Every MCP call from Claude Code was going out through claude.ai's connector
infrastructure, across the public internet, through Cloudflare and NPM on
piguard, back into koala's k3s ingress — to reach a service on the same
machine the session is running on. For brain that means a two-cloud round trip
to read /var/lib/supervisor/brain, a file on koala's local disk.
Cloudflare rate-limits and size-caps tool results on that path, which is the
actual user-facing symptom. Measured from koala:
brain koala:30330 200 in 6.8ms
infra koala:30342 200 in 3.6ms
brain public edge 200 in 27.7ms
infra starts working again as a side effect: its only fault was an SNI/cert
gap at the public edge (TLS "unrecognized name"), which the NodePort path does
not traverse. No NPM change needed for local use.
Note this is not a relocation of existing config. The mcpServers block that
lived in ~/.claude/settings.json was inert — Claude Code reads server
definitions from ~/.claude.json, project .mcp.json, plugins and connectors,
not from settings.json. Verified: a uniquely-named server placed there is
invisible to both `claude mcp list` and `claude mcp get`. So before the plugin
existed, koala had no direct path at all and every call went via Cloudflare by
construction. That also explains how a stale GITEA_MCP_TOKEN went unnoticed
for five days: nothing consumed it.
Safe to land now because koala is the only host with the plugin installed
(#24). The koala firewall must allow 30330/30342 on the Tailscale interface —
NOT on the LAN broadly, so tailnet membership stays the perimeter — before the
Macs get the plugin. Tracked as a prerequisite in #24. Measured today: those
ports are refused from iguana over both LAN and tailnet while :22 answers, so
the rule does not exist yet.
Bump-Type: minor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BeAp5LTscnz2W7Ubt4eJ6m
Every gitea__* call from Claude Code on koala already resolves through the
claude.ai connector, not through this env-var-authenticated HTTP server. The
entry was a second path to the same service that nothing actually used.
That redundancy is exactly why it rotted unnoticed. GITEA_MCP_TOKEN on koala
resolves ~/.op-env -> op://HomeLab/GITEA_MCP_TOKEN, an item orphaned by the
2026-07-30 consolidation that moved gitea-mcp, agentsquad-serve and
crush-runner onto a single shared item in the AgentSecrets vault. The host
env-file was never migrated and cannot be: koala's 1Password service account
has no access to AgentSecrets, while onepassword-connect in-cluster maps both
vaults. So the host copy diverged and stayed diverged for five days.
The cluster was never affected — zero 401s from the pod CIDR in 30 days, every
rejection came from the gateway. Deleting the divergent copy beats maintaining
a second source of truth for a token this host does not need.
brain stays: it authenticates, and it is genuinely used from the plugin.
infra stays but is currently unreachable for an unrelated reason —
infra-mcp.d-ma.be fails TLS with "unrecognized name", an SNI/cert gap at the
NPM edge, tracked separately.
Bump-Type: patch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BeAp5LTscnz2W7Ubt4eJ6m
The plugin now carries the two hooks Mathias owns and the brain/gitea/infra
MCP server definitions, not just skills.
Why this matters more than tidiness: both hooks existed ONLY in koala's
~/.claude/, which is host-local and unsynced. flamingo and iguana have been
running with no secret-guard at all — that is the control which blocks the
decrypt-and-print shape behind the 2026-08-05 ntfy-token leak, the op-item-get
shape behind 2026-07-30, and the base64-bypass shape behind 2026-06-11. Its
absence on two of three machines is a security gap, not a config gap. Shipping
it in the plugin means installing the plugin installs the guard.
.mcp.json references tokens as ${BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN} / ${GITEA_MCP_TOKEN} only —
env indirection, never literal values, so the manifest is safe to commit.
tests/secret_guard_test.sh pins 14 cases. It asserts on
hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, NOT exit status: the guard always exits
0 by contract, so an exit-status assertion would pass vacuously while the guard
silently allowed everything. Each deny case names the incident that produced it.
gsd-* hooks are deliberately NOT migrated — GSD owns and updates those in place.
Bump-Type: minor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BeAp5LTscnz2W7Ubt4eJ6m