ADR-014 item 2 — a single per-egress-IP rate gate shared by every caption
fetch — was specced but only per-video backoff (rate_limited_at) shipped.
Build the real gate now: it is load-bearing once ADR-018 puts auto-summarize
on an in-process schedule across multiple users (all fetches leave one pod's
egress IP, concurrently with live "Summarize" clicks — without a shared gate
that self-inflicts 429s every cycle).
globalFetchGate (golang.org/x/time/rate, default 2s/req burst 1) is consulted
in httpDo before every live outbound fetch — player, watch-page, timedtext —
so the scheduler runners and the web click-path serialise through one limiter
regardless of how many users/goroutines are upstream. The test seam
(a.transport != nil) skips the gate so fakes are not throttled.
TAPIR_FETCH_RATE (Go duration, default 2s, 0 = unlimited) wires SetFetchRate in
cmdRun; the existing per-video backoff stays as the complementary 429 handler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Writes passwords.dex.coreos.com CRs against the in-cluster Kubernetes
API using the pod's service-account token + cluster CA (no kubectl /
client-go dependency). NewPasswordClient returns ErrNotInCluster off
cluster so the web layer degrades gracefully in dev.
Load-bearing: Dex's kubernetes storage types Password.Hash as []byte,
which k8s JSON-marshals as base64 — so the `hash` field carries the
base64 of the bcrypt string, not the raw string. Storing the raw string
makes Dex's base64-decode-on-login produce garbage and every login fail.
409 -> ErrPasswordExists, 401/403 -> ErrForbidden (RBAC missing) so the
handler can give precise messages. Tested against an httptest TLS server.
bcrypt cost-12 hashing lives in the web handler; golang.org/x/crypto was
already a transitive dep (now promoted in go.sum).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the lane-C reader surface: list, detail, and an action button-group
fragment over the lane-A store reads/actions, behind the web.Auth seam.
- Templ components (base layout, list+filters, detail, ActionButtons) with
committed *_templ.go so go build/task check work without the templ binary;
`task generate` regenerates. Filters and action toggles are HTMX-swapped and
degrade to plain form GET/POST (POST→303→GET) without JS.
- Handlers (internal/web): GET / (channel+date filters, in-memory),
GET /v/{videoId}, POST /v/{videoId}/action (re-click clears, else SetAction;
store enforces watched↔skipped exclusion), GET /healthz (no auth). Store ops
run as the configured UserID; Auth only gates.
- `tapir serve` wires store + StubAuth{Subject: cfg.UserID} + http.Server on
TAPIR_HTTP_ADDR (default :8080), graceful shutdown on signal. Handlers depend
only on web.Auth — Conductor swaps StubAuth → oidc.DexAuth at merge (one line
in cmdServe).
- Handler tests: real store (embedded-postgres) + StubAuth — list rows+state,
HTMX fragment vs full page, channel filter, detail highlights/takeaways,
404, action toggle+clear, no-JS redirect, bad-verb 400.
New dep: github.com/a-h/templ — the house default for typed server-rendered
HTML (CLAUDE.md stack, ui-spec.md §3). Generated code is committed so the
templ binary is build-time-optional.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds internal/web/oidc.DexAuth, the production web.Auth impl behind the seam
(ADR-011, docs/ui-spec.md §6). Standard Authorization Code flow against Dex:
- Routes() mounts /auth/login (state+nonce, redirect to authorize),
/auth/callback (code exchange, ID-token verify, nonce check, allowlist:
sub must equal Config.AllowedSubject else 403, set session, redirect /),
/auth/logout (clear session).
- Middleware redirects unauthenticated requests to /auth/login, slides the
session expiry on each authenticated request; /healthz and /auth/* bypass.
- CurrentUser resolves the principal from the session cookie.
- Sessions: server-side in-memory store (single Stage-0 replica) keyed by an
HMAC-SHA256 (HS256) signed, HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax cookie with a
short TTL + sliding refresh. State->nonce pending map is one-time + expiring
(replay/CSRF defense). Tokens are never logged.
Constructor New(ctx, Config, ...Option); the six-field Config (Issuer,
ClientID, ClientSecret, RedirectURL, SessionSecret, AllowedSubject) is what
cmd/tapir wires from TAPIR_OIDC_*/TAPIR_DEX_*/TAPIR_SESSION_SECRET/
TAPIR_ALLOWED_SUBJECT. Options (clock, TTL, insecure cookies) are test-only.
Tests use a fake OIDC issuer via httptest (discovery + JWKS + token endpoint
signing an RS256 ID token) — no live Dex: login 302s to authorize; callback
for the allowlisted sub sets a session and 302s to /; non-allowlisted sub 403;
middleware redirects unauthenticated and passes authenticated; logout clears;
plus expiry, tampered-cookie, and unknown-state cases.
Deps (per ADR-006 / ui-spec §6): adds github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 — the
homelab-standard OIDC lib, small, handles discovery + JWKS + ID-token
verification; pairs with the already-present golang.org/x/oauth2. go-jose/v4
(transitive via go-oidc) is used directly only in tests to sign the fake
issuer's tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements ports.Sink over Postgres (pgx/v5 + pgxpool, DSN from env per
estate convention). This is the primary sink (ADR-003) and the source of
the engine's durable, cross-restart dedup — the in-engine processed map is
process-lifetime only.
- Migrations (golang-migrate, NNN_name.up/down.sql per estate convention,
applied from an embedded FS on New): users, videos, transcripts,
summaries, sink_deliveries. Every user-owned table carries user_id
(Stage-0 per-user isolation promise, data-model.md). summaries has
UNIQUE(user_id, video_id) — at most one summary per video; highlights /
takeaways are jsonb.
- Deliver upserts the summary idempotently on (user_id, video_id)
(ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE) inside one tx with its sink_delivery row. Re-
delivering the same summary updates in place, never duplicates or errors.
- Dedup reads (store methods, not a new port): HasSummary(ctx,userID,
videoID) and SeenVideoIDs(ctx,userID) — both user_id-scoped, so one
user never sees another's videos.
summaries.video_id is intentionally not FK-constrained to videos at Stage 0:
the sink receives only a Summary, so the dedup key stands alone; video-row
persistence is the engine/source's concern, deferred.
Tested against a real in-process Postgres via embedded-postgres (real SQL:
constraints, ON CONFLICT, jsonb, user_id scoping) — no docker, no live
cluster, no creds, fully offline.
Deps: golang-migrate/migrate/v4 and jackc/pgx/v5 (runtime),
fergusstrange/embedded-postgres + stretchr/testify (test-only). go mod tidy
raised the go directive to 1.25.0 (minimum required by the dep graph;
estate elsewhere already runs 1.26.1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements ports.VideoSource against the YouTube Data API v3:
ListSubscriptions (paginated), NewVideos (recent per channel), and
captions-first FetchTranscript — an absent caption track yields
domain.SourceNone (not an error) per ADR-007, with no audio download
or speech-to-text.
OAuth is written fresh on golang.org/x/oauth2 (ADR-006, distinct from
ingestion's inbound MCP auth); the Google token endpoint is inlined to
avoid the heavy x/oauth2/google dep. The per-connection refresh token is
resolved through the SecretStore port from an opaque TokenSecretRef and
is never stored on the adapter or logged.
Unit-tested against an httptest server + fake SecretStore (no live
googleapis egress): subscriptions list/pagination, new-video detection,
captions present -> Source set, captions absent -> SourceNone no error,
and secret-ref resolution failure surfacing as an error.
oauth2 pinned to v0.30.0 to keep the go directive at 1.23.x (koala
runner), not the v0.36 line that requires a newer toolchain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8