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hyperguild/ingestion/internal/claudewatcher/scrubber.go
T
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 0eeb1df4a2
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fix(claudewatcher): scrub bare 1Password service-account tokens (ops_)
A ~/.zshrc read surfaced OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN into a transcript. The
_TOKEN= form was already caught by homelab-env-token, but a bare ops_<b64>
value was not. Add an op-service-account rule (ordered early). Tests cover
both env-assigned and bare forms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 00:28:47 +02:00

127 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

package claudewatcher
import (
"fmt"
"regexp"
"sync"
)
// Scrubber drops any turn whose content matches a known-bad pattern.
// Fail-closed by design: we'd rather lose signal than ingest credentials
// into a public-readable brain. The caller logs the drop reason.
//
// Rules cover the credential shapes most common to leak through Claude
// Code sessions: bearer tokens, postgres URIs with embedded auth, OAuth
// secret values, SOPS-encrypted secret blobs (we don't want the
// ciphertext either — it's a marker that the original message contained
// secret state), PEM-encoded private keys, and the explicit env-var
// naming conventions used in the homelab.
//
// Pattern philosophy: match by shape, not by content. A 40-char hex
// string in isolation is fine; the same string after `Authorization:
// Bearer ` is not. Tuned to catch known leak vectors from prior
// secret-hygiene incidents (POSTGRES_PASSWORD via kubectl exec env,
// INFRA_MCP_TOKEN via sops -d output) without dropping every Edit on a
// config file.
// Rule is a single named regex with a redact hint shown in the warn log.
type Rule struct {
Name string
RE *regexp.Regexp
}
// DefaultRules is the regex set applied by Scrub. Mutable for tests but
// callers should treat it as read-only at runtime.
var DefaultRules = []Rule{
// authorization-header is checked before the bare bearer rule so
// contextual hits ("Authorization: Bearer X") report the more
// specific match name in logs.
{Name: "authorization-header", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)Authorization\s*:\s*[A-Za-z]+\s+\S{8,}`)},
{Name: "bearer-token", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{16,}`)},
// JWT (header.payload.sig), e.g. a Dex/OAuth token dumped to stdout
// without a "Bearer " prefix. Both header and payload base64url-encode
// JSON, so both segments begin with "eyJ".
{Name: "jwt", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}`)},
{Name: "postgres-uri-with-password", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`postgres(?:ql)?://[^:\s/]+:[^@\s/]+@`)},
{Name: "private-key", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN[^-]*PRIVATE KEY-----`)},
{Name: "ssh-key", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`ssh-(?:rsa|ed25519|ecdsa)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}`)},
{Name: "github-pat", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghr|gha)_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b`)},
// 1Password service-account token (ops_<base64url>). Long, high-value root
// credential; guard the bare value (the _TOKEN= form also hits homelab-env-token).
{Name: "op-service-account", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`\bops_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}`)},
// No leading \b: a shell mangle can glue the key to a preceding word
// ("yes"+"sk-...") which has no word boundary, and that exact case
// leaked a LiteLLM master key past this rule (2026-06-11). Match the
// sk- shape wherever it appears; the {32,} length floor keeps short
// "task-"/"disk-" words from tripping it.
{Name: "openai-sk", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}`)},
{Name: "anthropic-sk", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{32,}\b`)},
{Name: "aws-access-key", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b`)},
{Name: "homelab-env-token", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:_TOKEN|_PASSWORD|_API_KEY|_SECRET)\s*[:=]\s*['"]?[A-Za-z0-9._/+\-]{12,}`)},
{Name: "sops-encrypted-marker", RE: regexp.MustCompile(`ENC\[AES256_GCM,data:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{8,}`)},
}
// extraRules is appended to DefaultRules at process startup via
// RegisterRule. The mutex guards concurrent RegisterRule calls (rare)
// against concurrent Scrub reads (hot path). Scrub takes a read lock
// only when extraRules is non-empty, so steady-state cost is zero
// when no client-name guard is configured.
var (
extraRulesMu sync.RWMutex
extraRules []Rule
)
// RegisterRule appends a runtime-configured regex to the scrubber's
// rule set. Used by main to inject client-name guards from
// CLAUDE_INGEST_CLIENT_BLOCK env var (or equivalent SOPS-encrypted
// secret) without baking client identities into source code.
//
// pattern is compiled as-is — callers wrap with `\b...\b` and case
// flags as needed. Duplicate names are accepted (rules are positional);
// the second registration just fires after the first.
func RegisterRule(name, pattern string) error {
re, err := regexp.Compile(pattern)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("compile rule %q: %w", name, err)
}
extraRulesMu.Lock()
extraRules = append(extraRules, Rule{Name: name, RE: re})
extraRulesMu.Unlock()
return nil
}
// ResetExtraRules clears every RegisterRule-added rule. Test-only.
func ResetExtraRules() {
extraRulesMu.Lock()
extraRules = nil
extraRulesMu.Unlock()
}
// Scrub reports the first matching rule, or empty when content is clean.
// Empty string is treated as clean. Caller decides what to do on a hit;
// the convention in claudewatcher is to drop the turn entirely and emit
// a slog.Warn naming the rule.
//
// Rule order: DefaultRules first (credential shapes), then runtime
// RegisterRule additions (client-name guards). Credential leaks
// outrank client-name hits in the log because they're strictly more
// dangerous.
func Scrub(content string) string {
if content == "" {
return ""
}
for _, r := range DefaultRules {
if r.RE.MatchString(content) {
return r.Name
}
}
extraRulesMu.RLock()
defer extraRulesMu.RUnlock()
for _, r := range extraRules {
if r.RE.MatchString(content) {
return r.Name
}
}
return ""
}