Files
tapir/internal/auth/auth.go
T
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 2aad79b2a8
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feat(web): web-initiated YouTube OAuth connect flow (ADR-006)
Add GET /oauth/youtube/connect and /oauth/youtube/callback, mounted inside
the login + registration guard so CurrentUserID is always set and every
connection binds to the authenticated tapir user.

- connect: generate a per-user CSRF state (single-use, short TTL, bound to
  the user), redirect to Google consent with access_type=offline and
  prompt=consent so a refresh token comes back.
- callback: verify the state belongs to this user, exchange the code via the
  existing auth.Exchange, persist the refresh token under a PER-USER ref
  (web.YouTubeTokenRef = "youtube/<userID>/refresh_token") so tenants never
  collide, then UpsertConnection (provider=youtube, status=active). Any
  failure renders a clean error page and leaves no half-written state.

Reuses auth.Exchange and adds auth.AuthCodeURL (offline + consent) rather
than the CLI's listener/terminal flow (ADR-006: web flow, not CLI). The
ConnectHandler depends on a narrow web.Connections port, not the concrete
store. Wired in cmdServe only when YT client credentials are present;
TAPIR_YT_CONNECT_REDIRECT_URL configures the callback URL. Per-user token-ref
scheme documented in docs/homelab-integration.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 16:12:42 +02:00

188 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

// Package auth implements the interactive OAuth 2.0 authorization-code flow used
// by `tapir auth` to mint a YouTube refresh token for the single Stage-0 user.
// It is written fresh on golang.org/x/oauth2 (ADR-006): the ingestion repo's
// oauth package is inbound MCP server auth and unrelated to this outbound
// provider flow.
//
// The minted refresh token is persisted through the SecretStore port (the file
// store at Stage 0) and is never logged or returned to the caller. Only the
// opaque token ref crosses package boundaries afterward.
package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
)
// GoogleEndpoint is Google's OAuth2 endpoint, inlined to avoid the heavy
// golang.org/x/oauth2/google dependency for two URLs (mirrors the youtube
// adapter's choice).
var GoogleEndpoint = oauth2.Endpoint{
AuthURL: "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth",
TokenURL: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
}
// DefaultScopes request read access to subscriptions/search and the force-ssl
// scope the Data API captions endpoints require.
var DefaultScopes = []string{
"https://www.googleapis.com/auth/youtube.readonly",
"https://www.googleapis.com/auth/youtube.force-ssl",
}
// TokenWriter persists a secret value under an opaque ref. *secrets.FileStore
// satisfies it; tests use a fake. (The read side is ports.SecretStore.)
type TokenWriter interface {
Put(ref, value string) error
}
// Config wires the flow. Endpoint defaults to GoogleEndpoint when zero, so tests
// can point it at an httptest token server.
type Config struct {
ClientID string
ClientSecret string
RedirectURL string // e.g. "http://localhost:8080/callback"
Scopes []string
TokenRef string // SecretStore ref to persist the refresh token under
Endpoint oauth2.Endpoint
}
func oauthConfig(c Config) *oauth2.Config {
ep := c.Endpoint
if ep == (oauth2.Endpoint{}) {
ep = GoogleEndpoint
}
scopes := c.Scopes
if len(scopes) == 0 {
scopes = DefaultScopes
}
return &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: c.ClientID,
ClientSecret: c.ClientSecret,
RedirectURL: c.RedirectURL,
Scopes: scopes,
Endpoint: ep,
}
}
// AuthCodeURL builds the provider consent URL the web connect flow redirects to
// (internal/web). It reuses oauthConfig and pins access_type=offline + prompt=
// consent so Google returns a refresh token even on a repeat authorization —
// without one, Exchange would reject the result. state is the per-request CSRF
// token the caller binds to the user and verifies on the callback.
func AuthCodeURL(c Config, state string) string {
return oauthConfig(c).AuthCodeURL(state,
oauth2.AccessTypeOffline,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("prompt", "consent"))
}
// Exchange swaps an authorization code for a token and persists the refresh
// token through the writer. It errors if the provider returned no refresh token
// (e.g. consent was not forced with offline access), since without one the
// token is useless for the unattended run loop. The token is never logged.
func Exchange(ctx context.Context, c Config, secrets TokenWriter, code string) error {
conf := oauthConfig(c)
tok, err := conf.Exchange(ctx, code)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: exchange code: %w", err)
}
if tok.RefreshToken == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: provider returned no refresh token (re-consent with offline access)")
}
if err := secrets.Put(c.TokenRef, tok.RefreshToken); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: persist refresh token: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Run performs the full interactive flow: it binds a local listener on the
// redirect URL's host, prints the consent URL to out, waits for the provider's
// redirect (validating the state parameter), then exchanges the captured code
// and persists the refresh token. It blocks until the callback arrives, ctx is
// cancelled, or the listener fails.
func Run(ctx context.Context, c Config, secrets TokenWriter, out io.Writer) error {
conf := oauthConfig(c)
u, err := url.Parse(c.RedirectURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: parse redirect url %q: %w", c.RedirectURL, err)
}
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", u.Host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("auth: bind redirect listener on %q: %w", u.Host, err)
}
state, err := randomState()
if err != nil {
return err
}
type result struct {
code string
err error
}
resCh := make(chan result, 1)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc(u.Path, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query()
if e := q.Get("error"); e != "" {
http.Error(w, "authorization failed: "+e, http.StatusBadRequest)
resCh <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("auth: provider returned error %q", e)}
return
}
if q.Get("state") != state {
http.Error(w, "state mismatch", http.StatusBadRequest)
resCh <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("auth: state mismatch (possible CSRF)")}
return
}
code := q.Get("code")
if code == "" {
http.Error(w, "missing code", http.StatusBadRequest)
resCh <- result{err: fmt.Errorf("auth: redirect carried no code")}
return
}
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "Tapir: authorization received. You can close this tab.")
resCh <- result{code: code}
})
srv := &http.Server{Handler: mux}
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
defer func() { _ = srv.Shutdown(context.Background()) }()
// AccessTypeOffline + ApprovalForce make Google return a refresh token even
// on re-authorization; without them a repeat consent yields only an access
// token and Exchange would reject it.
authURL := conf.AuthCodeURL(state, oauth2.AccessTypeOffline, oauth2.ApprovalForce)
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "Open this URL to authorize Tapir, then return here:\n\n%s\n\n", authURL)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case res := <-resCh:
if res.err != nil {
return res.err
}
if err := Exchange(ctx, c, secrets, res.code); err != nil {
return err
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "Refresh token stored. You can now run `tapir run`.")
return nil
}
}
func randomState() (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("auth: generate state: %w", err)
}
return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
}