checked against the tree listing.
var codeSearchBinaryExts = map[string]bool{
".png": true, ".jpg": true, ".jpeg": true, ".gif": true, ".ico": true, ".webp": true, ".bmp": true,
".pdf": true, ".zip": true, ".tar": true, ".gz": true, ".bz2": true, ".xz": true, ".7z": true,
".exe": true, ".dll": true, ".so": true, ".dylib": true, ".bin": true, ".class": true, ".jar": true,
".woff": true, ".woff2": true, ".ttf": true, ".eot": true, ".otf": true,
".mp3": true, ".mp4": true, ".mov": true, ".avi": true, ".webm": true,
".pyc": true, ".o": true, ".a": true,
}
// SearchCode does a client-side "git grep"-equivalent search. Gitea's REST API
// has no code-content-search endpoint — confirmed against a live 1.25.5
// instance's swagger spec (only /repos/search, /repos/issues/search,
// /topics/search etc exist). The web UI's OWN code search falls back to
// server-side `git grep` because no Repository Indexer is enabled on that
// instance, and that fallback is an HTML-only route, not JSON API. So this
// walks the tree, fetches text-like blobs (bounded by codeSearchMaxFiles /
// codeSearchMaxFileSize), and substring-matches q — case-insensitive, literal
// (not a regex, to keep behavior predictable and avoid a ReDoS surface from
// user-supplied input) — against file contents.
//
// Pagination is over the FULL sorted result set, recomputed on every call —
// there is no server-side index to page through incrementally, so requesting
// page 2 re-scans the tree. Acceptable for the repo sizes this targets; a real
// indexer (bleve/elasticsearch) enabled server-side would be the long-term
// fix, and is an infra decision, not something gitea-mcp controls.
func (c *Client) SearchCode(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, q string, page, limit int) ([]CodeSearchHit, error) {
if q == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("q is required: %w", ErrValidation)
}
if page < 1 {
page = 1
}
if limit < 1 {
limit = 30
}
path := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/search?q=%s&type=code&page=%d&limit=%d",
owner, repo, url.QueryEscape(q), page, limit)
body, status, err := c.GetJSON(ctx, path)
r, err := c.GetRepo(ctx, owner, repo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve repo: %w", err)
}
if err := MapStatus(status, body); err != nil {
return nil, err
branch := r.DefaultBranch
if branch == "" {
branch = "main"
}
var env codeSearchEnvelope
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &env); err != nil {
return nil, err
tree, err := c.GetTree(ctx, owner, repo, branch, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tree walk: %w", err)
}
return env.Data, nil
qLower := strings.ToLower(q)
all := make([]CodeSearchHit, 0)
scanned := 0
for _, e := range tree.Tree {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
break
}
if e.Type != "blob" {
continue
}
if codeSearchBinaryExts[strings.ToLower(path.Ext(e.Path))] {
continue
}
if e.Size > codeSearchMaxFileSize {
continue
}
if scanned >= codeSearchMaxFiles {
break
}
scanned++
fc, ferr := c.GetFileContents(ctx, owner, repo, e.Path, branch)
if ferr != nil {
continue // vanished/unreadable between tree walk and read — skip, don't fail the whole search
}
decoded, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fc.Content)
if derr != nil {
continue
}
if bytes.IndexByte(decoded, 0) >= 0 {
continue // binary content the extension filter missed
}
content := string(decoded)
contentLower := strings.ToLower(content)
count := strings.Count(contentLower, qLower)
if count == 0 {
continue
}
idx := strings.Index(contentLower, qLower)
all = append(all, CodeSearchHit{
Path: e.Path,
Snippet: codeSearchSnippet(content, idx, len(q)),
HTMLURL: fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s/src/branch/%s/%s", c.baseURL, owner, repo, branch, e.Path),
Score: float64(count),
})
}
sort.Slice(all, func(i, j int) bool {
if all[i].Score != all[j].Score {
return all[i].Score > all[j].Score
}
return all[i].Path < all[j].Path
})
start := (page - 1) * limit
if start >= len(all) {
return []CodeSearchHit{}, nil
}
end := start + limit
if end > len(all) {
end = len(all)
}
return all[start:end], nil
}
// codeSearchSnippet returns a short window of text centered on a match,
// trimmed to a single line-ish window so results read like a grep hit rather
// than a content dump.
func codeSearchSnippet(content string, idx, matchLen int) string {
const window = 60
start := idx - window
if start < 0 {
start = 0
}
end := idx + matchLen + window
if end > len(content) {
end = len(content)
}
snippet := strings.ReplaceAll(content[start:end], "\n", " ")
return strings.TrimSpace(snippet)
}
+151 -18
View File
@@ -2,31 +2,78 @@ package gitea_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestSearchCode(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/search", r.URL.Path)
assert.Equal(t, "SearchCode", r.URL.Query().Get("q"))
assert.Equal(t, "code", r.URL.Query().Get("type"))
func b64(s string) string { return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(s)) }
// codeSearchFake serves GetRepo + GetTree + GetFileContents off an in-memory
// file map — the REAL endpoints SearchCode uses now that Gitea's REST API has
// no code-content-search endpoint (confirmed against a live 1.25.5 instance's
// swagger spec: only /repos/search, /repos/issues/search etc exist — the web
// UI's own code search falls back to server-side `git grep`, an HTML-only
// route, not JSON API). Records which paths were actually fetched, so tests
// can assert a file was SKIPPED (binary ext, oversized) without ever being
// read, not just absent from results.
type codeSearchFake struct {
files map[string]string // path -> content
sizes map[string]int64 // path -> tree-entry size (defaults to len(content))
fetched []string
}
func (f *codeSearchFake) handler(t *testing.T, owner, repo, branch string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
"data":[{
"path":"internal/gitea/code_search.go",
"snippet":"func (c *Client) SearchCode",
"html_url":"http://gitea.example.com/mathias/infra/src/branch/main/internal/gitea/code_search.go",
"score":2.5
}],
"ok":true
}`))
}))
p := r.URL.Path
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == "/api/v1/repos/"+owner+"/"+repo:
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":%q,"full_name":"%s/%s","default_branch":%q}`, repo, owner, repo, branch)
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/v1/repos/"+owner+"/"+repo+"/git/trees/"):
var entries []string
for path, content := range f.files {
size := int64(len(content))
if s, ok := f.sizes[path]; ok {
size = s
}
entries = append(entries, fmt.Sprintf(`{"path":%q,"type":"blob","sha":"s","size":%d}`, path, size))
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"sha":"root","tree":[%s],"truncated":false}`, strings.Join(entries, ","))
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && strings.HasPrefix(p, "/api/v1/repos/"+owner+"/"+repo+"/contents/"):
path := strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/api/v1/repos/"+owner+"/"+repo+"/contents/")
f.fetched = append(f.fetched, path)
content, ok := f.files[path]
if !ok {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"not found"}`))
return
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"path":%q,"sha":"s","size":%d,"content":%q,"encoding":"base64"}`, path, len(content), b64(content))
default:
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, p)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}
}
}
func TestSearchCode_FindsMatchInTree(t *testing.T) {
f := &codeSearchFake{files: map[string]string{
"internal/gitea/code_search.go": "func (c *Client) SearchCode(ctx context.Context) {}\n",
"internal/gitea/repos.go": "func (c *Client) ListRepos() {}\n",
}}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
@@ -34,6 +81,92 @@ func TestSearchCode(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, hits, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "internal/gitea/code_search.go", hits[0].Path)
assert.Equal(t, "func (c *Client) SearchCode", hits[0].Snippet)
assert.InDelta(t, 2.5, hits[0].Score, 0.001)
assert.Contains(t, hits[0].Snippet, "SearchCode")
assert.Contains(t, hits[0].HTMLURL, "internal/gitea/code_search.go")
assert.Equal(t, 1.0, hits[0].Score)
}
func TestSearchCode_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
f := &codeSearchFake{files: map[string]string{
"README.md": "# MyProject\n\nBuild instructions here.\n",
}}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
hits, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "myproject", 1, 30)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, hits, 1)
}
func TestSearchCode_SkipsBinaryExtensionWithoutFetching(t *testing.T) {
f := &codeSearchFake{files: map[string]string{
"assets/logo.png": "SearchCode", // would match if fetched — must not be
"main.go": "package main\n",
}}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
hits, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "SearchCode", 1, 30)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, hits)
assert.NotContains(t, f.fetched, "assets/logo.png", "binary extension must be skipped before fetch")
}
func TestSearchCode_SkipsOversizedFileWithoutFetching(t *testing.T) {
f := &codeSearchFake{
files: map[string]string{"vendor/bundle.txt": "SearchCode"},
sizes: map[string]int64{"vendor/bundle.txt": 10 * 1024 * 1024}, // 10MB per the tree listing
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
hits, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "SearchCode", 1, 30)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, hits)
assert.NotContains(t, f.fetched, "vendor/bundle.txt", "oversized file must be skipped before fetch")
}
func TestSearchCode_SkipsBinaryContentNullByte(t *testing.T) {
f := &codeSearchFake{files: map[string]string{
"data.bin": "SearchCode\x00binary-marker",
}}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
hits, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "SearchCode", 1, 30)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, hits, "content with a null byte must be treated as binary even past the extension filter")
}
func TestSearchCode_Pagination(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{}
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
files[fmt.Sprintf("file%d.go", i)] = strings.Repeat("hit ", i+1) // increasing occurrence count => increasing score
}
f := &codeSearchFake{files: files}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "mathias", "infra", "main"))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
page1, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "hit", 1, 2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, page1, 2)
page2, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "hit", 2, 2)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, page2, 2)
assert.NotEqual(t, page1[0].Path, page2[0].Path, "pages must not overlap")
assert.True(t, page1[0].Score >= page1[1].Score, "page1 sorted desc by score")
assert.True(t, page1[1].Score >= page2[0].Score, "page1's worst must rank >= page2's best")
}
func TestSearchCode_EmptyQueryErrors(t *testing.T) {
c := gitea.NewClient("http://unused", "tok")
_, err := c.SearchCode(context.Background(), "mathias", "infra", "", 1, 30)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrValidation))
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+3 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ type Issue struct {
}
type Label struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Color string `json:"color,omitempty"`
}
type User struct {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
package gitea
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
)
// ListLabels fetches all labels defined on a repo.
func (c *Client) ListLabels(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string) ([]Label, error) {
p := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/labels", owner, repo)
body, status, err := c.GetJSON(ctx, p)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := MapStatus(status, body); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var labels []Label
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &labels); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return labels, nil
}
// AddIssueLabels adds labelIDs to an issue or pull request (PRs share index
// space with issues, per Gitea). This is additive per Gitea's own POST
// semantics — existing labels are left in place, no replace/delete needed.
// Returns the issue's full label set after the add.
func (c *Client) AddIssueLabels(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int, labelIDs []int64) ([]Label, error) {
p := fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/issues/%d/labels", owner, repo, number)
payload, err := json.Marshal(map[string][]int64{"labels": labelIDs})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
body, status, err := c.PostJSON(ctx, p, payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := MapStatus(status, body); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var labels []Label
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &labels); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return labels, nil
}
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
package gitea_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestListLabels(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, r.Method)
assert.Equal(t, "/api/v1/repos/o/r/labels", r.URL.Path)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[
{"id":1,"name":"bug","color":"ee0701"},
{"id":2,"name":"enhancement","color":"84b6eb"}
]`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
labels, err := c.ListLabels(context.Background(), "o", "r")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, labels, 2)
assert.Equal(t, int64(1), labels[0].ID)
assert.Equal(t, "bug", labels[0].Name)
assert.Equal(t, "ee0701", labels[0].Color)
assert.Equal(t, "enhancement", labels[1].Name)
}
func TestListLabels_Empty(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[]`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
labels, err := c.ListLabels(context.Background(), "o", "r")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, labels)
}
func TestListLabels_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"repo not found"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
_, err := c.ListLabels(context.Background(), "o", "r")
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, gitea.ErrNotFound)
}
func TestAddIssueLabels(t *testing.T) {
var captured []byte
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, r.Method)
assert.Equal(t, "/api/v1/repos/o/r/issues/42/labels", r.URL.Path)
var err error
captured, err = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[
{"id":1,"name":"bug","color":"ee0701"},
{"id":3,"name":"priority","color":"00ff00"}
]`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
labels, err := c.AddIssueLabels(context.Background(), "o", "r", 42, []int64{3})
require.NoError(t, err)
var payload map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(captured, &payload))
ids, ok := payload["labels"].([]any)
require.True(t, ok)
require.Len(t, ids, 1)
assert.Equal(t, float64(3), ids[0])
require.Len(t, labels, 2)
assert.Equal(t, "bug", labels[0].Name)
assert.Equal(t, "priority", labels[1].Name)
}
func TestAddIssueLabels_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"issue not found"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
_, err := c.AddIssueLabels(context.Background(), "o", "r", 999, []int64{1})
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, gitea.ErrNotFound)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+5 -1
View File
@@ -16,10 +16,12 @@ type PullRequest struct {
Draft bool `json:"draft"`
Head struct {
Ref string `json:"ref"`
Sha string `json:"sha"`
} `json:"head"`
Base struct {
Ref string `json:"ref"`
} `json:"base"`
Mergeable bool `json:"mergeable"`
}
type CreatePullRequestArgs struct {
@@ -105,8 +107,10 @@ func (c *Client) GetPullRequestDiff(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, ind
type MergePRArgs struct {
Do string `json:"Do"`
Title string `json:"merge_message_title,omitempty"`
Title string `json:"merge_title_field,omitempty"`
Body string `json:"merge_message_field,omitempty"`
// HeadCommitID binds the merge to the commit whose CI was checked: if the PR branch moved, Gitea refuses.
HeadCommitID string `json:"head_commit_id,omitempty"`
}
func (c *Client) MergePullRequest(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, index int, args MergePRArgs) error {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
-1
View File
@@ -255,4 +255,3 @@ func (c *Client) GetRepo(ctx context.Context, owner, name string) (*Repo, error)
}
return &r, nil
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ func TestCreateRepo_Org(t *testing.T) {
c := gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok")
r, err := c.CreateRepo(context.Background(), gitea.CreateRepoArgs{
Name: "infra",
Org: "hyperguild",
Name: "infra",
Org: "hyperguild",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "hyperguild/infra", r.FullName)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ package identity_test
import (
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
// Package localtools holds MCP tools that must never be reachable from the
// shared HTTP gitea-mcp server (RegisterAll, cmd/gitea-mcp). Each tool here
// carries a capability too dangerous to expose network-side, even behind
// OIDC — mint_service_account_token resets whatever password its target
// account has. Only cmd/gitea-admin-mcp, a separate local-only stdio binary,
// imports this package.
package localtools
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
// bootstrapper is the one method this tool needs — narrow so tests inject a
// fake instead of a real adminbootstrap.Bootstrapper.
type bootstrapper interface {
Run(ctx context.Context, req adminbootstrap.Request) (adminbootstrap.Result, error)
}
type MintServiceAccountToken struct {
b bootstrapper
}
func NewMintServiceAccountToken(b bootstrapper) *MintServiceAccountToken {
return &MintServiceAccountToken{b: b}
}
func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{
Name: "mint_service_account_token",
Description: "Create (or reset the password of) a dedicated Gitea " +
"service/bot account, mint it a scoped access token, optionally " +
"grant it read-only collaborator access on named repos, and store " +
"the token via 1Password. Requires confirm_service_account=true: " +
"this resets whatever password the target account currently has, " +
"which is only safe for a dedicated bot account, never a real " +
"person's login.",
InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"username":{"type":"string"},
"email":{"type":"string"},
"full_name":{"type":"string"},
"scopes":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"}},
"token_name":{"type":"string"},
"secret_name":{"type":"string","description":"name to store the minted token under"},
"grant_read_repos":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"},"description":"owner/repo strings"},
"confirm_service_account":{"type":"boolean"}
},
"required":["username","email","scopes","token_name","secret_name","confirm_service_account"]
}`),
}
}
type mintArgs struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Email string `json:"email"`
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
TokenName string `json:"token_name"`
SecretName string `json:"secret_name"`
GrantReadRepos []string `json:"grant_read_repos"`
ConfirmServiceAccount bool `json:"confirm_service_account"`
}
func (t *MintServiceAccountToken) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
var args mintArgs
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse arguments: %w", err)
}
repos := make([]adminbootstrap.RepoRef, 0, len(args.GrantReadRepos))
for _, r := range args.GrantReadRepos {
owner, name, ok := strings.Cut(r, "/")
if !ok || owner == "" || name == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("grant_read_repos entry %q must be owner/repo", r)
}
repos = append(repos, adminbootstrap.RepoRef{Owner: owner, Name: name})
}
result, err := t.b.Run(ctx, adminbootstrap.Request{
Username: args.Username,
Email: args.Email,
FullName: args.FullName,
Scopes: args.Scopes,
TokenName: args.TokenName,
SecretName: args.SecretName,
GrantReadRepos: repos,
ConfirmServiceAccount: args.ConfirmServiceAccount,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return json.Marshal(result)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
package localtools_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/adminbootstrap"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/localtools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// This tool lives in its own package, never internal/tools, on purpose: it
// resets whatever password its target account has, which is far too
// dangerous a capability to risk it ever being wired into RegisterAll and
// exposed on the shared HTTP gitea-mcp server. Only cmd/gitea-admin-mcp (a
// separate, local-only, stdio binary) imports this package.
type fakeBootstrapper struct {
gotReq adminbootstrap.Request
result adminbootstrap.Result
err error
}
func (f *fakeBootstrapper) Run(_ context.Context, req adminbootstrap.Request) (adminbootstrap.Result, error) {
f.gotReq = req
return f.result, f.err
}
func TestMintServiceAccountToken_ParsesArgsAndCallsBootstrapper(t *testing.T) {
fb := &fakeBootstrapper{result: adminbootstrap.Result{
Username: "dispatch-bot", Created: true,
SecretRef: "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/token",
}}
tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"username": "dispatch-bot",
"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
"scopes": []string{"read:repository", "read:issue"},
"token_name": "dispatch-ci-readonly",
"secret_name": "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly",
"grant_read_repos": []string{"mathias/cobalt-dingo"},
"confirm_service_account": true,
})
out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "dispatch-bot", fb.gotReq.Username)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"read:repository", "read:issue"}, fb.gotReq.Scopes)
assert.Equal(t, true, fb.gotReq.ConfirmServiceAccount)
require.Equal(t, []adminbootstrap.RepoRef{{Owner: "mathias", Name: "cobalt-dingo"}}, fb.gotReq.GrantReadRepos)
var result map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(out, &result))
assert.Equal(t, "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/token", result["SecretRef"])
// The tool's own output must never carry a raw token or password field --
// adminbootstrap.Result structurally can't (it has none), which this pins.
_, hasToken := result["Token"]
_, hasPassword := result["Password"]
assert.False(t, hasToken)
assert.False(t, hasPassword)
}
func TestMintServiceAccountToken_RejectsMalformedRepoRef(t *testing.T) {
fb := &fakeBootstrapper{}
tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"username": "dispatch-bot",
"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
"scopes": []string{"read:repository"},
"token_name": "x",
"secret_name": "x",
"grant_read_repos": []string{"not-owner-slash-repo"},
"confirm_service_account": true,
})
_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "owner/repo")
}
func TestMintServiceAccountToken_PropagatesBootstrapperError(t *testing.T) {
fb := &fakeBootstrapper{err: assert.AnError}
tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(fb)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"username": "dispatch-bot",
"email": "dispatch@d-ma.be",
"scopes": []string{"read:repository"},
"token_name": "x",
"secret_name": "x",
"confirm_service_account": true,
})
_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), args)
require.Error(t, err)
}
func TestMintServiceAccountToken_Descriptor(t *testing.T) {
tool := localtools.NewMintServiceAccountToken(&fakeBootstrapper{})
d := tool.Descriptor()
assert.Equal(t, "mint_service_account_token", d.Name)
assert.NotEmpty(t, d.Description)
}
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
package localtools
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"strings"
)
// OpSecretStore implements adminbootstrap.SecretStore against the local
// `op` (1Password) CLI. Run is injectable for tests; nil defaults to
// actually invoking `op`.
//
// The token value is passed via the child process's stdin, never as a
// literal argv element — matching the estate's own secret-handling rule
// (a value in argv lands in process listings and any transcript of the
// command). `credential[password]=-` is `op item create`'s documented way
// to read one field's value from stdin instead of the command line.
type OpSecretStore struct {
Vault string
Run func(ctx context.Context, stdin string, args ...string) error
}
func (s OpSecretStore) Store(ctx context.Context, name, value string) (string, error) {
run := s.Run
if run == nil {
run = runOp
}
args := []string{
"item", "create",
"--category=login",
"--vault=" + s.Vault,
"--title=" + name,
"credential[password]=-",
}
if err := run(ctx, value, args...); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("op item create: %w", err)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("op://%s/%s/credential", s.Vault, name), nil
}
func runOp(ctx context.Context, stdin string, args ...string) error {
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "op", args...)
cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(stdin)
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
}
return nil
}
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
package localtools_test
import (
"context"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/localtools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// The estate's own secret-handling rule: never place a literal secret in a
// command's argv — it lands in process listings and any transcript of the
// command. OpSecretStore feeds the token to `op` via stdin instead.
func TestOpSecretStore_PassesValueViaStdinNeverArgv(t *testing.T) {
var gotStdin string
var gotArgs []string
s := localtools.OpSecretStore{
Vault: "AgentSecrets",
Run: func(_ context.Context, stdin string, args ...string) error {
gotStdin = stdin
gotArgs = args
return nil
},
}
ref, err := s.Store(context.Background(), "gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly", "tok_the_actual_secret_value")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "op://AgentSecrets/gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly/credential", ref)
assert.Equal(t, "tok_the_actual_secret_value", gotStdin)
for _, a := range gotArgs {
assert.NotContains(t, a, "tok_the_actual_secret_value",
"the secret value must never appear as a literal argv element")
}
assert.Contains(t, gotArgs, "--vault=AgentSecrets")
assert.Contains(t, gotArgs, "--title=gitea-dispatch-bot-ci-readonly")
}
func TestOpSecretStore_PropagatesRunError(t *testing.T) {
s := localtools.OpSecretStore{
Vault: "AgentSecrets",
Run: func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ ...string) error {
return assert.AnError
},
}
_, err := s.Store(context.Background(), "x", "y")
require.Error(t, err)
}
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
package mcp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"time"
chassisauth "git.d-ma.be/mathias/mcp-chassis/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
)
// auditTargetKeys are the only argument values copied into the audit record:
// they identify what a call acted on without copying what it wrote. Every
// other argument (file content, issue bodies) is reduced to args_bytes so the
// audit trail never becomes a second copy of repo content (gitea-mcp#64).
var auditTargetKeys = []string{"owner", "repo", "name", "number", "index", "branch", "path", "tag"}
// logToolCall emits one structured record per tools/call (OWASP MCP08).
func logToolCall(ctx context.Context, name string, args json.RawMessage, start time.Time, err error) {
attrs := []any{
"tool", name,
"caller", auth.Caller(ctx),
"args_bytes", len(args),
"duration_ms", time.Since(start).Milliseconds(),
}
if tok, ok := gitea.TokenFromContext(ctx); ok {
attrs = append(attrs, "token_fp", chassisauth.Fingerprint(tok))
}
var parsed map[string]any
if json.Unmarshal(args, &parsed) == nil {
for _, k := range auditTargetKeys {
if v, ok := parsed[k]; ok {
attrs = append(attrs, k, v)
}
}
}
outcome := "ok"
if err != nil {
outcome = err.Error()
}
attrs = append(attrs, "outcome", outcome)
slog.InfoContext(ctx, "mcp tool call", attrs...)
}
+135
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
package mcp_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type auditStubTool struct {
name string
err error
}
func (s auditStubTool) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{Name: s.name, InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{"type":"object"}`)}
}
func (s auditStubTool) Call(context.Context, json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
if s.err != nil {
return nil, s.err
}
return json.RawMessage(`{"ok":true}`), nil
}
// captureAudit routes slog to a buffer and returns the decoded
// "mcp tool call" records emitted while fn runs.
func captureAudit(t *testing.T, fn func()) []map[string]any {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
prev := slog.Default()
slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, nil)))
t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) })
fn()
var out []map[string]any
for _, l := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(buf.String()), "\n") {
if l == "" {
continue
}
var rec map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(l), &rec))
if rec["msg"] == "mcp tool call" {
out = append(out, rec)
}
}
return out
}
func auditServer(tools ...registry.Tool) http.Handler {
reg := registry.New()
for _, tl := range tools {
reg.Register(tl)
}
srv := mcp.NewServer(mcp.ServerOptions{Registry: reg})
return auth.CallerMiddleware(slog.Default(), srv)
}
func callTool(t *testing.T, h http.Handler, name string, args any) {
t.Helper()
body := map[string]any{
"jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call",
"params": map[string]any{"name": name, "arguments": args},
}
b, err := json.Marshal(body)
require.NoError(t, err)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", bytes.NewBuffer(b))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("X-Auth-Request-User", "alice")
h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
}
// gitea-mcp#64: tools/call dispatched with no record at all.
func TestToolsCallLogsOneAuditRecordWithToolCallerAndTarget(t *testing.T) {
recs := captureAudit(t, func() {
callTool(t, auditServer(auditStubTool{name: "repo_delete"}), "repo_delete",
map[string]any{"owner": "mathias", "repo": "scratch", "confirm": "scratch"})
})
require.Len(t, recs, 1)
r := recs[0]
assert.Equal(t, "repo_delete", r["tool"])
assert.Equal(t, "alice", r["caller"])
assert.Equal(t, "mathias", r["owner"])
assert.Equal(t, "scratch", r["repo"])
assert.Equal(t, "ok", r["outcome"])
assert.Contains(t, r, "duration_ms")
}
func TestToolsCallAuditRecordsErrorOutcome(t *testing.T) {
recs := captureAudit(t, func() {
callTool(t, auditServer(auditStubTool{name: "pr_merge", err: errors.New("boom")}),
"pr_merge", map[string]any{"owner": "mathias", "repo": "x", "number": 3})
})
require.Len(t, recs, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "boom", recs[0]["outcome"])
assert.EqualValues(t, 3, recs[0]["number"])
}
// The audit line must not become a second copy of repo content.
func TestToolsCallAuditOmitsArgumentValuesOtherThanTarget(t *testing.T) {
const sentinel = "SENTINEL-FILE-CONTENT-7f3a"
recs := captureAudit(t, func() {
callTool(t, auditServer(auditStubTool{name: "file_write_branch"}), "file_write_branch",
map[string]any{"owner": "mathias", "repo": "x", "path": "a.txt", "content": sentinel})
})
require.Len(t, recs, 1)
raw, err := json.Marshal(recs[0])
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotContains(t, string(raw), sentinel)
assert.Contains(t, recs[0], "args_bytes")
}
// #38 keeps `name` (for repo) and `index` (for number) as legacy aliases; a
// caller using them must still leave a target in the audit record.
func TestToolsCallAuditRecordsLegacyAliasTargets(t *testing.T) {
recs := captureAudit(t, func() {
callTool(t, auditServer(auditStubTool{name: "issue_close"}), "issue_close",
map[string]any{"owner": "mathias", "name": "infra", "index": 7})
})
require.Len(t, recs, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "infra", recs[0]["name"])
assert.EqualValues(t, 7, recs[0]["index"])
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
+5 -2
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"time"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
const (
ProtocolVersion = "2025-03-26"
ProtocolVersion = "2025-03-26"
maxRequestBodyBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
)
@@ -90,7 +91,9 @@ func (s *Server) handlePOST(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
NewErrorResponse(req.ID, -32602, "invalid params", nil))
return
}
start := time.Now()
out, err := s.opts.Registry.Dispatch(r.Context(), p.Name, p.Arguments)
logToolCall(r.Context(), p.Name, p.Arguments, start, err)
if err != nil {
code := -32000
if errors.Is(err, registry.ErrToolNotFound) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"sync"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
package mcp
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
// ServeStdio runs the MCP JSON-RPC protocol over stdio: one JSON-RPC message
// per line on in, one response per line on out — the standard MCP stdio
// framing, and how Claude Code spawns a LOCAL MCP server as a subprocess.
//
// Built for gitea-admin-mcp (see cmd/gitea-admin-mcp), which has to run
// locally where real admin credentials exist just-in-time, rather than
// through the hosted HTTP server (server.go) a sandboxed agent session talks
// to. The method dispatch below intentionally mirrors handlePOST in
// server.go — same three methods, same error codes — so a tool written
// against registry.Tool behaves identically over either transport; it is
// kept as a separate small loop rather than a shared refactor of the HTTP
// handler, which mixes in http.ResponseWriter specifics this transport
// doesn't have.
func ServeStdio(ctx context.Context, reg *registry.Registry, in io.Reader, out io.Writer) error {
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(in)
scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64*1024), 1<<20) // 1 MiB max line, matches server.go's request cap
enc := json.NewEncoder(out)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Bytes()
if len(line) == 0 {
continue
}
var req Request
if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &req); err != nil {
if werr := enc.Encode(NewErrorResponse(nil, -32700, "parse error", nil)); werr != nil {
return werr
}
continue
}
if req.ID == nil {
continue // notification — no response, per JSON-RPC 2.0
}
resp := dispatch(ctx, reg, req)
if err := enc.Encode(resp); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return scanner.Err()
}
// dispatch handles one already-parsed request. Mirrors server.go's
// handlePOST switch exactly (initialize / tools/list / tools/call / unknown).
func dispatch(ctx context.Context, reg *registry.Registry, req Request) Response {
if req.Method == "initialize" {
return NewResponse(req.ID, map[string]any{
"protocolVersion": ProtocolVersion,
"capabilities": map[string]any{"tools": map[string]any{}},
"serverInfo": map[string]any{"name": "gitea-admin-mcp", "version": "0.1.0"},
})
}
switch req.Method {
case "tools/list":
return NewResponse(req.ID, map[string]any{"tools": reg.Tools()})
case "tools/call":
var p struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Arguments json.RawMessage `json:"arguments"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(req.Params, &p); err != nil {
return NewErrorResponse(req.ID, -32602, "invalid params", nil)
}
out, err := reg.Dispatch(ctx, p.Name, p.Arguments)
if err != nil {
code := -32000
if errors.Is(err, registry.ErrToolNotFound) {
code = CodeNotFound
}
return NewErrorResponse(req.ID, code, err.Error(), nil)
}
return NewResponse(req.ID, map[string]any{
"content": []map[string]any{{"type": "text", "text": string(out)}},
})
default:
return NewErrorResponse(req.ID, -32601, fmt.Sprintf("method not found: %s", req.Method), nil)
}
}
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package mcp_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/mcp"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// The existing MCP server (server.go) only speaks HTTP. gitea-admin-mcp needs
// to run as a LOCAL stdio server (Claude Code's local .mcp.json stdio server
// type, spawned as a subprocess with real 1Password/admin auth already in its
// environment) -- reusing the exact same registry.Tool interface and
// jsonrpc.go message types, one JSON-RPC message per line on stdin/stdout,
// which is the standard MCP stdio framing.
type echoTool struct{}
func (echoTool) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{Name: "echo", Description: "echoes its input"}
}
func (echoTool) Call(_ context.Context, args json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
return args, nil
}
func TestServeStdio_Initialize(t *testing.T) {
reg := registry.New()
in := strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}` + "\n")
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, in, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
var resp mcp.Response
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(out.Bytes()), &resp))
assert.EqualValues(t, 1, resp.ID)
assert.Nil(t, resp.Error)
}
func TestServeStdio_ToolsListAndCall(t *testing.T) {
reg := registry.New()
reg.Register(echoTool{})
in := strings.NewReader(
`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}` + "\n" +
`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"echo","arguments":{"hello":"world"}}}` + "\n",
)
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, in, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(out.String()), "\n")
require.Len(t, lines, 2, "one JSON-RPC response per line, in request order")
var listResp mcp.Response
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[0]), &listResp))
assert.EqualValues(t, 1, listResp.ID)
var callResp mcp.Response
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(lines[1]), &callResp))
assert.EqualValues(t, 2, callResp.ID)
require.NotNil(t, callResp.Result)
}
func TestServeStdio_NotificationGetsNoResponse(t *testing.T) {
// A request with no "id" is a notification per JSON-RPC 2.0 -- must not
// write anything back, and must not stop the loop from processing what
// follows it.
reg := registry.New()
in := strings.NewReader(
`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}` + "\n" +
`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}` + "\n",
)
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, in, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
lines := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(out.String()), "\n")
require.Len(t, lines, 1, "the notification must not produce a response line")
}
func TestServeStdio_UnknownMethodReturnsJSONRPCError(t *testing.T) {
reg := registry.New()
in := strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"not/a/real/method"}` + "\n")
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, in, out)
require.NoError(t, err)
var resp mcp.Response
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(out.Bytes()), &resp))
require.NotNil(t, resp.Error)
assert.Equal(t, -32601, resp.Error.Code)
}
func TestServeStdio_UnparseableLineReturnsParseError(t *testing.T) {
reg := registry.New()
in := strings.NewReader("not json at all\n")
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
err := mcp.ServeStdio(context.Background(), reg, in, out)
require.NoError(t, err, "a malformed line must not crash the loop")
var resp mcp.Response
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(bytes.TrimSpace(out.Bytes()), &resp))
require.NotNil(t, resp.Error)
assert.Equal(t, -32700, resp.Error.Code)
}
+36 -11
View File
@@ -7,27 +7,27 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// #36: every caller (claude.ai connector, gitea's own convention) sends the
// repo identifier as `repo` and issue/PR index as `index`, but the tools
// declare them as `name` and `number`. Unmatched fields zero-valued the path
// segment and produced gitea's misleading /api/swagger 404. parseArgs now
// aliases repo->name and index->number so the idiomatic call works.
// #38: `repo` (and `number`) are the canonical, idiomatic gitea/GitHub arg names
// that identifier tools advertise. `name` is kept as a back-compat alias via the
// bidirectional shim, so old `name` callers still work. `index`->`number` stays.
// An explicit canonical (`repo`) always wins over its alias (`name`).
func TestRepoAndIndexAliasesResolve(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
args string
wantPath string
}{
{"repo+index aliases", `{"owner":"mathias","repo":"infra","index":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"canonical name+number", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"infra","number":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"explicit name wins over repo", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"infra","repo":"ignored","number":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"canonical repo+number", `{"owner":"mathias","repo":"infra","number":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"repo+index alias", `{"owner":"mathias","repo":"infra","index":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"legacy name alias", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"infra","number":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
{"explicit repo wins over name", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"ignored","repo":"infra","number":7}`, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/issues/7"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -47,3 +47,28 @@ func TestRepoAndIndexAliasesResolve(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// #38: identifier tools must ADVERTISE `repo` (not `name`) in their schema, so
// the contract a client reads matches what every caller sends. The two create
// tools keep `name` because there it means "name of the new repo", not an
// existing-repo identifier.
func TestRepoIsCanonicalInAdvertisedSchema(t *testing.T) {
c := gitea.NewClient("http://unused", "")
a := allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"})
identifier := map[string]json.RawMessage{
"repo_get": tools.NewRepoGet(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema,
"issue_get": tools.NewIssueGet(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema,
"pr_merge": tools.NewPRMerge(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema,
"repo_delete": tools.NewRepoDelete(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema,
"file_read": tools.NewFileRead(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema,
}
for name, sch := range identifier {
s := string(sch)
assert.Contains(t, s, `"repo":`, name+" must advertise repo")
assert.NotContains(t, s, `"name":`, name+" must not advertise name")
}
// create tools keep `name` (new resource name, not an existing-repo id)
assert.Contains(t, string(tools.NewRepoCreate(c, a).Descriptor().InputSchema), `"name":`)
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type BranchDelete struct {
@@ -27,17 +27,17 @@ func (t *BranchDelete) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"branch":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","branch"]
"required":["owner","repo","branch"]
}`),
}
}
type branchDeleteArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Branch string `json:"branch"`
}
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ func (t *BranchDelete) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawM
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Branch == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("branch is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
if err := t.c.DeleteBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Branch); err != nil {
if err := t.c.DeleteBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Branch); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+8 -8
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type BranchList struct {
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@ func (t *BranchList) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"page":{"type":"integer","minimum":1},
"limit":{"type":"integer","minimum":1,"maximum":50}
},
"required":["owner","name"]
"required":["owner","repo"]
}`),
}
}
type branchListArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Page int `json:"page"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
}
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ func (t *BranchList) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMes
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
branches, err := t.c.ListBranches(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Page, capLimit(args.Limit, 30))
branches, err := t.c.ListBranches(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Page, capLimit(args.Limit, 30))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+8 -8
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type BranchProtectionGet struct {
@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ func (t *BranchProtectionGet) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"branch":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","branch"]
"required":["owner","repo","branch"]
}`),
}
}
type branchProtectionGetArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Branch string `json:"branch"`
}
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ func (t *BranchProtectionGet) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (js
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
bp, err := t.c.GetBranchProtection(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Branch)
bp, err := t.c.GetBranchProtection(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Branch)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+5 -5
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"sync"
"time"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type semaphore chan struct{}
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func (t *CodeSearch) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
type codeSearchArgs struct {
Q string `json:"q"`
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Repo string `json:"repo,omitempty"` // optional: empty => owner-wide fan-out (#37 opt-out)
Page int `json:"page"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (t *CodeSearch) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMes
if args.Q == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("q is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Page < 1 {
+111 -78
View File
@@ -2,36 +2,92 @@ package tools_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestCodeSearchSingleRepo(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
assert.Equal(t, "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/search", r.URL.Path)
assert.Equal(t, "ListRepos", r.URL.Query().Get("q"))
assert.Equal(t, "code", r.URL.Query().Get("type"))
// multiRepoSearchFake serves ListRepos + per-repo GetRepo/GetTree/GetFileContents
// for a set of repos — the real endpoints code_search's underlying SearchCode
// now uses (Gitea's REST API has no code-content-search endpoint; see
// internal/gitea/code_search.go's doc comment).
type multiRepoSearchFake struct {
owner string
repos []string // ListRepos response, in this order
files map[string]map[string]string // repo -> path -> content
fail map[string]bool // repo -> GetRepo 500s for this repo (simulates a per-repo failure)
}
func (f *multiRepoSearchFake) handler(t *testing.T) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
"data":[{
"path":"internal/gitea/repos.go",
"snippet":"func (c *Client) ListRepos",
"html_url":"http://gitea.example.com/mathias/infra/src/branch/main/internal/gitea/repos.go",
"score":3.0
}],
"ok":true
}`))
}))
p := r.URL.Path
for _, repo := range f.repos {
base := "/api/v1/repos/" + f.owner + "/" + repo
switch {
case p == base && f.fail[repo]:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"internal error"}`))
return
case p == base:
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":%q,"full_name":"%s/%s","default_branch":"main"}`, repo, f.owner, repo)
return
case strings.HasPrefix(p, base+"/git/trees/"):
var entries []string
for path := range f.files[repo] {
entries = append(entries, fmt.Sprintf(`{"path":%q,"type":"blob","sha":"s","size":100}`, path))
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"sha":"root","tree":[%s],"truncated":false}`, strings.Join(entries, ","))
return
case strings.HasPrefix(p, base+"/contents/"):
path := strings.TrimPrefix(p, base+"/contents/")
content, ok := f.files[repo][path]
if !ok {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"not found"}`))
return
}
enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(content))
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"path":%q,"sha":"s","size":%d,"content":%q,"encoding":"base64"}`, path, len(content), enc)
return
}
}
if p == "/api/v1/users/"+f.owner+"/repos" {
var entries []string
for _, repo := range f.repos {
entries = append(entries, fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":%q,"full_name":"%s/%s","default_branch":"main"}`, repo, f.owner, repo))
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `[%s]`, strings.Join(entries, ","))
return
}
t.Errorf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, p)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
}
}
func TestCodeSearchSingleRepo(t *testing.T) {
f := &multiRepoSearchFake{
owner: "mathias",
repos: []string{"infra"},
files: map[string]map[string]string{
"infra": {"internal/gitea/repos.go": "func (c *Client) ListRepos() {}\n"},
},
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewCodeSearch(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"}))
@@ -50,7 +106,7 @@ func TestCodeSearchSingleRepo(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, result.Results, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "mathias/infra", result.Results[0].Repo)
assert.Equal(t, "internal/gitea/repos.go", result.Results[0].Path)
assert.Equal(t, "func (c *Client) ListRepos", result.Results[0].Snippet)
assert.Contains(t, result.Results[0].Snippet, "ListRepos")
}
func TestCodeSearchAllowlistRejects(t *testing.T) {
@@ -67,22 +123,15 @@ func TestCodeSearchRequiresQ(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCodeSearchFanOutHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/api/v1/users/mathias/repos":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[
{"name":"infra","full_name":"mathias/infra","default_branch":"main"},
{"name":"gitea-mcp","full_name":"mathias/gitea-mcp","default_branch":"main"}
]`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/search":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"path":"main.go","snippet":"infra hit","html_url":"http://x/infra/main.go","score":2.0}],"ok":true}`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/gitea-mcp/search":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"path":"cmd/main.go","snippet":"gitea-mcp hit","html_url":"http://x/gitea-mcp/main.go","score":1.0}],"ok":true}`))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
f := &multiRepoSearchFake{
owner: "mathias",
repos: []string{"infra", "gitea-mcp"},
files: map[string]map[string]string{
"infra": {"main.go": "this is an infra hit\n"},
"gitea-mcp": {"cmd/main.go": "this is a gitea-mcp hit\n"},
},
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewCodeSearch(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"}))
@@ -110,23 +159,15 @@ func TestCodeSearchFanOutHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCodeSearchFanOutPartialFailure(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/api/v1/users/mathias/repos":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[
{"name":"infra","full_name":"mathias/infra","default_branch":"main"},
{"name":"broken","full_name":"mathias/broken","default_branch":"main"}
]`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/infra/search":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"path":"main.go","snippet":"infra hit","html_url":"http://x/infra/main.go","score":1.0}],"ok":true}`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/broken/search":
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"internal error"}`))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
f := &multiRepoSearchFake{
owner: "mathias",
repos: []string{"infra", "broken"},
files: map[string]map[string]string{
"infra": {"main.go": "this is an infra hit\n"},
},
fail: map[string]bool{"broken": true},
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewCodeSearch(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"}))
@@ -134,9 +175,11 @@ func TestCodeSearchFanOutPartialFailure(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
var result struct {
Results []struct{ Repo string `json:"repo"` } `json:"results"`
Partial bool `json:"partial"`
PartialRepos []string `json:"partial_repos"`
Results []struct {
Repo string `json:"repo"`
} `json:"results"`
Partial bool `json:"partial"`
PartialRepos []string `json:"partial_repos"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(out, &result))
assert.True(t, result.Partial)
@@ -147,41 +190,31 @@ func TestCodeSearchFanOutPartialFailure(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCodeSearchFanOutSortsByScore(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/api/v1/users/mathias/repos":
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`[
{"name":"alpha","full_name":"mathias/alpha","default_branch":"main"},
{"name":"beta","full_name":"mathias/beta","default_branch":"main"}
]`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/alpha/search":
// low score
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"path":"a.go","snippet":"low","html_url":"http://x/alpha/a.go","score":1.0}],"ok":true}`))
case "/api/v1/repos/mathias/beta/search":
// high score
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"data":[{"path":"b.go","snippet":"high","html_url":"http://x/beta/b.go","score":5.0}],"ok":true}`))
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}))
f := &multiRepoSearchFake{
owner: "mathias",
repos: []string{"alpha", "beta"},
files: map[string]map[string]string{
"alpha": {"a.go": "one high here"}, // 1 occurrence => score 1
"beta": {"b.go": "high high high high high"}, // 5 occurrences => score 5
},
}
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewCodeSearch(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"mathias"}))
out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"q":"something","owner":"mathias"}`))
out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"q":"high","owner":"mathias"}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
var result struct {
Results []struct {
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Snippet string `json:"snippet"`
Score float64 `json:"score"`
} `json:"results"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(out, &result))
require.Len(t, result.Results, 2)
// First result must be the high-score one
assert.Equal(t, "mathias/beta", result.Results[0].Repo, "higher-score repo (5 occurrences) must sort first")
assert.True(t, result.Results[0].Score > result.Results[1].Score,
"expected results sorted by score desc, got %v then %v",
result.Results[0].Score, result.Results[1].Score)
assert.True(t, strings.Contains(result.Results[0].Snippet, "high"))
"expected results sorted by score desc, got %v then %v", result.Results[0].Score, result.Results[1].Score)
}
+267 -92
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
var nameRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,38}[a-z0-9]$`)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ func NewCreateProjectFromTemplate(c *gitea.Client, a *allowlist.Allowlist, tmplO
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{
Name: "create_project_from_template",
Description: "Create a new project repo from a template. Best-effort substitution of placeholders (__PROJECT_NAME__, __MODULE_PATH__) in every file's content AND path (e.g. renaming cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/): it completes only if the generated branch is promptly writable. If gitea's async generate is slow (infra#179) the repo is still created and partial_failure explains how to finalize locally (`hyperguild new-project`). Check files_substituted and partial_failure. Defaults to the server-configured template; pass template_name to override (e.g. template-go-agent). Pass dispatch_allow=true to also inject a .dispatch-allow file so the project is immediately dispatch-eligible (dispatch#3).",
Description: "Create a new project repo from a template. Best-effort substitution of placeholders (__PROJECT_NAME__, __MODULE_PATH__) in every file's content AND path (e.g. renaming cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/): it completes only if the generated branch is promptly writable. If gitea's async generate is slow (infra#179) the repo is still created and partial_failure explains the shortfall — call this tool again with resume=true (same owner/name) once the branch settles to safely continue where it left off; already-correct files/renames are left untouched. Check files_substituted, partial_failure, and dispatch_allow_failure. Defaults to the server-configured template; pass template_name to override (e.g. template-go-agent) — ignored when resume=true. Pass dispatch_allow=true to also inject a .dispatch-allow file so the project is dispatch-eligible (dispatch#3); safe to re-request on resume.",
InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
"type":"object",
"properties":{
@@ -56,8 +56,9 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"name":{"type":"string","pattern":"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{1,38}[a-z0-9]$"},
"description":{"type":"string"},
"private":{"type":"boolean"},
"template_name":{"type":"string","description":"Template repo name to generate from. Defaults to the server-configured template."},
"dispatch_allow":{"type":"boolean","description":"When true, inject a .dispatch-allow file so the new project is immediately opt-in for headless dispatch (dispatch#3). Default false."}
"template_name":{"type":"string","description":"Template repo name to generate from. Defaults to the server-configured template. Ignored when resume=true."},
"dispatch_allow":{"type":"boolean","description":"When true, inject a .dispatch-allow file (dispatch#3) AND register owner/name into mathias/dispatch's git-tracked allowlist (dispatch-repos.txt, dispatch#19) — both gates are required for the watcher to actually pick the repo up; each is applied independently and idempotently. Default false. Safe to re-request on resume."},
"resume":{"type":"boolean","description":"Resume substitution on an ALREADY-CREATED repo from a prior call that hit infra#179's branch-writability race (its partial_failure names this). Skips template lookup and repo generation entirely; the destination must already exist. Safe to call repeatedly — files/renames already correct are left untouched. Default false."}
},
"required":["owner","name"]
}`),
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ type createProjectArgs struct {
Private bool `json:"private"`
TemplateName string `json:"template_name"`
DispatchAllow bool `json:"dispatch_allow"`
Resume bool `json:"resume"`
}
// dispatchAllowContent is the body injected when dispatch_allow=true. Mirrors the
@@ -80,14 +82,28 @@ const dispatchAllowContent = "# Presence of this file marks this repo as opt-in
"# See dispatch#3.\n"
type createProjectResult struct {
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"`
CloneURL string `json:"clone_url"`
DefaultBranch string `json:"default_branch"`
FilesSubstituted []string `json:"files_substituted"`
PartialFailure string `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"`
CloneURL string `json:"clone_url"`
DefaultBranch string `json:"default_branch"`
FilesSubstituted []string `json:"files_substituted"`
PartialFailure string `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowFailure string `json:"dispatch_allow_failure,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowlisted bool `json:"dispatch_allowlisted,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowlistFailure string `json:"dispatch_allowlist_failure,omitempty"`
}
// The dispatch allowlist (dispatch#19) is a fixed integration point — a
// specific file in a specific repo the mathias/dispatch watcher reads at the
// start of every cycle. Hardcoded to match its own DISPATCH_ALLOWLIST_OWNER/
// _REPO/_PATH defaults (unconfigured in the live CronJob, confirmed 2026-07-06).
const (
dispatchAllowlistOwner = "mathias"
dispatchAllowlistRepo = "dispatch"
dispatchAllowlistPath = "dispatch-repos.txt"
dispatchAllowlistBranch = "main"
)
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
var args createProjectArgs
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
@@ -95,7 +111,7 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
}
// Allowlist check first.
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -104,6 +120,94 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
return nil, fmt.Errorf("name %q does not match pattern %s: %w", args.Name, nameRe.String(), gitea.ErrValidation)
}
var result createProjectResult
var branch string
var err error
if args.Resume {
result, branch, err = t.resumeDestination(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name)
} else {
result, branch, err = t.createDestination(ctx, args)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Substitute across the WHOLE tree: content in every blob, plus a path rename
// for any file whose path carries a placeholder (e.g. cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go).
// A fixed known-files list can't rename directories or cover every templated
// file, which is why the old scaffold didn't build. GetTree reflects the
// branch's CURRENT state, which is what makes this loop safe to re-run on
// resume: a file already fixed in a prior partial pass shows up already-correct
// (or already-renamed) and substituteEntry is a no-op for it.
repls := substitutions(args.Owner, args.Name)
tree, terr := t.c.GetTree(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch, true)
if terr != nil {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf("tree walk (%s@%s): %v", args.Name, branch, terr)
return textOK(result)
}
for _, e := range tree.Tree {
if e.Type != "blob" {
continue
}
substituted, fail := t.substituteEntry(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch, e.Path, repls)
if fail != "" {
result.PartialFailure = fail
break
}
if substituted != "" {
result.FilesSubstituted = append(result.FilesSubstituted, substituted)
}
}
// Opt the new project into headless dispatch if asked. Two INDEPENDENT gates,
// both required (dispatch#3 + dispatch#19): the .dispatch-allow marker on this
// repo, and this repo's owner/name listed in mathias/dispatch's git-tracked
// allowlist. Skip both if substitution itself already stalled — don't mark an
// incomplete repo dispatch-eligible. Each failure is reported in its OWN field
// (gitea-mcp#51/#54) — never conflated with each other or with substitution,
// since any one of the three can fail independently of the other two.
if args.DispatchAllow && result.PartialFailure == "" {
if didWrite, fail := t.injectDispatchAllow(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch); fail != "" {
result.DispatchAllowFailure = fail
} else if didWrite {
result.FilesSubstituted = append(result.FilesSubstituted, ".dispatch-allow")
}
ownerName := args.Owner + "/" + args.Name
if didRegister, fail := t.registerDispatchAllowlist(ctx, ownerName); fail != "" {
result.DispatchAllowlistFailure = fail
} else if didRegister {
result.DispatchAllowlisted = true
}
}
// If substitution stalled because the generated branch wasn't writable in time,
// the repo IS created — say so clearly and point to the concrete recovery step
// (resume=true), rather than leaking the raw "branch does not exist" (infra#179:
// gitea's template-generate is slow-async on this instance, so tool-side
// substitution is best-effort).
if strings.Contains(result.PartialFailure, "branch does not exist") ||
strings.Contains(result.PartialFailure, "not found") {
result.PartialFailure = infra179FinalizeMessage(
branch, substitutionBudget, len(result.FilesSubstituted), result.PartialFailure)
}
// Fail loud on a FRESH create with nothing substituted: a real template
// should have placeholders, so finding none is suspicious. On resume, nothing
// left to substitute is the expected steady state once a prior partial run is
// fully caught up — success, not a loud failure.
if !args.Resume && result.PartialFailure == "" && len(result.FilesSubstituted) == 0 {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf("no placeholders substituted in %s@%s — verify the scaffold is not left templated", args.Name, branch)
}
return textOK(result)
}
// createDestination generates a new repo from the template: verifies the
// template exists and the destination doesn't already exist, then calls
// gitea's /generate and resolves the default branch.
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) createDestination(ctx context.Context, args createProjectArgs) (createProjectResult, string, error) {
// Resolve template: per-call override takes precedence over the
// server-configured default. Owner stays server-configured.
tmplName := args.TemplateName
@@ -114,17 +218,19 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
// Verify template exists and is marked as a template repo.
tmpl, err := t.c.GetRepo(ctx, t.templateOwner, tmplName)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("template lookup: %w", err)
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf("template lookup: %w", err)
}
if !tmpl.Template {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("repo %s/%s is not marked as template: %w", t.templateOwner, tmplName, gitea.ErrValidation)
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf("repo %s/%s is not marked as template: %w", t.templateOwner, tmplName, gitea.ErrValidation)
}
// Verify destination doesn't already exist.
if _, err := t.c.GetRepo(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name); err == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("destination %s/%s already exists: %w", args.Owner, args.Name, gitea.ErrConflict)
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf(
"destination %s/%s already exists: %w (pass resume:true to continue a prior partial create)",
args.Owner, args.Name, gitea.ErrConflict)
} else if !errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("destination check: %w", err)
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf("destination check: %w", err)
}
// Generate repo from template.
@@ -136,7 +242,7 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
GitContent: true,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate: %w", err)
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf("generate: %w", err)
}
result := createProjectResult{
@@ -158,73 +264,113 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
}
}
result.DefaultBranch = branch
return result, branch, nil
}
// Substitute across the WHOLE tree: content in every blob, plus a path rename
// for any file whose path carries a placeholder (e.g. cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go).
// A fixed known-files list can't rename directories or cover every templated
// file, which is why the old scaffold didn't build.
repls := substitutions(args.Owner, args.Name)
tree, err := t.c.GetTree(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch, true)
// resumeDestination looks up an ALREADY-CREATED repo to continue substitution
// on (gitea-mcp#50). It errors if the destination doesn't exist — resume has
// nothing to resume without it. Template lookup and generation are skipped
// entirely: resume only ever operates on the destination.
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) resumeDestination(ctx context.Context, owner, name string) (createProjectResult, string, error) {
repo, err := t.c.GetRepo(ctx, owner, name)
if err != nil {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf("tree walk (%s@%s): %v", args.Name, branch, err)
return textOK(result)
if errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound) {
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf(
"resume:true but %s/%s does not exist — nothing to resume; omit resume to create it: %w",
owner, name, gitea.ErrValidation)
}
return createProjectResult{}, "", fmt.Errorf("resume destination check: %w", err)
}
branch := repo.DefaultBranch
if branch == "" {
branch = "main"
}
return createProjectResult{
FullName: repo.FullName,
HTMLURL: repo.HTMLURL,
CloneURL: repo.CloneURL,
DefaultBranch: branch,
}, branch, nil
}
// injectDispatchAllow makes .dispatch-allow's presence idempotent (safe to call
// on every resume, not just the first attempt): creates it if absent, updates
// it if present but different, leaves it untouched if already correct. Without
// this, a naive create-only write would error on a re-invoke (gitea rejects a
// create at a path that already exists) — that was the reported failure in
// gitea-mcp#51. Returns whether a write actually happened.
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) injectDispatchAllow(ctx context.Context, owner, name, branch string) (didWrite bool, failure string) {
const path = ".dispatch-allow"
sha := ""
if fc, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, owner, name, path, branch); err == nil {
if decoded, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fc.Content); derr == nil && string(decoded) == dispatchAllowContent {
return false, "" // already present and correct — idempotent no-op
}
sha = fc.Sha // exists but differs (unexpected) — update it, don't blind-create
} else if !errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound) {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("read %s: %v", path, err)
}
for _, e := range tree.Tree {
if e.Type != "blob" {
continue
}
substituted, fail := t.substituteEntry(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, branch, e.Path, repls)
if fail != "" {
result.PartialFailure = fail
break
}
if substituted != "" {
result.FilesSubstituted = append(result.FilesSubstituted, substituted)
if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, path, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: branch,
Content: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(dispatchAllowContent)),
Message: "dispatch: mark project dispatch-eligible (dispatch#3)",
Sha: sha,
}); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", path, err)
}
return true, ""
}
// registerDispatchAllowlist appends ownerName ("owner/name") to
// mathias/dispatch's git-tracked dispatch-repos.txt if not already listed
// (gitea-mcp#54) — idempotent, safe to call on every resume. This is the
// SECOND of the two required dispatch gates: being listed here is necessary
// but not sufficient on its own (the repo also needs its own .dispatch-allow
// marker, injectDispatchAllow's job) — dispatch#3's structural trust-zone
// design requires both independently. Returns whether a write actually
// happened, so the caller only reports a fresh registration, not a no-op.
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) registerDispatchAllowlist(ctx context.Context, ownerName string) (didRegister bool, failure string) {
fc, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, dispatchAllowlistBranch)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("read %s/%s:%s: %v", dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
}
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(fc.Content)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("decode %s: %v", dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
}
content := string(decoded)
for _, line := range strings.Split(content, "\n") {
if strings.TrimSpace(line) == ownerName {
return false, "" // already listed — idempotent no-op
}
}
// Opt the new project into headless dispatch if asked: presence of a
// .dispatch-allow file on the default branch marks it dispatch-eligible
// (dispatch#3). Ride the same upsertRetry path as substitution so it inherits
// the infra#179 branch-readiness / partial-failure handling below. Skip if the
// loop already stalled — a failed injection then degrades identically.
if args.DispatchAllow && result.PartialFailure == "" {
const dispatchAllowPath = ".dispatch-allow"
if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, dispatchAllowPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: branch,
Content: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(dispatchAllowContent)),
Message: "dispatch: mark project dispatch-eligible (dispatch#3)",
}); err != nil {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", dispatchAllowPath, err)
} else {
result.FilesSubstituted = append(result.FilesSubstituted, dispatchAllowPath)
}
newContent := strings.TrimRight(content, "\n") + "\n" + ownerName + "\n"
if _, err := t.c.UpsertFile(ctx, dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: dispatchAllowlistBranch,
Content: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(newContent)),
Message: fmt.Sprintf("chore(allowlist): opt in %s for headless dispatch", ownerName),
Sha: fc.Sha,
}); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("append to %s/%s:%s: %v", dispatchAllowlistOwner, dispatchAllowlistRepo, dispatchAllowlistPath, err)
}
return true, ""
}
// If substitution stalled because the generated branch wasn't writable in time,
// the repo IS created — say so clearly and point to the local finalize step,
// rather than leaking the raw "branch does not exist" (infra#179: gitea's
// template-generate is slow-async on this instance, so tool-side substitution
// is best-effort).
if strings.Contains(result.PartialFailure, "branch does not exist") ||
strings.Contains(result.PartialFailure, "not found") {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf(
"repo created, but its branch (%s) was not writable within %ds — gitea's "+
"template-generate is slow-async on this instance (infra#179), so substitution "+
"is incomplete (%d file(s) done). Finalize locally with `hyperguild new-project` "+
"(clone + substitute, no API race). Underlying: %s",
branch, substitutionBudget, len(result.FilesSubstituted), result.PartialFailure)
}
// Fail loud: a scaffold that still holds placeholders does not build. Nothing
// substituted (with no explicit failure) means the walk found no placeholders —
// suspicious for a real template. Surface it instead of returning silent success.
if result.PartialFailure == "" && len(result.FilesSubstituted) == 0 {
result.PartialFailure = fmt.Sprintf("no placeholders substituted in %s@%s — verify the scaffold is not left templated", args.Name, branch)
}
return textOK(result)
// infra179FinalizeMessage explains the best-effort outcome when gitea's slow
// async template-generate (infra#179) leaves the branch unwritable within the
// budget. It points at the concrete recovery step — re-invoking this same tool
// with resume=true (gitea-mcp#50) — rather than a manual clone/sed/push, since
// resume safely continues from wherever substitution stalled.
func infra179FinalizeMessage(branch string, budget, done int, underlying string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(
"repo created, but its branch (%s) was not writable within %ds — gitea's "+
"template-generate is slow-async on this instance (infra#179), so substitution "+
"is incomplete (%d file(s) done). Retry by calling this tool again with resume=true "+
"(same owner/name) once the branch is writable — it safely continues where this left "+
"off, skipping anything already correct. Underlying: %s",
branch, budget, done, underlying)
}
// substitutionBudget bounds how long we retry the first write while the freshly
@@ -232,7 +378,8 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessag
// before the branch ref is committed, so writes 404 "branch does not exist" for a
// window. We keep the budget SHORT so the MCP call stays responsive: a healthy
// gitea commits in ~1s and this catches it; a slow one (infra#179, observed >40s)
// fails fast and we defer substitution with clear guidance rather than hang.
// fails fast with partial_failure naming resume=true as the recovery path
// (gitea-mcp#50), rather than blocking the call for a minute-plus.
const substitutionBudget = 5
// upsertRetry retries UpsertFile on the transient post-generate "branch does not
@@ -283,21 +430,7 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) substituteEntry(ctx context.Context, owner,
enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(newContent))
if renamed {
if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: branch,
Content: enc,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", path, newPath),
}); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, err)
}
if _, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, owner, name, path, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
Branch: branch,
Sha: fc.Sha,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: drop placeholder path %s", path),
}); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("delete %s: %v", path, err)
}
return path + " -> " + newPath, ""
return t.renameEntry(ctx, owner, name, branch, path, newPath, enc, newContent, fc.Sha)
}
if err := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, path, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
@@ -310,3 +443,45 @@ func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) substituteEntry(ctx context.Context, owner,
}
return path, ""
}
// renameEntry writes newPath then deletes oldPath. Both halves are idempotent
// so a resume that hits a prior write-succeeded/delete-failed rename (the two
// are separate, non-atomic API calls) completes cleanly instead of erroring on
// a blind re-create at a path that already exists (gitea-mcp#53): if newPath
// already holds the correct content, the write is skipped and only the
// outstanding delete of oldPath runs; if oldPath is already gone, the delete
// is a no-op too.
func (t *CreateProjectFromTemplate) renameEntry(ctx context.Context, owner, name, branch, oldPath, newPath, enc, newContent, oldSha string) (substituted, failure string) {
existing, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, owner, name, newPath, branch)
switch {
case err == nil:
decoded, derr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(existing.Content)
if derr == nil && string(decoded) == newContent {
break // already correct from a prior partial run — skip the write
}
if writeErr := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: branch, Content: enc, Sha: existing.Sha,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", oldPath, newPath),
}); writeErr != nil {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, writeErr)
}
case errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound):
if writeErr := t.upsertRetry(ctx, owner, name, newPath, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: branch, Content: enc,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: substitute + rename %s -> %s", oldPath, newPath),
}); writeErr != nil {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("write %s: %v", newPath, writeErr)
}
default:
return "", fmt.Sprintf("read %s: %v", newPath, err)
}
if _, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, owner, name, oldPath, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
Branch: branch,
Sha: oldSha,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("template: drop placeholder path %s", oldPath),
}); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gitea.ErrNotFound) {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("delete %s: %v", oldPath, err)
}
return oldPath + " -> " + newPath, ""
}
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ import (
"sync"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
@@ -29,20 +29,36 @@ func templateRepoJSON(name string, isTemplate bool) string {
// fakeTemplateServer serves the whole create-from-template flow off an in-memory
// file map, driving the tool's tree-walk. Records writes/deletes/put-bodies.
type fakeTemplateServer struct {
mu sync.Mutex
files map[string]string // path -> raw (un-substituted) content
genBranch string // default_branch returned by /generate ("" to force fallback)
generated bool
puts []string
deletes []string
putBodies map[string]string // path -> decoded written content
repoGetsPost int // GET dest after generate (branch fallback)
mu sync.Mutex
files map[string]string // path -> raw (un-substituted) content
genBranch string // default_branch returned by /generate ("" to force fallback)
generated bool
generateCalls int // # times POST .../generate was hit — resume must never increment this
puts []string
deletes []string
putBodies map[string]string // path -> decoded written content
repoGetsPost int // GET dest after generate (branch fallback)
// dispatchRepos simulates mathias/dispatch:dispatch-repos.txt (gitea-mcp#54).
// "" (default) 404s the read, matching a repo that hasn't seeded the file
// (a distinct error path); tests that care set it explicitly.
dispatchRepos string
dispatchReposPuts int
}
func newFakeTemplateServer(files map[string]string, genBranch string) *fakeTemplateServer {
return &fakeTemplateServer{files: files, genBranch: genBranch, putBodies: map[string]string{}}
}
// newFakeTemplateServerResumed simulates a repo that already exists from a
// prior (real) generate call — GET dest succeeds immediately, without a
// /generate call first. Used for resume:true tests.
func newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files map[string]string, genBranch string) *fakeTemplateServer {
f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, genBranch)
f.generated = true
return f
}
func (f *fakeTemplateServer) handler(t *testing.T, tmpl, dest string) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
f.mu.Lock()
@@ -50,7 +66,28 @@ func (f *fakeTemplateServer) handler(t *testing.T, tmpl, dest string) http.Handl
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
p := r.URL.Path
const dispatchReposPath = "/api/v1/repos/mathias/dispatch/contents/dispatch-repos.txt"
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == dispatchReposPath:
if f.dispatchRepos == "" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"not found"}`))
return
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"path":"dispatch-repos.txt","sha":"repos-sha","content":%q,"encoding":"base64"}`, encb64(f.dispatchRepos))
case r.Method == http.MethodPut && p == dispatchReposPath:
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
var args struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &args)
dec, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(args.Content)
f.dispatchRepos = string(dec)
f.dispatchReposPuts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"content":{"path":"dispatch-repos.txt","sha":"repos-sha2"},"commit":{"sha":"c"}}`))
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && p == "/api/v1/repos/mathias/"+tmpl:
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(templateRepoJSON(tmpl, true)))
@@ -65,6 +102,7 @@ func (f *fakeTemplateServer) handler(t *testing.T, tmpl, dest string) http.Handl
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && p == "/api/v1/repos/mathias/"+tmpl+"/generate":
f.generated = true
f.generateCalls++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":%q,"full_name":"mathias/%s","default_branch":%q,"clone_url":"http://gitea.example.com/mathias/%s.git","html_url":"http://gitea.example.com/mathias/%s","template":false}`,
dest, dest, f.genBranch, dest, dest)
@@ -135,10 +173,13 @@ func callTool(t *testing.T, srvURL, tmpl, argsJSON string) createOut {
}
type createOut struct {
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
DefaultBranch string `json:"default_branch"`
FilesSubstituted []string `json:"files_substituted"`
PartialFailure string `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
FullName string `json:"full_name"`
DefaultBranch string `json:"default_branch"`
FilesSubstituted []string `json:"files_substituted"`
PartialFailure string `json:"partial_failure,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowFailure string `json:"dispatch_allow_failure,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowlisted bool `json:"dispatch_allowlisted,omitempty"`
DispatchAllowlistFailure string `json:"dispatch_allowlist_failure,omitempty"`
}
// Happy path: whole-tree substitution, content + path rename, correct module host.
@@ -258,6 +299,229 @@ func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllow(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// ── resume: durable substitution against infra#179 (gitea-mcp#50) ───────────
// resume:true requires an ALREADY-CREATED destination — there is nothing to
// resume otherwise.
func TestCreateProject_Resume_NoDestination_Errors(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"not found"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
_, err := newTool(srv.URL, "template-go-agent").Call(context.Background(),
json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true}`))
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, gitea.ErrValidation)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "nothing to resume")
}
// resume:true on an existing repo continues substitution — fixes only what's
// still wrong, leaves already-correct files untouched, and never calls
// /generate again (the whole point: no re-creation, just continuation).
func TestCreateProject_Resume_ContinuesPartialSubstitution(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{
"go.mod": "module git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc\n", // already correct from a prior partial run
"README.md": "# __PROJECT_NAME__\n", // still needs substitution
}
f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
assert.Equal(t, 0, f.generateCalls, "resume must never call /generate")
assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "README.md")
assert.NotContains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "go.mod", "already-correct file must not be re-reported")
assert.NotContains(t, f.puts, "go.mod", "already-correct file must not be rewritten")
assert.Contains(t, f.puts, "README.md")
}
// resume:true when everything is already substituted is the expected steady
// state (a prior resume already finished the job, or this is a redundant
// re-invoke) — success, NOT the "no placeholders substituted" loud failure
// that a fresh (non-resume) create would trigger.
func TestCreateProject_Resume_AlreadyFullyDone_IsSuccess(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{
"go.mod": "module git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc\n",
"README.md": "# new-svc\n",
}
f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.FilesSubstituted)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure, "nothing left to do on resume must be success, not a loud failure")
}
// A resume where a prior partial run's rename write SUCCEEDED but its paired
// delete FAILED (both are separate, non-atomic API calls) must complete
// cleanly: recognize the new path is already correct, skip re-writing it, and
// just finish the outstanding delete of the stray old path (gitea-mcp#53).
func TestCreateProject_Resume_StrayRenamedOldPath_CompletesCleanly(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{
// stray: delete never completed in the prior run
"cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go": "package main\nimport \"__MODULE_PATH__/pkg/litellm\"\nconst n = \"__PROJECT_NAME__\"\n",
// already correct: the write half of the same prior rename DID complete
"cmd/new-svc/main.go": "package main\nimport \"git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc/pkg/litellm\"\nconst n = \"new-svc\"\n",
}
f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go -> cmd/new-svc/main.go")
assert.NotContains(t, f.puts, "cmd/new-svc/main.go", "already-correct new path must not be rewritten")
assert.Contains(t, f.deletes, "cmd/__PROJECT_NAME__/main.go", "the outstanding delete must still happen")
}
// dispatch_allow injection is idempotent on resume: if .dispatch-allow already
// has the correct content (from an earlier successful injection), re-invoking
// must not attempt another write — and must not error the way a naive
// create-only write would (gitea 409/422 on an existing path with no sha).
func TestCreateProject_Resume_DispatchAllowIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
// Phase 1: a normal (non-resume) call captures the REAL content the tool
// writes for .dispatch-allow, without the test needing to know the exact
// unexported constant.
seedFiles := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
seedSrv := newFakeTemplateServer(seedFiles, "main")
srv1 := httptest.NewServer(seedSrv.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
out1 := callTool(t, srv1.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
srv1.Close()
require.Empty(t, out1.PartialFailure)
realContent := seedSrv.putBodies[".dispatch-allow"]
require.NotEmpty(t, realContent, "phase 1 must have written .dispatch-allow")
// Phase 2: resume with .dispatch-allow ALREADY at that exact content, plus
// one file still needing substitution.
files := map[string]string{
".dispatch-allow": realContent,
"README.md": "# __PROJECT_NAME__\n",
}
f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
srv2 := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv2.Close()
out2 := callTool(t, srv2.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true,"dispatch_allow":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out2.PartialFailure)
assert.Empty(t, out2.DispatchAllowFailure)
assert.NotContains(t, f.puts, ".dispatch-allow", "already-correct .dispatch-allow must not be rewritten")
assert.NotContains(t, out2.FilesSubstituted, ".dispatch-allow", "unchanged file must not be reported as substituted")
assert.Contains(t, out2.FilesSubstituted, "README.md")
}
// dispatch_allow injection failing is reported in its OWN field, distinct from
// PartialFailure (gitea-mcp#51) — substitution can succeed while dispatch
// eligibility still fails, and the caller must be able to tell them apart.
func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowFailure_IsDistinctField(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
base := f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc")
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.Contains(r.URL.Path, "/contents/.dispatch-allow") {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"boom"}`))
return
}
base(w, r)
}))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure, "substitution itself succeeded — must not be conflated with the dispatch failure")
assert.NotEmpty(t, out.DispatchAllowFailure)
assert.Contains(t, out.DispatchAllowFailure, ".dispatch-allow")
assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "go.mod", "substitution must still be reported despite the separate dispatch failure")
}
// dispatch_allow now ALSO registers the new repo into mathias/dispatch's
// git-tracked allowlist (dispatch-repos.txt) — the second of the two required
// dispatch gates, independent of the .dispatch-allow marker (gitea-mcp#54).
func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllow_RegistersAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
f.dispatchRepos = "# comment\nmathias/dispatch-sandbox\nmathias/cobalt-dingo\n"
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
assert.True(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted)
assert.Equal(t, 1, f.dispatchReposPuts)
assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/new-svc")
// existing entries preserved, not clobbered
assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/dispatch-sandbox")
assert.Contains(t, f.dispatchRepos, "mathias/cobalt-dingo")
}
// Registering is idempotent: a repo already listed (e.g. a resume re-running
// with dispatch_allow:true) must not produce a duplicate line or a redundant write.
func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllow_RegistersAllowlist_AlreadyListedIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module git.d-ma.be/mathias/new-svc\n"} // already substituted
f := newFakeTemplateServerResumed(files, "main")
f.dispatchRepos = "mathias/dispatch-sandbox\nmathias/new-svc\n"
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","resume":true,"dispatch_allow":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
assert.False(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted, "already-listed must not be reported as a fresh registration")
assert.Equal(t, 0, f.dispatchReposPuts, "already-listed repo must not trigger a write")
}
// A failure registering the allowlist is reported in its OWN field — distinct
// from PartialFailure (substitution) AND DispatchAllowFailure (the marker
// file) — since all three are independent gates that can fail independently.
func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowlistFailure_IsDistinctField(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
f.dispatchRepos = "mathias/dispatch-sandbox\n"
base := f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc")
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPut && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/mathias/dispatch/contents/dispatch-repos.txt" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"boom"}`))
return
}
base(w, r)
}))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc","dispatch_allow":true}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure, "substitution succeeded — must not be conflated")
assert.Empty(t, out.DispatchAllowFailure, ".dispatch-allow marker succeeded — must not be conflated")
assert.NotEmpty(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure)
assert.Contains(t, out.DispatchAllowlistFailure, "dispatch-repos.txt")
assert.Contains(t, out.FilesSubstituted, "go.mod", "substitution must still be reported despite the separate allowlist failure")
}
// dispatch_allow=false/omitted must never touch the allowlist file at all.
func TestCreateProject_DispatchAllowFalse_DoesNotTouchAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
files := map[string]string{"go.mod": "module __MODULE_PATH__\n"}
f := newFakeTemplateServer(files, "main")
srv := httptest.NewServer(f.handler(t, "template-go-agent", "new-svc"))
defer srv.Close()
out := callTool(t, srv.URL, "template-go-agent", `{"owner":"mathias","name":"new-svc"}`)
assert.Empty(t, out.PartialFailure)
assert.False(t, out.DispatchAllowlisted)
assert.Equal(t, 0, f.dispatchReposPuts)
}
// ── guardrails unchanged by the rewrite ──────────────────────────────────────
func TestCreateProject_NameRegexFailure(t *testing.T) {
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
package tools
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// #46: the infra#179 finalize guidance must not point at a non-existent command
// (`hyperguild new-project` was never built). #50 superseded the original
// manual-editing guidance with a concrete, real recovery: re-invoke this same
// tool with resume=true.
func TestInfra179FinalizeMessage(t *testing.T) {
msg := infra179FinalizeMessage("main", 5, 2, "branch does not exist")
for _, want := range []string{"infra#179", "resume=true", "branch does not exist"} {
if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
t.Errorf("message missing %q\ngot: %s", want, msg)
}
}
if strings.Contains(msg, "hyperguild new-project") {
t.Errorf("message must not reference the defunct `hyperguild new-project` command\ngot: %s", msg)
}
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type DirList struct {
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@ func (t *DirList) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"path":{"type":"string"},
"ref":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name"]
"required":["owner","repo"]
}`),
}
}
type dirListArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Ref string `json:"ref"`
}
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ func (t *DirList) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessag
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
entries, err := t.c.ListContents(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Path, args.Ref)
entries, err := t.c.ListContents(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Path, args.Ref)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+8 -8
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type FileDelete struct {
@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@ func (t *FileDelete) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"path":{"type":"string"},
"branch":{"type":"string"},
"message":{"type":"string"},
"sha":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","path","branch","message","sha"]
"required":["owner","repo","path","branch","message","sha"]
}`),
}
}
type fileDeleteArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Branch string `json:"branch"`
Message string `json:"message"`
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func (t *FileDelete) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMes
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Sha == "" {
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func (t *FileDelete) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMes
return nil, fmt.Errorf("message is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
result, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Path, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
result, err := t.c.DeleteFile(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Path, gitea.DeleteFileArgs{
Branch: args.Branch,
Message: args.Message,
Sha: args.Sha,
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+9 -9
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
const fileReadMaxBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
@@ -30,18 +30,18 @@ func (t *FileRead) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"path":{"type":"string"},
"ref":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","path"]
"required":["owner","repo","path"]
}`),
}
}
type fileReadArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Ref string `json:"ref"`
}
@@ -51,20 +51,20 @@ func (t *FileRead) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessa
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ref := args.Ref
if ref == "" {
var err error
ref, err = t.c.DefaultBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name)
ref, err = t.c.DefaultBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
fc, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Path, ref)
fc, err := t.c.GetFileContents(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Path, ref)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+15 -12
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type FileWriteBranch struct {
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ func NewFileWriteBranch(c *gitea.Client, a *allowlist.Allowlist) *FileWriteBranc
func (t *FileWriteBranch) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{
Name: "file_write_branch",
Description: "Create or update a file on a feature branch. Branch is created from base if it doesn't exist.",
Description: "Create or update a file on the given branch. Pass an existing branch — e.g. the default branch `main` — to commit directly to it (trunk-based); a branch that doesn't exist yet is created from `base` first (PR flow). Pair with pr_create/pr_merge for the branch→PR→merge path.",
InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"path":{"type":"string"},
"content":{"type":"string"},
"branch":{"type":"string"},
@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ func (t *FileWriteBranch) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"message":{"type":"string"},
"sha":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","path","content","branch","message"]
"required":["owner","repo","path","content","branch","message"]
}`),
}
}
type fileWriteBranchArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Content string `json:"content"`
Branch string `json:"branch"`
@@ -57,18 +57,21 @@ func (t *FileWriteBranch) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.R
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Branch == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("branch is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
if err := ValidateBranchName(args.Branch); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Message == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("message is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
// Resolve base default if branch needs to be created
exists, err := t.c.BranchExists(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Branch)
exists, err := t.c.BranchExists(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Branch)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -76,18 +79,18 @@ func (t *FileWriteBranch) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.R
base := args.Base
if base == "" {
var err error
base, err = t.c.DefaultBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name)
base, err = t.c.DefaultBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if err := t.c.CreateBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Branch, base); err != nil {
if err := t.c.CreateBranch(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Branch, base); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(args.Content))
result, err := t.c.UpsertFile(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Path, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
result, err := t.c.UpsertFile(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Path, gitea.UpsertFileArgs{
Branch: args.Branch,
Content: encoded,
Message: args.Message,
+9 -7
View File
@@ -9,17 +9,19 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
const branchCheckExistsResp = `{"name":"feat/x","commit":{"id":"abc","url":"http://example.com"}}`
const createBranchResp = `{"name":"feat/new","commit":{"id":"abc","url":"http://example.com"}}`
const upsertFileResp = `{"content":{"path":"doc.md","sha":"filsha","html_url":"http://example.com/doc.md"},"commit":{"sha":"cmt1","html_url":"http://example.com/commit/cmt1"}}`
const getRepoResp = `{"name":"myrepo","full_name":"owner/myrepo","default_branch":"main"}`
const (
branchCheckExistsResp = `{"name":"feat/x","commit":{"id":"abc","url":"http://example.com"}}`
createBranchResp = `{"name":"feat/new","commit":{"id":"abc","url":"http://example.com"}}`
upsertFileResp = `{"content":{"path":"doc.md","sha":"filsha","html_url":"http://example.com/doc.md"},"commit":{"sha":"cmt1","html_url":"http://example.com/commit/cmt1"}}`
getRepoResp = `{"name":"myrepo","full_name":"owner/myrepo","default_branch":"main"}`
)
func TestFileWriteBranchCreatesBranchAndFile(t *testing.T) {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
package tools
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// foldKey must agree with strings.EqualFold, which is how encoding/json matches.
func TestFoldKeyAgreesWithEqualFold(t *testing.T) {
pairs := [][2]string{{"branch", "Branch"}, {"sha", "ſha"}, {"k", "K"}, {"ss", "ß"}, {"a", "b"}, {"Σ", "ς"}}
for _, p := range pairs {
if got, want := foldKey(p[0]) == foldKey(p[1]), strings.EqualFold(p[0], p[1]); got != want {
t.Errorf("%q vs %q: foldKey equal=%v, EqualFold=%v", p[0], p[1], got, want)
}
}
}
// The duplicate scan is linear in the number of keys: 90k keys (about the
// 1 MiB body cap) must scan well under a second.
func TestRejectAmbiguousKeysScalesLinearly(t *testing.T) {
var b strings.Builder
b.WriteString("{")
for i := 0; i < 90_000; i++ {
if i > 0 {
b.WriteString(",")
}
fmt.Fprintf(&b, `"k%d":1`, i)
}
b.WriteString("}")
var dst struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
}
start := time.Now()
if err := rejectAmbiguousKeys([]byte(b.String()), &dst); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if d := time.Since(start); d > 2*time.Second {
t.Errorf("scan of 90k keys took %v", d)
}
}
+8 -8
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueClose struct {
@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ func (t *IssueClose) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"number":{"type":"integer","minimum":1}
},
"required":["owner","name","number"]
"required":["owner","repo","number"]
}`),
}
}
type issueCloseArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Number int `json:"number"`
}
@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ func (t *IssueClose) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMes
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
iss, err := t.c.SetIssueState(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Number, "closed")
iss, err := t.c.SetIssueState(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Number, "closed")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+10 -10
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueComment struct {
@@ -29,18 +29,18 @@ func (t *IssueComment) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"number":{"type":"integer","minimum":1},
"body":{"type":"string"}
},
"required":["owner","name","number","body"]
"required":["owner","repo","number","body"]
}`),
}
}
type issueCommentArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Number int `json:"number"`
Body string `json:"body"`
}
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func (t *IssueComment) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawM
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Number < 1 {
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (t *IssueComment) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawM
}
body := identity.ApplyFooter(args.Body, auth.Caller(ctx))
c, err := t.c.CreateIssueComment(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Number, body)
c, err := t.c.CreateIssueComment(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Number, body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+10 -10
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/auth"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/identity"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueCreate struct {
@@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ func (t *IssueCreate) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"title":{"type":"string"},
"body":{"type":"string"},
"labels":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"integer"}},
"assignees":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"}},
"milestone":{"type":"integer"}
},
"required":["owner","name","title"]
"required":["owner","repo","title"]
}`),
}
}
type issueCreateArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Title string `json:"title"`
Body string `json:"body"`
Labels []int64 `json:"labels"`
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func (t *IssueCreate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMe
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Title == "" {
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func (t *IssueCreate) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMe
}
body := identity.ApplyFooter(args.Body, auth.Caller(ctx))
iss, err := t.c.CreateIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, gitea.CreateIssueArgs{
iss, err := t.c.CreateIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, gitea.CreateIssueArgs{
Title: args.Title,
Body: body,
Labels: args.Labels,
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+8 -8
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueEdit struct {
@@ -30,19 +30,19 @@ func (t *IssueEdit) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"number":{"type":"integer","minimum":1},
"title":{"type":"string","description":"New title. Omit to leave unchanged."},
"body":{"type":"string","description":"New body, full replacement. Omit to leave unchanged."}
},
"required":["owner","name","number"]
"required":["owner","repo","number"]
}`),
}
}
type issueEditArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Number int `json:"number"`
Title *string `json:"title,omitempty"`
Body *string `json:"body,omitempty"`
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func (t *IssueEdit) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMess
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Number < 1 {
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func (t *IssueEdit) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMess
return nil, fmt.Errorf("at least one of title or body must be set: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
iss, err := t.c.EditIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Number, gitea.EditIssueArgs{
iss, err := t.c.EditIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Number, gitea.EditIssueArgs{
Title: args.Title,
Body: args.Body,
})
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+8 -8
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueGet struct {
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ func (t *IssueGet) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"name":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"number":{"type":"integer","minimum":1}
},
"required":["owner","name","number"]
"required":["owner","repo","number"]
}`),
}
}
type issueGetArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Number int `json:"number"`
}
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@ func (t *IssueGet) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessa
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(args.Owner); err != nil {
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
iss, err := t.c.GetIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Name, args.Number)
iss, err := t.c.GetIssue(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Number)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"gitea.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
package tools
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/registry"
)
type IssueLabel struct {
c *gitea.Client
a *allowlist.Allowlist
}
func NewIssueLabel(c *gitea.Client, a *allowlist.Allowlist) *IssueLabel {
return &IssueLabel{c: c, a: a}
}
func (t *IssueLabel) Descriptor() registry.ToolDescriptor {
return registry.ToolDescriptor{
Name: "issue_label",
Description: "Add labels to an issue or pull request. Resolves label names to IDs via the repo's label list. Additive — existing labels are left in place.",
InputSchema: json.RawMessage(`{
"type":"object",
"properties":{
"owner":{"type":"string"},
"repo":{"type":"string"},
"number":{"type":"integer","minimum":1},
"labels":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"},"description":"Label names to resolve and apply. Either labels or label_ids is required."},
"label_ids":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"integer"},"description":"Label IDs to apply directly, skipping name resolution. Either labels or label_ids is required."}
},
"required":["owner","repo","number"]
}`),
}
}
type issueLabelArgs struct {
Owner string `json:"owner"`
Repo string `json:"repo"`
Number int `json:"number"`
Labels []string `json:"labels,omitempty"`
LabelIDs []int64 `json:"label_ids,omitempty"`
}
func (t *IssueLabel) Call(ctx context.Context, raw json.RawMessage) (json.RawMessage, error) {
var args issueLabelArgs
if err := parseArgs(raw, &args); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := t.a.Check(ctx, args.Owner); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if args.Number < 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("number must be >= 1: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
if len(args.Labels) == 0 && len(args.LabelIDs) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("labels is required: %w", gitea.ErrValidation)
}
ids := append([]int64{}, args.LabelIDs...)
if len(args.Labels) > 0 {
existing, err := t.c.ListLabels(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
byName := make(map[string]int64, len(existing))
for _, l := range existing {
byName[l.Name] = l.ID
}
for _, name := range args.Labels {
id, ok := byName[name]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("label %q not found in %s/%s: %w", name, args.Owner, args.Repo, gitea.ErrValidation)
}
ids = append(ids, id)
}
}
labels, err := t.c.AddIssueLabels(ctx, args.Owner, args.Repo, args.Number, ids)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return textOK(labels)
}
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
package tools_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/allowlist"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/gitea"
"git.d-ma.be/mathias/gitea-mcp/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
const labelListFixture = `[
{"id":1,"name":"bug","color":"ee0701"},
{"id":2,"name":"enhancement","color":"84b6eb"}
]`
func TestIssueLabelAppliesByName(t *testing.T) {
var captured []byte
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/o/r/labels":
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(labelListFixture))
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/o/r/issues/42/labels":
var err error
captured, err = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(labelListFixture))
default:
t.Fatalf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"o"}))
out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"o","repo":"r","number":42,"labels":["bug","enhancement"]}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
var payload map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(captured, &payload))
ids, ok := payload["labels"].([]any)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []any{float64(1), float64(2)}, ids)
assert.Contains(t, string(out), `"name":"bug"`)
assert.Contains(t, string(out), `"name":"enhancement"`)
}
// label_ids alone (no labels) must work end-to-end without hitting ListLabels
// at all — this is the schema-level "either labels or label_ids" contract, and
// it must never require a GET to the label list when the caller already has IDs.
func TestIssueLabelAppliesByIDOnly(t *testing.T) {
var captured []byte
var listCalled bool
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/o/r/labels":
listCalled = true
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(labelListFixture))
case r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/o/r/issues/42/labels":
var err error
captured, err = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(labelListFixture))
default:
t.Fatalf("unexpected request: %s %s", r.Method, r.URL.Path)
}
}))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"o"}))
out, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"o","repo":"r","number":42,"label_ids":[1,2]}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, listCalled, "label_ids-only must not call ListLabels")
var payload map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(captured, &payload))
ids, ok := payload["labels"].([]any)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []any{float64(1), float64(2)}, ids)
assert.Contains(t, string(out), `"name":"bug"`)
}
// #52 review finding: the advertised schema wrongly required "labels", making
// label_ids-only calls fail JSON-Schema validation before reaching Call at all.
// Lock the fixed contract: neither is individually required.
func TestIssueLabelSchema_NeitherLabelsNorLabelIDsRequired(t *testing.T) {
sch := string(tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient("http://unused", ""), allowlist.New([]string{"o"})).Descriptor().InputSchema)
assert.NotContains(t, sch, `"required":["owner","repo","number","labels"]`)
assert.Contains(t, sch, `"required":["owner","repo","number"]`)
}
func TestIssueLabelUnknownNameNamesTheMissingLabel(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(labelListFixture))
}))
defer srv.Close()
tool := tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient(srv.URL, "tok"), allowlist.New([]string{"o"}))
_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"o","repo":"r","number":42,"labels":["bug","does-not-exist"]}`))
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, gitea.ErrValidation)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), `"does-not-exist"`)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "o/r")
}
func TestIssueLabelAllowlistRejects(t *testing.T) {
tool := tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient("http://unused", ""), allowlist.New([]string{"allowed"}))
_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"evil","repo":"r","number":1,"labels":["bug"]}`))
require.Error(t, err)
}
func TestIssueLabelRequiresValidNumber(t *testing.T) {
tool := tools.NewIssueLabel(gitea.NewClient("http://unused", ""), allowlist.New([]string{"o"}))
_, err := tool.Call(context.Background(), json.RawMessage(`{"owner":"o","repo":"r","number":0,"labels":["bug"]}`))
require.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, gitea.ErrValidation)
}

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More