fix(test): run the secret guard via its own shebang, not through sh

The suite piped hook input into `sh "$GUARD"`, which overrides the hook's
`#!/usr/bin/env bash` and tests an interpreter production never uses. Claude
Code executes the hook as a program.

On Debian /bin/sh is dash, which has no `set -o pipefail`, so the guard died
on line 23 before reading a byte of input:

    secret-guard.sh: 23: set: Illegal option -o pipefail
    secret_guard: 0 passed, 20 failed

while passing 20/20 on a host where /bin/sh happens to be bash. A security
gate that tests green and cannot start is the worst of both, and the test was
the only thing standing between those two states.

Found because baked-v16 added jq to the runner: this suite needs jq to build
its hook JSON, so it had been silently doing nothing in CI and started running
for the first time. Same shape as installing zip and immediately learning the
gitea backup check had never run -- a missing tool does not announce that it
is suppressing a whole suite.

Also asserts the hook is executable, since direct invocation depends on the
exec bit, and that assertion is what stops this regressing to `sh "$GUARD"`.

Checked the rest of the suite: every other `sh "$SUT"` targets a POSIX script,
which is correct. hooks/pre-task-ritual.sh is the other bash-shebang hook and
has no test at all -- filed separately rather than fixed here.

Bump-Type: patch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "skills",
   "description": "Mathias's engineering skills library, plus the hooks and MCP servers that make it enforceable: TDD, clean code, debugging, specs, discovery, CI, and secret hygiene.",
-  "version": "0.16.0",
+  "version": "0.19.2",
   "author": {
     "name": "Mathias",
     "url": "https://git.d-ma.be/mathias"

.mcp.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "_comment": "Tailscale Serve on koala, not the public d-ma.be hostnames. The public path exits to Cloudflare and NPM to reach a k3s service on the same machine most sessions run on, which imposes rate limits and message-size caps on tool results. Serve terminates TLS with a real Tailscale cert and proxies to the NodePort over loopback, so traffic reaches the service from koala itself and satisfies the default-deny-ingress NetworkPolicy with no cluster change. Clients need 'tailscale set --accept-dns=true' for the MagicDNS name to resolve; see mathias/skills#24.",
+  "_comment": "Tailscale Serve on koala, not the public d-ma.be hostnames. The public path exits to Cloudflare and NPM to reach a k3s service on the same machine most sessions run on, which imposes rate limits and message-size caps on tool results. Serve terminates TLS with a real Tailscale cert and proxies to the NodePort over loopback, so traffic reaches the service from koala itself and satisfies the default-deny-ingress NetworkPolicy with no cluster change. Clients need 'tailscale set --accept-dns=true' for the MagicDNS name to resolve; see mathias/skills#24. Every ${VAR} below must be one ~/.op-env defines -- bin/check-mcp-env enforces that, because an undefined one sends an empty Authorization header and reports as 'requires authentication', which is indistinguishable from a revoked credential.",
   "mcpServers": {
     "brain": {
       "type": "http",
@@ -11,23 +11,24 @@
     "infra": {
       "type": "http",
       "url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8444/mcp"
+    },
+    "gitea": {
+      "_comment": "gitea-mcp authenticates by PASS-THROUGH: the bearer is a Gitea PAT, which the server validates against Gitea and then acts as. So no dedicated MCP token is needed, and the AgentSecrets blocker that parked this entry (skills#32, #33) never applied to it -- DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN is op://HomeLab and already in the session environment. Verified 2026-09-07: initialize 200 (serverInfo gitea-mcp) and tools/list returns 41 tools. Two DIFFERENT PATs both authenticate while GITEA_MCP_TOKEN 401s, which is what proves this is pass-through validation and not a static-token comparison.",
+      "type": "http",
+      "url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8446/mcp",
+      "headers": {
+        "Authorization": "Bearer ${DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN}"
+      }
     }
   },
   "_parked": {
-    "_reason": "cad and gitea-mcp are proxied, reachable and AUTHENTICATING: tailscale serve 8445 -> 127.0.0.1:31877 and 8446 -> 127.0.0.1:30340; an MCP initialize with the correct bearer returns 200 from both (serverInfo gitea-mcp 0.1.0, cad aed2aaf). They stay parked only because nothing puts those two tokens into the session environment. Both live in the 1Password AgentSecrets vault, and by deliberate design (infra#224, closed) no single identity on koala reads both vaults: koala-homelab is HomeLab-only and resolves ~/.op-env, koala-agentsecrets-write is AgentSecrets-only and lives in ~/.op-agent-write.env. Adding an AgentSecrets reference to ~/.op-env does NOT degrade gracefully -- `op run` fails wholesale and every other token, BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN included, goes unresolved with it. Enabling needs a read-scoped AgentSecrets identity in the session-env path; see mathias/skills#32, #33.",
+    "_reason": "cad is proxied, reachable and AUTHENTICATING: tailscale serve 8445 -> 127.0.0.1:31877, and an MCP initialize with the correct bearer returns 200 (serverInfo cad aed2aaf). It stays parked only because nothing puts CAD_MCP_TOKEN into the session environment. It lives in the 1Password AgentSecrets vault, and by deliberate design (infra#224, closed) no single identity on koala reads both vaults: koala-homelab is HomeLab-only and resolves ~/.op-env, koala-agentsecrets-write is AgentSecrets-only and lives in ~/.op-agent-write.env. Adding an AgentSecrets reference to ~/.op-env does NOT degrade gracefully -- `op run` fails wholesale and every other token, BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN included, goes unresolved with it. Enabling needs a read-scoped AgentSecrets identity in the session-env path; see mathias/skills#32, #33. gitea was parked here for the same stated reason and has been unparked: it needs no AgentSecrets token at all, because gitea-mcp is pass-through-authenticated.",
     "cad": {
       "type": "http",
       "url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8445/mcp",
       "headers": {
         "Authorization": "Bearer ${CAD_MCP_TOKEN}"
       }
-    },
-    "gitea": {
-      "type": "http",
-      "url": "https://koala.tail30472e.ts.net:8446/mcp",
-      "headers": {
-        "Authorization": "Bearer ${GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN}"
-      }
     }
   }
 }

README.md

@@ -100,9 +100,11 @@ default to point into `~/dev`.
 | `AGENTS_SKILLS_DIR` | `$HOME/.agents/skills` |
 | `CRUSH_SKILLS_DIR` | `$HOME/.config/crush/skills` |
 | `OPENCODE_SKILLS_DIR` | `$HOME/.config/opencode/skills` |
+| `ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON` | `$HOME/.gemini/config/skills.json` (registers `AGENTS_SKILLS_DIR` as a path entry; needs `jq`) |
 | `SKILLS_EXTRA_SOURCES` | unset (colon-separated extra source directories) |
 
-Antigravity and Mistral Vibe targets were removed — unused.
+The Mistral Vibe target was removed — unused. Antigravity's was removed for
+the same reason and re-added once it came back into use.
 
 ## Checking a host
 

SKILLS_INDEX.md

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ the SKILL.md, not the table.
 | `tdd` | Test-Driven Development enforcement | Starting any new feature or fixing a bug | claude-code, library |
 | `telos-load` | Load TELOS intention substrate at session start | Starting any koala session; before architectural decisions; CAD pipeline entry | claude-code, library |
 | `test-design` | Dave Farley test design scoring (Farley Index) | Reviewing or writing tests | claude-code, library |
+| `traceability` | Forward trace — requirement to decision to commit to verification to release, and what cannot be checked | Proving why a change exists; auditing a claim; before an attestation or a compliance ask | claude-code, library |
 | `trainer` | Two-phase brain curation (score candidates, write past quality gate) | Periodic brain pruning and curation | claude-code, library |
 | `user-stories` | Elephant Carpaccio story slicing | Breaking down features | claude-code, library |
 | `web-shot` | Screenshot a running web UI via a koala k3s Playwright job | Visual verification of a running UI when no local browser exists | claude-code, library |

Taskfile.yml

@@ -138,6 +138,26 @@ tasks:
           echo "ERROR: missing .claude-plugin/plugin.json" >&2; fail=1
         fi
 
+        # Every ${VAR} a live .mcp.json server interpolates must be one the
+        # session env-file defines. An undefined one is silent: the header
+        # goes out empty and the server reports "requires authentication",
+        # which reads as a revoked credential. Exit 2 means the check could
+        # not run (no jq, or no env-file — CI has neither); that is reported
+        # and not fatal, but it is never treated as a pass.
+        if [ -x "{{.TASKFILE_DIR}}/bin/check-mcp-env" ]; then
+          # `|| rc=$?` is load-bearing, not style. Task runs this block under
+          # `sh -e`, so a bare invocation exiting non-zero kills the shell
+          # before `case` is reached -- the tolerance below never ran, and the
+          # gate died with `exit status 2` on the commit that added it.
+          rc=0
+          "{{.TASKFILE_DIR}}/bin/check-mcp-env" "{{.TASKFILE_DIR}}/.mcp.json" "$HOME/.op-env" || rc=$?
+          case $rc in
+            0) ;;
+            2) echo "NOTE: MCP env wiring unverified on this host" >&2 ;;
+            *) fail=1 ;;
+          esac
+        fi
+
         if [ $fail -ne 0 ]; then
           echo "check FAILED" >&2; exit 1
         fi

bin/check-mcp-env

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# check-mcp-env — assert every variable a live MCP server interpolates is one
+# the session env-file actually defines.
+#
+# Why this is a gate and not a comment: the failure is silent. A header of
+# "Bearer ${FOO}" where FOO is undefined does not error -- it goes out empty,
+# the server answers 401, and Claude Code reports "requires authentication",
+# which reads exactly like a revoked credential. On 2026-09-07 that cost a
+# full investigation on koala before the credential turned out to be fine.
+#
+# Servers under `_parked` are exempt by design. Parked means "reachable, but
+# nothing puts its token in the environment yet" -- flagging those would
+# report the intended state as a fault.
+#
+# Usage:  check-mcp-env <mcp.json> <env-file>
+#
+# Exit 0  every live server's variables are defined
+#      1  at least one is not, named on stderr
+#      2  could not verify (bad usage, unreadable input, jq absent).
+#         Deliberately distinct from 0: an unverified config is not a clean
+#         one, and a gate that cannot run should say so rather than pass.
+
+set -u
+
+CONFIG=${1:-}
+ENVFILE=${2:-}
+
+if [ -z "$CONFIG" ] || [ -z "$ENVFILE" ]; then
+  echo "usage: check-mcp-env <mcp.json> <env-file>" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "SKIP: jq not installed -- MCP env wiring unverified" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "$CONFIG" ]; then
+  echo "ERROR: no such config: $CONFIG" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f "$ENVFILE" ]; then
+  # EXPECTED IN CI, and permanently so. The env-file holds live credentials, so
+  # it is not on the runner and must not be -- which means this check can only
+  # ever verify on a host that has one. infra#368 added jq to the runner image
+  # believing that would let CI verify; it removed the jq branch below and
+  # changed nothing else, because this branch is the binding one.
+  #
+  # Said plainly so nobody concludes CI covers this. It does not, it cannot,
+  # and putting ~/.op-env on the runner to make it would be trading a real
+  # secret for a green tick.
+  echo "ERROR: no such env-file: $ENVFILE -- cannot verify MCP variables" >&2
+  echo "       (expected in CI: this check only verifies on a host with ~/.op-env)" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+# Every "<server>\t<VAR>" pair a live server interpolates. `..` walks the whole
+# value, so a variable is found wherever it is placed, not only under headers.
+refs=$(jq -r '
+  .mcpServers // {}
+  | to_entries[]
+  | .key as $server
+  | (.value | .. | strings)
+  | select(test("\\$\\{"))
+  | [ scan("\\$\\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\\}")[] ]
+  | .[]
+  | "\($server)\t\(.)"
+' "$CONFIG" 2>/dev/null) || {
+  echo "ERROR: $CONFIG is not valid JSON -- MCP env wiring unverified" >&2
+  exit 2
+}
+
+if [ -z "$refs" ]; then
+  echo "check-mcp-env: no interpolated variables in live servers"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+fail=0
+checked=0
+for pair in $(printf '%s\n' "$refs" | tr '\t' ':'); do
+  server=${pair%%:*}
+  var=${pair#*:}
+  checked=$((checked + 1))
+  if grep -qE "^[[:space:]]*(export[[:space:]]+)?$var=" "$ENVFILE"; then
+    continue
+  fi
+  printf 'ERROR: MCP server %s interpolates %s, which %s does not define.\n' \
+    "$server" "$var" "$ENVFILE" >&2
+  printf '       It will send an empty Authorization header and report as "requires authentication".\n' >&2
+  fail=1
+done
+
+if [ "$fail" -ne 0 ]; then
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+printf 'check-mcp-env: %d interpolated variable(s) across live MCP servers, all defined in %s\n' \
+  "$checked" "$ENVFILE"

bin/check-session-log

@@ -25,15 +25,39 @@ for dir in "$ROOT"/skills/*/; do
 
   grep -q 'session_log' "$dir/SKILL.md" || continue
 
-  if ! grep -q 'session_id' "$dir/SKILL.md"; then
-    echo "ERROR: skills/$name documents session_log without session_id — the tool's only required field" >&2
-    fail=1
+  # Read the PAYLOAD, not the file. The first version of this gate grepped the
+  # whole SKILL.md for "session_id", so a payload missing the field passed as
+  # long as the word appeared anywhere — including in prose explaining that the
+  # field is required. A traceability probe demonstrated it in one sed.
+  payloads=$(grep -n 'session_log' "$dir/SKILL.md" | grep '{' || true)
+
+  if [ -z "$payloads" ]; then
+    # Mentions the tool but documents no call. Nothing to check, and nothing to
+    # get wrong.
+    continue
   fi
 
-  if grep -q 'duration_ms:[[:space:]]*<' "$dir/SKILL.md"; then
-    echo "ERROR: skills/$name documents duration_ms as a placeholder an agent cannot measure — omit it or pass a real measurement" >&2
+  printf '%s\n' "$payloads" | while IFS= read -r line; do
+    [ -n "$line" ] || continue
+    body=$(printf '%s' "$line" | sed 's/^[0-9]*://')
+    lineno=$(printf '%s' "$line" | cut -d: -f1)
+
+    printf '%s' "$body" | grep -q 'session_id' \
+      || echo "ERROR: skills/$name:$lineno documents a session_log payload with no session_id — the tool's only required field" >&2
+
+    # Any spelling of the key, quoted or not, followed by anything that is not a
+    # bare number. A placeholder nobody can fill gets fabricated or dropped; a
+    # real measurement is fine.
+    if printf '%s' "$body" | grep -Eq '"?duration_ms"?[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*[^0-9,}[:space:]]'; then
+      echo "ERROR: skills/$name:$lineno documents duration_ms as something other than a real measurement — an agent does not observe a clock; omit it" >&2
+    fi
+  done > "$ROOT/.session_log_errors.$$" 2>&1
+
+  if [ -s "$ROOT/.session_log_errors.$$" ]; then
+    cat "$ROOT/.session_log_errors.$$" >&2
     fail=1
   fi
+  rm -f "$ROOT/.session_log_errors.$$"
 done
 
 exit $fail

install.sh

@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
 #   /plugin install skills@mathias
 #
 # That path carries the hooks and MCP server definitions too, which symlinks
-# cannot. This script covers the harnesses with no plugin system: Crush, Pi
-# and OpenCode.
+# cannot. This script covers the harnesses with no plugin system: Crush, Pi,
+# OpenCode, and Antigravity.
 #
 # Wiring model — one managed directory, one link per harness:
 #
@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@
 #   ~/.config/crush/skills      -> ~/.agents/skills
 #   ~/.config/opencode/skills   -> ~/.agents/skills
 #
+# Antigravity has no symlink-directory discovery — it reads a path-entries
+# JSON instead (~/.gemini/config/skills.json:
+# {"entries":[{"path":"..."}]}). One entry points at ~/.agents/skills, so it
+# sees exactly the same surfaces-filtered, collision-resolved set every other
+# harness does. Requires jq; skipped with a warning if jq is unavailable —
+# every other target in this script stays dependency-free on purpose.
+#
 # ~/.agents/skills was itself a link to this checkout until #27. That encoded
 # an assumption nobody had stated — that this checkout is the ONLY source of
 # skills on the host — and on flamingo the only way to install this library
@@ -53,7 +60,12 @@ CHECKOUT_DIR="${SKILLS_CHECKOUT_DIR:-$HOME/.local/share/skills}"
 AGENTS_DIR="${AGENTS_SKILLS_DIR:-$HOME/.agents/skills}"
 CRUSH_DIR="${CRUSH_SKILLS_DIR:-$HOME/.config/crush/skills}"
 OPENCODE_DIR="${OPENCODE_SKILLS_DIR:-$HOME/.config/opencode/skills}"
+ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON="${ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON:-$HOME/.gemini/config/skills.json}"
 EXTRA_SOURCES="${SKILLS_EXTRA_SOURCES:-}"
+# Overridable so the jq-absent branch is testable on a host that has jq. That
+# branch is a contract, not a fallback: jq is optional here while every other
+# target in this script is dependency-free.
+JQ="${SKILLS_JQ:-jq}"
 # Recorded beside the managed directory rather than inside it: a stray file in
 # there would look like a skill to every harness reading the dir.
 SOURCES_MANIFEST="$(dirname "$AGENTS_DIR")/$(basename "$AGENTS_DIR")-sources"
@@ -213,6 +225,42 @@ link_dir() {
   log "linked $link → $target"
 }
 
+# wire_antigravity — register $AGENTS_DIR in Antigravity's skills.json.
+# Merges rather than overwrites: skills.json is a documented user-editable
+# config (json_configs.md), so a hand-added entry (e.g. a personal skills
+# dir) must survive a re-run untouched.
+wire_antigravity() {
+  if ! command -v "$JQ" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    log "Antigravity: jq not found — skipping (needed to merge $ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON safely)"
+    return
+  fi
+
+  local existing already updated
+  mkdir -p "$(dirname "$ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON")"
+
+  if [ -s "$ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON" ]; then
+    existing="$(cat "$ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON")"
+  else
+    existing='{}'
+  fi
+
+  already="$(printf '%s' "$existing" | "$JQ" --arg p "$AGENTS_DIR" \
+    '[.entries // [] | .[] | select(.path == $p)] | length' 2>/dev/null)" || {
+    log "Antigravity: $ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON is not valid JSON — leaving it untouched"
+    return 1
+  }
+
+  if [ "$already" -gt 0 ]; then
+    log "Antigravity: $AGENTS_DIR already registered in $ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON"
+    return
+  fi
+
+  updated="$(printf '%s' "$existing" | "$JQ" --arg p "$AGENTS_DIR" \
+    '.entries = ((.entries // []) + [{path: $p}])')"
+  printf '%s\n' "$updated" > "$ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON"
+  log "Antigravity: registered $AGENTS_DIR in $ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON"
+}
+
 main() {
   ensure_checkout
 
@@ -224,6 +272,7 @@ main() {
 
   link_dir "$CRUSH_DIR" "$AGENTS_DIR"
   link_dir "$OPENCODE_DIR" "$AGENTS_DIR"
+  wire_antigravity
 
   log "done — $LINKED_COUNT skill(s) linked from $(sources | wc -l | tr -d ' ') source(s), ref=$REF"
   log "Claude Code: install the plugin instead — /plugin marketplace add $REPO_URL"

skills/adr/SKILL.md

@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ adr:           0004
 title:         <the decision, as a sentence — not "database choice">
 status:        proposed | accepted | superseded | amended
 date:          2026-08-29
-deciders:      <who accepted it, by name — or "pending: <name>" while proposed>
-supersedes:    <adr number, or ->
+deciders:      <who accepted it, by name — or "pending: <name>" (QUOTED) while proposed>
+supersedes:    <adr number, or null>
 ---
 
 # ADR-0004 — <same title>
@@ -97,6 +97,25 @@ the condition that fires a revisit. An ADR with no validation section is a prefe
 with a template around it.
 ```
 
+### The frontmatter must actually parse
+
+It exists to be machine-read, so a block that does not load is worse than no block at
+all: it drops that ADR silently out of every "what is still open?" query, while looking
+correct. Two shapes this template used to suggest are invalid YAML, and both were found
+live in the estate on 2026-09-05 — `openbanking-api` ADR-0001 and `infra` ADR-0019, each
+copied verbatim from here:
+
+| Wrong | Why | Right |
+|---|---|---|
+| `supersedes:    -` | a bare dash is a YAML *sequence entry*, not a string | `supersedes:    null` |
+| `deciders:      pending: Mathias` | the second, unquoted colon reads as a nested mapping | `deciders:      "pending: Mathias"` |
+
+Check before committing:
+
+```sh
+python3 -c "import yaml,sys;yaml.safe_load(open(sys.argv[1]).read().split('---')[1]);print('ok')" docs/adr/0004-*.md
+```
+
 ## Preserving a productive tension
 
 Some tradeoffs are not unresolved because nobody thought hard enough. They are

skills/traceability/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+---
+name: traceability
+surfaces: [claude-code, library]
+summary: "Forward trace — requirement to decision to commit to verification to release, and what cannot be checked"
+use_when: "Proving why a change exists; auditing a claim; before an attestation or a compliance ask"
+description: Establish the forward trace for a change — requirement, decision, commit, verification, CI, release, closure — as a chain of links that are each checked rather than asserted. Names the links that cannot be verified from the repository instead of letting them pass as verified. Use when auditing why a change exists, preparing an attestation, or when a claim needs to be provable rather than plausible.
+---
+
+# Traceability
+
+## Overview
+
+A trace is not a story about how a change came to be. It is a chain of links, each of
+which is either **checked** or **named as unchecked**. The value is entirely in that
+distinction: a trace where every link is asserted is a narrative, and narratives are what
+audits exist to defeat.
+
+The chain in this estate:
+
+```
+issue (requirement) → comment (decision) → commit → test/gate → CI run on that sha
+    → release tag → closing comment (evidence)
+```
+
+Note where the decisions live: **in issue comments**, not issue bodies. A tool that reads
+issue titles will trace the wrong thing.
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Auditing why a change exists, especially one nobody remembers making
+- Preparing an attestation, a compliance answer, or a client-facing "how do you know"
+- Before claiming a requirement is satisfied
+- When a claim is repeated in several places, which is the condition under which nobody
+  checks it
+
+**Do not use for:** a change you are about to make. That is `adr` (the decision) and
+`spec-driven-dev` (the requirement). This skill reconstructs; it does not author.
+
+## The tool
+
+```sh
+skills/traceability/trace.sh <sha> [repo-path]
+```
+
+Prints what git can prove — the commit, its files, the test files it touched, the release
+that contains it, every issue it references as a URL — and then prints, every time, the
+three things git **cannot** prove. That last section is the point of the tool.
+
+## The sequence
+
+**1. Run the tool.** It does the mechanical half in one command.
+
+**2. Open the issues it printed, and read the comments.** The requirement is in the body;
+the decision is almost always in a comment, and so is the closure record. A trace built
+from commit messages alone will confidently cite an issue that says something else.
+
+**3. Match CI on the head sha, not on the branch.** "The pipeline is green" is not
+evidence about a commit. Find the run whose `head_sha` is this commit and read its
+conclusion — and check which *job* and which *step* passed, because a run can be red for a
+reason that has nothing to do with the gate you care about, and green overall while the
+gate you care about was skipped.
+
+The estate's `workflow_run_status` returns only the run-level conclusion — no jobs, no
+steps. For that breakdown you have to drop to the API:
+
+```sh
+op run --env-file ~/.op-env -- sh -c 'curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN" \
+  "https://git.d-ma.be/api/v1/repos/<owner>/<repo>/actions/runs/<id>/jobs"'
+```
+
+Said explicitly because a step whose tooling dead-ends is exactly where a trace becomes
+"the run was green".
+
+**4. Check that the tests actually cover the behaviour.** A commit that touched a test
+file is not a commit that is verified. Read the assertions and ask what would have to
+break for them to fail. If nothing would, the link is decorative.
+
+**5. Probe the load-bearing claim — try to falsify it.** This is the step that separates a
+trace from a summary, and it is the one that finds things.
+
+Pick the claim the chain rests on, and attack it in a scratch copy:
+
+```sh
+git archive <sha> | (mkdir -p /tmp/probe && tar -x -C /tmp/probe)
+# then break exactly the thing the claim protects, and run the gate
+```
+
+If the gate stays green, the claim is false — regardless of how many places assert it.
+This is not hypothetical: the probe that shaped this skill falsified a "the list only
+shrinks" claim that was stated in five places in the repository and enforced in none.
+
+**6. Look for what cites the commit, not only what it cites.** A commit cannot reference
+an issue filed after it, and that is precisely where an outcome gets falsified. Search the
+tracker for the sha, across issues *and comments*, and `git log --all --grep=<sha>` for
+later commits referring back. In the run that shaped this skill, the issue proving the
+traced commit had *relocated* rather than fixed its defect was filed 90 minutes later and
+was reachable only this way.
+
+**7. Report unverifiable links as unverifiable.** Not as weak links, not as caveats at the
+end. Each gets its own line saying what would be needed to close it.
+
+## What a broken link looks like
+
+| Symptom | What it means |
+|---|---|
+| The commit cites `#37`, and `#37` describes something else | The reference is decoration; someone renumbered or misremembered |
+| A claim appears in five places and a check in none | Convention wearing a mechanism's clothes. Probe it |
+| The gate greps for a heading | Presence is not compliance. A heading with nothing under it passes |
+| `git describe` says unreleased | Usually stale local tags, not an unreleased commit. `git fetch --tags` first |
+| The requirement is a bare `#5` with no URL | Recoverable only while the tracker lives. Not traceable from the repo alone |
+| CI green, but on a different sha | The most common false link, and the easiest to accept by accident |
+
+## Output
+
+State the chain, then the gaps, in that order:
+
+```
+CHAIN
+  requirement  #36 item 3 (defect report)          → verified, read: body + comments
+  requirement  #19 (standing execution bar)        → verified, read
+  decision     comment 8509                        → verified; names the commit
+  commit       b616c51                             → verified
+    claim "nine skills, none named session_id"     → verified against b616c51^: 9/9
+    claim "session_id is the only required field"  → verified against the live tool schema
+  gate         bin/check-session-log               → RED on parent (17 errors), GREEN on it
+  wiring       Taskfile check step 5               → verified; CI runs task check
+  verification tests/check_session_log_test.sh     → verified, 4 cases, both directions
+  CI           run 4880, job "Check / Test"        → verified, head_sha matches, success
+  release      v0.13.3                             → verified against the REMOTE
+
+GAPS
+  - The gate greps the file, not the payload. Probe: stripped session_id from
+    every payload, left the word in prose — gate returned 0. FALSIFIED.
+  - Defect relocated, not removed: #39, filed 90 minutes later by the same
+    author, says so. The commit's outcome claim does not hold.
+```
+
+Four slots that are not optional, each learned by leaving them out:
+
+- **More than one requirement, and they differ in kind.** A defect report and a standing
+  policy bar are both requirements and collapsing them hides which one was not met.
+- **The gate, separately from the test.** A commit that ships a check has three artifacts,
+  not two, and the chain usually rests on the one in the middle.
+- **The RED/GREEN baseline.** Run the gate against the parent commit. Without it you have
+  shown a gate exists, not that it caught anything.
+- **The commit's factual claims, checked.** "Nine skills, none named it" is falsifiable in
+  one command. Without a slot for it, "commit → verified" means only "this sha exists".
+
+Gaps ranked by how much they matter, not by where you found them. A trace whose gap
+section is empty should be suspicious of itself.
+
+## Escalation
+
+Read-only. Reports the chain; changes nothing, and closes no issue on the strength of
+what it finds.
+
+Stop and hand back when: a link's evidence is outside anything you can reach — a tracker
+you cannot read, a CI system you have no access to, a decision made in conversation. Say
+which link and what would close it. An inferred link presented as a traced one is worse
+than a gap, because the gap is honest and the inference is citable.
+
+Also stop before *acting* on a falsified claim. Finding that a gate does not enforce what
+it says is a finding; deciding what to do about it is the owner's call.
+
+## Cross-References
+
+- `lineage` — the same discipline backwards: this asks "does the chain hold", that asks
+  "was it tried before and why did it stop".
+- `adr` — the decision layer of the chain. A trace that reaches an ADR has found the
+  reasoning; a trace that reaches only a commit message has found a summary of it.

skills/traceability/trace.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# trace.sh — the forward trace for one commit, and an honest list of what it
+# could not check.
+#
+# The chain this estate actually uses:
+#
+#   issue (requirement) -> comment (decision) -> commit -> test/gate -> CI run
+#     -> release tag -> closing comment
+#
+# git can prove the middle of that and nothing else. The issue bodies, the
+# comments where decisions actually live, and the CI run are all tracker state.
+# So this prints what git knows and then names, with URLs, the links a human has
+# to follow — because a link nobody checked must not read like a verified one.
+#
+# Usage: trace.sh <sha> [repo-path]
+#
+# Read-only.
+
+set -u
+
+[ $# -ge 1 ] || { echo "usage: trace.sh <sha> [repo-path]" >&2; exit 2; }
+SHA=$1
+REPO=${2:-.}
+
+git -C "$REPO" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo "trace: $REPO is not a git repository" >&2; exit 2; }
+git -C "$REPO" rev-parse --verify --quiet "$SHA^{commit}" >/dev/null || {
+  echo "trace: $SHA is not a commit in $REPO" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+TOP=$(git -C "$REPO" rev-parse --show-toplevel)
+ORIGIN=$(git -C "$REPO" config --get remote.origin.url 2>/dev/null || true)
+# Never print the URL as configured: url.insteadOf can expand it into a live
+# token. Reduce it to owner/repo and use that.
+SLUG=$(printf '%s' "$ORIGIN" | sed -E 's#\.git$##; s#^.*[/:]([^/]+/[^/]+)$#\1#' 2>/dev/null || true)
+
+section() { printf '\n== %s ==\n' "$1"; }
+
+section "Commit"
+git -C "$REPO" log -1 --format='%h  %ad  %an%n%n%B' --date=short "$SHA"
+
+section "Files"
+git -C "$REPO" show --stat --format='' "$SHA"
+
+section "Verification it touched"
+tests=$(git -C "$REPO" show --name-only --format='' "$SHA" \
+  | grep -Ei '(^|/)(tests?|spec)/|_test\.|\.test\.|_spec\.' || true)
+if [ -n "$tests" ]; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$tests"
+else
+  printf 'none — this commit changed no test or spec file.\n'
+  printf 'That is not automatically wrong (docs, config), but if it changed behaviour\n'
+  printf 'it means the change has no verification of its own.\n'
+fi
+
+section "Released in"
+tag=$(git -C "$REPO" describe --tags --contains "$SHA" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/[~^].*//' || true)
+if [ -n "$tag" ]; then
+  printf '%s   (LOCAL tags only — confirm with: git ls-remote --tags origin)\n' "$tag"
+else
+  printf 'no release contains this commit in THIS checkout.\n'
+  printf 'Local tags go stale — run `git fetch --tags` and re-check before\n'
+  printf 'concluding it was never released.\n'
+fi
+
+section "Referenced issues"
+refs=$(git -C "$REPO" log -1 --format='%B' "$SHA" | grep -oE '#[0-9]+' | sort -u || true)
+if [ -n "$refs" ]; then
+  for r in $refs; do
+    n=${r#\#}
+    if [ -n "$SLUG" ]; then
+      printf '%s  ->  https://git.d-ma.be/%s/issues/%s\n' "$r" "$SLUG" "$n"
+    else
+      printf '%s\n' "$r"
+    fi
+  done
+else
+  printf 'none — the commit cites no issue, so its requirement is unrecorded.\n'
+fi
+
+section "Issues that cite THIS commit"
+printf 'Not searchable from the commit — an issue filed after it cannot appear in\n'
+printf 'its message, and that is exactly where an outcome gets falsified. Check:\n\n'
+printf '  git -C %s log --all --grep=%s   # later commits referring back\n' "$REPO" "$SHA"
+if [ -n "$SLUG" ]; then
+  printf '  tracker search for "%s" across issues AND comments\n' "$SHA"
+fi
+printf '\nIn the run that shaped this tool, the issue that falsified the traced\n'
+printf 'commit was filed 90 minutes after it and was reachable only this way.\n'
+
+section "Cannot verify from here"
+cat <<'TXT'
+git proves the commit, its files, and which tag contains it. It cannot prove:
+
+  1. That the issues above say what the commit claims they say. The DECISION is
+     usually in a comment, not the issue body — open them and read the comments.
+  2. That CI actually passed on this exact sha. A green pipeline elsewhere is not
+     evidence about this commit; match on head_sha.
+  3. That the tests listed above assert the behaviour this commit added. A test
+     file touched is not a behaviour covered.
+  4. That any gate this commit ships enforces what its message says it does.
+     Probe it: break exactly the thing the claim protects, in a scratch copy,
+     and see whether the gate goes red.
+
+None of the three is a formality. Each has been the broken link in this estate:
+a claim asserted in five places and enforced in none, a red run whose gate had
+passed, and a gate that greps for a heading and calls it a contract.
+TXT

tests/check_session_log_test.sh

@@ -63,5 +63,38 @@ expect 1 'documenting duration_ms as wall-clock fails' \
   "$(fixture clock 'Call `session_log` with `{session_id: "<id>", skill: "alpha", duration_ms: <wall-clock>}`')" \
   'duration_ms'
 
+# --- the gate must read the PAYLOAD, not the file ---------------------------
+# A traceability probe falsified the original: it grepped the whole file for the
+# string "session_id", so stripping the field from every documented payload and
+# leaving the word once in prose passed cleanly. The exact regression the gate
+# exists to prevent was back in the file and the gate said nothing.
+
+expect 1 'a payload without session_id fails even when prose mentions the word' \
+  "$(fixture prose 'The tool has a required session_id field.
+
+Call `session_log` with `{skill: "alpha", phase: "red", final_status: "pass"}`')" \
+  'session_id'
+
+expect 1 'one bad payload among several fails' \
+  "$(fixture mixed 'Call `session_log` with `{session_id: "<id>", skill: "alpha", phase: "red"}`
+
+Then `session_log` with `{skill: "alpha", phase: "green", final_status: "pass"}`')" \
+  'session_id'
+
+# duration_ms was banned by matching exactly one spelling of it — the historical
+# one. Both of these passed the original gate.
+expect 1 'duration_ms with a JSON-quoted key fails' \
+  "$(fixture jsonkey 'Call `session_log` with `{session_id: "<id>", "duration_ms": <wall-clock>}`')" \
+  'duration_ms'
+
+expect 1 'duration_ms described in prose rather than angle brackets fails' \
+  "$(fixture prosems 'Call `session_log` with `{session_id: "<id>", duration_ms: elapsed wall-clock ms}`')" \
+  'duration_ms'
+
+# A real measurement is allowed: the objection is to a placeholder no agent can
+# fill, not to the field.
+expect 0 'a duration_ms carrying a real value is allowed' \
+  "$(fixture realms 'Call `session_log` with `{session_id: "<id>", duration_ms: 1430}`')"
+
 printf '\ncheck_session_log: %d passed, %d failed\n' "$pass" "$fail"
 [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]

tests/check_tolerates_unverifiable_test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# `task check` must survive a check that reports "could not verify".
+#
+# The regression these exist for: bin/check-mcp-env exits 2 to mean "I could
+# not run — no jq, or no env-file", which the gate deliberately treats as a
+# reported NOTE rather than a failure. The Taskfile said exactly that:
+#
+#   "$DIR/check-mcp-env" "$DIR/.mcp.json" "$HOME/.op-env"
+#   case $? in 0) ;; 2) echo "NOTE: ..." ;; *) fail=1 ;; esac
+#
+# and it did not work. Task runs each cmds block under `sh -e`, so a bare
+# command exiting non-zero aborts the shell *before* `case $?` is ever
+# reached. The whole gate died with `exit status 2`. Locally the check found
+# jq and exited 0, so it went green; CI has neither jq nor ~/.op-env, so main
+# went red on the very commit that added it (skills run #57, 2026-09-07).
+#
+# A tolerated exit code that is only tolerated on the host where it never
+# fires is not tolerated at all. This pins the tolerance itself.
+#
+# No mocking: pointing HOME at an empty directory removes ~/.op-env, which is
+# exactly the condition CI runs under, so check-mcp-env genuinely exits 2.
+
+set -u
+
+ROOT=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)
+
+pass=0
+fail=0
+
+ok() { pass=$((pass + 1)); printf '  ok   %s\n' "$1"; }
+no() { fail=$((fail + 1)); printf '  FAIL %s\n' "$1"; }
+
+if ! command -v task >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '  SKIP: task not installed -- cannot exercise the gate\n'
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+TMP=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+# Sanity: the precondition must actually hold, or the test proves nothing.
+# An empty HOME means no ~/.op-env, so check-mcp-env cannot verify anything.
+"$ROOT/bin/check-mcp-env" "$ROOT/.mcp.json" "$TMP/.op-env" >/dev/null 2>&1
+rc=$?
+if [ "$rc" -eq 2 ]; then
+  ok 'precondition: check-mcp-env exits 2 when the env-file is absent'
+else
+  no "precondition: expected check-mcp-env to exit 2, got $rc"
+fi
+
+# The assertion. `task check` must still pass, and must say why it could not
+# verify -- silence would mean the check was skipped rather than tolerated.
+out=$(HOME="$TMP" task --dir "$ROOT" check 2>&1)
+rc=$?
+
+if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then
+  ok 'task check passes when MCP env wiring cannot be verified'
+else
+  no "task check exited $rc when check-mcp-env reported unverifiable"
+  printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed 's/^/       | /' | tail -8
+fi
+
+if printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'unverified'; then
+  ok 'the unverifiable check is reported, not silently skipped'
+else
+  no 'no NOTE reported -- an unverifiable check must never look like a pass'
+fi
+
+printf '  %d passed, %d failed\n' "$pass" "$fail"
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]

tests/install_test.sh

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SUT="$ROOT/install.sh"
 
 pass=0
 fail=0
+skipped=0
 WORK=${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/install_test.$$
 
 if [ ! -f "$SUT" ]; then
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ run_install() {
     AGENTS_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.agents/skills" \
     CRUSH_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.config/crush/skills" \
     OPENCODE_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.config/opencode/skills" \
+    ANTIGRAVITY_SKILLS_JSON="$_f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json" \
     SKILLS_EXTRA_SOURCES="$_extra" \
     bash "$SUT" 2>&1)
   rc=$?
@@ -156,6 +158,40 @@ else
   no 'configured sources are recorded for doctor' "$out"
 fi
 
+# --- Antigravity: jq is optional, so BOTH branches must be tested -----------
+# These three cases inherited whatever jq the host happened to have. koala has
+# it, the CI runner does not, so they passed locally and failed in CI — the
+# classic works-on-my-machine gate. install.sh treats jq as optional by design,
+# which means the skip is a contract and needs a test of its own.
+
+# run_install_nojq <fixture> — same as run_install, with the jq lookup pointed
+# at a binary that does not exist. Deterministic regardless of the host.
+run_install_nojq() {
+  _f=$1
+  _out=$(HOME="$_f/home" \
+    SKILLS_SKIP_FETCH=1 \
+    SKILLS_CHECKOUT_DIR="$_f/ck" \
+    AGENTS_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.agents/skills" \
+    CRUSH_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.config/crush/skills" \
+    OPENCODE_SKILLS_DIR="$_f/home/.config/opencode/skills" \
+    SKILLS_JQ="definitely-not-jq-$$" \
+    bash "$SUT" 2>&1)
+  rc=$?
+  printf '%s' "$_out"
+}
+
+f=$(new_fixture antigravity_nojq)
+out=$(run_install_nojq "$f")
+if [ -e "$f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json" ]; then
+  no 'without jq, no skills.json is written' "$out"
+elif ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qi 'jq not found'; then
+  no 'without jq, the skip is reported' "$out"
+elif [ ! -L "$f/home/.agents/skills/alpha" ]; then
+  no 'without jq, the other harnesses are still wired' "$out"
+else
+  ok 'without jq, Antigravity is skipped and the rest still wires'
+fi
+
 # --- 8. surfaces: the library link set is not "every skill" -----------------
 # claude.ai has no shell, no cluster and no checkout, so a chat-only skill
 # linked into Crush is a skill that can never fire, competing for selection
@@ -183,5 +219,59 @@ else
   no 'a source with no surfaces convention is linked as-is' "$out"
 fi
 
-printf '\ninstall: %d passed, %d failed\n' "$pass" "$fail"
+# --- 9-11. Antigravity's merge behaviour, only where jq exists ---------------
+# These three assert what jq DOES. install.sh treats jq as optional, so on a
+# host without it there is nothing to assert — and failing there is what turned
+# main red: they passed on koala (jq present) and failed on the runner (absent).
+# A skipped case is honest; a case that fails because the host lacks an optional
+# dependency is a false red, and false reds are how a suite stops being read.
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  skipped=$((skipped + 3))
+  printf '  SKIP jq absent — Antigravity merge behaviour not covered on this host (3 cases)\n'
+else
+  # skills.json entries must point at $AGENTS_DIR — that carries the
+  # surfaces-filtering, collision handling and multi-source merge. Pointing at
+  # the checkout directly would give Antigravity a different skill set than
+  # every other harness.
+  f=$(new_fixture antigravity)
+  out=$(run_install "$f")
+  AG="$f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json"
+  if [ ! -f "$AG" ]; then
+    no 'Antigravity skills.json is created' "$out"
+  else
+    registered=$(jq -r --arg p "$f/home/.agents/skills" '[.entries[]? | select(.path == $p)] | length' "$AG")
+    if [ "$registered" = "1" ]; then
+      ok 'Antigravity registers the managed agents dir, not the raw checkout'
+    else
+      no 'Antigravity registers the managed agents dir, not the raw checkout' "$(cat "$AG")"
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  f=$(new_fixture antigravity_idempotent)
+  run_install "$f" >/dev/null
+  out=$(run_install "$f")
+  AG="$f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json"
+  count=$(jq '.entries | length' "$AG" 2>/dev/null || echo "?")
+  if [ "$count" = "1" ]; then
+    ok 'Antigravity wiring is idempotent (no duplicate entries)'
+  else
+    no 'Antigravity wiring is idempotent (no duplicate entries)' "entries=$count"$'\n'"$out"
+  fi
+
+  # A user may hand-edit skills.json to point at their own personal skills dir
+  # (json_configs.md documents this). Our merge must not clobber it.
+  f=$(new_fixture antigravity_preserve)
+  mkdir -p "$f/home/.gemini/config"
+  printf '{"entries":[{"path":"/Users/mathias/personal-skills"}]}' > "$f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json"
+  out=$(run_install "$f")
+  AG="$f/home/.gemini/config/skills.json"
+  personal=$(jq -r '[.entries[]? | select(.path == "/Users/mathias/personal-skills")] | length' "$AG" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+  if [ "$personal" = "1" ]; then
+    ok 'Antigravity wiring preserves pre-existing hand-authored entries'
+  else
+    no 'Antigravity wiring preserves pre-existing hand-authored entries' "$(cat "$AG")"$'\n'"$out"
+  fi
+fi
+
+printf '\ninstall: %d passed, %d failed, %d skipped\n' "$pass" "$fail" "$skipped"
 [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]

tests/mcp_config_test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Tests for bin/check-mcp-env.
+#
+# The fault this gate exists for is silent, which is why it needs a gate at
+# all. An `.mcp.json` server whose Authorization header interpolates a
+# variable nothing in the session environment defines does not error: the
+# header goes out empty, the server answers 401, and Claude Code reports
+# "requires authentication". That is indistinguishable from a revoked or
+# expired credential, and on 2026-09-07 it cost a full investigation on koala
+# to establish that the credential was fine and the variable was simply never
+# set.
+#
+# So the property is: every ${VAR} a LIVE server interpolates must be a
+# variable the session env-file actually defines.
+#
+# The `_parked` block is deliberately exempt. Parked servers reference
+# variables nothing provides on purpose -- that is what parked means -- and a
+# gate that flagged them would be reporting the intended state as a fault.
+#
+# Fixtures drive the checker through argv, so no test touches the real host.
+
+set -u
+
+ROOT=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)
+CHECK="$ROOT/bin/check-mcp-env"
+
+pass=0
+fail=0
+WORK=${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mcp_config_test.$$
+
+if [ ! -f "$CHECK" ]; then
+  printf 'FAIL: %s does not exist\n' "$CHECK"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cleanup() { rm -rf "$WORK"; }
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+mkdir -p "$WORK"
+
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf 'SKIP: jq not installed -- bin/check-mcp-env cannot be exercised\n'
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+# ok <name> / bad <name> <detail>
+ok()  { pass=$((pass+1)); printf '  ok   %s\n' "$1"; }
+bad() { fail=$((fail+1)); printf '  FAIL %s  %s\n' "$1" "${2:-}"; }
+
+# run <mcp-json> <env-file> -> sets $rc and $out
+run() {
+  out=$("$CHECK" "$1" "$2" 2>&1); rc=$?
+}
+
+ENVFILE="$WORK/op-env"
+cat > "$ENVFILE" <<'ENVEOF'
+BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN=op://HomeLab/brain/token
+DMABE_GITEA_API_TOKEN=op://HomeLab/gitea/token
+ENVEOF
+
+# --- a live server whose variable IS defined ---------------------------------
+cat > "$WORK/good.json" <<'JSONEOF'
+{"mcpServers":{"brain":{"type":"http","url":"https://x/mcp",
+ "headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN}"}}}}
+JSONEOF
+run "$WORK/good.json" "$ENVFILE"
+[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && ok "defined variable passes" || bad "defined variable passes" "rc=$rc $out"
+
+# --- a live server whose variable is NOT defined ------------------------------
+# The exact shape that broke: the server looks correct and fails at runtime.
+cat > "$WORK/missing.json" <<'JSONEOF'
+{"mcpServers":{"gitea":{"type":"http","url":"https://x/mcp",
+ "headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN}"}}}}
+JSONEOF
+run "$WORK/missing.json" "$ENVFILE"
+if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
+  case "$out" in
+    *gitea*GITEA_MCP_STATIC_TOKEN*) ok "undefined variable is flagged, naming server and variable" ;;
+    *) bad "undefined variable is flagged, naming server and variable" "report did not name both: $out" ;;
+  esac
+else
+  bad "undefined variable is flagged, naming server and variable" "rc=0"
+fi
+
+# --- a server with no headers at all (the `infra` shape) ----------------------
+# Unauthenticated by design. Nothing to resolve, so nothing to flag.
+cat > "$WORK/noauth.json" <<'JSONEOF'
+{"mcpServers":{"infra":{"type":"http","url":"https://x/mcp"}}}
+JSONEOF
+run "$WORK/noauth.json" "$ENVFILE"
+[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && ok "header-less server is not flagged" || bad "header-less server is not flagged" "rc=$rc $out"
+
+# --- parked servers are exempt ------------------------------------------------
+cat > "$WORK/parked.json" <<'JSONEOF'
+{"mcpServers":{"brain":{"type":"http","url":"https://x/mcp",
+  "headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${BRAIN_MCP_TOKEN}"}}},
+ "_parked":{"_reason":"no identity provides these yet",
+  "cad":{"type":"http","url":"https://x/mcp",
+   "headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${CAD_MCP_TOKEN}"}}}}
+JSONEOF
+run "$WORK/parked.json" "$ENVFILE"
+if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then
+  ok "parked server is exempt"
+else
+  bad "parked server is exempt" "rc=$rc $out"
+fi
+
+# --- malformed JSON must not pass silently ------------------------------------
+# A config the checker cannot read is an unverified config, not a clean one.
+printf '{"mcpServers":{' > "$WORK/broken.json"
+run "$WORK/broken.json" "$ENVFILE"
+[ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && ok "unparseable config does not report success" || bad "unparseable config does not report success" "rc=0"
+
+# --- a missing env-file is unverifiable, not clean ----------------------------
+run "$WORK/good.json" "$WORK/no-such-env"
+[ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && ok "missing env-file does not report success" || bad "missing env-file does not report success" "rc=0"
+
+printf '\n%s: %d passed, %d failed\n' "$(basename "$0")" "$pass" "$fail"
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]

tests/secret_guard_test.sh

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ decision_for() {
   _tool=${2:-Bash}
   jq -n --arg t "$_tool" --arg c "$_cmd" \
     '{tool_name: $t, tool_input: {command: $c}}' \
-    | sh "$GUARD" \
+    | "$GUARD" \
     | jq -r '.hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision // "MISSING"'
 }
 
@@ -42,6 +42,20 @@ expect() {
   fi
 }
 
+# Invoked as a PROGRAM above, never as `sh "$GUARD"`. Claude Code executes the
+# hook directly, so its `#!/usr/bin/env bash` shebang decides the interpreter;
+# piping it into `sh` overrides that and tests something production never runs.
+#
+# It is not academic. On Debian /bin/sh is dash, which has no `set -o
+# pipefail`, so the guard died on line 23 before reading a byte of input and
+# every deny case returned empty -- 20 of 20 assertions failed in CI while
+# passing on a host where /bin/sh happens to be bash. A security gate that
+# tests green and cannot start is the worst of both.
+if [ ! -x "$GUARD" ]; then
+  printf 'FAIL: %s is not executable -- it must run via its own shebang\n' "$GUARD"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
 if [ ! -f "$GUARD" ]; then
   printf 'FAIL: %s does not exist\n' "$GUARD"
   exit 1

tests/traceability_test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Tests for skills/traceability/trace.sh.
+#
+# The RED run for #10 established what a forward trace costs by hand: sixteen
+# commands, of which the decisive ones were reading issue comments and running a
+# probe against a claim. This tool does the mechanical half — what git can prove
+# — and, more importantly, states what it CANNOT prove, so an unverifiable link
+# never reads as a verified one.
+
+set -u
+
+ROOT=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)
+SUT="$ROOT/skills/traceability/trace.sh"
+
+pass=0
+fail=0
+WORK=${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traceability_test.$$
+
+if [ ! -f "$SUT" ]; then
+  printf 'FAIL: %s does not exist\n' "$SUT"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cleanup() { rm -rf "$WORK"; }
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+mkdir -p "$WORK/repo/tests"
+cd "$WORK/repo" || exit 1
+git init -q .
+git config user.email t@example.com
+git config user.name test
+# A remote is needed for the tool to turn "#37" into a checkable URL, which is
+# the point of that section.
+git remote add origin https://git.d-ma.be/mathias/demo.git
+
+printf 'baseline\n' > README.md
+git add -A && git commit -qm "chore: baseline"
+
+printf 'gate\n' > gate.sh
+printf 'case\n' > tests/gate_test.sh
+git add -A && git commit -qm "feat(gate): add the thing
+
+Implements the decision recorded in #5, filed as #37.
+
+Closes #37"
+SHA=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)
+git tag -a v1.2.0 -m "release v1.2.0"
+
+printf 'more\n' >> gate.sh
+git add -A && git commit -qm "chore: later work"
+
+cd - >/dev/null || exit 1
+out=$(sh "$SUT" "$SHA" "$WORK/repo" 2>&1)
+
+check() {
+  if printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "$1"; then
+    pass=$((pass + 1)); printf '  ok   %s\n' "$2"
+  else
+    fail=$((fail + 1)); printf '  FAIL %s\n       output had no %s\n%s\n' "$2" "$1" "$out"
+  fi
+}
+
+check '#5'              'lists every issue the commit references, not just the closing one'
+check '#37'             'lists the closing reference'
+check 'tests/gate_test.sh' 'names the test files the commit touched'
+check 'v1.2.0'          'names the release that contains it'
+check 'Cannot verify' 'states what it could not verify'
+check 'issues/37'       'emits a checkable URL for the tracker link it cannot follow'
+
+# A commit in no release must say so — "no tag" and "not checked" are different
+# answers and only one of them is about the commit.
+last=$(git -C "$WORK/repo" rev-parse --short HEAD)
+out=$(sh "$SUT" "$last" "$WORK/repo" 2>&1)
+if printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qi 'no release contains'; then
+  pass=$((pass + 1)); printf '  ok   an unreleased commit is reported as unreleased\n'
+else
+  fail=$((fail + 1)); printf '  FAIL an unreleased commit is reported as unreleased\n%s\n' "$out"
+fi
+
+printf '\ntraceability: %d passed, %d failed\n' "$pass" "$fail"
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]