Files
tapir/internal/adapters/store/invitations.go
T
mathiasandClaude Opus 4.8 8b7ef07ba3 feat(store): invitations table + create/peek/claim methods
Stage-1 email onboarding: Mathias mints an invite, the recipient claims
it to set a Dex password. Invitations exist before their user, so the
table carries no user_id FK and is deliberately outside RLS — the
32-byte crypto-random token is the capability (single-use, time-boxed).

ClaimInvitation consumes atomically (UPDATE ... WHERE used_at IS NULL
... RETURNING) so concurrent claims of one token can't both succeed.
PeekInvitation validates the link for the form without consuming it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-03 23:12:40 +02:00

87 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package store
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)
// Invitations are NOT routed through withUser: an invitation exists before its
// user does, so there is no user_id to scope by and no authenticated context when
// one is minted (host CLI) or claimed (the public /invite handler). The token is
// the capability — single-use, time-boxed, crypto-random. The invitations table
// is deliberately outside RLS for the same reason (see migration 009).
// CreateInvitation mints a single-use invite for email, valid for ttl, and
// returns its token. The token is 32 bytes of crypto-random entropy, hex-encoded;
// it is the only secret a recipient needs to claim the invite.
func (s *Store) CreateInvitation(ctx context.Context, email string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
token, err := newInviteToken()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if _, err := s.pool.Exec(ctx,
`INSERT INTO invitations (email, token, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, NOW() + $3::interval)`,
email, token, ttl.String()); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("store: create invitation: %w", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// PeekInvitation returns the invited email for a token that is real, unexpired,
// and unused WITHOUT consuming it — the read the /invite form does to validate the
// link before showing the password fields. Returns ErrNotFound when the token is
// missing, expired, or already used. Use ClaimInvitation to consume.
func (s *Store) PeekInvitation(ctx context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
var email string
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT email FROM invitations
WHERE token = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > NOW()`,
token).Scan(&email)
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return "", ErrNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("store: peek invitation: %w", err)
}
return email, nil
}
// ClaimInvitation atomically consumes a valid invite and returns its email. The
// UPDATE ... WHERE used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > NOW() guarded by RETURNING
// makes the claim a single round-trip race-free check-and-set: two concurrent
// claims of the same token, only one updates a row, the other gets no rows and so
// ErrNotFound. Same ErrNotFound for missing/expired/already-used tokens.
func (s *Store) ClaimInvitation(ctx context.Context, token string) (string, error) {
var email string
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`UPDATE invitations
SET used_at = NOW()
WHERE token = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > NOW()
RETURNING email`,
token).Scan(&email)
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return "", ErrNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("store: claim invitation: %w", err)
}
return email, nil
}
// newInviteToken returns 32 bytes of crypto-random entropy, hex-encoded (64
// chars). Hex keeps the token URL-safe with no escaping in /invite/{token}.
func newInviteToken() (string, error) {
var b [32]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("store: invite token: %w", err)
}
return hex.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
}