Every gitea__* call from Claude Code on koala already resolves through the
claude.ai connector, not through this env-var-authenticated HTTP server. The
entry was a second path to the same service that nothing actually used.
That redundancy is exactly why it rotted unnoticed. GITEA_MCP_TOKEN on koala
resolves ~/.op-env -> op://HomeLab/GITEA_MCP_TOKEN, an item orphaned by the
2026-07-30 consolidation that moved gitea-mcp, agentsquad-serve and
crush-runner onto a single shared item in the AgentSecrets vault. The host
env-file was never migrated and cannot be: koala's 1Password service account
has no access to AgentSecrets, while onepassword-connect in-cluster maps both
vaults. So the host copy diverged and stayed diverged for five days.
The cluster was never affected — zero 401s from the pod CIDR in 30 days, every
rejection came from the gateway. Deleting the divergent copy beats maintaining
a second source of truth for a token this host does not need.
brain stays: it authenticates, and it is genuinely used from the plugin.
infra stays but is currently unreachable for an unrelated reason —
infra-mcp.d-ma.be fails TLS with "unrecognized name", an SNI/cert gap at the
NPM edge, tracked separately.
Bump-Type: patch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BeAp5LTscnz2W7Ubt4eJ6m
The plugin now carries the two hooks Mathias owns and the brain/gitea/infra
MCP server definitions, not just skills.
Why this matters more than tidiness: both hooks existed ONLY in koala's
~/.claude/, which is host-local and unsynced. flamingo and iguana have been
running with no secret-guard at all — that is the control which blocks the
decrypt-and-print shape behind the 2026-08-05 ntfy-token leak, the op-item-get
shape behind 2026-07-30, and the base64-bypass shape behind 2026-06-11. Its
absence on two of three machines is a security gap, not a config gap. Shipping
it in the plugin means installing the plugin installs the guard.
.mcp.json references tokens as ${BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN} / ${GITEA_MCP_TOKEN} only —
env indirection, never literal values, so the manifest is safe to commit.
tests/secret_guard_test.sh pins 14 cases. It asserts on
hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision, NOT exit status: the guard always exits
0 by contract, so an exit-status assertion would pass vacuously while the guard
silently allowed everything. Each deny case names the incident that produced it.
gsd-* hooks are deliberately NOT migrated — GSD owns and updates those in place.
Bump-Type: minor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BeAp5LTscnz2W7Ubt4eJ6m